PRINCETON,  N.  J. 


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Diman,  J.  Lewis  1831-1881. 
The  theistic  argument  as 
affected  by  recent  theorie^ 

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THE 


THEISTIC  ARGUMENT 


AS  AFFECTED  BY  RECENT  THEORIES 


A  COURSE  OF  LECTURES  DELIVERED  AT  THE  LOWELL 
INSTITUTE  IN  BOSTON 


J.  LEWIS  DIMAN,  D.  D. 

LATE  PROFESSOR  OF  HISTORY  AND   POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
IN   BROWN  UNIVERSITY 


BOSTON 

HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN  AND  COMPANY 

C&e  Htoermte  Ptreaa,  Camfcutoffe 

1881 


Copyright,  1881, 
Bv  HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN  &  CO. 

All  rights  reserved. 


The  Riverside  Press,  Cambridge : 
Stereotyped  and  Printed  by  H.  O.  Houghton  &  Company. 


XI 


A.CE. 


Professor  Diman,  the  author  of  this  volume, 
died,  after  a  short  illness,  on  the  3d  of  February, 
188 1.  From  the  time  of  his  acceptance  of  the 
Chair  of  History  and  Political  Economy  in  Brown 
University,  in  1864,  he  devoted  himself  chiefly  to 
historical  studies,  for  which  from  early  life  he  had 
shown  a  remarkable  aptitude.  His  enthusiasm  in 
this  department,  however,  and  the  brilliant  success 
which  he  attained  as  a  teacher,  did  not  dull  the  in- 
terest, which  he  had  likewise  early  manifested,  in 
Philosophy.  While  preparing  for  the  Christian 
ministry,  he  had  spent  two  years  in  Germany, 
where  he  numbered  among  his  instructors  Julius 
Miiller  and  Rothe,  Erdmann,  Ulrici,  and  Trende- 
lenburg. During  those  years  his  time  was  mainly 
given  to  the  study  of  Kant,  and  of  the  series  of 
philosophers  in  the  line  of  succession  from  him. 
While  a  Pastor,  and  after  he  became  a  Professor, 
the  problems  which  belong  to  metaphysics  and  the- 
ology in  common,  to  the  exploring  of  which  the 
marvelous  advance  of  natural  and  physical  science 
has  lent  a  new  stimulus,  continued  to  engage  his 
attention.      Indeed,  it  was  the  flavor  of   a  certain 


IV  PREFACE. 

speculative  element,  kept  within  due  bounds,  that 
imparted  a  peculiar  fascination  to  his  portrayal  of 
historical  persons  and  eras.  When,  therefore,  he 
was  invited  to  give  a  Course  of  Lectures  at  the 
Lowell  Institute,  in  the  spring  of  1880,  on  the 
foundations  of  Natural  Religion,  he  needed  no 
other  qualification  than  a  careful  review  of  the 
recent  literature  on  the  subject.  This  preparation 
was  conscientiously  made.  In  particular,  the  most 
prominent  writers,  as  Mill,  Spencer,  Huxley,  Dar- 
win, Tyndall,  who  have  dealt  directly  or  indirectly 
with  these  topics  from  points  of  view  more  or  less 
at  variance  with  prevalent  opinion,  he  examined 
afresh.  At  the  same  time  he  did  not  pass  by  the 
ablest  of  the  later  writers  in  defense  of  Theism. 
I  perceive  that  he  had  profited  especially  by  the 
perusal  of  Janet's  thorough  treatise  on  "  Final 
Causes,"  and  Professor  Flint's  excellent  volumes 
on  "  Theism  "and  "Anti-Theistic  Theories."  The 
result  of  his  reflections  and  researches  appears  on 
the  pages  which  follow. 

In  fulfilling  the  request  that  I  should  superin- 
tend the  publication  of  these  Lectures  of  a  dear 
and  most  valued  friend,  I  have  had  no  hesitation  in 
deciding  to  print  them  precisely  as  they  were  left  by 
the  author.  The  changes  of  phraseology  are  very 
few,  and  are  confined  almost  exclusively  to  such  ob- 
scurities or  slight  inaccuracies  of  expression  as  are 
incident  to  rapid  composition.  In  cases  where  the 
author  had  noted  in  an  abbreviated  form  the  title 


PREFACE.  V 

of  a  book  from  which  a  citation  is  drawn,  I  have 
made  the  reference  more  full  and  exact.  In  other 
cases  where  it  appeared  desirable  to  add  references 
not  indicated  at  all  in  the  manuscript,  I  have  en- 
closed them  in  brackets.  Had  Professor  Diman 
himself  prepared  these  discourses  for  the  press,  he 
might  have  curtailed  certain  passages  and  expanded 
others,  have  fortified  his  argument  anew  at  various 
points,  and  have  made  the  whole  volume,  both  as  to 
matter  and  style,  more  closely  conformed  to  his 
high  standard  of  literary  work. 

At  the  same  time  I  do  not  feel  that  the  book 
needs  any  apology.  It  will  be  found  to  be  distin- 
guished from  most  of  the  recent  publications  on  the 
subject  by  its  freedom  from  technical  language,  and 
by  the  luminous  treatment  which  is  fitted  to  com- 
mend it  to  the  favor  of  thoughtful  persons  not  spe- 
cially addicted  to  metaphysical  reading.  It  is  marked 
by  the  elevation  and  grace  which,  as  they  were  part 
and  parcel  of  the  author's  mind,  could  not  fail  to 
enter  into  all  the  productions  of  his  pen.  The  dis- 
cussion is  conducted  throughout  with  absolute  can- 
dor. Nowhere  is  there  an  attempt  to  forestall  the 
judgment  of  the  reader  by  raising  a  prejudice 
against  an  opinion  that  is  to  be  controverted.  The 
doctrines  and  the  reasoning  of  adversaries  are  fully 
and  even  forcibly  stated.  Vituperation  is  never  sub- 
stituted for  evidence.  Nothing  in  the  way  of  objec- 
tion that  deserves  consideration  is  passed  by.  The 
entire  field   suggested  by   the  theme  is  traversed. 


VI  PREFACE. 

Whatever  dissent  may  arise  in  the  reader's  mind  in 
reference  to  any  of  the  positions  which  are  taken  by 
Professor  Diman,  or  the  reasons  by  which  they  are 
maintained,  there  can  be,  as  I  believe,  among  com- 
petent judges  but  one  opinion  as  to  the  acuteness 
and  vigor,  as  well  as  the  learning  and  fairness,  with 
which  the  argument  is  pursued. 

George  P.  Fisher. 
New  Haven,  May  19,  1881. 


CONTENTS. 


LECTURE   I. 

PAGE 

Present  Aspects  of  the  Problem i 


LECTURE   II. 
The  Relativity  of  Knowledge 35 

LECTURE  in. 
Cause  and  Force .67 

LECTURE  IV. 
The  Argument  from  Order 99 

LECTURE   V. 
The  Argument  from  Design 133 

LECTURE  VI. 
Evolution  and  Final  Cause 168 

LECTURE  VII. 
Immanent  Finality .  201 

LECTURE  VIII. 

Conscience  and  a  Moral  Order  .  ...  234 


Vlll  CONTENTS. 

LECTURE   IX. 
History  and  a  Moral  Purpose 265 

LECTURE  X. 
Personality  and  the  Infinite 297 

LECTURE  XL 
The  Alternative  Theories 329 

LECTURE  XII. 
The  Inferences  from  Theism 361 


X 

THE   THEISTIC   ARGUMENT. 


LECTURE   I. 

PRESENT    ASPECTS    OF    THE    PROBLEM. 

In  beginning  a  course  of  lectures,  like  the  present, 
I  am  well  aware  that  I  lay  myself  open  to  what  may 
seem  a  grave  objection.  Are  not  the  questions,  it 
may  be  asked,  which  will  claim  our  consideration, 
as  old  as  human  thought,  and  have  they  not  been 
explored  to  the  utmost  limit  to  which  thought  can 
hope  to  go  ?  Can  anything  be  said  that  has  not 
been  said  already  ?  In  other  directions  of  inquiry 
we  may  add  to  the  sum  of  human  knowledge,  but 
when  we  reach  the  line  that  severs  the  seen  from 
the  unseen,  the  natural  from  the  supernatural,  are 
we  not  treading  an  eternal  circle,  and  only  echoing 
the  opinions,  while  we  modify  the  phrases,  of  earlier 
thinkers  ?  As  respects  the  grounds  of  religious  be- 
lief, the  philosopher  of  the  present  day,  it  is  claimed, 
has  no  advantage  over  the  sages  of  antiquity.  Ad- 
vance in  knowledge  has  in  no  way  affected  the  force 
of  the  argument.  "  The  reasoning,"  says  Macaulay, 
"by  which  Socrates,  in  Xenophon's  hearing,  con- 
futed the  little  atheist  Aristodemus,  is  exactly  the 
reasoning  of  Paley's  natural  theology.  Socrates 
makes  precisely  the  same  use  of  the  statues  of  Poly- 


2  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

cletus  and  the  pictures  of  Zeuxis  which  Paley  makes 
of  the  watch."  "  Natural  theology,  then,  is  not  a 
progressive  science."  2 

As  with  many  of  Macaulay's  maxims,  there  is  a 
sense  in  which  this  statement  is  true,  but  a  very  im- 
portant sense  in  which  it  mistakes  the  truth.  No 
one  will  deny  that  the  great  problems  of  natural 
theology  are  the  same  to-day  that  they  were  in  the 
days  of  yore.  Yet  any  one  but  slightly  versed  in  the 
history  of  opinions  must  equally  admit  that  the  at- 
titude of  the  human  mind,  with  reference  to  these 
problems,  has  been  marked  by  many  changes.  It  is, 
indeed,  only  a  most  superficial  view  which  affirms 
that  history  repeats  itself.  True,  as  we  study  cer- 
tain aspects  of  the  past,  we  are  struck  with  what 
seem  the  marvelous  resemblances  to  our  own  time. 
In  ancient  states  there  were  periods  of  youth  and 
periods  of  decline,  and  as  we  turn  the  pages  of  their 
annals  what  we  have  been  used  to  look  upon  as  an- 
cient becomes  strangely  modern.  Yet,  after  all,  it 
is  only  analogy  that  we  can  trace,,  and  not  a  perfect 
parallel.  For  the  conditions  of  successive  epochs 
can  never  be  precisely  the  same.  Beneath  an  ap- 
parent likeness  is  veiled  an  essential  difference.  As 
little  in  its  opinions,  as  in  its  dress,  does  one  age 
ever  reproduce  another. 

In  the  following  discussion  it  will  be  my  aim  to 
show  how  the  great  problems  which  make  up  what  is 
called  natural  religion,  —  the  problem  of  the  exist- 
ence of  a  Supreme  Being,  of  a  divine  order  in  nature 
and  in  human  life,  of  the  immortality  and  moral  re- 
sponsibility of  man,  —  have  been  affected  by  some  of 

1  Macaulay,  "  Ranke's  History  of  the   Popes"  {Essays,  Am.  ed., 
vol.  iv.,  pp.  303,  204). 


PRESENT  ASPECTS  OF  THE  PROBLEM.  3 

the  more  recent  phases  of  human  thought.  The  in- 
quiry, at  best,  under  the  limitations  imposed  by  a 
course  of  lectures  like  the  present,  can  only  be  in- 
complete. A  full  examination  of  any  of  the  ques- 
tions which  such  an  investigation  covers  would  de- 
mand a  minuteness  of  treatment  intolerable  to  the 
most  patient  and  attentive  hearer.  I  can  only  hope 
to  single  out  the  more  salient  aspects  of  my  subject, 
and  shall  willingly  forego  any  praise  for  elegance 
of  treatment  if  I  can  succeed,  by  the  plainest  and 
most  simple  language,  in  setting  my  subject-matter 
clearly  before  you.  The  ascertainment  of  truth  is 
my  single  aim.  In  the  presence  of  the  solemn  mys- 
teries which  we  are  about  to  probe  all  lesser  con- 
siderations should  be  forgotten. 

One  of  the  greatest  thinkers  of  all  time  has  said 
that  the  business  of  philosophy  is  to  answer  three  1 
questions  :  What  can  I  know?  What  ought  I  to  do  ?| 
and,  For  what  may  I  hope  ?  If  I  may  venture  to 
modifylhis  sentence,  I  would  make  it  read,  not  the 
business  of  pJiilosopJiy,  but  the  business  of  life.  The 
problems  here  presented  are  not  problems  for  the 
professed  student  alone,  but  problems  which  present 
themselves  to  every  man,  and,  if  we  consider  them 
carefully,  it  is  plain  that  they  virtually  resolve  them- 
selves into  a  single  one.  Evidently  the  questions 
'what  I  ought  to  do,'  and  'what  I  may  hope  for,'  can 
only  be  answered  when  I  have  answered  the  prior 
question,  What  can  I  know  ?  For  "  rational  expec- 
tation and  moral  action  are  based  upon  belief,"  and 
belief  is  the  result  of  knfcledge.  The  grounds  and 
the  boundaries  of  knowledge  belong  to  a  distinct  field 
of  inquiry,  but  that  knowledge,  on  whatever  basis  it 
may  be  found  to  rest,  is  the  condition  of  responsible 


4  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

action  and  of  intelligent  belief,  seems  a  principle  so 
evident  that  it  needs  only  to  be  stated.  The  ques- 
tion that  first  confronts  us,  then,  is,  What  can  I 
know  ? 

On  the  far-reaching  scope  of  this  inquiry  I  surely 
need  not  enlarge.  It  is  the  question  which  first 
confronts  us  ;  and  it  is  the  question  which  gives 
every  other  question  its  meaning.  The  questions 
which,  as  a  rational  being,  I  am  forced  to  put  to 
myself,  '  Whence  ami?''  For  what  was  I  made  ? '  and 
'Whither  am  I  going?' — are  these  questions  which 
I  have  a  right  to  ask,  questions  to  which  I  may  ex- 
pect an  answer  ;  or  do  they  lie  outside  the  boundaries 
of  any  knowledge  to  which  I  can  reach,  and  are  they 
simply  insoluble  enigmas  which  sober  reflection  will 
leave  in  the  region  of  dream-land  ?  The  question 
whether  I  myself  am  simply  the  passing  effect  of  an 
indefinite  succession  of  physical  forces,  a  single  step 
in  the  unresting  evolution  of  a  purely  natural  order,  a 
momentary  pause  between  an  unfathomable  past  and 
an  unfathomable  future,  a  helpless  link  in  a  chain 
of  consequences  whose  beginning  and  end  stretch 
alike  beyond  the  limit  of  legitimate  inquiry ;  or 
whether  I  am  endued  with  the  attributes  of  a  moral 
being ;  whether  I  am  related  to  a  supernatural  order  ; 
whether  I  can  by  conscious  volition  control  my  own 
acts  ;  and  whether  I  am  held  to  a  responsibility 
which  invests  my  brief  mortal  life  with  an  immor- 
tal import,  —  this  question,  whatever  form  it  may 
take,  evidently  throws  every  other  question  of  life 
into  insignificance.  Until  this  is  answered  all  other 
questions  are  of  little  account.  I  may  seek  to  oc- 
cupy myself  with  the  study  of  the  external  world ; 
I  may  search  out  the  subtle  properties  of  matter ; 


PRESENT  ASPECTS  OF  THE  PROBLEM.  5 

I  may  analyze  the  mysterious  forces  whose  restless 
movement  masks  itself  behind  the  perplexing  phe- 
nomena of  physical  nature  ;  I  may  note  the  won- 
drous order  of  the  heavens  ;  delight  myself  with  the 
evidence  of  an  ever-present  law  comprehending  the 
dust  in  the  sunbeam,  and  the  constellations  set  in 
the  flaming  walls  of  space  ;  or,  may  busy  myself 
with  the  study  of  man,  —  trace  back  his  history  to 
its  remote  and  unrecorded  beginning,  gather  the 
proofs  of  his  upward  progress  from  age  to  age,  strive 
to  elicit  from  his  supreme  achievements  the  secret 
of  his  restless  aspiration,  seek  to  comfort  myself 
with  the  prospect  of  his  future  perfectibility,  to  trace 
the  increasing  purpose  that  runs  through  his  years, 
—  but  I  come  back  again  unsatisfied  to  the  haunt- 
ing question,  '  What  am  I  myself,  what  do  I  know,  1 
what  have  I  to  do  ? '  Nothing  else  profits  if  I  can-j 
not  answer  this. 

While  these  problems  are  as  old  as  philosophy 
itself,  they  have  never  been  presented  with  the  dis- 
tinctness, and  never  been  urged  with  the  searching 
force  with  which  they  are  clothed  at  the  present 
hour.  The  question  as  to  the  nature  and  limits  of 
human  knowledge  is  the  one  that  crops  out  of  all 
the  philosophical  and  scientific  discussion  of  the 
day.  It  is  the  underlying  granite  that  shows  itself 
whenever  the  superficial  strata  are  disturbed.  And 
it  is  not  a  matter  for  regret,  but  rather  for  congratu- 
lation, that  the  controversies  of  the  day  have  con- 
verged to  this  point.  For  this  is  the  final  issue  on 
which  lesser  difference  of  opinion  turns ;  and  it  can 
but  be  regarded  as  a  wholesome  symptom  that  the 
very  school  which  so  arrogantly  discarded  meta- 
physics has  been   brought  at   last  to 


6  THE    THE  I  STIC  ARGUMENT. 

clearly  the  great  truth  that  even  physical  inquiries 
result  in  metaphysical  principles,  and  that  the 
newest  conclusions  of  science  carry  us  back  to  a  re- 
gion where  something  more  than  science  must  be 
called  into  request.  The  science  simply  of  natural 
things  rests  on  fundamental  truths  which  are  the 
first  principles  of  the  whole  edifice  of  human  knowl- 
edge. The  boundary  line  which  divides  legitimate 
and  positive  knowledge  from  empty  theory  and  as- 
sumption was  first  traced  out  by  philosophers.  If 
Descartes  laid  the  foundation  of  modern  philosophi- 
cal criticism  by  his  inquiry  into  the  nature  of  cer- 
tainty, it  was  the  more  sober  genius  of  Locke  which 
taught  the  busy  mind  of  man  "  to"  be  more  cautious 
in  meddling  with  things  exceeding  its  comprehen- 
sion ;  to  stop  when  it  was  at  the  utmost  extent  of  its 
tether ;  and  to  sit  down  in  quiet  ignorance  of  those 
things  which  upon  examination  are  found  to  be  be- 
yond the  reach  of  our  capacities."  "We  should  not 
then,"  he  says,  "  be  so  forward,  out  of  an  affectation 
of  universal  knowledge,  to  raise  questions  and  per- 
plex ourselves  and  others  with  disputes  about  things 
to  which  our  understandings  are  not  suited,  and  of 
which  we  cannot  frame  in  our  minds  any  clear  and 
distinct  perception,  or  whereof,  as  it  has  perhaps 
too  often  happened,  we  have  not  any  notion  at  all. 
We  shall  not  have  much  reason  to  complain  of  the 
narrowness  of  our  minds  if  we  will  but  employ  them 
about  what  may  be  of  use  to  us.  Our  business  here 
is  not  to  know  all  tilings,  but  those  which  concern 
our  conduct."  : 

The  conclusion  from  which  Locke  was  saved  by 
his  strong  sense  and  his  sincere  religious  faith  did 

1  Quoted  by  Huxley,  Hume,  p.  54. 


PRESENT  ASPECTS  OF  THE   PROBLEM.  J 

not  appall  the  more  subtle  genius  of  Hume.  In  re- 
gions where  the  English  philosopher  only  recom- 
mended caution,  his  Scottish  follower  boldly  advo- 
cated skepticism.  Locke  has  been  accused  of  in- 
consistency. Attacking  the  theory  of  innate  ideas, 
it  has  been  said  that  he  yet  clings  to  conceptions 
vitally  associated  with  that  theory.  Thus  asserting 
that  all  our  knowledge  comes  through  the  senses,  he 
allows  that  we  yet  know  of  a  being  who  cannot  be 
manifested  through  the  senses.  No  such  complaint 
has  been  brought  against  Hume.  Unlike  Locke,  he 
was  free  from  theological  prepossessions.  He  was 
content  to  follow  logic  wherever  it  led  him.  He 
completes  the  critical*  movement  which  Locke  be- 
gan and  did  not  push  to  its  legitimate  results,  and 
from  him  we  may  date  the  definite  abandonment  of 
conceptions  which  up  to  his  time  had  ruled  almost 
without  question.  He  assailed  alike  the  old  theory 
of  perception  and  the  old  theory  of  causation,  and 
the  result  was  complete  uncertainty  as  to  the  ulti- 
mate grounds  alike  of  human  knowledge  and  human 
belief. 

Under  the  name  of  "  mitigated  skepticism,"  he 
advocates  the  limitation  of  our  faculties  to  such 
subjects  as  are  best  adapted  to  the  narrow  capacity 
of  human  understanding.  "  The  imagination  of 
man,"  he  says,  "  is  naturally  sublime,  delighted  with 
whatever  is  remote  and  extraordinary,  and  running 
without  control  into  the  most  distant  parts  of  space 
and  time,  in  order  to  avoid  the  objects  which  cus- 
tom has  rendered  too  familiar  to  it.  A  correct  judg- 
ment observes  a  contrary  method,  and,  avoiding  all 
distant  and  high  inquiries,  confines  itself  to  common 
Hfe,  and  to  such  subjects  as  fell  under  daily  practice 


8  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

and  experience,  leaving  the  more  sublime  topics  to 
the  embellishments  of  poets  and  orators,  or  to  the 
arts  of  priests  and  politicians.  While  we  cannot 
give  a  satisfactory  reason  why  we  believe,  after  a 
thousand  experiments,  that  a  stone  will  fall,  or  fire 
burn,  can  we  ever  satisfy  ourselves  concerning  any 
determination  which  we  may  form  with  regard  to 
the  origin  of  worlds,  and  the  situation  of  nature  from 
and  to  eternity."  1  The  only  method  of  freeing  the 
mind  from  these  useless  questions  was  such  an  an- 
alysis of  its  powers  as  would  show  that  it  was  un- 
fitted to  solve  them. 

No  fact  in  modern  literary  history,  it  seems  to 
me,  is  more  remarkable  than  the  revival  of  the  phi- 
losophy of  Hume.  In  his  own  time  his  influence 
was  not  widely  felt.  The  pages  of  his  autobiogra- 
phy are  sprinkled  with  mortifying  admissions  of  the 
meagre  attention  awarded  to  his  works  at  the  time 
of  their  publication.  His  ruling  ambition  was  love 
of  literary  fame,  and  this  reward,  in  the  direction 
that  he  most  coveted  it,  —  that  of  metaphysical  in- 
quiry,—  he  did  not  succeed  in  winning.  "  Never," 
lie  says,  "  was  literary  attempt  more  unfortunate 
than  my  'Treatise  of  Human  Nature.'"  And  years 
after  his  death  one  of  his  own  countrymen,  Sir 
James  Mackintosh,  says  of  his  system,  "  Universal 
skepticism  involves  a  contradiction  in  terms.  It  is 
a  belief  that  there  can  be  no  belief.  It  is  an  at- 
tempt of  the  mind  to  act  without  its  structure  and 
by  other  laws  than  those  to  which  its  nature  has 
subjected  its  operations.  To  reason  without  assent- 
ing to  the  principles  on  which  reasoning  is  founded 
is  not  unlike  an  effort  to  feel  without  nerves,  or  to 

1  Huxley,  Hume,  p.  55. 


PRESENT  ASPECTS  OF  THE  PROBLEM.  9 

move  without  muscles."1  And  almost  in  our  own 
day  a  later  historian  of  philosophy,  Morell,2  writes, 
"  The  philosophy  of  Hume,  as  a  whole,  originated  and 
perished  with  himself.  A  more  partial  and  less  dar- 
ing skepticism  might,  probably,  have  gained  many 
followers  ;  but  it  is  the  inevitable  result  of  every 
system  professing  universal  unbelief  to  destroy  it-  y 
self."  It  has  been  reserved  for  our  own  time  to  ^ 
assign  to  Hume  a  wholly  different  position  in  the 
history  of  thought,  and  to  recognize  him  as  one  I 
whose  principles  have  proved  the  most  fertile  seeds  j 
in  the  hot-bed  of  modern  opinion.  His  skepticism 
marks  one  of  the  great  turning-points  in  modern 
speculation.  His  reasonings  respecting  the  ques- 
tion of  the  existence  of  God  are  commended  as  the 
single  example  in  our  literature,  until  very  recent 
times,  of  a  passionless  and  searching  examination  of 
that  great  problem.  He  is  praised  for  having  un- 
flinchingly inquired  into  the  profoundest  of  all  ques- 
tions, and  of  having  dared  to  give  the  result  of  his 
inquiries  without  fear  or  favor.  And,  with  some 
criticism  of  subordinate  parts  of  his  system,  its 
strain  and  method  receive  unqualified  approval 
from  his  latest  admiring  biographer.  "  One  can  but 
suspect,"  says  Huxley,  "  that  his  shadowy  and  in- 
consistent theism  was  the  expression  of  his  desire  . 
to  rest  in  a  state  of  mind  which  distinctly  excluded 
regation,  while  it  included  as  little  as  possible  of 
affirmation  respecting  a  problem  which  he  felt  to  be 
hopelessly  insoluble."  3 

1  [Sir  J.  Mackintosh,  "  Dissertation,"  etc.,  Miscellaneous   Works, 
(London,  1846),  vol.  i.,  p.  137.] 

2  [J.  D.  Morell,  An  Historical  and  Critical  Review  of  the  Speculative 
Philosophy  of  Europe  in  the  Nineteenth  Century,  2  ed.,  vol.  i.,  p.  3S3-] 

3  Huxley,  Hume,  p.  155. 


IO  THE    THE  I  STIC  ARGUMENT 

Hume's  philosophy  did  not,  then,  perish  with  him. 
On  the  contrary,  of  no  great  English  thinker  may  it 
be  more  truly  said  that  he  lives  in  the  thought  of  the 
present  day.  His  precise  conclusions  on  some  points 
may  not  be  accepted,  and  in  some  instances  may 
even  be  forgotten.  Those  who  applaud  his  max- 
ims seem  not  always  to  remember  that  he  was  not 
less  a  skeptic  in  philosophy  than  in  theology,  and 
that  if  he  calls  in  question  the  validity  of  the  reason- 
ing by  which  we  seek  to  establish  the  divine  exis- 
tence, he  just  as  much  throws  doubt  upon  our  belief 
in  the  invariable  order  of  the  universe.  It  is  not  his 
method  so  much  as  his  spirit  and  temper  that  make 
him  so  acceptable  to  the  modern  mind.  He  is  the 
recognized  prophet  of  that  new  dispensation  which 
finds  so  many  representatives  in  the  science  and  in 
the  literature  of  the  present  day ;  which  holds  that, 
respecting  the  greatest  problems  and  ultimate  issues 
of  human  life,  we  have  no  means  of  arriving  at  any 
conclusions,  and  that  it  is  the  part  of  wisdom  to 
banish  them  from  sight,  and  busy  ourselves  with 
what  lies  within  our  sphere,  seeking  our  highest  re- 
ward in  our  own  improvement,  or  in  the  future 
growth  of  the  race.  There  is  a  passage  in  one  of 
the  letters  of  Goethe  that  so  exactly  reflects  this 
temper  that  I  may  quote  it  here.  Writing  to  Knebel, 
he  says,  "  The  natural  sciences  are  so  human,  so 
true,  that  I  wish  every  one  luck  who  occupies  him- 
self with  them.  They  teach  us  that  the  greatest,  the 
most  mysterious,  and  the  most  magical  phenomena, 
take  place  openly,  orderly,  simply,  unmagically  ;  they 
must  finally  quench  the  thirst  of  poor  ignorant  man 
for  the  dark  extraordinary,  by  showing  him  that  the 
extraordinary  lies  so  near,  so  clear,  so  familiar,  and 


PRESENT  ASPECTS  OF  THE  PROBLEM.  \  \ 

so  determinately  true.  I  daily  beg  my  good  genius 
to  keep  me  from  all  other  observation  and  learning, 
and  guide  me  always  in  the  calm  definite  path  which 
the  student  of  nature  has  to  tread."  His  long  career 
was  the  realization  of  this  ideal.  What  was  sore  and 
and  weary  in  life,  what  was  humiliating  in  his  own 
experience,  he  resolutely  put  aside  ;  neither  the 
wrongs  which  his  own  selfishness  inflicted  nor  the 
woes  of  his  unhappy  country  could  turn  him  from 
the  "calm  definite  path"  in  which  he  was  resolved 
to  tread.  To  make  the  most  of  himself  was  his  con- 
stant aim.  Closing  his  eyes  to  the  perplexing  prob- 
lems and  tormenting  mysteries  of  life,  he  dedicated 
his  whole  strength  to  the  knowable  and  the  attaina- 
ble and  gave  up  all  wild  desire  for  what  lay  beyond. 
The  theory  of  nescience,  or,  in  other  words,  the 
doctrine  that  the  limit  of  human  knowledge  is  the 
investigation  of  the  laws  of  phenomena,  and  that 
all  inquiry  into  their  ultimate  causes  is  illegitimate, 
defended  with  so  much  acuteness  by  Hume  on 
purely  metaphysical  grounds,  has  derived  an  im- 
mense impulse  in  our  own  day  from  its  supposed 
coincidence  with  the  conclusions  of  physical  science. 
This  is,  in  fact,  the  grand  characteristic  of  the  specu- 
lative thought  of  the  present  time.  Metaphysics  has 
been  transmuted  into  science,  and  what  was  for- 
merly the  subtle  speculation  of  abstract  thinkers 
now  claims  to  rest  on  the  positive  basis  of  reasoned 
truth.  As  a  result,  the  doctrine  has  gained  a  sudden 
and  wide  acceptance.  It  has  passed  from  the  hands 
of  the  recluse  thinker  to  the*  lecture  platform  and 
the  pages  of  the  popular  review.  The  brilliant  dis- 
coveries of  modern  science  are  supposed  to  be  ar- 
rayed   on    its    side,    and    it    is    presented    to    the 


12  THE   THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT 

world  in  alliance  with  the  most  distinctive  and  most 
admired  intellectual  tendencies  of  modern  society. 
The  most  eloquent  of  scientific  teachers  have  uttered 
this  as  their  final  word. 

Thus  Hume  asserted  that  "  what  we  call  a  mind 
is  nothing  but  a  heap  or  collection  of  different  per- 
ceptions, united  together  by  certain  relations,  and 
supposed,  though  falsely,  to  be  endued  with  a  per- 
fect simplicity  and  identity."  A  modern  school, 
insisting  that  psychology  must  be  based  simply  on 
physiology,  have  developed  this  idea,  and  by  bring- 
ing mental  laws  under  the  more  general  physical 
laws  of  correlation,  conservation,  and  evolution,  have 
deduced  the  will  from  nervous  force,  and  have  at  last 
reached  the  startling  conclusion  that  thought,  mem- 
ory, reason,  conscience,  all  that  has  shaped  itself 
through  successive  generations  in  social  forms,  in 
art,  in  philosophy,  in  religion,  many  ages  ago  was 
latent  in  a  fiery  cloud.  In  this  view  the  human 
will,  no  longer  free,  is  reduced  to  the  resultant 
force  of  a  predetermined  organization,  transmitted 
from  generation  to  generation  with  a  cumulative 
power.  The  practical  conclusion  does  not  differ 
from  that  reached  by  the  Scottish  philosopher,  but 
the  grounds  on  which  the  conclusion  rests  seem  to 
have  received  from  this  alliance  with  scientific  re- 
sults an  enormous  reenforcement. 

Again,  Hume  threw  doubt  upon  all  reasoning 
from  external  nature  in  proof  of  a  first  cause.  He 
was  logically  forced  to  admit  the  self-existence  of 
the  phenomenal  universe.  Still  he  was  forced  to 
this  admission  on  purely  metaphysical  grounds.  No 
scientific  data  existed  in  the  eighteenth  century 
which  could  be  urged  in  support  of  such  a  theory. 


PRESENT  ASPECTS  OF   THE   PROBLEM.  1 3 

With  the  physical  theories  then  accepted  it  may  be 
questioned  whether  any  more  satisfactory  solution 
of  the  complexity  and  harmony  everywhere  so  con- 
spicuous in  the  material  world  was  possible  than  the 
hypothesis  of  intelligence.     But,  in  our  own  time, 
physical  theory  has    been   completely  transformed, 
and  to  many  scientists  the  doctrine  of  the  self-ex- 
istence of  the  universe  seems  capable  of  scientific 
proof.    The  acceptance  of  the  principle  that  energy 
is   indestructible,   that   the  amount  of  force  in  the 
universe  is  never  greater  and  never  less,  and  that 
the  endless  transformations  of  material  things  are 
but  the  shapes  this  masking  spirit  wears,  supplies  us 
with    a   theory    which  renders  needless,  we  are  as- 
sured, any  further  inquiry  into  an  ultimate  cause. 
Thus  we  reach  the  same  practical  result  that  Hume 
reached,  but  we  reach  it  in  a  different  way,  and  sci- 
ence becomes  the  handmaid  of  philosophy  in  teach- 
ing that  the  rational  use  of  our  intellectual  faculties 
lies  in  confining  ourselves  to  the  realm  of  the  sen- 
sible, and  in  relegating  to  the  land  of  dreams  all 
that  lies  beyond.     The  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of 
knowledge  is  held  to  preclude  us  from  either  affirm- 
ing or  denying  anything  that  lies  outside  the  bounds 
of  rigid  scientific  demonstration.     In  the  words  of 
one  of  its  most  eminent  representatives,  this  doctrine 
teaches   "that  we  have  no  knowledge  of  anything 
but  phenomena,  and  our  knowledge  of  phenomena  is 
relative,  not  absolute.     We  know  not  the  essence, 
nor  the  real  mode  of  production,   of  any  fact,  but* 
only  its  relations  to  other  facts  in  the  way  of  succes- 
sion  or  similitude.     These    relations   are  constant, 
that  is,  always  the  same  in  the  same  circumstances. 
The  constant  resemblances  which  bind  phenomena 


14  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

together  are  termed  their  laws.  All  phenomena, 
without  exception,  are  governed  by  invariable  laws, 
with  which  no  volitions,  either  natural  or  supernatu- 
ral, interfere.  The  essential  nature  of  phenomena, 
and  their  ultimate  causes,  whether  efficient  or  final, 
are  unknown  and  inscrutable  to  us."  : 

The  appalling  array  of  consequences  which  are 
involved  in  the  unqualified  acceptance  of  this  doc- 
trine cannot  be  fully  realized  unless  we  consider 
them  a  little  in  detail.  And,  here,  let  me  say  that 
nothing  is  further  from  my  thought  than  the  wish 
to  cast  reproach  upon  any  system  of  thought  by 
seeking  to  deduce  consequences  not  fairly  involved 
in  it.  In  philosophical  discussion  we  deal  with  rea- 
soned truth,  and  the  truth  or  the  falsity  of  any  the- 
ory cannot  be  established  by  misrepresentation.  I 
have  no  other  purpose  than  to  trace  clearly  the  logi- 
cal inferences  which  follow  from  the  acceptance  of 
the  proposition  that  the  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of 
knowledge  precludes  us  from  either  affirming  or  de- 
nying that  anything  exists  beyond  the  region  of 
investigation  which  science,  in  the  sense  of  veri- 
fying facts  which  rest  on  the  testimony  of  the  senses, 
includes.  It  will  be  only  necessary  for  me  to  sum 
up  the  past  admissions  of  some  of  the  recognized 
representatives  of  this  theory.  As  we  pass  through 
the  dreary  desert  to  which  they  invite  us,  no  rhetor- 
ical phrases  will  be  needed  to  make  us  more  con- 
scious of  the  fact  that  we  are  wandering  in  a  region 
of  desolation  and  death. 

According,  then,  to  this  view,  the  notion  that  the 
origin  of  things  admits  of  being  explained  by  the 
theory  of  theism  any  better  than  by  the  theory  of 

1  Mill,  quoted  by  Bowen,  Modern  Philosophy,  p.  266. 


PRESENT  ASPECTS  OF  THE  PROBLEM.  I  5 

atheism  must  be  dismissed  as  conspicuously  absurd ; 
the  argument  that  the  human  heart  requires  a  God 
is  invalid,  since  even  could  such  an  inward  necessity 
be  demonstrated  beyond  a  doubt,  far  from  proving, 
it  would  not  even  render  probable,  any  correspond- 
ing external  existence.  And  if  even  theistic  aspira- 
tions are  held  to  point  to  God  as  their  explanatory 
cause,  the  argument  could  only  be  admitted  when 
the  possibility  of  any  explanation  from  mere  natural 
causes  had  been  excluded.  So  the  argument  from 
an  intuitive  belief  must  be  given  up,  since  if  the  be- 
lief were  real  it  would  only  apply  to  an  individual 
case,  while  it  is  certain  that,  for  the  vast  majority  of 
the  race,  such  is  not  the  fact.  And  so  far  as  relates 
to  the  argument  from  a  first  cause,  it  would  seem 
that  our  experience,  to  which  we  are  indebted  for 
the  idea  of  cause,  instead  of  furnishing  an  argument 
for  a  first  cause  is  repugnant  to  it,  and  that  the  very 
essence  of  causation,  as  it  exists  within  the  limits  of 
our  knowledge,  is  incompatible  with  an  absolute  and 
uncaused  cause. 

Proceeding  further,  we  find  that  the  argument  for 
the  divine  existence  derived  from  the  existence  of 
mind  is  as  little  worthy  of  attention.  This  argument 
consists  in  the  reflection  that  trie  existence  of  our 
own  intelligence  is  the  most  certain  fact  that  our 
experience  supplies,  and  one  that  demands  an  ade- 
quate cause  for  its  explanation,  and  that  such  a  cause 
can  only  be  found  in  some  other  intelligence.  But 
to  this  it  is  replied  that  there  is  no  warrant  for  the 
assertion  that  mind  must  be  either  self-existing  or 
caused  by  another  mind.  What  we  call  matter  and 
force  are  to  all  appearances  eternal,  and  so  far  as 
experience  goes,  mind  is  invariably  associated  with 


1 6  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

highly  organized  matter  and  distribution  of  force, 
and  all  results  of  science  strengthen  the  conclusion 
that  the  grade  of  intelligence  is  invariably  associated 
with  a  corresponding  grade  of  cerebral  development. 
It  is  nothing  to  the  point  to  assert  that  it  is  incon- 
ceivable that  matter  and  motion  should  produce  con- 
sciousness, since  the  problem  confessedly  surpasses 
thought.  While,  lastly,  the  argument  from  the  sup- 
posed freedom  of  the  will,  and  the  existence  of  the 
moral  sense,  is  negatived  by  the  theory  of  evolution 
and  by  the  new  ethics  to  which  evolution  has  given 
birth. 

The  argument  from  design,  we  are  further  told, 
affords  us  no  more  satisfactory  grounds  for  proving 
the  divine  existence,  since  we  have  no  means  of 
ascertaining  the  subjective  psychology  of  that  Su- 
preme Mind  whose  existence  the  argument  is  meant 
to  demonstrate.  Apparent  intellectual  adaptations 
are  perfectly  valid  indications  of  design,  so  long  as 
their  authorship  is  known  to  be  confined  to  human 
intelligence,  but  when  we  pass  the  limits  of  experi- 
ence we  can  argue  nothing  of  any  other  intelligence, 
even  supposing  it  to  exist.  The  argument  from 
general  laws  dwindles  to  nothing  in  the  face  of  the 
doctrine  that  matter  and  force  have  been  eternal, 
and  that  all  and  every  law  follows,  as  a  necessary 
consequence,  from  the  persistence  of  force  and  the 
primary  qualities  of  matter.  For  aught  that  specu- 
lative science  can  show  to  the  contrary,  the  evolution 
of  all  the  diverse  phenomena  of  organic  nature,  of 
life,  and  of  mind  appears  to  be  necessary  and  self- 
determined.  Human  intelligence,  but  nothing  else, 
has  been  evolved.  And  so  far  as  the  human  mind 
can  see  it  can  discover  no  need  of  a  superior  mind 


PRESENT  ASPECTS  OE  THE  PROBLEM.  l? 

to  explain  the  phenomena  of  existence.  Man  has 
no  kith  or  kin  in  all  this  universe  of  being.1 

It  is  needless  to  ask  what  is  left  when  we  have 
reached  this  result.  We  have  our  own  thinking 
selves  ;  but  thought  is  an  evolution  over  which  we 
have  no  control,  our  personal  consciousness  is  simply 
a  series  of  successive  sensations  and  states ;  we  have 
no  responsibility,  we  can  have  no  relation  to  an  in- 
visible world.  Morality  and  religion  are  alike  empty 
terms.  There  is  something,  indeed,  almost  pathetic 
in  Mr.  Mill's  recoil  from  a  conclusion  which  makes 
such  havoc  of  the  sanctities  of  life,  and  in  his  pleas 
for  a  belief  in  God  on  the  score  of  utility,  even  if  it 
does  not  rest  on  any  conclusive  grounds.  But  the 
utmost  concession  to  which  this  school  can  be 
brought,  is  the  admission  of  an  unknown  and  un- 
knowable power  lying  behind  all  phenomena.  It 
may  be  said  that  in  this  view  science  and  religion, 
instead  of  being  hostile,  are  at  one,  since  they  both 
assume  a  cause,  a  permanent  and  all-pervading  force. 
But  under  the  law  of  evolution,  the  recognition  of 
this  force  will  vary  with  the  consciousness  of  each 
generation.  The  so-called  religious  sentiment  will 
have  for  its  object  of  contemplation  only  the  Infinite 
Unknowable.  Of  it  it  can  only  know  that  it  can 
know  nothing. 

A  recent  exponent  of  this  philosophy2  has  sought 
to  modify  the  doctrine  of  the  unknowable,  by  devel- 
oping it  into  a  definite  system  of  scientific  theology. 
This,  he  assures  us,  is  the 'most  ennobling  form  of 
religion  that  mankind  is  destined  ever  to  reach.  It 
is  represented  as  a  system  in  which  the  most  funda- 

1  Abridged  from  J.  S.  Mill,  Theism,  pp.  62,  102. 

2  [John  Fiske,  Outlines  of  Cosmic  Philosophy  (1S75).] 


1 8  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

mental  truths  of  theism  are  taught,  as  necessary  de- 
ductions from  the  highest  truths  of  science  ;  a  sys- 
tem in  which  the  noblest  of  our  aspirations  and  the 
most  sublime  of  our  emotions  are  supplied  with  a 
far  more  worthy  and  glorious  object  than  has  been 
supplied  by  any  of  the  older  forms  of  theism.  Ac- 
cording to  this  view,  on  rigid  scientific  grounds,  we 
must  assume  "  the  existence  of  a  power,  to  which  no 
limit  in  space  or  time  is  conceivable,  of  which  all 
phenomena  presented  in  consciousness  are  manifes- 
tations, but  which  we  can  only  know  through  these 
manifestations."  But  cosmic  theism,  when  care- 
fully analyzed,  will  be  found  to  involve  no  essential 
modification  of  the  doctrine  of  the  unknowable ;  for 
though  the  designation  of  the  deity  is  retained,  he 
is  divested  of  all  the  attributes  which  give  the  des- 
ignation meaning.  We  have  simply  absolute  being, 
devoid  of  personality,  intelligence,  and  volition. 

Such  an  attempt  of  one  of  the  disciples  of  this 
school  to  supply  a  deity  divested  of  all  anthropomor- 
phic elements,  which  linger  in  the  accepted  theolo- 
gies, and  in  harmony  with  the  latest  conclusions  of 
scientific  thought,  is  indeed  chiefly  interesting  as 
furnishing  cogent  illustration  of  the  reluctance  with 
which  the  more  thoughtful  adherents  of  this  school 
part  with  beliefs  so  endeared  to  the  human  heart. 
Thus,  one  who  asserts,  without  the  least  hesitation, 
"that  the  hypothesis  of  mind  in  nature  is  as  cer- 
tainly superfluous  to  account  for  any  of  its  phenom- 
ena, as  the  scientific  doctrine  of  the  persistence  of 
forces  and  the  indestructibility  of  matter  is  certainly 
true,"  adds  the  touching  confession,  "It  is  with  the 
utmost  sorrow  that  I  find  myself  compelled  to  accept 
the  conclusions  here  worked  out,  and  nothing  would 


PRESENT  ASPECTS  OF  THE  PROBLEM.  1 9 

have  induced  me  to  publish  them  save  the  strength 
of  my  conviction,  that  it  is  the  duty  of  every  mem- 
ber of  society  to  give  his  fellows  the  benefit  of  his 
labors  for  whatever  they  may  be  worth.  So  far  as 
the  realization  of  individual  happiness  is  concerned, 
no  one  can  have  a  more  lively  perception  than  my- 
self of  the  possibly  disastrous  tendency  of  my  work. 
And,  forasmuch  as  I  am  far  from  being  able  to  agree 
with  those  who  affirm  that  the  twilight  doctrine  of 
the  '  new  faith '  is  a  desirable  substitute  for  the 
waning  splendor  of  '  the  old,'  I  am  not  ashamed  to 
confess  that  with  this  virtual  negation  of  God  the 
universe  has  lost  to  me  its  soul  of  loveliness  ;  and 
although  from  henceforth  the  precept  to  '  work  while 
it  is  day/  will  doubtless  but  gain  an  intensified  force 
from  the  terribly  intensified  meaning  of  the  words 
that,  '  the  night  cometh  when  no  man  can  work,'  yet 
when  at  times  I  think,  as  think  at  times  I  must,  of 
the  appalling  contrast  between  the  hallowed  glory 
of  that  creed  which  once  was  mine,  and  the  lonely 
mystery  of  existence  as  now  I  find  it,  at  such  times 
I  shall  ever  feel  it  impossible  to  avoid  the  sharpest 
pang  of  which  my  nature  is  susceptible.  I  cannot 
but  feel  that  for  me,  and  for  others  who  think  as  I 
do,  there  is  a  dreadful  truth  in  these  words  of  Ham- 
ilton :  '  Philosophy  having  become  a  meditation,  not 
merely  of  death,  but  of  annihilation,  the  precept 
know  thyself  has  become  transformed  into  the  ter- 
rific oracle  to  CEdipus. 

Mayest  thou  ne'er  know  the  truth  of  what  thou  art.'  "  x 

These  confessions  of  a  calm  and  acute  adherent 
of  the  Agnostic  school  have  an  emphasis  which  the 
most  convincing  objections  of  an  opponent  could 
never  equal. 

1  A  Candid  Examination  of  Theism,  by  Physicus  (Boston,  1868). 


20  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

To  comprehend  the  full  import  of  the  problem 
here  presented,  it  is  needful  to  observe  that  those 
who  shrink  from  these  conclusions  of  modern  Ag- 
nosticism cannot  justify  their  position  by  the  view 
that  has  been  eloquently  advocated  that  this  demon- 
strated impotence  of  mere  natural  religion  to  solve 
the  problem  of  the  divine  existence,  and  of  human 
responsibility  and  immortality,  only  brings  out  in 
stronger  relief  the  necessity  of  an  authoritative  rev- 
elation. This  easy  solution  of  the  difficulty  will  not 
stand  the  test  of  examination.  Such  extreme  reac- 
tion against  the  results  of  an  irreligious  sensational- 
ism is  perfectly  natural,  and  has  hardly  ever  failed 
to  show  itself  at  crises  when  the  deepest  spiritual 
sentiments  of  mankind  have  received  a  shock,  and 
the  idea  of  a  living  God  has  been  lost  sight  of  in 
that  of  unconscious  nature.  Alarmed  at  what  seem 
the  results  of  rational  investigation,  this  tendency 
throws  discredit  upon  all  operations  of  reason,  and, 
by  boldly  turning  the  enemies'  guns,  aims  to  base 
the  authority  of  revealed  truth  on  this  manifest  im- 
potence of  natural  reason  to  establish  any  valid  and 
indisputable  foundations  of  belief.  The  most  brill- 
iant illustration  of  this  reaction  was  furnished  in  the 
passionate  protest  of  Lamennais  against  the  sensa- 
tional philosophy  which  constituted  the  speculative 
factor  in  the  French  Revolution.  Disgusted  with 
the  petty  aims  which  deluged  society  around  him, 
he  sought  to  force  his  countrymen  into  the  ark  of 
faith  by  destroying  their  confidence  in  all  attempts 
of  reason  to  solve  spiritual  problems.  The  senses, 
he  cried,  deceive  us  ;  feeling  is  a  continual  series  of 
doubts  and  illusions  ;  reason  operates  only  on  data 
furnished  by  the  senses  or  feelings,  and  from  these 


PRESENT  ASPECTS  OF  THE  PROBLEM.  21 

uncertain  data  draws  the  most  contradictory  conclu- 
sions. For  man  there  is  no  reality  either  in  his  own 
processes  or  in  the  external  world,  there  is  nothing 
in  which  he  has  any  right  to  believe  unless  he  has 
some  other  ground  than  his  own  private  sentiment, 
or  his  own  individual  consciousness.  These  ex- 
treme opinions  are  explicitly  asserted  by  few  at  the 
present  day ;  yet  so  far  as  any  definite  meaning  can 
be  attached  to  Mr.  Mallock's  recent  solution  of  the 
problem,  "  Is  life  worth  living,"  it  would  seem  to 
amount  to  this  :  appeal  to  external  authority  is  the 
only  refuge  left  us. 

But  where  shall  that  authority  be  found  ? 

Shall  we  make  our  appeal  to  a  written  revelation  ? 
But  revelation  rests  on  testimony ;  its  authority  can 
only  be  established  by  appealing  to  certain  tests  in- 
dependent of  itself.  Unless  every  man  blindly  ac- 
cepts the  traditions  in  which  he  has  been  born,  —  in 
which  case  the  claims  of  one  particular  class  of  tra- 
ditions to  be  superior  to  any  other  could  never  be 
established,  and  the  great  historic  religions  of  the 
world  would  stand  side  by  side  on  an  equal  footing, — 
an  appeal  must  be  allowed  to  reason  and  to  the  moral 
intuitions.  Shall  we  make  our  appeal  to  the  visible 
church  ?  But  here  we  come  into  the  presence  of  a 
great  historical  fact,  the  origin,  the  nature,  the  au- 
thority of  which,  all  become  at  once  subjects  not 
only  of  legitimate  but  of  imperative  discussion.  If 
we  reduce  this  authority  to  the  authority  of  univer- 
sal assent,  we  have  still  to  ask  the  question  where 
and  how  such  universal  assent  is  to  be  found,  and 
thus  become  at  once  involved  in  a  maze  of  inquiries 
which  tax  to  the  utmost  our  capacity  of  rational 
comparison  and  deduction. 


22  THE   THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

Hence  natural  and  revealed  religion  must  stand 
or  fall  together.  We  cannot,  even  in  the  most  ex- 
treme subjection  to  an  external  authority,  divest 
ourselves  of  an  appeal  to  the  moral  and  intellectual 
constitution  of  man.  To  say,  as  some  devout  men 
have  said,  that  the  problems  of  natural  theology  are 
insoluble,  and  that  it  is  the  part  of  wisdom  to  retire 
from  a  border-land  so  dimly  irradiated  by  any  cer- 
tain light,  is  in  effect  to  concede  all  that  modern 
Agnosticism  has  claimed.  It  is  equally  the  surren- 
der of  revealed  truth  and  of  church  authority.  I 
by  no  means  claim  that  natural  and  revealed  religion 
are  throughout  identical,  and  that  we  may  not  owe 
to  revelation  truths  which  the  natural  reason  by  no 
searching  could  find  out  ;  I  only  mean  that  the  two 
must  correspond,  and  that  natural  religion  furnishes 
the  fundamental  principles  by  which  alone  the  truth 
of  revealed  religion  can  be  certified.  If  it  be  dem- 
onstrated, beyond  a  doubt,  that  the  human  faculties 
cannot  transcend  the  limits  of  the  finite  and  the 
sensible,  that  the  mind  only  dreams  when  it  affects 
to  recognize  the  unseen  and  the  supernatural,  the 
truth  of  any  revelation  becomes  an  idle  question. 

The  distinction  between  natural  and  revealed  re- 
ligion is  one  not  easily  traced,  though  we  are  accus- 
tomed to  have  the  terms  placed  in  opposition,  as  if 
the  relation  between  them  were  clearly  defined.  It 
seems  not  unlikely  that  they  designate,  after  all,  not 
different  classes  of  truths,  but  simply  different  meth- 
ods in  which  these  truths  have  been  apprehended 
by  mankind.  What  man  has  ascertained  by  the  un- 
aided exercise  of  his  own  powers  is  termed  natural ; 
what  he  has  been  brought  to  recognize  through  the 
medium  of  some  assumed  supernatural  illumination 


PRESENT  ASPECTS  OF  THE  PROBLEM.  23 

is  termed  revealed ;  but  the  harmony  of  all  truth 
with  itself  forbids  us  to  suppose  that,  between  these 
two  classes  of  truths,  supposing  them  really  to  exist, 
there  can  be  any  contradiction,  or  any  lack  of  perfect 
correspondence.  All  truth,  from  whatever  source 
derived,  must  be  rational  truth,  though  its  rational 
grounds  may  not  be  apprehended  by  the  mind,  and 
we  cannot  resist  the  conclusion  that,  with  the  pro- 
gressive illumination  and  enlargement  of  the  spir- 
itual faculties,  this  harmony  of  truth  will  be  more 
clearly  perceived,  and  thus  the  distinction  between 
natural  and  revealed  truth  be  gradually  done  away. 

Who,  then,  can  draw  the  line  between  natural  and 
revealed  religion,  as  we  see  them  actually  existing 
before  us  ?  Who  can  say  where  one  begins  and 
where  the  other  ends  ?  Look  at  the  most  elevated 
and  ennobling  modern  thought,  that  boasts  its  inde- 
pendence of  revelation,  and  yet  how  many  impulses 
of  revealed  truth  may  have  unconsciously  contrib- 
uted to  give  it  shape  !  And  study  the  historical 
forms  of  revealed  religion,  and  into  them,  too,  how 
many  elements  may  have  entered  that  owed  their  ex- 
istence to  a  purely  natural  source  !  The  wider  study 
of  revealed  religion  has  taught  us  to  recognize  every- 
where the  working  of  natural  elements  ;  and  in  the 
great  tide  of  social  and  political  and  intellectual  life 
around  us,  we  seek  in  vain  to  discriminate  them. 
The  question  of  the  relation  between  the  two  is  a 
question  in  itself  of  the  highest  interest,  but  one 
that  has  no  important  bearing  upon  our  present  sub- 
ject ;  for  the  tendency  of  thought  which  we  have  to 
investigate  is  one  that  stands  in  antagonism  to  any 
recognition  of  the  supernatural  in  nature  or  in  hu- 
man life.     All  question  as  to  the  comparative  value 


24  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

of  revealed  or  natural  religion  fades  into  nothing 
before  the  momentous  issue  which  is  here  so  dis- 
tinctly presented. 

It  is  superfluous  to  add  the  remark  that  the  issue 
here  raised  is  one  that  covers  the  whole  of  human 
life,  and  goes  to  the  very  core  of  human  society  ; 
for,  whatever  be  our  opinion  as  to  the  grounds  of  re- 
ligious belief,  the  fact  is  incontestible  that  the  sense 
of  the  supernatural  has  been  in  all  ages  the  most 
ipotent  factor  in  the  development  of  character  ;  that 
lit  has  supplied  the  great  ideals  of  human  action  ; 
that  it  has  furnished  the  controlling  and  sustaining 
motives  in  the  diversified  movement  of  human  life. 
Whether  a  great  truth,  or  only  a  delusion  of  man's 
imagination,  it  has  lain  at  the  roots  of  domestic,  of 
social,  and  of  political  relations,  and  the  proud 
structure  of  modern  civilization  is  compacted  of  it. 
The  history  of  the  race,  searched  out  in  all  its  con- 
trasted aspects  of  brutal  force,  or  of  social  order, 
shows  no  more  universal  and  more  unmistakable 
fact  than  that  the  human  soul,  whether  impelled  by 
blind  superstition,  or  impelled  by  rational  instincts, 
has  reposed  on  the  conviction  of  a  supernatural  or- 
der, and  recognized  in  things  seen  and  temporal 
the  evidences,  obscure  or  distinct,  of  things  unseen 
and  eternal.  The  literature  of  nations  speaks  one 
voice  in  its  testimony  on  this  point ;  and  what  is  lit- 
erature but  the  expression  of  the  deepest,  fullest 
conviction  of  the  human  heart  ?  Let  us  listen  to 
the  supreme  singers  who  have  set  to  music  the  sov- 
ereign thoughts  of  mankind.  Poetry,  Aristotle  tells 
us,  is  more  instructive  and  weighty  than  history 
even,  because  it  deals  with  truth  in  its  universal 
forms.     I  have  already  quoted  a  passage  from  Goe- 


PRESENT  ASPECTS  OF  THE  PROBLEM.  2$ 

the  in  illustration  of  his.  purpose  to  seek  inward 
peace  by  resolutely  shutting  his  eyes  to  the  great 
problems  of  the  supra-sensible  world  ;  but  Goethe, 
versed  as  he  was  in  the -literature  of  so  many  na-l 
tions,  seems  strangely  to  have  forgotten  that  litera-l 
ture  in  its  noblest  forms  has  always  dealt  with  the 
great  problems  of  life  and  destiny.  It  is  the  per- 
petual recurrence  of  these  familiar  chords  that  gives 
the  best  literature  its  perennial  freshness,  and  re- 
duces all  differences  of  ancient  and  modern  to  a 
superficial  distinction.  The  sublime  strains  of  Job/ 
find  their  motive  in  an  unappeasable  curiosity  of  man 
to  pierce  the  darkness  that  rounds  off  his  little  life, 
and  to  see  himself  in  his  true  relation  to  a  universal 
and  eternal  order.  Revolting  from  the  meagre  the- 
ory prevailing  among  the  Hebrews  of  his  own  time, 
which  saw  in  human  suffering  the  exact  measure 
and  equivalent  of  human  guilt,  the  soul  of  the  right- 
eous man  asserts  a  larger  solution.  He  seeks  refuge 
in  the  thought  that  the  disorder  and  misery  which 
reproach  this  present  system  are  parts  of  a  plan  not 
yet  revealed.  So  the  Greek  tragedy  hinges  on  the 
recognition  of  man's  relation  to  the  supernatural 
powers.  And  in  him  who,  more  than  any  other, 
held  the  mirror  up  to  nature,  we  find  the  constant 
recognition  of  the  same  principle.  And,  in  Shake-  I 
speare,  this  is  all  the  more  impressive  because  of 
his  own  ambiguous  relation  to  any  definite  form  of 
belief.  Standing  on  the  water-shed  of  two  great 
epochs,  a  new  religious  and  a  new  political  world 
struggling  around  him  into  being,  he  held  himself 
strangely  aloof  from  either.  The  splendor  of  the 
Elizabethan  Renaissance  was  fading  in  the  solemn 
presence  of  the  impending  Puritan  revolution,  yet 


26  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

we  search  in  vain  the  pages  of  the  great  dramatist 
for  any  hint  of  his  relation  to  the  questions  of  his 
day.  For  anything  he  has  left  us,  we  should  be  at 
a  loss  to  decide  whether  he  was  Catholic  or  Protes- 
tant. The  party  questions  discussed  around  him 
have  left  no  mark  on  the  great  creations  of  his  gen- 
ius. We  are  wholly  in  the  dark  as  to  his  positive 
belief.     "To  die"  is  to  go  "we  know  not  where."  l 

But  when  he  uncovers  the  springs  of  human  ac- 
tion, when  he  sounds  the  depths  of  human  nature, 
when  he  unravels  the  workings  of  human  conscience, 
when  he  draws  man  in  his  most  hidden  moods,  in 
his  most  anguishing  experiences  of  doubt,  of  terror, 
of  remorse,  he  makes  him  walk  along  a  path  that 
derives  all  its  mystery  and  meaning  from  its  sugges- 
tion of  the  supernatural.  To  be,  or  not  to  be,  may 
remain  an  unsolved  enigma,  yet  conscience  cannot 
throw  off  the  dread  of  something  after  death.  Ham- 
|  let  holds  us,  not  as  a  son,  not  as  a  lover,  but  as  one 
I  brought  suddenly  abreast  the  dark  mystery  of  exist- 
ence.  What  links  him  so  strongly  to  our  sympathies 
is  the  fact  that  he  forgets  little  Denmark,  and  be- 
comes suddenly  akin  to  all  his  kind.  He  rises  from 
the  concrete  to  the  abstract,  and  not  one  ghastly 
crime  alone,  but  the  troubled  order  of  the  world  is 
what  fills  his  gaze.  He  is  irresolute,  not  from  lack 
of  will,  but  because  his  mind  lies  all  abroad.  He  can 
avenge  his  father's  murder,  but  what  will  be  the 
good  of  it  ?  There  runs  through  all  his  greatest 
dramas  this  sense  of  man's  kinship  with  the  infinite 
\  and  eternal.  Thus  in  Macbeth  it  is  not  the  death 
I  of  the  victim,  but  the  remorse  of  the  murderer,  that 
stands  out ;  not  that  Duncan  sleeps,  but  that  Mac- 
beth shall  sleep  no  more. 

1   [Measure  for  Measure,  Act  iii.,  Sc  I.] 


PRESENT  ASPECTS  OF  THE   PROBLEM.  27 

I  have  allowed  myself  this  digression  not  for  the 
purpose  of  advancing  any  argument  in  favor  of  be- 
lief in  the  supernatural,  for  that  belongs  to  a  later 
stage  of  our  discussion,  but  simply  for  the  purpose  of 
making  as  plain  as  possible,  at  the  outset,  the  grav- 
ity of  the  questions  which  we  are  about  to  consider. 
I  wish  to  show  that,  while  the  definite  problems  of 
natural  theology  are  the  same  to-day  as  in  the  days 
of  Socrates,  or  that  while  in  a  sense,  it  is  true,  as 
Macaulay  urges,  that  natural  theology  is  not  a  pro- 
gressive science,  and  that  the  early  Greeks  had  pre- 
cisely the  same  evidences,  in  the  structure  of  the 
universe,  of  the  existence  of  a  Supreme  Being,  or  of 
the  immortality  of  the  soul,  that  lie  before  an  ob- 
server of  the  present  day,  still  the  aspects  of  the 
discussion  have  been  essentially  changed.  Doubts 
which,  at  the  outset,  were  purely  speculative,  have 
been  transferred  to  the  domain  of  reasoned  truth, 
and  the  ascertained  principles  of  the  physical  uni- 
verse have  been  summoned  with  decisive  effect  to 
the  solution  of  metaphysical  problems.  The  validity 
of  this  process  involves  questions  which  the  ancient 
thinkers  were  never  called  upon  to  consider. 

And  while  new  factors  have  thus  been  introduced 
into  the  problem,  the  problem  itself,  through  the 
growth  of  modern  civilization,  has  gained  a  new  im- 
port. Modern  life  owes  its  distinctive  character  to 
its  strongly  emphasized  sense  of  man's  relation  to  a 
supernatural  order.  This,  more  than  anything  else, 
marks  the  contrast  between  modern  life  and  "the 
most  high  and  palmy  state  of  ancient  society."  Mod- 
ern civilization,  in  every  aspect  in  which  we  consider 
it,  confesses  the  operative  presence  of  a  power  which 
the  ancients,  at  best,   only  dimly  recognized.      In 


28  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

domestic  and  social  life,  in  laws,  in  literature,  in 
poetry,  in  art,  we  cannot  miss  it.  The  import  of  life 
has  been  everywhere  measured  by  its  recognized 
relation  to  spiritual  and  immortal  destinies.  Hence, 
while  in  many  points  the  problem  of  human  exist- 
ence may  seem  to-day  the  same  that  it  seemed  to  the 
ancient  world,  yet  in  the  momentous  issues  involved 
in  the  problem  it  is  not  the  same.  The  surrender 
of  faith  in  the  supernatural  involves  vastly  more  for 
us  than  it  involved  for  them.  For  them  it  was  the 
loss  of  a  castle  in  Spain,  for  us  it  is  the  loss  of  a 
heritage  around  which  the  most  hallowed  memories 
of  life  are  clustered. 

It  is  wholly  impossible  to  measure  the  revolution 
that  would  be  caused  in  modern  society  by  a  general 
renunciation  of  faith  in  unseen  things.  No  revolu- 
tion that  has  ever  taken  place  in  the  world's  history 
can  be  likened  to  it.  It  would  be  a  revolution  affect- 
ing man  in  all  his  conditions  of  development,  in 
all  his  relations  to  his  fellows,  in  all  his  habits  of 
thought,  all  his  motives  of  action,  all  his  ideals 
of  conduct.  Where  it  would  land  him  no  reason- 
ings drawn  from  other  ages,  or  other  conditions  of 
society,  would  enable  us  to  predict.  Those  who  look 
forward  with  complacency  to  such  a  result  have  ap- 
pealed to  some  of  the  eastern  religions  in  proof  of 
the  fact  that  powerful  creeds  have  flourished  "which 
have  omitted  all  that  makes  the  doctrine  of  a  fut- 
ure state  valuable  in  the  eyes  of  its  supporters," 
and  "systems  of  pure  human  ethics  may  be  found 
divorced  from  the  existence  of  God,"  but  we  cannot 
reason  so  easily  from  eastern  to  western  results  of 
thought.  The  doctrines  of  Buddhism  are  profoundly 
mystical  in  their  character,  and  owe  their  popular 


PRESENT  ASPECTS  OF  THE  PROBLEM.  29 

success  to  maxims  which  the  scientific  unbelief  of 
Europe  expressly  repudiates.  It  is  true  that  Buddh- 
ism, like  modern  agnosticism,  repudiates  any  per- 
sonal God,  and  any  conscious  immortality.  So  far 
they  would  seem  to  be  precisely  alike.  Yet  we  can- 
not reason  from  the  effect  of  such  a  creed  on  an 
inactive,  contemplative  race,  profoundly  impressed 
with  the  misery  of  life,  and  reckoning  annihilation 
the  supreme  boon,  to  its  effect  on  a  society  full  of 
energy  and  action,  resolute  in  the  accomplishment 
of  great  aims,  prizing  life,  and  eager  to  put  its  oppor- 
nities  to  the  highest  use.  Western  civilization  is 
instinct  with  convictions  and  with  hopes  respecting 
human  life  and  human  destiny  that,  as  far  as  we  can 
see,  have  never  stirred  the  drowsy  East.  To  have 
all  these  snatched  away  is  not  to  unite  us  to  the 
passive  mysticism  of  Oriental  society,  but  to  launch 
us  on  a  wholly  new  experiment.  Such  is  the  vast 
import  of  the  problem  with  which  we  have  to  deal. 
We  have  to  look  at  it  in  aspects  which  were  never 
even  suggested  to  ancient  thinkers,  and  we  have  to 
approach  it  with  a  sense  of  its  momentous  and  far- 
reaching  consequences  such  as  the  most  penetrating 
intellect  among  them  could  never  have  realized. 

I  have  termed  the  following  lectures  a  discussion 
of  the  theistic  argument  rather  than  a  discussion  of 
theism,  because  what  I  have  in  mind  is  not  theism, 
meaning   by  that  belief   in  the  existence  of  a  Su-J 
preme  Being,  but  simply  the  intellectual  or  rational! 
grounds  upon  which  such  belief  may  be  based.    The--1 
ism,  considered  as   a   temper  or  attitude  of  mind, 
has  its  origin  in  many  sources.  (There  are  very  few, 
if  there  are  any,  with  whom  belief  in  God  is  simply 
the  result  of  logical  conviction.  \  In  the  actual  shape 


3<D  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT 

in  which  this  belief  sways  so  many  souls  it  is  the 
result  of  all  the  forces  by  which  human  character  is 
fashioned.  It  is  a  conviction  springing  from  spirit- 
ual needs,  determined  by  training,  sanctioned  by  tra- 
dition. Its  practical  and  governing  power  has  very 
little  to  do  with  the  controversies  that  have  raged 
respecting  it.  It  is  a  conviction  cherished  as  part  of 
their  own  being  by  countless  multitudes,  who  have 
never  asked  themselves  on  what  ground  it  should  be 
received.  But  I  propose  to  confine  myself  strictly  to 
its  rational  grounds,  and  to  seek  to  ascertain  to  what 
extent  these  have  been  modified  by  recent  scientific 
theories. 

And,  without  anticipating  my  argument,  I  may 
permit  myself  to  say  that  the  aim  of  this  discussion 
will  be  to  show  that  the  rational  grounds  on  which 
belief  in  the  existence  of  a  Supreme  Being  must  be 
rested,  have  not  been  essentially  modified  by  modern 
thought.  No  doubt  the  most  profound  alteration  of 
scientific  opinion  in  our  time  is  connected  with  the 
doctrine  of  evolution,  in  its  wide-spread  application  to 
physical  and  moral  phenomena.  With  the  various 
forms  of  this  theory  we  shall  have  most  to  do  in  the 
evenings  before  us.  In  the  conclusions  that  have 
been  deduced  from  this  theory,  the  most  formidable 
antagonism  to  faith  in  the  supernatural,  is  supposed 
to  lie.  But,  if  I  do  not  wholly  fail  of  the  end  I  have 
in  view,  I  shall  show  you,  before  we  conclude,  not 
only  that  this  theory  stands  in  no  necessary  antag- 
onism to  the  doctrine  of  theism,  but  that  the  view 
of  nature,  and  of  natural  operations  which  it  en- 
forces, has  some  striking  points  of  harmony  with 
the  truths  not  only  of  natural  but  of  revealed  relig- 
ion. That  it  results  in  atheism  is  a  wholly  ground- 
less and  gratuitous  assumption. 


PRESENT  ASPECTS  OF  THE  PROBLEM.  3  I 

With  a  single  additional  reflection  I  close  these  in- 
troductory remarks.  We  have  heard  much  said,  in 
recent  days,  of  the  pursuit  of  truth  for  its  own  sake, 
and  surely  no  pursuit  can  be  nobler,  no  pursuit  can 
be  more  alluring  to  an  eager  and  ingenuous  mind. 
To  throw  away  all  lesser  considerations,  to  forget 
ourselves  even,  and  all  that  relates  merely  to  our 
own  personal  welfare,  in  the  unselfish  search  after 
undiscovered  principles,  to  cast  every  weight  of  mere 
private  interest  aside  as  we  climb  the  lofty  summits 
that  lift  themselves  before  our  enraptured  gaze, — 
what  more  worthy  temper  than  this  can  befit  the  sin- 
cere seeker  after  truth  ?  Is  not  the  pursuit  of  truth, 
without  regard  to  consequences,  our  highest  duty  ? 
Should  not  truth  be  independent  of  feeling,  indepen- 
dent even  of  hope  ?  Will  not  the  genuine  worship- 
per press  on  in  whatever  path  opens  before  him, 
"  with  his  eyes  open,  with  his  head  erect."  "To  be 
strong  and  of  good  courage,"  we  are  told,  is  our  only 
watchword.  We  are  bound  by  the  laws  of  ou  "  intel- 
tectual  being  to  honest  inquiry.  With  the  possible 
consequences  of  this  inquiry  we  have  no  concern. 
In  courageous  search  alone  the  soul  finds  its  highest 
function  and  its  best  reward. 

It  may  be  doubted  whether  this  is  true.  It  may  be 
most  seriously  questioned  whether  the  highest  truth 
should  be  thus  sought  in  the  interest  of  mere  intel- 
lectual curiosity.  This  rule  may  suffice  when  we 
seek  for  truth  in  some  of  its  more  definite  and  lim- 
ited forms.  The  mathematician  who  sets  out  to  solve 
an  equation,  needs  only  to  have  his  mental  parts  alert. 
The  chemist  may  trust  his  mere  intellectual  facul- 
ties when  applying  his  tests.  Emotion,  passion,  sym- 
pathy, have  no  place  in  such  restricted  fields.     But 


32  THE    THE  IS  TIC   ARGUMENT. 

the  maxim  fails  when  we  study  the  more  mysterious 
and  far-reaching  problems  that  cover  the  whole  na- 
ture and  destiny  of  man.  The  temper  proper  to  mere 
scientific  inquiry  will  not  suffice  us  here.  Logic 
leads  us  up  to  a  certain  point,  but  at  this  point  it 
leaves  us  in  the  lurch.  The  motives  proper  to 
scientific  investigation  by  no  means  include  all  the 
legitimate  impulses  to  inquiry.  "After  all,"  says 
Cardinal  Newman,  "  man  is  not  a  reasoning  animal : 
he  is  a  seeing,  feeling,  contemplating,  acting  ani- 
mal." And  in  the  pursuit  of  the  highest  truth  not 
one  faculty,  but  all  faculties  need  to  be  enlisted. 

And  even  were  it  possible  thus  to  pursue  the 
highest  truth  as  a  mere  exercise  of  the  intellect, 
and  to  separate  the  search  after  it  from  all  con- 
sideration of  consequences,  it  may  be  still  more 
doubted  whether  our  progress  would  be  helped  by 
it  ;  whether  the  mere  intellect,  could  it  be  di- 
vorced from  the  other  faculties,  would  be  any  more 
trustworthy  in  its  operations.  It  by  no  means  fol- 
lows that  in  the  sphere  of  spiritual  truth  the  mind 
is  at  its  best,  and  that  its  conclusions  are  most  to  be 
relied  upon,  when  left  thus  solitary  and  naked,  like 
Adam  before  the  creation  of  Eve.  In  its  perfect 
state  the  intellect  needs  to  be  wedded  to  the  moral 
sense.  It  is  an  old  maxim  that  "  wonder  is  a  highly 
philosophical  affection,"  and  no  one  who  recognizes 
the  fact  that  man's  nature  is  a  unit  can  for  a  mo- 
ment doubt  that  his  faculties  are  at  their  most  per- 
fect play  when  this  mutual  adjustment  is  most  com- 
plete. In  other  words,  the  highest  rational  state 
must  be  at  the  same  time  a  moral  state,  so  that  the 
maxim  is  unquestionably  sound  that  faith,  in  its  best 
analysis,  is  an  eminent  act  of  reason,  and  that  rea- 
son finds  its  normal  completion  in  faith. 


PRESENT  ASPECTS  OF  THE  PROBLEM.  33 

I  am  well  aware  that  some  recent  writers  are  fond 
of  insisting  on  the  distinction  between  what  they 
term  the  objective  and  the  subjective  methods,  and 
that  the  great  superiority  of  later  over  earlier  in- 
quirers is  to  be  attributed  to  the  fact  that  they  have 
learned  to  confine  themselves  rigorously  to  the  for- 
mer, in  other  words,  that  they  have  learned  to  look 
at  truth  as  wholly  independent  of  themselves,  and 
to  study  it  purely  for  its  own  sake.  Without  rais- 
ing the  question  whether  this  be  the  fact,  and 
whether  modern  investigators,  as  a  class,  show  that 
they  are  thus  exempt  from  human  passions,  I  ven- 
ture wholly  to  doubt  whether  such  purely  objective 
methods  would  furnish  the  means  by  which  the 
highest  merits  of  thinking  can  be  secured ;  whether 
a  spirit  of  inquiry,  thus  emptied  of  the  universal 
interests  and  emotions  which  belong  to  man,  not 
merely  as  a  thinking  and  reasoning,  but  as  a  feeling, 
hoping,  believing  being,  can  supply  the  highest  and 
most  earnest  impulses  to  inquiry.  Surely  the  whole 
history  of  the  race  is  proof  that  man  has  been  im- 
pelled to  his  most  earnest  searchings  after  truth  not 
by  mere  intellectual,  but  always  by  moral  impulses. 

And  on  this  point  I  am  glad  to  appeal  to  the  sup- 
port of  one  who  will  not  be  suspected  of  any  exces- 
sive bias  in  favor  of  religious  truth,  but  whose  state- 
ments relating  to  it  are  singularly  clear  and  accu- 
rate :  "  Curiosity  determined  by  natural  sentiments 
and  emotions,"  says  the  late  Chauncey  Wright,  "sub- 
jective curiosity,  is  the  cause  of  a  culture  coexten- 
sive with  civilization,  long  preceding  the  growth 
of  science,  and  constituting  all  that  is  peculiar  to 
civilized  life  except  the  material  arts.  However 
meanly  the  conclusions  of  theological  and  metaphys- 
3 


34  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

ical  operations  may  appear,  when  tried  by  the  ob- 
jective standard  of  science,  they,  too,  have  their 
superiorities,  by  the  test  of  which  science  becomes 
in  turn  insignificant.  Unverified  conclusions,  vague 
ideas,  crude  fancies  they  may  be,  but  they  certainly 
are  the  products  of  activities  which  constitute  more 
of  human  happiness  and  human  worth  than  the  nar- 
row material  standards  of  science  have  been  able  to 
measure."  a 

After  these  striking  words,  I  do  not  shrink  from 
expressing  my  own  conviction  that  the  benefit  which 
every  one  of  us  may  derive  from  the  following  dis- 
cussion will  depend  very  largely  on  the  temper  of 
mind  with  which  we  approach  its  solemn  themes. 
We  shall  discuss  mysteries  which  have  perplexed 
the  wisest  thinkers;  we  shall  deal  with  questions 
which  lend  our  human  lives  all  their  meaning  and 
value.  We  shall  only  deceive  ourselves  if  we  think 
there  are  no  difficulties  in  the  path  we  have  to 
climb.  It  is  impossible  to  separate  our  inquiry 
from  issues  so  vast.  I  repeat,  with  added  emphasis, 
what  I  said  at  the  beginning,  that  the  problems  be- 
fore us  are  not  problems  -of  philosophy,  but  prob- 
lems of  life.  We  are  not  idly  gazing  at  a  landscape, 
pleased  for  the  moment  with  its  alternate  play  of 
light  and  shadow,  but  we  are  pilgrims  treading  a 
path  where  a  false  step  may  ruin  our  most  cher- 
ished hopes.  To  profess  indifference  to  the  result 
is  to  give  the  lie  to  the  finest  instincts  of  our  na- 
ture. 

1  Philosophical  Discussions,  pp.  51,  52. 


LECTURE   II. 

THE    RELATIVITY   OF    KNOWLEDGE. 

Perhaps  some  who  are  present  here  this  evening 
can  remember  when  a  famous  lecturer  stood  forth, 
in  this  very  city,  to  vindicate  the  new  views,  which, 
more  than  a  generation  ago,  were  provoking  so  much 
discussion.  These  views,  he  declared,  were  not  new, 
but  the  oldest  of  thoughts  cast  into  the  mould  of  a 
new  time.  In  the  style  which  marked  him  as  a  con- 
summate master  of  the  highest  of  all  arts,  —  the  art 
of  using  our  mother  tongue,  —  he  portrayed  the  two 
great  schools  into  which  the  thinking  men  of  every 
age  have  been  divided.  These  two  schools  were  the 
materialists  and  the  idealists  :  according  to  the  first, 
all  our  knowledge  is  founded  on  external  experience  ; 
according  to  the  second,  the  source  of  knowledge 
must  be  sought  in  the  soul  itself.  The  first  makes 
the  starting-point  of  thought  the  impressions  made 
on  the  senses ;  While  the  second  claims  that  the 
thoughts  which  enable  us  to  classify  and  arrange  the 
impressions  on  the  senses  must  be  traced  to  a  source 
which  the  senses  cannot  affect.  To  the  first,  the 
world  of  fact  is  the  only  real  world ;  while  the  sec- 
ond insists  that  only  in  the  world  of  ideas  do  we 
come  in  contact  with  the  true,  the  absolute,  the  eter- 
nal. To  the  enthusiastic  hearers,  who  drank  in  his 
honeyed  words,  the  speaker  seemed  the  prophet  of 
a  new  dispensation ;  and  the  disciples  of  his  gospel 


36  THE    THE/STIC  ARGUMENT. 

confidently  pictured  a  near  time  when  the  ideal  would 
be  recognized  as  the  alone  real,  when  the  standard 
of  measurement  would  be  found  in  the  mind  itself, 
when  society,  government,  art,  religion,  would  be 
estimated  solely  with  reference  to  this,  and  all  the 
teeming  activities  of  life  be  viewed  as  an  endless 
stream  flowing  from  this  invisible  fountain.  Even 
the  moral  code  would  find  here  its  springs.  This  in- 
ner life  was  a  law  unto  itself  ;  man  was  best  when 
allowed  the  largest  liberty.  The  mind  fashioned  its 
circumstances;  if  its  thoughts  were. changed  they 
transformed  its  conditions.  The  best  that  could  be 
asked  for  man,  was  that  this  spiritual  principle  in 
him  should  be  suffered  to  work  itself  out.  In  the 
creed  of  the  new  school  the  first  place  was  given  to 
the  intuitions.  Hence  it  hastened  to  avow  its  belief 
in  the  supra-sensible ;  the  soul,  it  affirmed,  could 
come  into  direct  contact  with  the  invisible  ;  and  was 
open,  at  all  times,  to  the  influx  of  the  All-knowing 
Spirit. 

The  sage  who  preached  this  ideal  philosophy  with 
so  much  applause,  still  lives  among  us,  but  the  times 
have  changed.  The  age  of  the  transcendentalist  is 
gone,  and  the  age  of  the  scientist  has  come.  The 
eager  thought  of  the  time  no  longer  expends  itself 
in  the  shadowy  region  of  the  intuition,  but  follows 
the  pathway  of  clearly  ascertained  fact.  Instead  of 
ravishing  itself  with  immediate  visions  of  the  abso- 
lute, it  denies  that  the  absolute,  even  conceding  its 
existence,  can  become  a  legitimate  object  of  reflec- 
tion. The  new  age,  so  confidently  heralded  by  the 
prophets  of  a  generation  back,  has  not  dawned.  Ex- 
perience, instead  of  holding  a  subordinate  place,  has 
been  in  turn  raised  to  the  chief  rank ;  and  philosophy, 


THE   RELATIVITY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  37 

no  longer  seeking  to  lay  its  foundations  in  regions 
not  subject  to  the  illusions  of  sense,  makes  its  boast, 
not  only  of  regarding  sense  as  the  starting-point, 
but  of  excluding  any  other  source  of  knowledge. 
Mind  is  no  more  a  self-subsisting  centre  of  energy 
and  life,  but  is  reduced  to  a  series  of  sensations, 
conditioned  in  all  its  action  by  its  physical  sur- 
roundings. 

Let  me  not  seem  to  confound  the  coarse  mate- 
rialism which  Emerson  had  in  mind,  with  the  subtle 
theories  of  physical  force  with  which  we  are  familiar. 
In  our  day  materialism  has  assumed  a  new  meaning, 
and  in  the  conception  of  an  indestructible  and  cease- 
lessly acting  energy,  underlying  the  phenomena  of 
the  external  world,  we  seem  to  have  the  dividing  line 
between  the  material  and  the  spiritual  almost  wiped 
out.  A  conception  of  matter  which  insists  upon  rec- 
ognizing in  it  the  "  promise  and  potency  of  all  life," 
which  tells  us  that  in  the  nebulous  gases,  of  which 
the  worlds  were  formed,  there  lay  latent  all  that 
afterwards  worked  itself  out  in  "Hamlet,"  in  "Para- 
dise Lost,"  in  the  "  Principia "  of  Newton,  is  evi- 
dently a  conception  very  unlike  that  against  which 
the  transcendentalists  protested ;  but  so  far  as  re- 
lates to  the  question  of  the  limitation  of  human 
knowledge,  the  issue  remains  unchanged.  The  old 
problem,  which  the  transcendentalists  so  confidently 
solved,  still  stares  us  in  the  face,  —  the  problem 
whether  we  have  any  certain  knowledge  beyond 
that  derived,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  from  ex- 
perience; and  whether,  from  the  things  that  are 
seen,  we  can  argue  with  any  assurance  to  the  things 
that  are  unseen. 

To  understand  clearly  the  position  of  the  school 


38  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

which  now  prevails,  we  must  bear  in  mind  the 
greatly  extended  meaning  given  to  the  term  expe- 
rience. The  so-called  experiential  method  by  no 
means  restricts  itself  to  the  enumeration  of  partic- 
ulars, and  classification  of  sensations,  which  was 
included  in  the  old  empiricism.  The  range  of  what 
is  known  is  extended  far  beyond  what  is  simply 
seen  and  felt.  Not  only  the  direct  impressions  upon 
the  senses,  but  the  indirect  representations,  in  other 
words,  the  inferences  from  the  impressions  of  sense 
which  are  capable  of  being  verified  by  rigid  scien- 
tific method,  are  all  included  within  its  legitimate 
scope.  And  not  only  the  experiences  of  the  indi- 
vidual, but  the  accumulated  and  transmitted  expe- 
rience of  the  race,  organized  in  language,  condensed 
in  axioms,  the  inherited  habits  of  apprehending  truth 
attested  in  the  whole  history  of  man,  all  this  varied, 
multiplied,  constantly  augmenting  product,  goes  to 
swell  the  vast  aggregate  to  which  the  term  expe- 
rience is  now  applied,  and  to  constitute  the  subject- 
matter  from  which  the  results  of  thought  may  be 
logically  deduced. 

Or,  stated  more  precisely,  "whatever  conceptions 
can  be  reached  through  logical  extensions  of  expe- 
rience, and  can  be  shown  to  be  conformable  with  it, 
are  legitimate  products,  capable  of  being  used  as 
principles  for  further  research."  1 

On  the  contrary,  whatever  lies  beyond  the  limits 
of  experience,  and  claims  another  origin  than  that 
of  induction  or  deduction  from  clearly  ascertained 
facts,  can  never  be  the  proper  object  of  scientific 
research,  and  can  result  only  in  vain  strife  of  words. 
Science,  in  short,  deals  with  things  and  their  rela- 

1  G.  H.  Lewes,  Problems  of  Life  and  Mind,  ist  Series,  vol.  i.,  p.  16. 


THE  RELATIVITY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  39 

tions  as  they  are  known  to  us,  or  as  their  existence 
is  logically  inferred  ;  beyond  this  line  we  plunge  into 
that  "vast  Serbonian  bog"  where  "armies  whole"  of 
metaphysicians  have  floundered  and  sunk  ;  we  deal 
with  things  and  relations  not  known  to  us  ;  we  sub- 
stitute for  the  constructions  of  science  the  con- 
structions of  the  imagination.  Yet,  with  this  great 
extension  given  to  the  meaning  of  the  term  "  expe- 
rience," the  problem  remains  precisely  as  before  : 
how  do  we  pass  from  thought  to  being  ?  what  ground 
of  assurance  have  we  that  the  intellectual  process 
within  us  has  a  corresponding  reality  without  ? 

Can  we  pass  outside  the  limits  of  our  own  expe-  1 
rience  ?     This  is  the  problem  that  stares  us  in  the  I 
face  at  the  threshold  of  our  inquiry,  and  unless  we  ] 
can  reach   some  solution  of  this,  any  further  inves- 
tigation will  be  idle.     On  this  the  foundations   of 
natural  religion  rest ;  for  if  we  are  shut  up  to  the 
creations  of  our  own  thought,  if  we  have  no  means 
of  ascertaining  whether  anything  exists  outside  our- 
selves and  independent  of  our  own  mental  processes, 
religion  is  reduced  to  mere  delusion.     It  does  not 
matter  with  what  rigorous  scientific  method  we  pur- 
sue our  investigations  and  deduce  our  inferences  ;  it 
does   not  matter  with  what  imposing  array  of   at- 
tributes  we    clothe   the   ideal    construction    of   our 
thought ;  if  we  cannot  rest,  at  last,  on  the  firm  con- 
viction of  a  corresponding  reality,  all  our  labor  and 
pains  will  be  thrown  away.     In  the  strict  and  proper 
sense,  we  are  directly  cognizant  of  no  facts  but  facts 
of  consciousness.     Our  inner  experience  is  the  start-J 
ing-point.     Reasoning    from   what   we   have   given 
here,  how  far  may  we  push  our  conclusions  into  the  . 
sphere  outside  ourselves?     This  is  the  first  ques-l 
tion. 


40  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT 

It  is  evident  that  the  problem  is  precisely  the 
same,  whether  we  speak  of  the  world  of  matter  or 
the  world  of  spirit.  Of  neither  have  we  any  direct 
and  immediate  knowledge.  Of  neither  can  we  dem- 
onstrate the  existence  in  the  sense  in  which  we 
demonstrate  the  truths  of  mathematics.  They  lie 
outside  ourselves,  and  any  assumption  that  we  make 
about  them  only  lands  us  in  manifest  absurdity.  No 
conception  seems  at  first  sight  more  simple  than 
that  of  matter.  No  child  doubts  for  a  moment  what 
his  senses  report  respecting  it.  But  are  all  the  parts 
|of  a  seemingly  solid  body  in  actual  contact  ?  We 
need  only  to  call  to  mind  that  every  portion  of  mat- 
ter is  compressible,  to  be  forced  to  the  admission 
that  the  molecules  of  which  matter  is  composed  are 
separated  from  each  other  by  tracts  of  empty  space. 
But  are  these  atoms  divisible  or  indivisible  ?  If  we 
assume  the  former,  we  are  confronted  with  the  in- 
finite divisibility  of  matter ;  if  we  assume  the  latter, 
we  have  an  indivisible  atom  ;  and,  in  either  case,  we 
have  a  conclusion  which  baffles  human  comprehen- 
sion. We  deal  with  a  problem  which  involves  us  in 
/endless  contradictions. 

The  principle  of  the  relativity  of  knowledge  is  as- 
I  serted  as  one  of  the  best  established  conclusions  of 
modern  psychology.  We  reach  it,  we  are  told,  not 
only  from  actual  experience,  of  our  inability  to  con- 
ceive either  of  matter  or  spirit,  but  from  an  analysis 
of  our  own  mental  processes.  What  do  we  mean 
when  we  say  that  we  know  any  given  fact  ?  Do  we 
mean  more  than  that  we  have  perceived  either  its 
likeness  or  its  unlikeness  to  similar  facts  which  we 
have  previously  investigated.  In  other  words,  things 
are  known  only  by  being  classified  ;  and  what  we 


THE  RELATIVITY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  4 1 

cannot  classify  remains  for  us  in  the  realm  of  the 
unknown.  A  thing  is  perfectly  known  only  when 
it  is  in  all  respects  like  things  previously  observed ; 
and  when  it  has  no  attribute  in  common  with  any- 
thing else  it  must  be  absolutely  unknown.  Or,  if 
we  view  the  process  under  a  different  but  correla- 
tive aspect,  and  recognize  not  likeness,  but  unlike- 
ness,  we  are  brought  to"  the  same  result.  To  be 
conscious,  we  must  be  conscious  of  something,  and 
that  something  can  only  be  known  as  that  which  it 
is  by  being  distinguished  from  that  which  it  is  not. 
Thus  all  knowledge  is  possible  only  in  the  form  of  a 
relation.1 

In  itself  considered,  this  principle  settles  nothing 
as  to  the  limits  of  human  knowledge.  It  does  not  de- 
termine how  far  the  mind  may  push  its  inquisitive 
search  into  the  region  of  the  unknown,  but  simplyj 
declares  that  as  far  as  the  mind  goes  it  must  follow  a) 
certain  method.  It  does  not  affirm  that  we  can  know 
nothing  of  the  Absolute,  but  only  that  the  Absolute 
must  be  revealed  to  us  under  the  conclusions  and 
limitations  of  our  own  consciousness  ;  it  does  not 
say  that  the  universe  around  us  and  above  us  must 
remain  inscrutable,  but  simply  that  the  universe  can 
be  known  to  us  only  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of 
our  own  spiritual  nature.  To  other  beings,  consti- 
tuted in  a  different  way,  it  may  be  disclosed  in 
wholly  different  aspects,  but  to  us  it  can  be  made 
known  only  under  the  conditions  of  our  human  con- 
sciousness. In  other  words,  when  we  affirm  th 
relativity  of  knowledge  we  simply  affirm  a  method 
we  do  not  fix  a  limit.  How  far  the  mind,  while  rec 
ognizing  this  condition,  may  legitimately  go,  is  a 
problem  that  remains  still  to  be  decided. 

1  Fiske,  Cosmic  Philosophy,  vol.  i.,  p.  14. 


\ 


42  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

But,  with  this  principle  established,  that  we  can- 
not directly  know  anything  save  modifications  of  our 
own  consciousness,  what  grounds  have  we  for  be- 
lieving in  the  existence  of  anything  external  to  our- 
selves ?  This  was  the  problem  with  which  Berkeley 
grappled ;  and  there  is  a  sense,  Mr.  Mill  truly  says, 
in  which  all  modern  philosophy  may  be  said  to  date 
from  the  good  Bishop,  to  whom  Pope  ascribed  "  every 
virtue  under  heaven."  His  theory  of  vision  is  per- 
haps the  most  important  contribution  made  to  the 
science  of  psychology  in  modern  times.  When  first 
published  it  appeared  so  novel  and  impossible  that 
it  was  scouted  as  a  paradox,  but  it  is  now  accepted 
by  every  scientific  school.  Briefly  stated,  it  amounts 
to  this,  that  there  is  no  resemblance  whatever  be- 
tween the  visible  and  tangible  qualities  of  things, 
and  that,  without  the  aid  of  our  other  senses,  our 
eyes  could  not  inform  us  that  anything  existed  out- 
side ourselves.  The  mind  invests  the  colors  and 
gradations  of  light  and  shade  with  the  various  modi- 
fications of  size  and  shape,  and  disposes  them  at  ap- 
propriate distances,  so  that  in  fact  we  learn  to  see 
precisely  as  we  learn  to  walk.  Common  experience 
shows  us  that  what  we  call  seeing  is  in  reality  a 
complicated  act  of  judgment.  It  is  not  the  eye,  but 
the  mind,  that  sees. 

While  the  researches  of  modern  physiologists  have 
not  affected  the  truth  of  Berkeley's  theory,  they  have 
set  it  forth  in  a  still  more  striking  light.  For  we 
now  know  with  certainty  that  it  is  not  the  image 
formed  on  the  retina  that  the  mind  perceives,  but 
that  the  physical  process  of  vision  must  be  traced 
much  farther  back.  The  eye  simply  receives  and 
measures  the  impressions  made  on  it  by  the  waves 


THE  RELATIVITY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  43 

of  light,  precisely  as  the  thermometer  and  the  bar- 
ometer measure  and  register  meteorological  phenom- 
ena. Its  function  is  merely  to  collect  the  data  out  of 
which  vision  is  constructed.  The  image  formed  on 
the  retina  is  not  transmitted  to  the  brain.  What  is 
sent  is  simply  the  sensation  excited.  Innumerable 
waves  of  nervous  energy  are  rolled  inward  to  the 
next  intercranial  station  (the  tubercula  quadrigem- 
ind).  Here  is  the  centre  of  the  sense  of  sight, 
though  not  of  the  highest  form  of  vision.  The 
optic  tubercles  take  up  the  process  of  vision  where 
the  eye  leaves  it,  and  elaborate  and  coordinate 
visual  impressions.  We  pass  to  a  third  station  (the 
angular  gyrus),  before  we  reach  the  true  sphere  of 
vision.  Here,  deep  in  the  recesses  of  the  brain,  the 
sensations,  transmitted  through  all  the  curious  ap- 
paratus we  have  described,  are  first  brought  into 
direct  relation  with  the  mind. 

The  line  of  thought  so  acutely  followed  out  in  his 
theory  of  vision  was  what  led  Berkeley  to  doubt  the 
existence  of  a  material  universe.  For,  if  the  world  of 
sight  is  a  phantasm,  and  exists  only  in  the  mind,  what 
reason  have  we  to  suppose  that  the  world  reported  to 
us  by  the  sense  of  touch  has  any  real  existence  out- 
side ourselves  ?  Only  with  regard  to  this  one  of  the 
five  senses  can  the  question  be  ever  raised.  Sight, 
as  we  have  seen,  primarily  tells  us  nothing,  and  the 
same  may  be  asserted,  without  hesitation,  of  hearing, 
smell,  and  taste.  They  are  simply  effects  produced 
on  the  mind,  and  of  the  causes  which  produce  them 
we  know  nothing.  So  far  as  we  can  see,  the  nature 
of  the  effect  depends  far  more  on  the  constitution 
of  the  thing  acted  upon  than  on  that  of  the  thing  act- 
ing.    Only  the  sense  of  touch  remains,  which  seems 


44  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

to  connect  us  with  an  external  world.  But  all  that 
touch  reveals  is  muscular  resistance.  For  aught 
that  we  know,  or  ever  can  know,  what  we  call  mat- 
ter may  be  only  the  regular  and  uniform  manifesta- 
tion of  force,  and  of  force  we  only  know  that  which 
is  the  result  of  mind.  Hence  Berkeley  inferred  that 
the  orderly  and  uniform  phenomena  of  the  external 
world  were  simply  manifestations  of  an  omnipresent 
mind. 

Berkeley  does  not  deny ;  on  the  contrary,  he 
strongly  affirms  the  uniformity  of  nature  and  the 
Universal  reign  of  law.  "That  what  I  see,  hear,  and 
feel  doth  exist,"  says  he,  "that  is  to  say,  is  perceived 
by  me,  I  no  more  doubt  than  I  do  of  my  own  being." 1 
What  he  denied  was  the  existence  of  an  unknown 
something,  lying  behind  phenomena,  without  sen- 
sible qualities  itself,  but  capable  of  exciting  the  im- 
pressions of  those  qualities  in  the  mind  of  the  be- 
holder. In  thus  reducing  matter  to  force,  and  then 
regarding  force  as  nothing  but  will,  the  virtuous  prel- 
ate strangely  anticipated  some  of  the  most  recent 
results  of  speculation.  As  he  sat  on  "  the  hanging 
rocks  "  and  gazed  at  the  fair  shore  where  Chan- 
ning  afterwards  wandered,  he  revolved  the  principle 
which  Schopenhauer  in  our  own  time  has  rendered 
so  familiar.  But  evidently  this  does  not  solve  the 
problem,  whether  we  can  know  anything  of  an  ex- 
ternal world.  It  assumes  that  this  world  has  no  ex- 
istence, and  this  cuts  but  does  not  untie  the  knot. 
Accepting  Berkeley's  theory,  we  are  shut  up  to  one 
of  two  alternatives,  either  that  the  modifications  of 
consciousness  in  the  mind  are  determined  directly 

1  [Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  P.  i.,  40  (  Works,  ed.  Fraser,  vol. 
U  P-  175] 


THE  RELATIVITY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  45 

by  the  will  of  God,  or  that  they  are  created  by  the 
mind  itself.  Berkeley  chose  the  former,  and  in  so 
doing,  as  he  supposed,  rested  religion  on  its  firmest 
basis. 

Himself  a  devout  believer  and  writing  in  the  inter- 
est of  religion,  Berkeley  paved  the  way  for  skepti- 
cism. He  had  shown  that  we  have  no  experience  of 
anything  outside  ourselves  independent  of  percep- 
tion; he  had  discarded  the  material  universe  as  a 
figment  of  the  imagination.  Hume  took  up  the  dis-  I 
cussion  at  this  point,  and  turned  the  guns  from  the  f 
world  without  to  the  world  within.  If  matter  was 
merely  a  figment,  what  reason  was  there  to  suppose 
that  mind  was  more  than  a  figment  also  ?  If  it  was 
unnecessary  to  infer  the  existence  of  any  hidden 
something  as  a  basis  for  material  phenomena,  why 
was  any  hidden  something  necessary  to  explain  the 
phenomena  of  mind  ?  In  the  external  world,  all  that 
we  have  any  experience  of  is  impressions.  In  the 
inner  world,  all  that  we  have  any  experience  of  is 
states  of  consciousness.  In  either  sphere  the  exist- 
ence of  anything  beyond  is  a  simple  inference  ;  and 
what  reason  have  we  for  making  this  inference  in 
the  one  case  more  than  in  the  other.  Matter  is  an 
aggregate  of  impressions,  mind  is  but  a  succession 
of  impressions.  Thus,  by  a  single  step,  idealism  was 
converted  into  skepticism.  Respecting  the  real  na- 
ture of  things  we  know  absolutely  nothing. 

It  was  precisely  at  this  point  that  Kant  grasped  \ 
the  problem.  To  determine  whether  we  have  any 
other  source  of  knowledge  than  that  given  in  expe- 
rience, was  the  professed  aim  of  the  critical  philos- 
ophy. Like  Locke,  of  whom  he  appears  as  the  suc- 
cessor and  rival,  the  German  philosopher  undertook 


46  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

"  to  inquire  into  the  origin,  certainty,  and  extent  of 
human  knowledge  ; "  and  as  a  means  to  this  he  sought 
to  make  a  critical  examination  of  the  human  mind, 
an  accurate  analysis  of  its  principal  cognitions  and 
ideas.  Hence  the  designation  adopted  for  his  sys- 
tem. His  aim  was  to  mediate  between  the  schooLof 
intuition  and  the  school  of  experience.  Yet  he  does 
not  compare  the  doctrines  of  those  rival  schools, 
but  opens  for  himself  a  wholly  new  path.  Giving 
up  any  consideration,  at  the  outset,  of  the  problems 
so  long  and  so  fruitlessly  debated,  he  sought  to  go 
further  back  and  make  mind  itself  the  subject  of  his 
inquiry.  On  account  of  the  new  method  which  he 
thus  adopted,  he  likened  himself  to  Copernicus,  who 
finding  that  the  motions  of  the  heavenly  bodies  could 
not  be  explained  by  supposing  the  firmament  to  re- 
volve round  the  earth,  reversed  the  whole  theory  of 
the  solar  system.  "  Mind,"  he  declared,  "  does  not 
derive  its  primitive  cognitions  from  nature,  but  im- 
poses them  on  nature." 

On  interrogating  consciousness,  Kant  satisfied 
himself  that  neither  of  the  explanations  that  have 
been  given  could  account  for  the  phenomena  pre- 
sented. On  the  one  hand,  the  mind  has  a  class  of 
abstract  ideas,  —  as  of  time,  of  space,  of  cause, — 
which  could  not  be  resolved  into  experience  alone  ; 
but,  on  the  other,  they  could  as  little  be  regarded 
as  absolutely  independent  of  experience,  since  they 
are  simply  the  necessary  conditions  of  experience. 
There  are  not,  therefore,  two  sources  of  knowledge, 
the  intellect  and  the  external  world,  but  knowledge  is 
the  union  of  the  two.  All  knowledge  begins  with  ex- 
perience, for  the  faculty  of  cognition  can  be  awakened 
into  exercise  in  no  other  way  than  by  means  of  objects 


THE  RELATIVITY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  47 

which  affect  the  senses,  and,  by  rousing  the  powers 
of  understanding  into  activity,  convert  the  mere  raw 
material  of  the  sensuous  impression  into  that  recog- 
nition of  objects  which  is  termed  experience.  But 
it  does  not  follow  that  all  knowledge  arises  from  ex- 
perience, for  it  is  possible  that  even  our  empirical 
knowledge  may  be  the  result  of  that  which  we  re- 
ceive through  the  senses,  and  that  which  the  faculty 
of  cognition  supplies.  Against  Locke,  the  German] 
philosopher  sought  to  prove  that  we  have  ideas  in-/ 
dependent  of  experience ;  and,  against  Hume,  that 
these  ideas  have  a  necessary  and  universal  charac- 
ter. 

The  great  problem  which  the  critical  philosopher 
undertook  to  solve,  as  expressed  in  Kant's  own 
phraseology,  was  the  question,  "  How  are  synthetic 
judgments,  a  priori,  possible  ?"  What  he  means  is 
this  :  All  our  judgments  may  be  divided  into  two 
classes,  analytic  and  synthetic.  An  analytic  judg- 
ment is  simply  a  definition,  as  when  we  say  that  a 
triangle  has  three  sides.  This  statement  is  simply 
explicative  ;  it  adds  nothing  to  our  knowledge. 
When,  however,  we  predicate  some  attribute  of  a 
thing  not  involved  in  the  conception,  as  that  iron  is 
hard,  we  express  an  additional  truth,  and  have  a 
synthetic  judgment.  Synthetic  judgments,  when 
derived  from  experience,  are  a  posteriori,  as  that 
sugar  is  soluble.  But  are  there  any  not  derived 
from  experience  ?  Hume  declared  that  our  ideas  of 
cause  and  effect  are  simply  the  result  of  an  experi- 
ence of  antecedence  and  consequence.  But  Kant 
replied  that,  in  the  mere  fact  of  antecedence  and 
consequence,  the  idea  of  causation  was  not  given. 
But,  as   it  is  irresistibly  believed  -in,  it  must  have 


48  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

some  source.  If  this  source  cannot  be  found  in  ex- 
perience, it  must  have  a  necessary  basis  in  the  un- 
derstanding. We  are,  therefore,  brought  to  recog- 
nize the  validity  of  synthetic  judgments  a  priori. 

At  first  glance  we  seem  to  have  reached  the  shore, 
and  to  be  planted  on  a  rock,  from  which  we  can  sur- 
vey with  complacency  the  frail  barks  of  former  sys- 
tems tossed  helplessly  on  an  unresting  sea.  But  a 
closer  examination  shows  that  the  critical  philosophy 
has  not  solved  the  problem  of  human  knowledge. 
We  have  found,  indeed,  that  mind  does  owe  some- 
thing to  sense-experience,  and  that  what  it  adds  has 
the  characteristics  of  certitude  and  universality, 
which  experience  can  never  claim.  Still,  the  great 
question,  whether  we  have  ideas  that  are  true  inde- 
pendent of  ourselves,  remains  unanswered.  These 
necessary  conditions  of  thought  are  purely  personal. 
They  are  applicable  only  within  the  field  of  experi- 
ence, and  if  pushed  beyond  it  only  lead  to  delusion 
and  error.  According  to  Kant,  even  space  and 
time  were  only  forms  of  human  perception,  and  not 
modes  of  real  existence.  They  are  universal  and 
necessary  conditions  of  all  experience,  but  have  no 
reality  beyond.  For  the  very  reason  that  they  exist 
in  the  mind,  as  forms  of  intuition,  they  cannot  exist 
out  of  it.  While  he  did  not  deny  the  existence  of  an 
external  world,  he  affirmed  that  its  existence  could 
not  be  proved. 

In  spite,  then,  of  his  decided  antagonism  to  Hume, 
Kant  must  be  regarded  as  equally  the  precursor  of 
the  doctrine  of  relativity.  He  taught  that  every  hy- 
pothesis which  we  can  frame  respecting  the  Infinite, 
the  first  cause,  or  the  ultimate  essences  of  things, 
must  inevitably  commit  us  to  contradictions.     He 


THE  RELATIVITY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  49 

showed  from  a  psychological  analysis  that  the  neces- 
sary cooperation  of  two  factors,  in  each  act  of  cog- 
nition, rendered  any  knowledge  of  the  external 
world,  as  it  really  exists,  forever  impossible.  And 
though  he  conceded  that  the  existence  of  an  exter- 
nal world  was  a  necessary  postulate,  yet  this  exist- 
ence was  only  logically  affirmed.  Any  attempt  to 
transcend  the  sphere  of  consciousness,  he  declared, 
was  hopeless  ;  as  well  might  the  bird,  when  feeling 
.  the  resistance  of  the  air,  wish  that  it  were  in  a  va- 
cuum. Where  Kant  differed  essentially  from  Humej 
was  in  asserting  the  veracity  of  consciousness. ' 
Here  he  found  the  basis  on  which  to  build  religion 
and  morals.  Reason  is  wholly  incompetent  to  the 
task  of  demonstrating  that  the  world  exists,  or  that 
God  exists.  But  there  is  another  certitude  besides 
that  derived  from  demonstration.  That  the  world/ 
exists,  that  God  exists,  are  irresistible  convictions. 

With  this  brief  review  of  phases  in  the  history  of 
thought,  perhaps  familiar  to  most  of  you,  we  are  in 
a  position  to  understand  the  position  of  the  present 
school  of  experience  represented  by  Mr.  Herbert 
Spencer.  To  this  school  the  term  Positive  is  com- 
monly applied,  but  in  its  latest  modification  it  de- 
parts essentially  from  the  so-called  Positive  Philos- 
ophy  as  expounded  by  August^Comte.  Starting^ 
from  the  postulate  of  the  relativity  of  knowledge, 
the  French  philosopher  affirmed  not  only  that  all 
knowledge  comes  from  experience,  but  that,  in  its 
utmost  development,  it  could  not  go  beyond  this 
line.  In  effect  he  reduced  philosophy  to  a  physical 
science,  and  denied  that  there  was  any  mode  of  veri- 
fying truth  save  that  which  the  physical  sciences 
supply.  One  method  must  be  followed  in  all  inves- 
4 


50  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

tigations,  whether  the  investigations  relate  to  phys- 
ics, to  psychology,  to  ethics,  or  to  politics.  Hence 
the  contempt  which  Comte  expressed  for  metaphys- 
ics as  concerned  with  questions  which  lay  outside 
the  limit  of  scientific  study.  Hence  his  famous  doc- 
trine of  the  three  stages,  in  which  theology  and 
metaphysics  were  represented  as  mere  stepping- 
stones  of  humanity  to  positive  philosophy. 

The  attitude  of  positivism  with  regard  to  the  great 
problem  whether  any  reality  existed  behind  the  phe- 
nomena recognized  by  the  senses  was  not  explicitly 
defined  by  Comte ;  he  simply  dismissed  the  ques- 
tion. In  his  recent  English  representative,  John 
Stuart  Mill,  we  find  substantially  the  same  treat- 
ment of  the  question.  In  his  essay  on  Berkeley  he 
says  that  we  owe  to  that  philosopher  "  the  discovery 
of  the  true  nature  and  meaning  of  the  externality 
which  we  attribute  to  the  objects  of  our  senses  ;  that 
it  does  not  consist  in  a  substratum  supporting  a  set 
of  sensible  qualities,  or  an  unknown  somewhat,  which 
not  being  itself  a  sensation  gives  us  our  sensations, 
but  consists  in  the  fact  that  our  sensations  occur  in 
groups,  held  together  by  a  permanent  law,  and  which 
come  and  go  independently  of  our  volitions  or  men- 
tal processes."  1  Hence  the  existence  of  an  unknown 
reality  behind  phenomena  is  not  denied,  but  is  left 
an  open  question.  Hence  it  appears  that  the  pos- 
itive philosophy,  refusing  to  deal  with  anything  be- 
yond the  sphere  of  experience,  simply  preserves  a 
non-committal  attitude  with  regard  to  the  question 
of  any  absolute  existence.  Any  attempt  to  solve 
this  problem  it  contemptuously  scouts  as  a  task  in 
which  only  children  can  take  an  interest. 

1  \Thrce  Essays  on  Religion  (New  York,  1874),  p.  263.] 


THE  RELATIVITY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  5  I 

Precisely  at  this  point  the  line  is  drawn  between 
the  school  of  Mill  and  the  school  of  Spencer.  For 
it  is  the  characteristic  of  the  latter  that  in  opposition 
to  idealism,  and  to  positivism  alike,  it  unhesitatingly 
affirms  the  existence  of  this  absolute  reality.  Start- 
ing from  precisely  the  same  point  of  the  relativity 
of  knowledge,  denying  that  we  have  direct  knowledge 
of  anything  but  sensible  impressions,  reducing  con- 
sciousness to  a  series  of  successive  states,  holding 
much  in  common  with  the  positive  philosophy,  it  af- 
firms that  by  a  strict  process  of  scientific  reasoning 
we  may  reach  the  result  that  something  real  and  ab- 
solute exists  behind  the  phenomena  presented  to 
the  senses.  It  affirms  this  conclusion,  not,  it  is 
true,  on  the  old  ground,  but  as  the  only  conclusion 
consistent  with  that  enlarged  and  systematized  ex- 
perience, to  which  alone  should  be  given  the  name 
of  science.  It  not  only  refuses  to  admit  the  legit- 
imacy of  the  inference  drawn  by  the  idealist  that 
the  unknown  reality  beyond  consciousness  does  not 
exist,  but  affirms  positively  that  the  doctrine  of  rela- 
tivity cannot  be  intelligibly  stated  without  postulat- 
ing the  existence  of  this  reality. 

The  grounds  for  this  departure  from  the  positive 
philosophy  may  be  briefly  stated  thus.  Although 
we  have  no  experience  whatever  of  this  absolute  ex- 
istence in  itself,  we  have  an  experience  of  the  mode 
in  which  we  are  affected  by  it.  This  experience 
generates  in  us  a  fixed  order  of  conceptions.  And 
since  we  are  thus  possessed  of  a  subjective  order  of 
conceptions  wholly  independent  of  our  volition,  we 
have  the  strongest  possible  warrant  for  believing 
that  this  inner  order  corresponds  to  the  outer  order 
of   phenomena.       Or  in    other  words,    "when  any 


52  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

given  order  among  our  conceptions  is  so  coherent 
that  it  cannot  be  sundered  except  by  the  temporary- 
annihilation  of  some  one  of  its  terms,  there  must  be 
a  corresponding  order  among  phenomena."  Or,  to 
put  the  principle  in  still  a  different  form,  "  perfect 
congruity  of  experience  must  generate  in  us  belief, 
of  which  the  component  conceptions  can  by  no  men- 
tal effort  be  torn  apart."  The  result  which  we  thus 
reach  is  a  reasoned  realism,  the  fundamental  the- 
orem of  the  most  recent  form  of  the  experience- 
philosophy.  It  may  be  defined  as  a  synthesis  of 
scientific  truths  in  a  universal  science  dealing  with 
phenomena  as  manifestations  of  an  absolute  power. 

Let  us  quote  the  language  of  Mr.  Spencer  himself. 
"  One  of  two  things  must  be  asserted :  either  the 
antecedents  of  each  feeling,  or  state  of  conscious- 
ness, exist  only  as  previous  feelings  or  states  of  con- 
sciousness ;  or  else  they,  or  some  of  them,  exist 
apart  from,  or  independently  of,  consciousness.  If 
the  first  is  asserted,  then  the  proof  that  whatever 
we  feel  exists  relatively  to  ourselves  only,  becomes 
doubly  meaningless.  To  say  that  a  sensation  of 
sound  and  a  sensation  of  jar  cannot  be  respectively 
like  their  common  antecedent  because  they  are  not 
like  one  another,  is  an  empty  proposition,  since  the 
two  feelings  of  sound  and  jar  never  have  a  com- 
mon antecedent  in  consciousness.  The  combination 
of  feelings  that  is  followed  by  the  feeling  of  jar  is 
never  the  same  as  the  combination  of  feelings  that 
is  followed  by  the  feeling  of  sound ;  and  hence,  not 
having  a  common  antecedent,  it  cannot  be  argued 
that  they  are  unlike  it.  Moreover,  if  by  antecedent 
is  meant  constant  and  uniform  antecedent  (and  any 
other  meaning  is  suicidal),  then  the  proposition  that 


THE  RELATIVITY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  53 

the  antecedent  of  sound  exists  only  in  consciousness, 
is  absolutely  irreconcilable  with  the  fact  that  the 
feeling  of  sound  often  abruptly  breaks  in  upon  the 
series  of  feelings  otherwise  determined,  when  no 
antecedent  of  the  specified  kind  has  occurred.  The 
other  alternative,  therefore,  that  the  active  antece- 
dent of  each  primary  feeling  exists  independently  of 
consciousness,  is  the  only  thinkable  one.  It  is  the 
one  implicitly  asserted  in  the  very  proposition  that 
feelings  are  relative  to  our  own  natures  ;  and  it  is 
taken  for  granted  in  every  step  of  every  argument 
by  which  this  proposition  is  proved."  1 

"  Hence  our  firm  belief  in  objective  reality,  a  be- 
lief which  metaphysical  criticisms  cannot  for  a  mo- 
ment shake.  When  we  are  taught  that  a  piece  of 
matter,  regarded  by  us  as  existing  externally,  can- 
not be  really  known,  but  that  we  can  only  know  cer- 
tain impressions  produced  on  us,  we  are  yet,  by  the 
relativity  of  our  thought,  compelled  to  think  of  them 
in  relation  to  a  positive  cause  —  the  notion  of  a  real 
existence  which  generated  these  impressions  be- 
comes nascent."  "  The  momentum  of  thought  inev- 
itably carries  us  beyond  conditioned  existence  to  un- 
conditional existence."  At  the  same  time  that  by 
the  laws  of  thought  we  are  rigorously  prevented  from 
forming  a  conception  of  absolute  existence,  we  are 
by  the  laws  of  thought  equally  prevented  from  rid- 
ding ourselves  of  the  consciousness  of  absolute  exist- 
ence; this  consciousness  being,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
obverse  of  our  self-consciousness."2 

But  this  affirmation  of  the  existence  of  an  abso- 
lute reality,  independent  of  the  series  of  changes 

1  Principles  of  Psychology,  i.  209. 

2  First  Principles,  pp.  93,  96. 


54  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

which  constitutes  our  consciousness,  is  made  with 
important  limitations.  If  we  ask  for  a  more  precise 
definition  of  what  it  means,  we  are  told  that  we  can- 
not identify  this  absolute  existence  with  mind,  since 
what  we  know  as  mind  is  nothing  more  than  a  series 
of  phenomenal  manifestations,  not  an  occult  reality, 
but  simply  a  group  of  thoughts  and  feelings.  Nor 
can  we  any  more  identify  this  absolute  existence 
with  matter,  since  what  we  know  as  matter  is  also 
but  a  group  of  phenomena  perceived  by  the  senses. 
Absolute  existence,  which  exists  independently  of 
us,  and  of  which  mind  and  matter  are  the  manifesta- 
tions, cannot  be  identified  with  either.  Thus  ideal- 
ism and  materialism  are  equally  set  aside.  And, 
since  the  relations  of  difference  and  no-difference, 
under  which  we  are  compelled  to  do  all  our  think- 
ing, are  subjective,  we  cannot  say  that  there  exists 
independently  of  consciousness  any  reality  to  which 
these  apply  ;  we  cannot  conceive  of  absolute  exist- 
ence even  as  single  being.  We  can  simply  affirm 
the  fact  of  absolute  existence  ;  the  nature  of  that 
existence  remains  inscrutable.  We  have  only  an 
unknowable  reality,  of  which  all  phenomena  are 
knowable  manifestations. 

v  Like  the  positive  philosophy,  the  system  of  Mr. 
-  Spencer  rejects  as  futile  all  ontological  speculation; 
like  the  positive  philosophy,  it  professes  to  make  a 
rigorous  use  of  scientific  method,  but  it  reaches  a  re- 
sult from  which  the  positive  philosophy  recoils.  And 
this  result  it  does  not  hesitate  to  assert  in  the  inter- 
est of  religion.  "The  certainty,"  says  Mr.  Spencer, 
"  that,  on  the  one  hand,  such  a  power  exists,  while, 
on  the  other  hand,  ifs  nature  transcends  intuition 
and  is  beyond  imagination,  is  the  certainty  towards 


THE  RELATIVITY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  55 

which  intelligence  has  been  from  the  first  progress- 
ing. To  this  conclusion  science  inevitably  arrives 
as  it  reaches  its  confines  ;  while  to  this  conclusion 
religion  is  irresistibly  driven  by  criticism.  And  sat- 
isfying, as  it  does,  the  demands  of  the  most  rigorous 
logic,  at  the  same  time  that  it  gives  the  religious 
sentiment  the  widest  possible  sphere  of  action,  it  is 
the  conclusion  we  are  bound  to  accept  without  re- 
serve or  qualification."  And  then,  having,  in  reply 
to  Mansel,  declared  that  duty  requires  us  neither  to 
affirm  or  deny  personality  of  this  Absolute  Un- 
known, but  submit  ourselves  with  all  humility  to 
the  established  limits  of  our  intelligence,  he  adds : 
"  This,  which  to  most  will  seem  an  essentially  irre- 
ligious position,  is  an  essentially  religious  one,  nay, 
is  the  religious  one  to  which  all  others  are  but  ap- 
proximations." x 

If  we  now  ask  what  is  the  ground  of  this  ineradi- 
cable belief  in  the  existence  of  absolute  being,  we  are 
told  that  it  rests  upon  the  strongest  of  all  founda- 
tions, —  the  unthinkableness  of  its  opposite.  With- 
out postulating  it,  we  can  frame  no  theory  whatever 
either  of  external  or  internal  phenomena.  But  why 
are  we  compelled  to  think  in  any  given  way  ?  Sim- 
ply, we  are  told,  because  we  cannot  transcend  ex- 
perience. "  The  very  fact  of  our  being  compelled  to 
judge  of  the  unknown  by  the  known,  of  our  irresist- 
ibly anticipating  that  the  future  course  of  events 
will  resemble  the  past,  of  our  incapacity  to  believe 
that  the  same  effects  should  not  grow  from  the 
same  causes  —  this  very  fact  is  a  triumphant  proof 
of  our  having  no  ideas  not  acquired  through  experi- 
ence."2    Only,  by  experience  is  not  meant  merely 

1  [First  Principles,  p.  108.] 

2  Lewes,  History  of  Philosophy,  vol.  i.,  p.  cxiii. 


$6  THE   THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

the  experience  of  the  individual,  nor  even  the  expe- 
rience of  the  race,  transmitted  from  past  generations 
by  tradition,  but  the  very  faculties  by  which  ideas 
are  acquired  are  themselves  the  products  of  accumu- 
lated and  organized  experiences  received  by  ances- 
tral races  of  beings.  This  primordial  experience 
supplies  the  basis  from  which  individual  experience 
begins. 

With  the  scientific  value,  or  the  logical  consis- 
tency, of  this  theory,  we  are  not  now  concerned.  I 
am  not  subjecting  the  philosophy  of  Mr.  Spencer  to 
any  critical  review,  but  simply  making  use  of  it  as 
illustrating  the  most  recent  phase  of  the  doctrine  of 
relativity.  And  it  clearly  shows  us  this,  that  start- 
ing with  the  doctrine  that  experience  is  the  only 
source  of  knowledge,  and  making  the  first  test  of 
truth  to  consist  in  "  the  inexpugnable  persistence 
in  consciousness,"  insisting  throughout  that,  in  its 
utmost  limit,  truth  is  simply  the  generalization  of 
experience,  he  reaches  a  point  when  he  is  compelled 
to  believe  in  something  which  is  not  the  product  of 
experience,  of  which  he  is  not  and  never  can  be 
conscious,  and  which  no  generalization  of  science 
could  ever  reach.  The  existence  of  this  something 
is  simply  a  matter  of  belief.  The  metaphysical 
ground  of  this  belief  is  a  secondary  question.  It 
is  essential  to  his  own  logical  support  of  his  posi- 
tion, but  is  not  essential  to  our  understanding  of 
it.  No  matter  how  explained,  no  matter  how  well 
I  or  how  ill  supported,  the  simple  fact  remains,  that 
our  only  guarantee  for  the  fundamental  conception 
on  which  philosophy  is  built  is  irresistible  belief. 

This  point  is  too  important  to  be  passed  over 
without  further  comment.     Nothing  was  more  char- 


THE  RELATIVITY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  57 

acteristic  of  the  positive  school,  as  represented  by 
Comte,  than  the  emphasis  with  which  it  insisted  on 
a  strictly  scientific  method.  No  truth  was  recog-' 
nized  as  having  any  validity  but  reasoned  or  logic- 
ally demonstrated  truth.  The  maxims  of  physical 
investigation  were  exalted  into  a  universal  organon. 
No  facts  were  recognized  that  could  not  be  made 
evident  to  sense.  It  was  the  boast  of  this  philos- 
ophy, that  the  solid  walls  of  the  structure  that  it 
reared  were  not  weakened  by  any  doubtful  mate- 
rial from  the  quarry  of  metaphysics.  But  this  later 
school  denounces,  as  a  popular  misconception,  the 
notion  that  nothing  can  be  known  to  be  true  that 
cannot  be  demonstrated.  It  does  not  hesitate  to 
recognize  belief  as  the  sole  basis  of  the  fundamental 
conceptions  of  human  thought.  True,  it  attempts 
an  elaborate  vindication  of  the  origin  of  such  belief. 
Discarding  as  equally  insufficient  the  explanation  of 
Hume,  that  the  sole  criterion  of  truth  is  uniformity  j 
of  experience,  and  the  explanation  of  Kant,'  that 
the  criterion  of  truth  is  to  be  found  in  the  constitu-' 
tion  of  the  mind,  it  professes  to  blend  both  theories 
together  in  the  doctrine  that  our  experience  is  the 
register  of  the  facts  which  the  external  world  is  con- 
tinually impressing  upon  consciousness,  so  that  the 
mind  receives,  from  generation  to  generation,  a 
shape  which  renders  it  incapable  of  conceiving  any- 
thing at  variance  with  this  register.  But  it  is  clear 
that  this  physical  theory  of  the  origin  of  our  neces- 
sary beliefs,  whether  true  or  false,  does  not  in  the 
least  modify  their  nature  ;  nor  does  it  modify,  in  the 
slightest  degree,  the  conditions  of  the  problem  we 
have  been  all  along  discussing.  What  ground  have 
we  for  inferring  the  existence  of  an  external  real- 


58  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

ity  corresponding  with  the  subjective  order  of  our 
thought  ?  When  we  reach  the  last  analysis,  our  sole 
warrant  for  this  is  not  demonstration,  but  belief. 
In  other  words,  far  as  we  may  push  our  rigid  chain 
of  scientific  reasoning,  we  reach  at  last  a  line  where 
the  whole  complexion  of  our  mental  state  is  altered. 
We  may  be  forced  by  a  logical  necessity  to  conceive 
the  existence  of  something  transcending  thought, 
but  that  this  existence  is  not  ideal,  but  real,  can  only 
be  matter  of  irresistible  belief. 

Another  characteristic  of  the  Comtean  school  of 
positivism  was  the  unqualified  contempt  which  it 
expressed,  on  all  occasions,  for  metaphysics.  The 
great  problems  of  metaphysics  were  dismissed  as  in- 
soluble, as  finding  no  place  in  scientific  method,  as 
characteristic  of  a  lower  and  preliminary  stage  in 
the  growth  of  the  human  race.  But  the  later  theory 
brings  us  face  to  face  with  a  purely  ontological  con- 
clusion, —  the  idea  of  absolute  being.  And  this  con- 
clusion it  does  not  know  of  as  an  abstraction,  but 
presents  as  a  reality,  the  negation  of  which  is  incon- 
ceivable. True,  the  old  phrases  are  repeated  about 
the  fruitlessness  of  metaphysical  inquiry,  and  what 
are  termed  the  objective  and  the  subjective  methods 
are  carefully  distinguished.  We  are  told  that  the 
difference  between  a  scientific  and  a  metaphysical 
principle  consists,  not  in  the  fact  that  the  former  is, 
not  disputed,  but  that  it  is  open  to  verification,  and 
that  a  sound  philosophy  is  simply  the  most  general- 
ized form  of  science  ;  but,  with  whatever  pretexts, 
the  great  fact  is  recognized  that  these  conceptions 
cannot  be  dismissed  from  human  thought. 

When  Mr.  Lewes  so  earnestly  contends  for  the 
application  of  scientific  methods  to  metaphysics,  he 


THE  RELATIVITY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  59 

virtually  avows  that  the  problems  of  metaphysics 
cannot  be  discarded.  There  is  a  path,  he  tells  us, 
through  which  these  problems  may  be  accessible. 
The  question  with  him  is  one  of  method.  The  first 
operation,  in  dealing  with  a  metaphysical  problem, 
is  to  disengage  the  known  from  the  unknown  ele- 
ments. As  a  guide  to  research,  he  proceeds  to 
lay  down  the  formula,  that  "the  existence  of  an 
unknown  quantity  does  not  necessarily  disturb  the 
accuracy  of  calculations  founded  on  the  known  func- 
tions of  that  quantity."  1  This  not  only  virtually  con- 
cedes the  principle  for  which  I  contended  at  the 
outset,  but  it  reveals,  on  the  part  of  this  popular 
writer,  a  significant  change  in  the  estimate  of  truths. 
The  sphere  of  inquiry  is  immeasurably  extended  be- 
yond the  line  drawn  by  those  who  limited  philos- 
ophy to  the  study  of  physical  causation.  When  he 
assures  us  that  the  great  problems  which  for  thirty 
years  he  dismissed  as  insoluble  he  now  regards  as 
soluble,  he  passes  sentence  of  condemnation  on  all 
who,  on  scientific  grounds,  profess  to  care  not  for 
these  things. 

The  general  body  of  doctrine  that  passes  under 
the  designation  of  positivism  is  the  bugbear  of  the 
modern  religious  mind.  It  is  looked  upon  as  a  sys- 
tem which,  on  rigidly  scientific  grounds,  subverts 
our  belief  in  a  supernatural  order,  and  which  arrays 
all  the  best  attested  results  of  modern  scientific  in- 
quiry in  opposition  to  the  most  cherished  convic- 
tions of  the  soul.  It  is  popularly  regarded  as  creat- 
ing an  impassable  barrier  between  the  seen  and  the 
unseen  ;  as  rejecting  with  contempt  inquiries  with 
which   the   most   vital    interests    of    humanity   are 

1  {Problems  of  Life  and  Mind  (1st  series),  vol.  i.,  p.  37.] 


60  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

bound  up.  And  it  must  be  acknowledged  that,  as 
frequently  expressed  in  its  more  popular  forms,  it 
has  furnished  ample  occasion  for  this  reproach.  But 
we  have  seen  from  this  hasty  survey,  that,  accepted 
in  this  spirit,  it  no  longer  satisfies  its  most  thought- 
ful adherents.  The  strict  disciples  of  Comte,  at 
the  present  day,  are  a  mere  handful.  His  name  is 
mentioned  with  scorn  by  some  of  the  leaders  of 
modern  thought  who  owe  their  first  impulse  to  his 
teachings  ;  and,  as  we  know,  he  lived  long  enough 
himself  to  bring  a  stinging  reproach  of  insufficiency 
against  his  own  fundamental  postulate.  In  its  mod- 
ified form,  this  school  deals  with  the  very  problems 
which  it  once  discarded,  and  not  only  this,  but,  in 
dealing  with  them,  it  virtually  indorses  the  method 
which  it  once  condemned  ;  for  the  irresistible  belief, 
which  Mr.  Spencer  recognizes  as  the  foundation  of 
philosophy,  however  he  may  account  for  its  exist- 
ence, does  not  practically  differ  from  the  intuition 
on  which  the  older  philosophy  insisted.  If  this  is 
merely  the  result  of  experience,  it  cannot  be  neces- 
sary and  absolute  ;  if  necessary  and  absolute,  it  must 
involve  an  element  which  mere  experience  cannot 
supply.  It  was  this  intuitional  element  in  Spen- 
cer's view  which  excited  the  profound  repugnance 
of  Mr.  Mill.  But  this  is  one  of  its  fundamental 
characteristics  ;  and  although,  as  applied  by  Mr. 
Spencer,  it  cannot  be  said  to  advance  us  very  far  in 
the  line  of  any  positive  religious  conception,  yet  it 
effectually  demolished  the  barrier  which  the  earlier 
positivism  had  set  up.  It  again  opened  the  ques- 
tions which  Comte  had  declared  forever  settled.  It 
may  not  decide  these  questions  in  a  satisfactory  way, 
but  it  no  longer  seeks  to  banish  them  from  the  juris- 
diction of  human  thought. 


THE  RELATIVITY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  6 1 

In  recognizing,  even  in  this  modified  form,  the 
validity  of  intuition,  Mr.  Spencer  concedes  the  great 
principle  that  the  sphere  of  truth  extends  beyond  the 
domain  of  mere  logical  inference.  In  other  words, 
the  soul  is  seen  to  be  subject  to  more  than  mere 
intellectual  conditions.  It  was  a  maxim  of  Comte, — 
a  maxim  that  underlies  and  pervades  his  whole  the- 
ory of  the  progress  of  humanity,  —  that  ideas  and 
ideas  alone,  govern  and  modify  society;  that  the  so- 
cial mechanism,  in  its  last  analysis,  rests  wholly  on 
opinions.  This  doctrine  was  made  familiar  to  Eng- 
lish readers  a  few  years  ago  in  the  now  almost  forgot- 
ten history  of  Mr.  Buckle.  This  writer,  with  a  parade 
of  learning  that  for  the  moment  confused  his  undis- 
cerning  readers,  set  forth  the  theorem  that  the  laws 
of  human  development  were  only  intellectual  laws, 
and  that  the  moral  element  might  safely  be  omitted 
from  our  survey.  We  find  in  Mr.  Spencer  an  un- 
qualified rejection  of  this  view.  "  Ideas,"  he  tells  us 
in  a  striking  passage,  "do  not  govern  and  overthrow 
the  world  ;  the  world  is  governed  or  overthrown  by 
feelings,  to  which  ideas  serve  only  as  guides.  The, 
social  mechanism  does  not  rest  finally  upon  opinions, 
but  almost  wholly  upon  character." 

Refusing  as  he  did,  to  recognize  in  his  philosophy 
any  consciousness  of  a  cause  manifesting  itself  to 
us  in  phenomena,  scouting,  indeed,  the  very  con- 
ception of  cause  as  unworthy  the  notice  of  science, 
Comte,  when  in  his  old  age  he  sought  satisfaction 
for  the  irresistible  cravings  of  his  religious  nature, 
was  driven  to  find  the  object  of  his  worship  in  Hu- 
manity, whose  collective  life  he  termed  the  Supreme 
Being.  And  hence  that  strange' ritual,  which  Mr. 
Huxley  sneered  at  as  "  Catholicism  minus  Christian- 


62  THE    THEISTJC  ARGUMENT. 

ity  ; "  while  Mr.  Spencer,  conceiving  the  object  of 
religious  sentiment  as  the  unknown  source  of  things, 
insists  that  however  the  mere  forms  of  apprehension 
may  change,  from  age  to  age,  the  substance  of  the 
consciousness  can  never  pass  away.  But  as,  accord- 
ing to  his  view,  the  life  of  humanity  is  a  constant 
evolution,  the  inner  necessity  which  shapes  our  think- 
ing, being  the  result  of  a  constant  and  progressive 
modification  of  the  structure  of  the  mind  itself,  we 
can  fix  no  limit  to  the  form  which  the  religious  sen- 
timent may  assume.  In  our  knowledge  of  the  Infi- 
nite Unknowable  we  may  make  an  indefinite  advance, 
and  come  to  know  far  more  than  we  now  do  of  the 
Being  whom  we  can  never  fully  search  out. 

The  question  by  what  philosophical  term  we  may 
choose  to  designate  the  result  here  reached  is  a  ques- 
tion of  quite  secondary  consequence.  The  term 
intuition  is  connected  with  old  associations  and  with 
different  modes  of  thought.  But  when  we  are  told 
that,  as  the  last  result  of  a  scientific  method,  and  by 
the  inexorable  conditions  of  our  thought  we  are  com- 
pelled to  recognize  the  existence  of  a  "Power  to 
which  no  limit  in  time  or  space  is  conceivable,  of 
which  all  phenomena,  as  presented  in  consciousness 
are  manifestations,"  we  seem  to  recognize  what  phi- 
losophy regards  as  the  most  fundamental  of  all  intu- 
itions, the  intuition  of  Being.  And,  in  reaching  this 
result,  it  need  hardly  be  added,  we  reach  the  start- 
ing-point of  Natural  Religion.  With  this  postulate 
conceded,  what  remains  is  a  question  of  mere  method. 
We  may  pause  with  this  result,  or  following  the 
path  of  a  scientific  or  a  metaphysical  inquiry,  may 
deduce  further  conclusions  from  it.  We  may  deduce 
these  conclusions  soberly,  or  we  may  deduce  them 


THE  RELATIVITY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  63 

rashly  ;  we  may  pursue  the  inquiry  with  the  indiffer- 
ence with  which  we  investigate  physical  phenomena, 
or  we  may  pursue  it  with  our  whole  being  stirred  to 
its  inmost  depths  by  a  sense  of  the  overwhelming 
interests  involved  in  the  solution  of  the  problem,  but 
we  are  no  longer  at  issue  respecting  the  reality  of 
the  fundamental  conception  on  which  religion  rests. 
The  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of  knowledge,  about 
which  we  have  heard  so  much,  does  not  affect  this 
conception  in  the  least.  A. few  may  say,  with  Mr. 
Frederic  Harrison,  "  We  do  not  concern  ourselves 
with  the  absolute  and  the  infinite,  or  with  first 
causes,  or  eternity,  or  transcendentals  of  any  kind. 
We  neither  accept  these  notions  nor  deny  them,  nor 
disprove  them,  nor  denounce  them,  nor  in  any  way 
concern  ourselves  about  them,"  but  the  doctrine 
of  relativity  leads  legitimately  and  logically  to  no 
such  result.  Physical  science  may  rightly  take  this 
ground.  The  physical  inquirer,  if  he  is  wise,  will 
not  intrude  upon  any  other.  But  beyond  the  limit 
of  logical  inference  lie  truths  which  make  their  ap- 
peal to  something  deeper  in  man  than  the  mere  rea- 
soning faculty.  So  that,  however  unsatisfactory  Mr. 
Spencer's  conclusion  may  seem,  if  we  go  no  further, 
it  supplies  an  essential  step  in  our  argument  for 
Theism. 

Let  it  not  be  supposed  that  in  affirming  this  we 
go  back  to  the  seductive  theories  of  the  early  Tran- 
scendentalists.  The  result  which  we  here  reach  is 
by  no  means  the  result  which  they  proclaimed  with 
such  generous  enthusiasm.  The  faith  instilled  in 
their  musical  sentences  was  faith  in  a  direct  insight 
that  recognized  ideas  independently  of  any  relation 
to  the  phenomena  of  sense  and  spirit.     The  capacity 


64  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

to  recognize  these  ideas  was  conceived  of  as  a  spe- 
cial faculty  for  the  infinite  and  absolute,  an  imme- 
diate intuition  of  the  eternal  and  divine.  According 
to  this  theory,  the  more  completely  the  soul  was 
sundered  from  the  things  of  sense,  the  clearer  and 
more  penetrating  was  its  insight.  But  the  conclu- 
sion which  we  have  reached,  though  not  the  logical 
result  of  reasoning,  is  yet,  in  the  strictest  sense,  a 
rational  result.  For,  while  we  conceive  that  the 
absolute  cannot  be  known  as  the  product  of  any  in- 
ductive or  deductive  reasoning  from  the  phenomena 
presented  to  the  senses,  we  affirm  that  it  is  and  can 
be  known  as  the  correlate  which  must  be  necessarily 
assumed  to  explain  and  account  for  those  phenom- 
ena. And  it  is  by  fixing  the  attention  upon  these 
phenomena  that  the  existence  of  the  absolute  and 
eternal  is  made  evident. 

This  belief  which  we  have  reached  in  the  exist- 
ence of  Absolute  Being  may,  therefore,  be  defined 
as  an  act  of  Reason.  "  Reason,"  in  the  words  of 
Cardinal  Newman,  "  is  that  faculty  of  mind  by  which 
knowledge  of  things  external  to  us,  of  beings,  facts, 
and  events,  is  attained  beyond  the  range  of  sense. 
It  ascertains  for  us  not  material  things  only,  or  im- 
material only,  or  present  only,  or  past,  or  future ; 
but,  even  if  limited  in  its  power,  it  is  unlimited  in 
its  range,  viewed  as  a  faculty,  though  of  course  in 
individuals  it  varies  in  range  also.  It  reaches  to  the 
ends  of  the  universe,  and  to  the  throne  of  God  be- 
yond them  ;  it  brings  us  knowledge,  whether  clear 
or  uncertain,  still  knowledge,  in  whatever  degree  of 
perfection  from  every  side  ;  but  at  the  same  time 
with  this  characteristic,  that  it  obtains  it  indirectly, 
not  directly." 


THE  RELATIVITY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  65 

"  Reason  does  not  really  perceive  anything ;  but 
it  is  a  faculty  of  proceeding  from  things  that  are 
perceived  to  things  which  are  not ;  the  existence  of 
which  it  certifies  to  us  on  the  hypothesis  of  some- 
thing else  being  known  to  exist,  in  other  words,  being 
assumed  to  be  true." 

"  Now,  if  this  be  Reason,  an  act  or  process  of 
Faith,  simply  considered,  is  certainly  an  exercise 
of  Reason.  It  is  an  acceptance  of  things  as  real 
which  the  senses  do  not  convey  :  it  is  an  instrument 
of  indirect  knowledge  concerning  things  external 
to  us."1 

I  trust  that  in  this  imperfect  handling  of  a  great 
subject  I  have  not  failed  to  make  my  main  purpose 
clear.  In  presenting  the  argument  for  the  divine 
existence,  it  was  needful  to  show  whether  the  ques- 
tion was  one  with  which  the  intellect  could  legiti- 
mately deal.  Does  a  problem  so  vast  lie  within  the 
scope  of  finite  faculties  ?  This  raises  at  once  the 
question  of  the  nature  and  limitations  of  human 
knowledge.  That  human  knowledge  is  in  its  nature 
relative,  that  what  we  know  can  be  known  to  us 
only  under  the  limitations  of  human  consciousness, 
is  a  principle  on  which  all  sober  thinkers  are  agreed. 
But  what  is  implied  in  this  ;  how  far  is  the  mind 
shut  up  by  acknowledging  this  principle  ?  Accord- 
ing to  one  view  the  mind  is  shut  up  to  phenomena 
and  their  laws,  and  any  attempt  to  pass  this  line  is 
denounced  as  childish  folly.  But  I  have  endeavored 
to  show,  from  the  writings  of  the  recognized  living 
leader  of  this  school,  that  the  doctrine  of  relativity, 
fairly  understood,  will  not  allow  us  to  stop  here,  that 
we  are  brought  at  last  to  a  point  where  the  intuition 

1  University  Sermons,  p.  206. 
5 


66  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

of  absolute  existence  is  forced  irresistibly  upon  the 
mind.  Even  science  cannot  come  to  its  extreme 
verge  without  drawing  transcendental  inferences. 

When  La  Place  was  reproached  for  not  having 
mentioned  the  name  of  God  in  his  great  work,  he  re- 
plied that  he  had  no  need  of  that  hypothesis.  As  a 
mere  man  of  science,  he  had  a  perfect  right  to  make 
such  an  answer.  Physical  science  deals  with  the 
facts  of  nature,  and  the  laws  to  be  deduced  from 
them.  It  does  not  undertake  to  go  beyond.  If  the 
motions  of  the  heavenly  bodies  could  be  accounted 
for  on  a  purely  mechanical  principle,  the  astron- 
omer had  a  right  to  stop  with  that.  The  task  he 
had  in  hand  did  not  require  him  to  push  his  re- 
searches any  further.  But  precisely  where  the  as- 
tronomer stopped  all  the  real  interest  of  the  problem 
'began.  The  question  which  he  had  so  skillfully  an- 
swered only  brought  the  mind  face  to  face  with 
questions  which  his  methods  could  not  solve.  By 
the  laws  of  our  intellectual  constitution  we  are 
forced  to  believe  that  there  is  something  beyond. 
What  light  is  thrown  by  the  external  universe,  or 
by  our  own  consciousness,  upon  the  nature  of  that 
unknown  something ;  what  is  taught  us  by  the  seen 
respecting  the  unseen  ;  these  are  questions  which 
science  does  not  ask,  but  to  which  the  soul  of  man 
demands  an  answer. 


LECTURE   III. 

CAUSE    AND    FORCE. 

Let  us  see  how  far  our  inquiry  has  thus  far 
brought  us.  I  have  sought  to  show  that  the  ac- 
cepted methods  of  modern  philosophical  thought 
furnish  no  presumption  against  the  primary  postu- 
late on  which  natural  religion  rests  ;  that  the  recog- 
nized principle  of  the  relativity  of  knowledge,  in- 
stead of  excluding,  logically  involves  the  affirmation 
of  absolute  existence.  It  is  simply  repeating  a  com- 
monplace when  I  assert  that  all  inquiry  leads  us 
back  to  certain  ultimate  truths,  or  facts,  which  defy 
any  further  analysis,  and  of  which  the  most  that  we 
can  say  is  that  no  conception  whatever  of  things  can 
be  formed  which  does  not  rest  in  the  affirmation  of 
their  existence.  For  any  explanation  of  the  uni- 
verse that  the  mind  essays  must  end  in  the  inexpli- 
cable. The  confines  of  the  known  are  everywhere  in 
contact  with  the  unknown  ;  the  most  certain  knowl- 
edge on  every  side  fades  out  in  mystery ;  the  far- 
thest vision  at  length  grows  dim  ;  the  infinite  world 
of  ever-changing  phenomena  forces  on  us  the  con- 
viction of  something  of  which  all  this  is  but  the 
manifestation  and  which  changes  not. 

We  have  now  to  ask  whether  this  mystery  that 
envelops  the  origin  and  end  of  all  things  is  abso- 
lutely inscrutable,  or  whether  the  human  intelligence 
may  make  some  effort  to  search  it  out.    Are  we  shut 


68  THE   THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

up  to  the  blank  conclusion  that  some  Being  exists, 
forced  to  recognize  the  fact,  but  with  no  faculties 
that  fit  us  to  understand  its  nature  and  interpret  its 
relation  to  ourselves ;  or  have  we  the  means  given  us 
of  advancing  along  the  path  that  thus  opens  before 
us  ?  What  can  we  know  of  the  central  principle  of 
all  existence  ?  Is  it  in  its  real  essence  accessible  to 
our  finite  faculties  ?  Are  we  capable  of  reaching 
any  further  explanation  of  it  ?  These  are  the  prob- 
lems that  have  haunted  human  thought  since  the  day 
when  man  became  conscious  of  his  own  existence. 
The  first  dim  questioning  of  the  awakened  soul  in 
the  infancy  of  time,  and  the  latest  results  of  the  most 
matured  and  discriminated  scientific  thought,  lead 
to  the  same  result,  and  culminate  in  the  question 
which  is  the  last,  and  highest,  and  greatest  of  all 
questions,  the  question  as  to  the  nature  of  that  Be- 
ing who  is  before  all  things  and  in  whom  all  things 
consist. 

But  it  will  be  of  use,  at  the  outset,  to  state  the  pre- 
cise form  of  the  inquiry  upon  which  we  are  about  to 
enter.  The  contest  between  those  who  affirm  and 
those  who  deny  the  existence  of  a  Supreme  Being, 
or  at  least  who  deny  that  we  have  any  sufficient  evi- 
dence presented  to  us  for  affirming  that  existence, 
has  varied  materially  from  age  to  age,  and  the  points 
on  which  the  controversy  now  hinges  are  not  the 
points  on  which  it  hinged  a  century  ago.  In  the 
last  century  the  warfare  against  religious  belief  was 
mainly  waged  on  metaphysical  grounds  ;  at  the  pres- 
sent  day  it  is  mainly  waged  on  grounds  derived  from 
the  conclusions  of  science.  The  physical  sciences 
especially  are  claimed  to  have  established  beyond 
doubt   certain  principles  which,  if  they  do  not  con- 


CAUSE  AND  FORCE.       .  69 

tradict  the  existence  of  a  Supreme  Being,  at  least 
render  the  hypothesis  of  such  existence  no  longer 
necessary.  In  the  new  conception  which  we  have 
reached  of  the  organization  and  correlation  of  the 
material  universe,  we  have  a  satisfactory  solution 
given  us  of  the  problem  of  existence,  and  religious 
belief  is  discarded  as  an  explanation  suited  to  one 
stage  of  human  progress,  but  destined  now  to  give 
way  to  a  worthier  view. 

By  the  most  serious  advocates  of  anti-theistic 
views  it  is  not  denied  that  the  race,  in  its  actual  his- 
torical development,  has  tended  to  recognize  the  ex- 
istence of  a  Supreme  Being  ;  nor  is  it  denied  that 
the  question  to  which  theism  is  an  answer  is  a  very 
natural  one,  and  that  it  has  its  origin  in  an  obvious 
want  of  the  human  mind.  For  as  soon  as  the  mind 
rose  to  the  conception  of  nature  as  a  connected  sys- 
tem, the  conviction  that  this  united  whole  had  its 
origin  in  one  mind,  and  was  directed  by  one  will, 
was  a  conception  to  which  it  was  logically  led.  Ac- 
customed as  we  are  within  the  limits  of  experience 
to  find  a  definite  beginning  for  every  fact,  and  to 
reason  continually  from  effects  to  causes,  it  was  im- 
possible that  the  mind  should  not  ask  whether  all 
that  we  see  had  not  also  a  beginning,  and  whether 
behind  the  endless  play  of  causes  and  effects  contin- 
ually presented  to  us,  there  were  not  veiled  a  more 
remote  and  ultimate  cause.  But  the  question,  it  is 
claimed,  which  we  have  now  to  answer  is,  whether 
this  universal  and  natural  belief  is  consistent  with 
the  ascertained  results  of  science,  and  will  it  bear  to 
be  tested  by  the  established  canons  of  scientific  in- 
quiry. 

Let  me  illustrate  more  clearly  the  nature  of  this 


70  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

change.  A  little  more  than  half  a  century  ago,  in  a 
lonely  spot  on  the  Italian  coast,  a  few  miles  to  the 
north  of  Leghorn,  a  strange  drama  was  enacted,  a 
drama  that  in  a  Christian  age  and  in  a  Christian 
land  seemed  the  revival  of  a  pagan  rite.  On  the 
yellow  sand  which  the  blue  water  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean was  gently  washing,  with  the  islands  of 
Gorgona  and  Elba  lying  in  the  sunlight,  with  the 
marble-crested  Apennines  glistening  in  the  back- 
ground, with  not  a  human  dwelling  in  sight,  and 
only  the  old  battlemented  watch-towers,  that  stretch 
along  the  coast,  looming  up  as  silent  witnesses, 
a  funeral  pyre  was  built.  From  out  the  pure 
sand  that  lay  lightly  over  it  a  naked  human  body,  of 
wondrous  loveliness,  was  next  drawn,  and  laid  upon 
the  wood.  Wine  and  oil  was  then  poured  reverently 
upon  it,  which  when  the  fire  was  kindled  caused  so 
intense  a  heat  that  the  atmosphere  itself  grew  trem- 
ulous and  wavy  with  the  quivering  flames.  In  the 
fierce  burning  the  body  was  soon  reduced  to  ashes, 
the  only  portions  not  consumed  being  some  frag- 
ments of  bone,  with  the  jaw  and  skull.  In  the  fiery 
pile  the  heart  alone  remained  entire.1 

Beside  the  funeral  pyre,  watching  with  intense  in- 
terest the  progress  of  the  flames,  stood  three  com- 
panions and  fellow-countrymen  of  the  departed,  one 
of  them  the  most  famous  poet  of  modern  times. 
Byron  watching,  by  the  shore  of  the  sea  that  he 
loved  and  sung  so  well,  the  burning  of  the  lifeless 
form  of  Shelley  !  I  recall  no  picture  more  striking 
than  that !  The  poet  who  sets  to  music  as  no  other 
poet  has  done  the  immeasurable  griefs  and  woes  that 

1  [See  Trelawny,  Records  of  Shelley,  Byron,  and  the  Author,  vol.  i. 
p.  212.] 


CAUSE  AND  FORCE.  J\ 

make  such  heart-ache  of  human  life,  and  the  poet 
whose  most  daring  venture  in  verse  was  a  denial 
that  life  had  any  consolation  beyond  the  grave.  Of 
Shelley  it  was  Byron  himself  that  wrote,  "  He  was 
the  most  gentle,  the  most  amiable,  and  least  worldly- 
minded  person  that  I  ever  met ;  full  of  delicacy,  dis- 
interested beyond  other  men,  and  possessing  a  de- 
gree of  genius  joined  to  simplicity  as  rare  as  it  is 
admirable."  And  yet  this  youth,  this  amiable,  this 
unworldly,  disinterested  being,  when  still  a  youth 
was  expelled  from  Oxford  for  avowing  himself  an 
atheist,  and  remained  through  his  brief  life  the  pas- 
sionate apostle  of  a  creed  which  left  to  those  who 
gathered  up  his  ashes  nothing 

"  But  pale  despair  and  cold  tranquillity." 

With  Shelley  atheism  was  a  sentiment.  The 
ruling  impulse  of  his  nature  was  a  passionate  antag- 
onism to  what  he  regarded  as  unreal  and  conven- 
tional. His  disgust  with  platitudes,  his  enthusiastic 
love  of  liberty,  his  hatred  of  intolerance,  his  impa- 
tience of  control,  his  passion  for  a  kind  of  logical 
consistency,  all  combined  to  make  him  the  champion 
of  an  extreme  opinion.  His  favorite  ideal,  we  are 
told  by  his  latest  biographer,  was  the  vision  of  a 
youth  "whose  eloquence  had  power  to  break  the 
bonds  of  despotism,  as  the  sun  thaws  the  ice  on  an 
April  morning." l  Compound  of  poet  and  philos- 
opher, his  imagination  pictured  a  new  realm  of  truth 
and  love  and  beauty  amid  the  wreck  of  religious 
faith  in  which  he  rejoiced.  The  spirit  of  that  un- 
quiet time,  of  which  the  French  Revolution  was  the 
fruit,  was  strong  upon  him.     So  far  as  he  had  any 

1  [J.  A.  Symonds,  Life  of  Shelley,  (Am.  ed.)  p.  39.] 


72  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

reasoned  ground  for  his  unbelief  it  was  drawn  from 
the  arguments  of  Hume.  The  little  tract  which 
provoked  his  expulsion  from  the  university  was 
mainly  an  abstract  of  the  Scotch  philosopher.  His 
favorite  authors  were  the  superficial  French  ma- 
terialists. And  it  is  striking  to  note  that  as  his 
poetic  instinct  was  emancipated  from  the  snares  of 
metaphysics  he  seeme'd  to  yearn  for  a  more  satis- 
factory solution  of  the  dark  problem  of  existence. 

But  the  denial  of  any  proof  of  the  divine  existence 
with  which  we  are  confronted  in  modern  thought  is 
of  a  very  different  kind.  It  is  not  a  mere  passionate 
protest  against  the  tyranny  of  custom,  an  impatient 
revolt  against  whatever  is  accepted  and  established, 
it  is  the  calm  deliberate  conclusion  of  those  who  are 
ready  to  acknowledge  that  religion  is  venerable  for 
its  age,  and  consoling  in  its  teachings,  but  who  re- 
fuse to  accept  it  because  it  will  not  bear  to  be  tested 
by  the  principles  and  canons  which  have  been  es- 

(tablished  as  the  only  safe  guides  of  inquiry.  The 
ruling  idea  of  our  time  is  not  revolution  but  evolu- 
tion. It  affects  no  contempt  for  the  past,  as  was  so 
much  the  fashion  in  the  last  century ;  it  wages  no 
angry  contest  with  what  is  old  and  established  ;  on 
the  contrary,  it  recognizes  all  that  has  gone  before  as 
the  essential  condition  of  the  present,  the  ladder  by 
which  the  human  mind  has  climbed  to  its  present 
height.  In  its  cautious  adherence  to  its  own  meth- 
ods it  refuses  even  to  deny  the  existence  of  an  eter- 
nal ground  of  all  phenomena  ;  it  only  asserts  that 
respecting  this  eternal  source  of  all  existence  we, 
as  finite  beings,  are  able  neither  to  affirm  nor  to 
deny  anything. 

That,  after  so  many  centuries,  this  question  should 


CAUSE  AND  FORCE.  73 

still  be  debated  seems  indeed  like  an  irony  of  fate. 
That  the  human  race  should  have  existed  so  many 
years,  that  it  should  have  indulged  such  long  cher- 
ished hopes,  that  it  should  have  confided  in  so  many 
forms  of  faith,  and  received  as  authentic  so  many 
utterances  respecting  the  invisible  world,  only  at  last 
to  be  brought  to  the  conclusion  that  it  has  walked 
in  a  vain  show  when  it  supposed  itself  to  be  com- 
muning with  its  Maker,  is  a  fact  which  at  the  outset 
may  incline  us  to  view  with  distrust  any  attempt  to 
rest  the  fundamental  postulate  of  theism  upon  ra- 
tional grounds.  The  utter  impotence  of  reason  to 
deal  with  this  problem,  may  seem  sufficiently  at- 
tested in  the  fact  that  the  progressive  development 
of  thought,  and  the  perfecting  of  methods  of  inquiry, 
have  only  landed  the  most  cultivated  minds  in  utter 
skepticism.  One  deeply  convinced  of  the  vital  re- 
lation of  this  doctrine  to  the  welfare  of  the  soul  may 
well  shrink  from  what  seems  so  precarious  an  ex- 
periment as  the  attempt  to  justify  to  reason  what 
should  be  accepted  upon  other  and  more  indisputa- 
ble grounds. 

Yet  however  profound  may  be  our  conviction  of 
the  importance  of  the  issues  involved  in  the  discus- 
sion, the  inquiry  whether  religion  has  any  reason- 
able ground  is  one  that,  in  the  present  state  of  opin- 
ion, we  cannot  afford  to  pass  by.  Without  ques- 
tioning the  fact  that  feeling  and  will  are  as  important 
constituents  in  religious  life  as  rational  conviction,  it 
seems  clear  that  we  cannot  feel  dependence  upon  that 
of  whose  existence  we  are  not  convinced,  and  that 
we  cannot  love  or  fear  that  of  which  we  have  no 
conception.  The  entire  self-surrender  of  the  soul, 
which  is  the  very  essence  of  religion,  can  only  be 


74  THE   THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT 

distinguished  from  superstition,  when  it  is  regarded 
as  in  the  highest  sense  a  rational  act.  On  any- 
other  supposition  religion  must  be  viewed  as  a  form 
of  mental  disease.  And  as  a  fact  history  shows  us, 
that  whatever  have  been  the  errors  and  shortcom- 
ings of  human  reason,  it  has  always  been  in  the 
path  of  rational  inquiry  that  men  have  reached  a 
theistic  conception.  Not  by  discarding  reason,  but 
by  making  use  of  reason,  has  the  human  mind  risen 
from  inadequate  to  adequate  conceptions  of  the  Su- 
preme Being. 

Theism  may  be  defined  in  few  words,  "  as  the 
doctrine  that  the  universe  owes  its  existence,  and 
continuance  in  existence,  to  the  reason  and  will  of  a 
self-existent  Being,  who  is  infinitely  powerful,  wise, 
and  good.  It  is  the  doctrine  that  nature  has  a  Cre- 
ator and  Preserver,  the  nations  a  Governor,  men  a 
Heavenly  Father  and  Judge."  :  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
this  conception  has  not  been  wrought  by  each  one  of 
us  for  himself,  but  has  been  handed  down  from  age 
to  age,  from  generation  to  generation,  from  parent 
to  child.  Few  of  us  know  when  or  how  we  became 
possessed  of  it.  Tradition,  education,  social  influ- 
ence, have  determined  its  shape  and  insured  its  ac- 
ceptance. It  is  part  of  our  civilization,  part  of  our 
life,  is  the  very  air  we  breathe.  Yet  this  does  not 
relieve  us  from  the  obligation  of  ascertaining  the 
rational  grounds  on  which  it  rests.  And  this  obliga- 
tion, which  our  own  inner  harmony  demands,  be 
comes  imperative  whenever  the  doctrine  is  called  in 
question.  What  we  have  perhaps  accepted  with  pas- 
sive acquiescence,  becomes  then,  at  once,  the  most 
urgent,  the  most  sacred,  the  most  momentous  inquiry 

1  Prof.  R.  Flint,  Theism,  p.  iS. 


CAUSE  AND  FORCE.  75 

with  which  the  human  intelligence  can  ever  busy 
itself. 

And  since  truth  is  infinite,  it  seems  a  reasonable 
conclusion  that  the  knowledge  of  religious  truth,  like 
other  knowledge,  is  progressive.  It  has  been  hastily 
assumed  that  in  the  discussion  of  religious  questions 
we  only  tread  a  circle,  and  repeat,  in  other  phrases, 
arguments  which  have  been  again  and  again  ad- 
vanced. But  there  seems  no  good  reason  for  sup- 
posing that  here,  as  everywhere,  the  mind  cannot, 
by  deeper  reflection,  by  wider  comparison,  by  sur- 
vey of  the  subject  from  new  points,  be  unclothed  of 
old  errors  and  clothed  upon  with  new  truths.  And 
especially  may  such  a  result  be  anticipated  as  a  re- 
sult of  the  new  controversies  which  from  time  to  time 
spring  up.  A  new  phase  of  error  and  unbelief,  if  it 
be  proved  to  be  such,  can  hardly  fail  to  develop  a 
new  phase  of  truth.  Progress  is  the  conciliation  of 
apparent  contradictions.  It  may  be,  even  in  relig- 
ious controversy,  that  both  assertions  are  imperfect 
statements.  In  dealing,  therefore,  with  what  we  re- 
gard as  error,  we  need  not  be  disturbed,  if  we  find, 
on  emerging  from  the  conflict,  that  while  we  have 
established  some  positions,  we  have  been  compelled 
to  relinquish  others.  We  learn  often  our  best  les- 
sons from  our  foes. 

If,  then,  we  believe  that  there  is  one  God,  and  be- 
lieve further,  that  we  can  know  Him  in  his  relations 
to  ourselves,  we  ought  to  have  reasons  or  grounds 
for  this  belief.  But,  upon  entering  upon  a  more  de- 
tailed examination  of  these  grounds,  there  are  certain 
general  considerations  respecting  the  nature  and 
limits  of  the  inquiry  in  which  we  are  about  to  en- 
gage, that  ought  to  be  presented.     The  question  is 


j6  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

the  most  momentous  and  solemn  that  the  human 
mind  can  consider,  and  it  needs  to  be  approached 
with  especial  care.  I  do  not  refer  simply  to  the 
moral  temper  that  befits  such  an  inquiry,  for  it  need 
not  be  said  that  in  such  a  discussion  we  ought,  at 
the  outset,  to  divest  ourselves  of  the  spirit  of  the 
mere  controversialist.  The  petty  ambition  to  van- 
quish an  opponent  should  have  no  place  in  a  discus- 
sion like  the  present.  We  are  dealing  with  a  ques- 
tion of  incalculable  gravity,  and  one  respecting  which 
opinion,  in  our  time,  is  widely  and  seriously  divided. 
And  the  arguments  of  those  who  deny  that  there  is 
any  proof  of  the  divine  existence,  or  any  means  of 
knowing  the  divine  nature,  have  been  urged  with 
too  much  candor,  and  too  much  seriousness,  to  be 
met  with  any  but  the  most  considerate  and  respect- 
ful answer. 

But  what  I  have  in  mind  is  not  so  much  this  moral 
temper,  as  certain  intellectual  conditions  which 
should  guide  our  study.  The  nature  of  the  proof 
which  we  are  about  to  undertake,  needs  to  be  care- 
fully discriminated.  Since  the  famous  critique  of 
Kant,  arguments  which  once  played  a  great  part  in 
the  discussion  have  fallen  into  disrepute,  and  the 
opinion  has  come  to  be  widely  spread,  not  only  with 
those  who  reject,  but  also  with  those  who  accept  the 
doctrine,  that  the  existence  of  God  does  not  admit 
of  being  proved.  It  is  therefore  needful  to  state 
clearly,  at  the  outset,  in  what  sense  we  use  the  word 
proof  as  applied  to  the  divine  existence.  For  it  is 
hardly  necessary  to  say  that  the  term,  in  different 
departments  of  inquiry,  is  used  in  very  different 
meanings.  "The  proofs  for  the  existence  of  God," 
says  Ulrici,  "  coincide  with  the  grounds  for  the  be- 


CAUSE  AND  FORCE.  77 

lief  in  God ;  they  are  simply  the  real  grounds  of  the 
belief,  established  and  expounded  in  a  scientific  man- 
ner. If  there  be  no  such  proofs,  there  are  also  no 
such  grounds,  and  a  belief  which  has  no  ground, 
if  possible  at  all,  can  be  no  proper  belief,  but  an  ar- 
bitrary, self-made,  subjective  opinion.  It  must  sink 
to  the  level  of  mere  illusion."  1 

If  this  be  true,  it  follows  that  the  proofs  of  God's 
existence  must  be  simply  his  own  manifestations ; 
the  ways  in  which  He  makes  himself  known,  or, 
in  other  words,  the  phenomena  alike  of  conscious- 
ness and  of  the  external  world.  Our  reasonings 
have  no  value  save  in  so  far  as  they  are  inductions 
from  these,  and  from  these  phenomena  our  minds 
may  rise  legitimately  to  the  apprehension  of  God, 
though  we  are  capable,  in  many  instances,  of  giving 
ourselves  no  rational  account  of  the  process  through 
which  we  have  gone.  The  analysis  of  our  mental 
acts  belongs  to  a  later  stage  of  our  development. 
According  to  this  view,  it  follows  further  that  the 
evidences  of  the  divine  existence  are  innumerable, 
while  at  the  same  time  they  coalesce  in  a  single, 
comprehensive  argument.  And  being  so  countless 
and  multiform  they  address  different  minds  in  very 
different  ways.  Thus,  as  Mr.  Mill  truly  remarks, 
"  the  evidences  of  a  Creator  are  not  only  of  several 
distinct  kinds,  but  of  such  diverse  characters  that 
they  are  adapted  to  minds  of  very  different  descrip- 
tions, and  it  is  hardly  possible  for  any  mind  to  be 
equally  impressed  by  them  all."2  Hence  a  true  view 
of  the  subject  must  be  a  very  wide  and  very  com- 
prehensive view. 

1  Quoted  by  Flint,  Theism,  p.  60. 

2  Three  Essays,  etc.,  p.  138. 


78  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT 

And  not  only  this,  but  the  exceedingly  complex 
nature  of  the  theistic  argument  is  further  seen  in 
the  fact  that  the  very  process  by  which  the  mind 
rises  to  the  apprehension  of  God  is  a  process  which 
involves  what  is  most  distinctive  and  essential  in  its 
own  constitution.  Or,  in  other  words,  God  can  be 
thought  of  as  the  active,  intelligent  principle  of  all 
that  exists  only  after  a  distinct  consciousness  of  our 
own  selves  as  voluntary  agents.  To  conceive  of  the 
Deity  as  a  cause,  we  must  have  had  some  experi- 
ence of  causation.  If  we  did  not  first  know  our- 
selves as  causes,  we  should  never  reach  the  concep- 
tion of  a  primary,  all-originating  will.  So,  too,  it  is 
only  in  virtue  of  the  direct  consciousness  of  our  in- 
tellectual operations,  that  we  can  conceive  of  a  Su- 
preme Intelligence.  So,  from  our  moral  nature,  we 
are  led  in  the  same  way  to  invest  the  Divine  Being 
with  moral  perfections.  Thus  the  mental  process 
by  which  we  reach  the  idea  of  God,  is  a  process 
which  summons  into  activity  all  that  is  highest  and 
most  essential  in  human  nature.  Whether  the  re- 
sult which  we  thus  reach  is  legitimate  or  not,  it  is  a 
result  in  which  all  our  noblest  parts  and  all  our 
finest  faculties  harmoniously  concur. 

Thus  the  various  arguments  for  the  existence  of 
the  Supreme  Being  are  but  stages  in  a  single  ra- 
tional process,  and  parts  of  one  comprehensive 
proof.  They  are  organically  related,  and  they  ought 
to  be  separated  only  for  the  purpose  of  comparison 
and  study.  The  strength  of  the  argument  is  the 
strength  of  the  whole,  not  the  strength  of  any  of 
the  separate  proofs  which  go  to  make  it  up.  And 
although  so  comprehensive  and  various  an  argument 
may  appear,  at  first  sight,  confused  and  difficult,  it 


CAUSE  AND  FORCE.  79 

is  not  really  so.  Though  the  Divine  Being  seems 
so  far  removed  from  us  in  accessless  majesty, 
though  no  man  hath  seen  Him  at  any  time,  and 
though  we  have  no  direct  or  immediate  knowledge 
of  Him,  yet  we  know  Him  as  naturally  and  as  simply 
as  we  know  our  fellow  men,  and  in  fact  we  know 
Him,  if  we  know  Him  at  all,  in  the  same  way.  We 
have  no  direct  or  immediate  knowledge  of  our  fellow 
men.  In  either  case,  we  simply  refer  certain  mani- 
festations of  character  to  certain  moral  and  intel- 
lectual qualities  which  consciousness  has  revealed 
to  us  as  their  causes.  Thus  we  grow  in  the  knowl- 
edge of  God  precisely  as  we  grow  in  the  knowledge 
of  those  whom  we  meet  in  the  intercourse  of  every 
day. 

I  do  not  of  course  mean  that  the  evidence  of  the 
divine  existence  is  as  plain  and  indubitable  as  the 
existence  of  our  fellow  men.  Were  it  so,  we  might 
have  spared  ourselves  this  long  discussion.  Though 
some  have  made  a  boast  of  atheism  who  really  be- 
lieved in  a  form  of  theism,  and  some  have  been 
called  atheists  for  rejecting  unworthy  conceptions 
of  the  Supreme  Being,  we  must  suppose  that  many 
have  been  brought  sincerely  to  doubt  the  divine 
existence.  Yet  the  fact  that  some  do  not  reach  any 
belief  in  God,  does  not  render  any  less  true  the 
statement,  that  the  process  by  which  the  mind  at- 
tains such  belief  is  of  the  same  direct  and  natural 
character  as  the  process  by  which  it  attains  belief  in 
the  existence  of  finite  beings.  And  when  it  has  at- 
tained this  belief  its  further  apprehension  of  the 
character  and  attributes  of  God  is  also  of  essentially 
the  same  nature  as  that  by  which  it  becomes  ac- 
quainted with  its  fellows.     For  the  mental  process 


80  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

must  remain  the  same,  whatever  the  subject  with 
which  for  the  time  the  mind  is  conversant.  With- 
out doubt  the  mental  process  is  affected  by  the 
moral  state,  and  becomes  keener  and  more  active  as 
the  emotions  are  quickened ;  but  that  its  essential 
movement  is  the  same,  under  whatever  circum- 
stances, cannot  admit  of  doubt. 

We  do  not  need  to  burden  our  discussion  with 
the  consideration  of  arguments  for  the  Divine  ex- 
istence which  are  practically  obsolete,  and  which  do 
not  touch  modern  speculation  with  force  enough 
even  to  provoke  controversy.  These  theories  lie 
like  wrecks  on  the  shores  of  thought,  and  interest 
us  only  as  relics  of  an  intellectual  habit  that  has 
long  passed  away.  These  a  priori  proofs  possessed 
a  singular  fascination  for  speculative  minds,  but  had 
they  been  conclusive  they  would,  like  the  demonstra- 
tions of  geometry,  have  carried  irresistible  convic- 
tion long  ago.  The  fact  that  they  have  failed  to 
convince  is  the  best  evidence  that  they  were  falla- 
cious. Whether  in  the  form  in  which  the  argument 
was  first  stated  by  Anselm,  or  in  the  more  elaborate 
theory  of  Descartes,  they  are  all  open  to  the  same 
objection  of  reasoning  from  the  necessary  notion  of 
God  to  his  necessary  existence.  But  the  very  es- 
sence of  the  problem  is  the  opening  of  a  path  by 
\yhich  we  may  pass  from  the  notions  of  the  intellect 
to  the  realities  of  the  universe  beyond,  and  at  the 
very  outset  to  assume  the  existence  of  the  one  as  a 
demonstration  of  the  other  is  simply  to  beg  the 
question.  We  have,  in  reality,  simply  an  ideal  con- 
clusion from  an  ideal  premise. 

Anselm  argued  that  our  idea  of  God  is  the  idea 
of   a  being   than   whom  we   can  conceive   nothing 


CAUSE  AND  FORCE.  3 1 

greater.  But  since  real  existence  is  greater  than 
mere  thought,  the  existence  of  God  is  involved  in 
the  idea  of  the  most  perfect  being.  For  if  we  sup- 
pose God  not  to  have  existence,  the  idea  of  some- 
thing greater  would  remain.  This  subtle  reasoning 
was  characteristic  of  the  scholastic  age.  That  so 
acute  a  mind  should  have  been  satisfied  with  such 
an  argument  can  only  be  explained  from  the  intel- 
lectual habit  of  the  time.  Descartes,  while  devising 
a  new  method  of  experimental  research,  strangely 
followed  the  track  of  mediaeval  speculation.  He 
argued  that  necessary  existence  is  as  essential  to 
the  idea  of  an  all-perfect  being  as  the  equality  of  its 
three  angles  to  two  right  angles  is  essential  to  the 
idea  of  a  triangle.  "  I  cannot  conceive  God,"  he 
says,  "  except  as  existing,  and  hence  it  follows  that 
existence  is  inseparable  from  him."  1  Here,  again, 
an  ideal  concept  is  identified  with  an  external  fact. 
The  most  that  the  argument  could  prove  would  be 
that  the  mental  concept  was  necessary,  not  that  it 
had  any  counterpart  in  the  external  universe.  But 
we  need  not  linger  with  arguments  that  modern 
thought  has  ceased  to  notice. 

Let  us  pass,  then,  to  a  conception  which  is  still 
regarded  as  a  main  support  of  the  argument  for  the 
divine  existence,  —  the  idea  of  a  First  Cause.  It  has 
been  truly  remarked,  that  everybody  is  a  metaphysi- 
cian, just  as  everybody  is  a  poet ;  that  is,  everybody 
has  certain  primary  ideas  and  maxims  which  are  in- 
volved in  all  exercise  of  thought,  precisely  as  the 
rules  of  grammar  are  involved  in  speech.  In  Molieres 
amusing  play,  Monsieur  Jourdain  is  amazed  to  find 
that  he  had  all  his  life  been  speaking  prose,  though 

1  {Meditationes,  v.] 
6 


$2  THE  THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

he  had  done  it  with  no  knowledge  of  the  fact.  In 
the  same  way  we  are  unconscious  philosophers  from 
the  hour  when  we  begin  to  think.  One  of  the  most 
simple  and  rudimental  of  all  truths  is  the  maxim 
that  every  event  must  have  had  a  cause,  —  not  every 
existence  in  nature,  for  much  confusion  and  un- 
sound reasoning  have  arisen  for  want  of  clear  dis- 
crimination at  this  point.  Merely  from  the  present 
existence  of  any  object,  I  cannot  infer  that  it  must 
have  had  a  cause  ;  for,  so  far  as  I  can  tell,  it  may 
have  existed  in  its  present  state  forever.  The  mere 
presence  of  the  world  would  not  enable  us  to  prove 
the  agency  of  a  Creator.  Simple  existence  supplies 
no  foundation  for  reasoning  from  effect  to  cause. 

The  idea  of  cause  springs  out  of  change.  So  soon 
as  change  takes  place,  we  affirm  without  hesitation 
that  there  is  some  agency  or  cause  at  work.  What- 
ever has  begun  to  be  must  have  had  a  ground  or 
antecedent  sufficient  to  account  for  its  beginning:. 
I  may  appeal  to  the  familiar  experience  of  every  one 
of  us  in  proof  of  this.  No  sooner  do  we  witness 
any  change  within  us  or  without  us  than  we  find 
ourselves  instinctively  considering  how  it  came  to 
pass.  By  an  instinctive  tendency  or  constitutional 
law,  the  mind  goes  out  in  the  direction  of  a  cause. 
The  intellect  is  not  content  till  it  has  pushed  on  to 
this  resting-place.  Save  on  the  hypothesis  of  this 
relation  between  effect  and  cause,  there  is  not  only 
no  rational  conception  of  the  present  phenomena  of 
mind  and  matter,  but  there  is  no  real  connection 
between  the  past,  the  present,  and  the  future.  Take 
this  away,  and  the  relation  of  all  this  is  destroyed, 
and  the  frame-work  of  the  universe  falls  to  pieces. 
Existence  becomes  incoherent  as  a  dream,  and  the 


CAUSE  AND  FORCE.  83 

great  globe  itself  but  the  "  baseless  fabric  of  a  vis- 
ion." Without  this  relation,  everything  becomes 
independent  ;  everything  becomes  separated  from 
everything  else ;  everything  is  its  own  beginning 
and  end. 

Yet,  while  the  idea  of  cause  is  the  simplest  and 
most  natural  of  all  ideas,  it  is  at  the  same  time  the 
most  imperious  and  most  unfathomable.  While  we 
are  compelled  to  accept  it,  we  strive  in  vain  to 
grasp  it.  While  we  are  forced  by  a  necessity  of  our 
nature  to  seek  after  it,  we  cannot  tell  what  it  is. 
When  we  are  brought  to  face  the  question,  what 
that  was  which  existed  before  existence,  and  of 
which  all  that  exists  was  the  necessary  outcome,  we 
can  simply  pause  and  confess  our  inability  to  answer 
it.  In  the  order  of  nature,  we  have  only  set  before 
us  an  endless  succession  of  consequents  and  ante- 
cedents, but  the  connection  between  these  two  is 
something  of  which  we  can  form  no  idea.  Yet, 
while  we  are  capable  of  forming  no  conception  of 
the  nature  of  a  cause,  we  are  none  the  less  con- 
vinced that  a  cause  for  every  event  must  exist,  and 
that  no  change  can  take  place  without  one.  And  in 
this  idea  is  involved  the  further  idea,  not  less  incon- 
ceivable, that  from  eternity  something  must  have 
existed.  Since  something  now  is,  it  is  equally  plain 
that  something  always  was.  "This  is  so  evident 
and  undeniable  a  proposition,"  says  Dr.  Samuel 
Clarke,  "  that  no  atheist  in  any  age  has  ever  pre- 
sumed to  assert  the  contrary."  1 

If  the  necessary  character  of  this  maxim  be  con- 
ceded, it  is  of  no  consequence,  so  far  as  its  bearing 
on  the  theistic  argument  is  concerned,  what  philo- 

1  \Demonstr.  of  the  Being  and  Attributes  of  God  (7th  ed.),  p.  8.] 


84  THE    THE/STIC  ARGUMENT. 

sophical  theory  we  adopt  to  account  for  its  origin. 
We  may  assert  that  the  mind  intuitively  believes 
that  every  event  is  caused  ;  or  that  the  idea  of  cause 
is  suggested  to  us  from  the  analogy  of  that  spiritual 
causation  of  which  we  are  directly  conscious  in  our- 
selves when  we  put  forth  an  effort  ;  or  explain  it 
from  the  inability  of  the  mind  to  form  any  other 
conception  ;  or  hold,  with  a  numerous  modern  school, 
that  the  idea  of  cause  is  simply  a  generalization  from 
observation.  "  The  law  of  causation,"  says  Mill,  "  the 
recognition  of  which  is  the  main  pillar  of  inductive 
philosophy,  is  but  the  familiar  truth,  that  invariabil- 
ity of  succession  is  found  by  observation  to  obtain 
between  every  fact  in  nature  and  some  fact  which 
preceded  it." 1  But  Hume  himself,  who  was  the  father 
of  this  theory,  did  not  deny  the  necessary  connec- 
tion between  effect  and  cause.  His  elaborate  inves- 
tigation into  the  nature  of  causation  was  undertaken 
simply  to  ascertain  why  we  think  it  necessary.  He 
only  sought  to  show  that  this  connection,  so  far  as 
the  mind  can  know  it,  is  simply  the  offspring  of  ex- 
perience. 

Accepting  this  principle,  which  no  one  will  deny, 
that  for  every  event  there  must  be  a  cause,  the  ques- 
tion next  arises,  How  far  does  it  legitimately  carry 
us  ?  The  notion  that  the  principle  of  causality  can 
only  be  abstractly  applied,  has  led  some  to  argue  that 
it  can  only  result  in  an  eternal  succession  of  causes 
and  effects.  We  have,  then,  next  to  ask  the  question, 
What  can  be  evolved  from  the  idea  of  cause  as  it  ex- 
ists in  our  own  minds  ?  Does  this  idea  demand  final- 
ity, or  is  it  satisfied  with  an  endless  series  ?  In  other 
wor^s,  does  the  same  necessity  of  thought,  which 

1  [System  of  Logic ;  b.  iii.,  c.  v.] 


CAUSE  AND  FORCE.  85 

requires  us  to  believe  in  cause  at  all,  require  us 
equally  to  believe  in  a  first  cause?  The  objector 
may  urge,  "  I  hold  to  causation,  but  why  must  I  be- 
lieve in  a  first  cause  ?  What  greater  difficulties  are 
there  in  an  infinite  succession  of  causes  than  in  an 
original  and  self-existent  cause  ?  Both  are  abso- 
lutely incomprehensible  ;  both  raise  difficulties  which 
I  cannot  solve.  But  why  compel  me  to  choose  one 
of  these  dilemmas  rather  than  the  other  ?  " 

The  objection,  at  first  sight,  seems  plausible,  but 
loses  its  force  when  we  reflect  that  an  infinite  series 
does  not  make  a  cause,  and  cause  is  precisely  what 
reason  here  demands.  The  real  alternative  does 
not  lie  between  an  infinite  series  and  a  first  cause, 
but  between  accepting  a  first  cause,  or  rejecting  the 
idea  of  cause  altogether.  We  are  familiar  enough 
with  the  notion  of  a  proximate  or  secondary  cause, 
and  we  may  form  the  conception  of  an  indefinite 
succession  of  real  causes,  yet  all  this  does  not  sat- 
isfy our  idea  of  cause.  The  only  true  cause  is  a  first 
cause  ;  when,  therefore,  the  universe  is  thrown  back 
upon  an  infinite  succession,  there  is  a  violation  of 
the  fundamental  principle  of  reason.  For  an  infinite 
succession  of  causes  rests,  by  the  very  hypothesis, 
upon  no  cause.  Each  particular  cause  rests,  indeed, 
upon  the  next,  but  the  whole  rests  on  nothing.  "  The 
reason,"  says  Kant,  "is  forced  to  seek  somewhere 
its  resting-point  in  the  regress  of  the  conditional. 
If  something  exists,  it  must  be  admitted  that  some- 
thing exists  necessarily  ;  for  the  contingent  exists 
only  under  the  condition  of  another  thing  as  its 
cause,  up  to  a  cause  which  exists  not  contingently."  1 
Reason  cannot  stop  short  of  this. 

1  Quoted  by  Mozley,  Essays,  vol.  ii.,  p.  432. 


86  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

Now,  if  it  be  true  that  the  notion  of  an  infinite 
succession  of  second  causes  is  incompatible  with  the 
idea  of  cause,  we  have  already  met  the  objection, 
that  the  argument  which  infers  a  self- existent  cause 
of  the  universe  is  a  contradiction  of  the  law  of 
causality.  That  every  event  must  have  a  cause  is 
granted ;  but  if  you  proceed,  it  is  said,  to  affirm  the 
existence  of  that  which  is  uncaused  you  deny  the 
principle  that  you  have  just  asserted.  You  claim 
more  than  your  argument  allows  ;  you  are  not  de- 
veloping a  logical  conclusion,  but  jumping  to  a  result 
that  lies  far  beyond  the  limit  of  your  reasoning.  It 
must  be  conceded  that  the  idea  of  a  self-existent 
cause  does  not  come  under  the  law  of  causation. 
But,  wThile  the  law  of  causation  does  not  lead  log- 
ically up  to  the  conclusion  of  a  first  cause,  it  compels 
us  to  affirm  it.  The  question  why  we  are  compelled 
to  make  this  affirmation  is  one  for  which  various 
explanations  may  be  given.  The  fact  that  every 
one  as  a  reasonable  being  is  forced  to  do  it,  is  the 
only  fact  of  consequence,  and  this  is  a  fact  that  is 
placed  beyond  dispute  by  any  fair  analysis  of  the 
operations  of  our  own  minds.  Those  who  have  de- 
nied that  the  principle  of  causality  thus  involves  a 
first  cause,  have  been,  in  fact,  forced  to  the  recog- 
nition of  the  principle  under  another  name.  They 
have  virtually  confessed  what  they  have  professed 
to  deny.  By  different  paths  they  have  been  led  to 
the  conception  of  an  original  ground  of  all  existence, 
and  not  to  the  conception  of  an  endless  succession 
of  second  causes.  It  matters  not  whether  this  orig- 
inal ground  of  all  phenomena  be  termed  matter, 
mind,  or  force,  it  comes  essentially  to  the  same  thing 
at  last.     I  do  not  mean  that  those  who  thus  hold  to 


CAUSE  AND  FORCE.  87 

a  permanent  element  beneath  phenomena  accept,  in 
the  strict  sense,  the  doctrine  of  a  First  Cause,  but 
the  readiness  with  which  they  adopt  this  hypothesis 
is  conclusive  proof  of  their  reluctance  to  rest  in  the 
idea  of  a  mere  succession  of  second  causes.  And  it 
should  further  be  observed,  that  the  most  inadequate 
explanations  of  the  principle  of  causality  are  not 
more  incompatible  with  the  tjieistic  inference  than 
they  are  with  any  scientific  inference  which  involves 
a  real  extension  of  knowledge.  If  compatible  with 
anything  more  than  formal  and  deductive  science, 
they  are  equally  compatible  with  religion. 

The  argument  which  we  have  here  considered  is 
metaphysical,  for  the  necessity  by  which  we  rise 
from  a  series  of  second  causes  to  a  first  cause,  is  a 
necessity  of  thought.  It  is  a  result  legitimately 
evolved  from  the  very  idea  of  cause.  Yet,  while 
metaphysical,  it  must  not  be  confounded  with  the 
purely  a  priori  speculations  of  Anselm  and  Des- 
cartes. For  it  is  reasoning  from  the  external  uni- 
verse, not  from  the  abstract  conception  of  the  mind. 
This  concrete  use  of  the  principle  of  causality,  the 
only  use  which  has  any  meaning,  renders  the  argu- 
ment, in  effect,  a  conclusion  from  experience.  Still, 
it  has  been  urged  that,  as  a  fact  of  experience,  cau- 
sation cannot  be  extended  to  the  material  universe 
itself,  but  only  to  its  changeable  phenomena ;  and 
that  it  is  a  necessary  part  of  the  fact  of  causation, 
within  the  sphere  of  our  experience,  that  the  causes, 
as  well  as  the  effects,  had  a  beginning  in  time  ;  since 
if  the  cause  existed  always  the  effect  would  have  ex- 
isted always  also.  "  It  would  seem,  therefore,"  Mr. 
Mills  argues,  "that  our  experience,  instead  of  fur- 
nishing an  argument  for  a  first  cause,  is  repugnant 


88  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

to  it ;  and  that  the  very  essence  of  causation,  as  it 
exists  within  the  limits  of  our  knowledge,  is  incom- 
patible with  a  first  cause."  l 

In  reply,  I  would  say,  that  no  one  has  ever  claimed 
that  we  gain  from  experience  the  idea  of  a  first 
cause,  and  if  we  can  know  nothing  but  what  we  gain 
directly  from  experience,  all  discussion  of  cause  that 
assigns  any  meaning  to  the  term  may  well  be,  at 
once,  abandoned.  Yet,  in  the  very  essay  which  I 
have  just  quoted,  Mr.  Mill  concedes  that  there 
may  be  a  permanent  element  in  nature  beneath  its 
changeable  phenomena,  which  may  with  some  jus- 
tice be  termed  a  first  or  universal  cause.  But  we 
know  nothing,  by  experience,  of  any  such  unchang- 
ing element.  It  is  a  legitimate  hypothesis  that  the 
substances,  which  seem  to  us-  elementary  and  in- 
transmutable,  are  in  reality  modifications  of  some 
single  element.  No  chemist  has  ever  recognized, 
in  his  experience,  those  ultimate  atoms  whose  exist- 
ence he  assumes.  If,  then,  we  undertake  to  assert 
the  existence  of  that  permanent  element  in  nature, 
which  Mr.  Mill  so  readily  concedes,  we  must  pass 
just  as  much  beyond  the  limits  of  experience,  as 
when,  by  a  necessity  of  thought,  we  are  led  to  rea- 
son from  a  succession  of  finite  causes  to  a  first  cause. 
Science,  not  less  than  Philosophy,  demands  a  faith 
which  transcends  all  testimony  that  the  senses  fur- 
nish. We  push  no  further  in  one  direction  than  in 
the  other. 

The  most  vigorous  assault  upon  the  doctrine  of  a 
first  cause  comes,  however,  in  our  own  time,  not 
from  the  field  of  metaphysics,  but  from  the  field  of 
physics  ;  and  this  we  have  next  to  consider.     The 

1  Three  Essays,  etc.  {Theism),  p.  144. 


CAUSE  AND   FORCE.  89 

concrete  argument  for  a  first  cause  starts,  as  we 
have  seen,  from  our  experience  of  the  changes  in 
the  external  universe.  These  are  known  to  us  as 
facts,  and  for  these  facts  we  have  to  give  ourselves 
an  account.  Yet  in  all  this  reasoning,  it  is  as- 
sumed that  the  universe  is  an  effect,  and  that  it 
owes  its  existence  to  a  cause  distinct  from  itself. 
And,  according  to  the  conception  which  formerly 
prevailed  respecting  matter,  and  the  distinction  be- 
tween matter  and  spirit,  it  is  conceded  that  the  view 
that  the  external  universe  was  an  effect  was  not 
irrational.  But  it  is  claimed  that  the  conclusions  of 
modern  science  have  changed  all  this,  and  that  in 
the  light  of  these  conclusions  we  are  no  longer 
authorized  to  look  upon  nature  as  simply  an  effect. 
Beside  the  changing  phenomena,  which  all  agree  in 
tracing  to  the  operation  of  causes,  we  are  confronted, 
as  we  examine  it,  with  permanent  and  unchangeable 
elements  which,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  stand  in  need 
of  no  such  explanation. 

These  permanent  elements  in  nature,  it  is  argued, 
are  not  known  to  us  as  beginning  to  exist ;  or,  in 
other  words,  within  the  range  of  human  knowledge 
they  had  no  beginning,  and  consequently  no  cause, 
though  they  are  themselves  causes  of  everything 
that  is  taking  place.  The  converging  evidence  of 
all  branches  of  physical  inquiry  seems  to  be  landing 
us  in  this  result.  For  wherever  a  physical  phenom- 
enon is  traced  to  its  cause,  that  cause  is  found,  in  the 
last  analysis,  to  be  a  certain  quantum  of  force,  com- 
bined with  certain  collocations,  and  the  last  general- 
ization which  science  reaches  is  that  this  force  is 
everywhere  essentially  the  same,  and  exists  in  a 
fixed   quantity  which   can   neither  be  lessened  nor 


Cp  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT 

increased  ;  and  that  the  constant  changes  which  we 
witness  are  due  partly  to  the  amount  of  force  and 
partly  to  the  diversity  of  the  collocations.  It  is  only 
to  this  permanent  element  in  nature  that  Mr.  Mill 
is  willing  to  apply  the  designation  of  First  Cause, 
that  is,  the  primeval  and  universal  element  in  all 
causes.  "  For  all  effects,"  he  says,  "may  be  traced 
up  to  it,  while  it  cannot  be  traced  up,  by  our  expe- 
rience, to  anything  beyond."  2  Here  we  reach  the 
last  result  of  physical  inquiry. 

This   requires  perhaps,  in  passing,  a  little   fuller 
statement.      The  fundamental  maxim   on  which   is 
founded  the  modern  scientific  conception  of  the  uni- 
verse is  derived  from  the  analytic  study  of  the  move- 
ments of  matter.      For,  as   the  beginning  alike  of 
chemistry  and  physics,  we  have  two  universal  prop- 
ositions, both  rendered  familiar  to  us  in  the  popular 
scientific  discussions  of  the  past  few  years.     These 
(two  propositions  are   that   matter  is  indestructible, 
land  that  motion  is  continuous.     Upon  the  validity  of 
these  two  closely  related  maxims  rests  the  validity 
of  every  conclusion  which  chemical  or  physical  sci- 
ence has  thus  far  reached.     If  the  scientific  inquirer 
had  to  deal  with  quantities  which  could  be  either 
wholly  or  in  part  annihilated,  or  with  motions  which 
could  wholly  or  in  part  cease,  science  would  at  once 
come  to  an  end.     The  ancients  held  to  the  opinion 
that  matter  might  be  created  or  destroyed  ;  and  until 
modern  times  it  was  supposed  that  moving  bodies 
had  a  natural  tendency  to  come  to  a  standstill ;  but 
by  degrees  it  was  seen  that  where  matter  apparently 
disappears,    and    where    motion    apparently    ceases, 
there  is  in  reality  only  a  subtle  transformation  into 
another  form  or  into  an  equivalent  quantity. 

1  Three  Essays,  etc.  {Theism),  p.  145. 


( 

CAUSE   AND  FORCE.  9 1 

These  two  theorems  are  not  fundamental  but  deriv- 
ative, and  thus  we  are  led  directly  to  a  more  general 
proposition  that  lies  back  of  both.  For  in  asserting 
that  matter  is  indestructible,  and  that  motion  is  con- 
tinuous, we  assert  by  implication  that  force  is  persis- 
tent, that  is,  that  the  force  manifested  in  the  known 
universe  is  constant,  and  can  neither  be  increased 
nor  diminished.  For,  it  is  evident,  that  the  inde- 
structible element  in  matter  is  its  resisting  power, 
or  the  force  which  it  exerts,  and  that  when  motion 
is  arrested  we  are  obliged  to  conceive  of  force  as  im- 
pressed in  the  shape  of  reaction  on  the  bodies  caus- 
ing the  arrest.  Strictly  speaking,  we  have  no  proof^ 
of  the  proposition  that  force  is  thus  persistent.  Il 
is  a  truth  which  does  not  admit  of  demonstration/ 
At  the  bottom  of  all  demonstration  there  must  lil 
an  axiom  which  itself  is  undemonstrable.  We  are 
compelled  to  believe  in  the  persistence  of  force,  sim- 
ply for  the  reason  that  it  is  impossible  to  conceive 
of  something  becoming  nothing,  or  of  nothing  be- 
coming something.  We  pass  beyond  the  realm  of 
experience,  and  appeal  to  a  psychological  necessity. 
Science  lands  us,  at  last,  in  a  transcendental  region 
—  all  her  conclusions  are  seen  to  rest  upon  a  pos-j 
tulate  which  we  recognize  as  a  law  of  conscious^ 
thought. 

In  this  persistent  force,  of  which  all  the  phenom- 
ena of  the  universe  are  but  modes  of  manifestation, 
we  have  given  us,  it  is  claimed,  that  permanent  ele- 
ment, to  which,  if  to  anything,  we  must  assign  the 
character  of  a  first  cause.  Nor  is  this  reasoning  es- 
sentially affected  if  we  claim  that  mind,  so  far  as 
experience  teaches  us,  is  the  only  thing  capable  of 
originating  change,  and  that  therefore  this  original 


92  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT 

force  from  which  all  change  results  must  be  identi- 
fied with  mind.  For  if  the  doctrine  of  the  conserva- 
tion of  force  be  true,  the  will  does  not,  any  more  than 
any  other  cause,  originate  force,  it  simply  directs 
into  a  particular  channel  a  portion  of  the  force  al- 
ready working  in  other  ways.  Volition  is  an  origi- 
nating cause  only  so  far  as  it  liberates  a  certain 
amount  of  force  evolved  in  the  physical  processes  of 
the  human  system.  Volition,  therefore,  does  not 
answer  to  the  idea  of  a  first  cause,  since  force  must, 
in  every  instance,  be  assumed  as  prior  to  it,  and 
there  is  no  reason  for  supposing  force  itself  to  have 
been  created  by  volition.  Thus  so  far  as  the  lights 
I  of  science  guide  us,  and  so  far  as  human  experience 
teaches  anything,  "  we  may  conclude  that  force  has 
'all  the  attributes  of  a  thing  eternal  and  uncreated."  l 
If  it  be  urged  that  mind  at  least  exists,  and  that 
mind  must  have  produced  mind,  we  are  pointed  to 
numberless  analogies  of  nature  in  proof  of  the  fact 
that  nobler  and  more  precious  products  are  con 
stantly  derived  from  a  viler  material,  and  that  the  de- 
velopment of  the  superior  from  the  inferior,  the  elab- 
oration of  the  higher  from  the  lower  is  the  general 
law.  Mind  does  not  therefore  demand  mind  as  its 
original  cause.  And,  as  a  result,  we  are  brought  to 
this  conclusion,  "that  the  argument  for  a  first  cause 
may  be  dismissed,  since  no  cause  is  needed  for  that 
which  had  no  beginning.  The  phenomena  and 
changes  in  the  universe  have,  indeed,  each  of  them  a 
beginning  and  a  cause,  but  this  cause  is  always  some 
prior  change ;  nor  do  the  analogies  of  experience  give 
us  any  reason  to  expect,  from  the  mere  occurrence 
of  changes,  that  if  we   could   trace   the  series  far 

1  Three  Essays,  etc.  {Theism),  p.  147. 


CAUSE  AND  FORCE.  93 

enough  back,  we  should  arrive  at  a  primeval  voli- 
tion. The  world  does  not,  by  its  mere  existence, 
bear  witness  to  a  God."1  Thus  on  reasonings  de- 
duced from  the  conclusions  of  physical  science  the 
doctrine  of  a  first  cause  is  set  aside  as  a  wholly  gra- 
tuitous hypothesis. 

Undoubtedly  the  argument  which  I  have  just 
sketched,  an  argument  urged  with  so  much  calmness 
and  made  to  rest  on  the  most  indubitable  results  of 
modern  science,  seems  the  most  powerful  assault 
upon  the  doctrine  of  a  first  cause  that  has  yet  been 
made.  The  mere  metaphysical  grounds  of  that  doc- 
trine are  wholly  set  aside.  The  questions  so  much 
debated  by  a  certain  school  of  thinkers,  whether 
from  the  consideration  of  a  chain  of  second  causes 
we  are  compelled,  by  a  necessity  of  thought,  to  as- 
sume a  first  cause,  whether  from  the  contingent  and 
finite  we  can  leap  up  by  a  legitimate  process  of  mind 
to  the  infinite  and  absolute,  are  no  longer  of  conse- 
quence. If  it  be  granted  that  some  kind  of  being 
must  always  have  existed,  and  that  the  universe  in 
the  endless  transformation  of  its  own  primeval  forces 
contains  within  itself  its  own  causal  principles,  the 
hypothesis  of  any  other  source  ceases  to  be  a  logical 
necessity.  In  short,  if  the  universe  be  not  an  effect, 
we  are  not  required  to  infer  a  cause.  For  the  affir- 
mation of  a  first  cause  being  a  regressive  inference 
from  the  existence  of  a  special  class  of  effects,  it 
is  evident  that  the  whole  argument  hinges  on  the 
question,  does  such  a  state  of  things  really  exist  as 
is  only  possible  through  the  agency  of  a  supra-mun- 
dane cause. 

Once  Locke  wrote  the  words,  "  If  it  be  said,  there 

]  Three  Essays,  etc.  (  Theism),  p.  153. 


94  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

was  a  time  when  no  being  had  any  knowledge,  when 
that  eternal  being  was  void  of  all  understanding,  I 
reply,  that  then  it  was  impossible  there  should  ever 
have  been  any  knowledge ;  it  being  as  impossible 
that  things  wholly  void  of  knowledge  and  operating 
blindly  and  without  perception  should  produce  a 
knowing  being,  as  it  is  impossible  that  a  triangle 
should  make  itself  three  angles  bigger  than  two  right 
ones.  For  it  is  as  repugnant  to  the  idea  of  senseless 
matter  that  it  should  put  into  itself  sense,  percep- 
tion, and  knowledge,  as  it  is  repugnant  to  the  idea 
of  a  triangle  that  it  should  put  into  itself  greater  an- 
gles than  two  right  ones."  The  argument  was  con- 
clusive in  his  day,  and  with  the  notion  of  the  distinc- 
tion between  spirit  and  matter  that  then  prevailed. 
But  in  our  day,  matter  is  no  longer  conceived  of  as 
senseless.  Our  notions  respecting  it  are  radically 
changed.  If  we  do  not  go  to  the  extent  of  Professor 
Tyndall's  famous  declaration,  and  see  in  it  "  the 
promise  and  potency  of  all  terrestrial  life,"  we  are 
compelled  to  view  it  in  a  light  which  goes  very  far 
to  destroy  the  sharp  antithesis  between  spirit  and 
matter  which  prevailed  in  the  time  of  Locke.  It  is 
a  sum  of  forces  and  of  forces  which  are  indestruc- 
tible. 

When,  however,  we  consider  more  closely  this 
most  recent  objection  to  the  old  doctrine  of  a  First 
Cause,  a  few  obvious  reflections  present  themselves. 

In  the  first  place,  what  is  essential  in  the  idea  is 
in  effect  conceded.  For  the  theory  of  an  original, 
indestructible  force  is,  after  all,  but  a  method  of  ac- 
counting for  change.  And  in  accounting  for  change 
it  not  only  concedes  that  every  change  in  nature 
had  a  cause,  but  that  back  of  all  change  lies  some- 


CAUSE  AND  FORCE.  95 

thing  persistent  and  unchangeable.  This  goes  far 
beyond  the  position  of  the  early  positivists,  who 
denied  that  the  conception  of  an  original  cause  had 
any  legitimate  place  in  scientific  investigation,  and 
also  recognizes  the  principle,  before  insisted  on, 
that  the  mind  cannot  rest  with  an  endless  succes- 
sion of  second  causes.  There  is,  after  all,  in  this 
theory  the  positive  affirmation  of  something  lying 
behind  the  finite  and  the  conditioned.  We  may  ap- 
ply to  it  what  designation  we  please,  but  we  cannot 
get  rid  of  the  fact  that  the  most  refined  conception 
of  the  universe  that  science  has  yet  reached  is  a 
conception  that  leads  us  back  to  an  absolute  and 
eternal  source  of  all  the  phenomena  of  existence. 

In  the  second  place,  the  subtle  conception  of  the 
material  universe  which  we  here  reach  is  not  a  result 
of  experience,  or  of  any  scientific  experiment,  but  a 
purely  abstract  and  metaphysical  conception.  If  the 
idea  of  a  first  cause,  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the 
term,  is  a  metaphysical  idea,  the  idea  of  a  primeval 
force  is  not  less  metaphysical.  We  arrive  at  it 
purely  as  a  deduction  from  the  two  doctrines  of  the 
indestructibility  of  matter  and  the  continuance  of 
motion,  and,  too,  the  truth  of  neither  one  of  these 
doctrines  has  ever  been  absolutely  established  by 
experiment.  They  are  seen  to  be  true  by  a  neces- 
sity of  thought.  Hence,  in  this  discussion,  the  an- 
tithesis is  not  between  metaphysics  and  science,  but 
between  two  purely  metaphysical  conceptions.  The 
two  hypotheses,  that  the  first  cause  was  self-existing 
mind,  and  that  the  first  cause  was  self-existing  mat- 
ter, considered  simply  as  hypotheses,  are  of  exactly 
equivalent  value.  To  say  that  one  rests  upon  a 
solid  basis  of  fact  while  the  other  is  merely  a  logical 


96  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

notion  of  the  intellect,  is  a  statement  for  which 
there  is  no  ground  whatever,  since  the  facts  to  be 
accounted  for  are  the  same  in  either  case.  The 
only  question  is  which  hypothesis  covers  those  facts 
most  completely. 

Science,  then,  does  not  rid  us  of  the  metaphysical 
necessity  of  inferring  some  kind  of  first  cause ;  the 
only  real  issue  is  whether  this  first  cause  must  be  con- 
-^— reived  of  as  mind  or  matter ;  whether  we  are  bound 
to  infer  some  action  of  conscious  intelligence  in  the 
production  of  the  ceaseless  changes,  of  the  begin- 
ning of  which  we  have  no  knowledge,  or  may  we  as 
rationally  refer  them  to  the  operation  of  blind  force. 
So  far  as  relates  to  the  bare  metaphysical  concep- 
tion of  a  first  cause,  it  makes  but  little  difference 
whether  we  assume  it  to  be  mind,  or  whether,  assum- 
ing it  to  be  matter,  we  proceed  to  sublimate  our  idea 
of  matter,  and  endue  it  with  such  powers  and  po- 
tencies that  the  dividing  line  between  mind  and 
matter  is  practically  wiped  out.  For  the  bare  ab- 
stract conception,  if  that  is  all  that  we  are  in  search 
of,  will  be  furnished  by  one  assumption  as  well  as 
by  the  other.  At  best,  such  a  conception  is  only 
a  colorless  beginning ;  it  satisfies  a  necessity  of 
thought,  but  does  not  set  us  forward  in  the  way  of 
any  actual  knowledge ;  its  only  value,  so  far  as  nat- 
ural theology  is  concerned,  consists  in  its  laying 
the  foundation  of  a  structure,  to  be  built  with  other 
material.  We  only  weary  ourselves  by  seeking  thus 
to  climb  the  ladder  of  finite  agency,  and  mount  back 
through  the  long  series  of  dependent  sequences  to 
one  uncaused  cause,  if  we  do  not  proceed  to  with- 
draw the  result  we  have  reached  from  the  region  of 
metaphysics.     "  The  notion  of  a  God,"  says  Sir  Wil- 


CAUSE  AND  FORCE.  97 

liam  Hamilton,  "  is  not  contained  in  the  notion  of  a 
mere  first  cause;  for,  in  the  admission  of  a  first 
cause,  atheist  and  theist  are  at  one."  *  What  we  are 
in  search  of,  as  the  foundation  of  religion,  is  not  a 
blank  essence,  or  an  inconceivable  substance.  It  is 
only  when  we  have  completed  and  perfected  the 
idea,  and  when  we  return  to  it  with  the  results  of 
further  inquiry,  that  the  idea  of  a  first  cause  be- 
comes clothed  with  religious  significance.  Yet,  in- 
complete and  unsatisfactory  as  is  the  mere  abstract 
conception  of  a  first^  cause,  it  is  still  an  essential 
part  of  that  complex 'and  comprehensive  reasoning 
on  which,  as  we  have  seen,  the  argument  for  the 
divine  existence  rests  ;  and  it  is  a  point  of  no  small 
importance  thus  to  ascertain  at  the  outset  of  our 
inquiry,  that  recent  science,  instead  of  dismissing 
the  hypothesis,  has  supplied  us  with  a  striking  evi- 
dence of  the  impossibility  of  excluding  it  from  ra- 
tional thought. 

For  this  reason,  I  find  myself  wholly  unable  to 
agree  with  those  advocates  of  theism  who  would 
wholly  dismiss  the  doctrine  of  a  first  cause  from  the 
science  of  natural  theology.  A  recent  writer,  Pro- 
fessor Knight,  himself  a  strenuous  theist,  is  a  repre- 
sentative of  this  class.  He  does  not  hesitate  to  say 
that  the  argument  for  a  first  cause  belongs  to  the 
same  class  with  the  long-discarded  arguments  of 
Anselm  and  Descartes,  and  that  it  is  not  less  illu- 
sory. But  this  ingenious  writer  seems  to  forget 
that  the  old  a  priori  arguments  were  mere  reason- 
ings from  conceptions  of  the  mind,  while  the  argu- 
ment for  a  first  cause,  as  here  presented,  is  an  argu- 
ment from  an  external  fact,  a  fact  whose  reality  is 

1  [Lectures  on  Metaphysics,  Lect.  ii.,  page  19.] 
7 


98  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT 

not  questioned,  and  whose  existence  demands  ex- 
planation ;  and  when  he  further  claims  that  it  is  by 
an  illicit  process  when,  in  the  argument  for  a  first 
cause,  we  rise  from  the  finite  to  the  infinite,  he  im- 
putes to  the  argument  a  conclusion  which  it  does 
not  claim,  for  in  the  guarded  form  in  which  I  have 
presented  it,  it  has  not  been  claimed  for  the  first 
cause  that  it  is  infinite.  From  the  universe  as  an 
effect,  we  have  simply  argued  a  cause,  and  all  that 
we  have  undertaken  to  show  further  is  that  a  mere 
sequence  of  second  causes  does  not  furnish  what  the 
reason  craves.  I  concede  that  in  the  bare  idea  of  a 
first  cause  we  do  not  have  the  idea  of  God.  Much 
remains  to  be  done  before  this  abstract  and  empty 
conception  is  filled  out  and  completed  to  a  full 
theistic  conclusion.  But  the  notion  of  a  first  cause 
is  one  essential  step  towards  this  result,  and  I  con- 
ceive it  to  be  a  matter  of  no  little  moment,  if  the 
theories  of  force,  with  which  modern  science  has 
made  us  so  familiar,  can  be  shown,  after  all,  to  be 
simply  disguised  forms  of  the  old  doctrine  of  a  first 
cause,  and  to  be  but  lame  and  impotent  substitutes 
for  that  earlier  conception.  It  is  something  to  be 
assured  that  so  far  as  science  has  established  any 
theoretical  conclusions,  these  conclusions  confirm 
the  doctrine  that  the  universe  must  have  had  its 
origin  in  something  back  of  itself,  and  that  if  science 
cannot  herself  give  us  the  idea  of  a  first  cause,  she 
has,  at  least,  reached  no  conclusions  inconsistent 
with  it.  The  notion  that  the  doctrine  of  a  first 
cause  has  been  wiped  out  by  the  modern  theory  of 
force,  may  be  dismissed  as  a  mistake. 


LECTURE  IV. 

THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  ORDER. 

We  have  advanced  thus  far  in  our  argument  to 
the  conception  of  a  first  cause,  and  if  I  have  not 
failed  of  my  aim  in  the  considerations  that  I  have 
presented,  I  have  made  it  plain  that  this  conception 
in  some  form  is  implied  in  any  explanation  that  has 
been  attempted  of  the  origin  of  the  universe  as  it 
now  exists.  The  most  opposite  schools  of  thought 
agree  in  this,  that  if  something  exists,  something 
must  have  always  existed,  and  that  the  unceasing 
change  which  we  witness  on  every  hand  can  only  find 
a  sufficient  ground  in  something  that  is  unchange- 
able. The  mind  refuses  to  rest  short  of  this  solu- 
tion. We  have  now  to  ask,  what  do  we  know  re- 
specting the  nature  of  this  first  cause.  Is  it  eternal 
matter,  or  is  it  eternal  mind  ;  is  it  force  acting 
blindly,  without  direction  and  without  aim,  achiev- 
ing its  results  by  a  natural  development  over  which 
no  conscious  intelligence  has  presided,  an  eternal 
rhythm  of  evolution  and  of  dissolution,  or  is  it  in- 
telligence, intelligence  above  nature  and  working 
through  it,  making  the  operations  of  nature  and  the 
infinite  manifestations  of  physical  force  subservient 
to  its  wise  and  all. comprehending  purposes  ? 

It  is  evident  that  unless  we  can  give  some  answer 
to  this  question,  all  that  we  have  previously  ascer- 
tained is  little  to  the  purpose.     On  the  mere  abstract 


100  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

question  of  a  first  cause  there  is  really  no  debate. 
The  most  extreme  materialist  at  the  present  day  is 
willing  to  concede  it,  provided  that  no  attempt  is 
made  to  define  it.  But  if  it  remains  undefined  the 
theist  has  gained  no  advantage  that  is  worth  con- 
tending for.  If  we  cannot  proceed  to  clothe  this  first 
cause  with  attributes,  if  we  cannot  connect  it  with 
intelligence  and  with  personality,  we  have  not  ad- 
vanced a  step  in  satisfying  the  demands  of  religion. 
In  other  words,  a  mere  formal  demonstration  of  the 
original  source  of  existence  has  no  theological  value. 
It  remains  a  colorless,  unillumined  admission,  at 
best  ministering  comfort  only  to  the  speculative  rea- 
son. And  if  it  thus  remains  an  absolute  zero,  inac- 
cessible to  inquiry,  the  blank  ground  of  existence,  it 
matters  very  little  whether  we  insist  upon  regarding 
it  as  mind,  or  whether  we  identify  it  with  the  ethe- 
realized  forms  of  matter  with  which  modern  science 
has  made  us  so  familiar.  Whether  it  be  termed 
cause  or  force  is  a  question  of  little  moment. 

We  have  thus  far  viewed  the  universe  simply  as 
one  endless  series  of  changes  ;  let  us  now  proceed  to 
subject  these  changes  to  a  closer  examination.  And 
what  strikes  us  at  the  first  glance  is  the  universal 
prevalence  of  order.  I  say  at  first  glance,  for  though 
the  nature  and  endless  manifestations  of  the  order 
that  runs  through  the  universe  are  only  partially 
perceived,  after  prolonged  and  elaborate  investiga- 
tion, the  fact  of  the  existence  of  this  order  is  the 
first  thing  that  strikes  the  observing  eye.  We  are 
not  more  impressed  with  the  great  fact  of  change 
than  with  the  fact  that  change  everywhere  proceeds 
in  accordance  with  fixed  and  invariable  rule.  The 
first  shepherds  who  watched  their  flocks  under  the 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  ORDER.  IOI 

clear  oriental  sky,  must  have  noted  the  fact  that  the 
stars  in  their  courses  marched  in  an  orderly  proces- 
sion ;  and  the  earliest  inhabitants  of  the  earth  must 
have  waited  with  implicit  confidence  for  each  new 
rising:  of  the  sun  that  would  bathe  the  world  with 
light  and  call  men  once  more  to  the  labors  of  the 
day.  And  all  subsequent  advance  of  human  science 
has  been  simply  the  following  out  of  this  first  sug- 
gestion. 

But  this  advance  of  science,  without  modifying 
the  principle,  has  given  it  an  immense  extension. 
The  earliest  observers  of  the  changes  of  the  exter- 
nal world,  while  profoundly  impressed  with  the  prev- 
alence of  law,  were  hardly  less  perplexed  with  its 
frequent  absence.  If  the  outgoings  of  morning  and 
of  evening,  if  the  solemn  march  of  the  constellations, 
if  the  waxing  and  waning  of  the  moon  spoke  of 
regular  and  orderly  succession,  there  were  other 
changes  which  refused  to  be  reduced  to  rule,  and 
which  seemed,  to  their  uninstructed  eye,  signs  of 
disorder  and  confusion.  The  flaming  comet  speed- 
ing unheralded  across  the  sky  was  to  them  the  por- 
tent of  direful  change.  In  its  train  were  pestilence 
and  war,  and  the  fate  of  empires.  It  seemed  a  fear- 
ful intruder  into  the  harmony  of  things.  It  has  been 
the  mission  of  science  to  extend  further  and  further 
on  every  hand  the  reign  of  law,  and  to  show  that 
what  at  first  'sight  appears  most  exceptional,  most 
unaccountable,  most  incapable  of  being  reduced  to 
regular  rule,  is  after  all  but  another  and  more  strik- 
ing illustration  of  this  principle,  a  principle  which 
equally  finds  its  illustration  in  the  falling  of  a  peb- 
ble to  the  ground,  and  the  flight  of  a  flaming  sphere 
through  the  furthest  removes  of  space. 


102  THE    THE/STIC  ARGUMENT. 

And  what  is  shown  so  clearly  in  the  grandest 
works  of  nature  is  shown  not  less  clearly  in  the 
least.  I  heard  not  long  ago  of  a  visit  paid  by  one 
of  the  first  of  living  botanists  to  a  friend,  whose 
summer  home  was  on  one  of  the  most  barren  and 
rocky  headlands  of  our  stern  New  England  coast. 
On  his  arrival,  his  host  laughingly  apologized  for 
having  invited  him  to  a  spot  that  presented  so  little 
opportunity  for  indulging  his  favorite  pursuit,  re- 
marking that  nothing  grew  there  but  a  few  imported 
trees,  whose  stunted  growth  seemed  only  to  reveal 
the  ungenial  nature  of  the  soil.  "  On  the  contrary," 
replied  the  guest,  "  I  see  much  to  reward  me,  and  I 
will  engage,  before  we  sit  down  to  dine,  to  gather 
three  hundred  distinct  specimens  of  plants."  And 
each  of  these,  so  small  most  of  them  that  only  the 
most  practiced  eye  could  detect  them  lurking  in  the 
crevices  of  the  rocks,  so  delicate  that  scores  of  them 
were  crushed  under  foot  by  each  step  of  a  careless 
child  playing  with  his  ball  or  driving  his  hoop,  was 
fashioned  in  its  growth  in  accordance  with  its  own 
law,  and  could  be  recognized  by  minute  differences 
of  structure  as  distinct  from  each  of  its  fellows,  and 
illustrated  in  its  way,  not  less  than  Orion  and  Arc- 
turus,  the  order  of  the  world. 

But  I  am  reciting  mere  commonplace  when  I  say 
that  order  pervades  the  universe.  It  is  obvious  to 
the  eye  of  the  child  led  out  by  the  hand  for  the  first 
time  to  gaze  at  the  starry  heavens  ;  it  is  the  last 
thing  noticed  by  the  man  of  science  whose  optic 
glass  has  swept  the  flaming  walls  of  space,  or  whose 
microscope  has  searched  out  the  minutest  forms,  of 
the  vegetable  or  animal  -creation.  And  it  is  not 
only  a  fact  of  to-day,  but  runs  equally  back  through 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  ORDER.  103 

all  epochs  of  astronomical  or  of  geological  time.  It 
has  been  the  common  work  of  all  the  sciences  since 
the  day  when  man  first  assumed  the  great  office  of 
making  himself  the  minister  and  interpreter  of  na- 
ture, to  discover  and  to  illustrate  it.  Science  is  in 
fact  but  another  name  for  this  progressive  and  ever 
extending  knowledge  of  the  order  of  nature,  for 
there  can  be  no  science  which  is  not  an  advance  of 
knowledge  in  this  direction.  And  it  is  the  pride 
and  boast  of  science  that  it  is  achieving  this  result, 
that  with  each  new  step  it  is  bringing  what  seems 
irregular  and  exceptional  within  the  realms  of  order, 
and  demonstrating  that  what  have  passed  for  excep- 
tions, when  intelligently  comprehended,  are  simply 
proofs  of  a  larger  and  more  comprehensive  order. 

Perhaps  the  most  impressive  result  of  this  more 
scientific  apprehension  of  the  order  of  the  world 
has  been  the  ascertainment  of  the  fact  that  the  laws 
of  the  physical  universe  are  laws  of  mathematical 
relations.  Thus  the  law  of  gravitation,  which  rules 
the  grains  of  dust  in  the  sunbeam  and  the  farthest 
orb  that  revolves  beyond  the  reach  of  human  vision, 
is  a  definite  numerical  law.  The  curves  which  the 
heavenly  bodies  describe  in  their  revolutions  around 
the  sun  and  around  one  another  belong  to  the  class 
of  curves  known  as  the  conic  sections,  —  curves  the 
proportions  of  which  were  investigated  by  geometers 
centuries  before  Kepler  and  Newton  had  revealed 
the  true  system  of  the  heavens.  The  law  of  chem- 
ical combination  always  admits  of  precise  numerical 
expression.  Each  color  in  the  rainbow  that  spans 
the  arch  of  heaven,  and  makes  the  heart  leap  up,  is 
due  to  a  certain  number  of  vibrations  within  a  given 
time,  and  so  are  the  long-drawn  notes  of  the  organ 


104  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

that  uplift  the  soul  in  praise,  or  the  accents  of  the 
human  voice,  melting  with  tenderness  from  a  moth- 
er's lips,  or  thrilling  the  ear  with  the  accents  of  an- 
guish and  despair.  A  crystal  is  frozen  geometry, 
and  the  feathers  in  the  wings  and  tail  of  the  hum- 
ming-bird are  all  numbered. 

The  universe  everywhere  reveals  itself  to  us  as  a 
whole,  all  the  parts  of  which  are  related  to  each 
other  by  precise  and  unvarying  laws.  The  system 
of  which  our  earth  is  a  member  is  a  vast  and  orderly 
system,  the  various  parts  of  which  are  so  adjusted, 
as  regards  mass  and  magnitude,  and  distance,  and 
rate  and  plane  of  motion,  that  the  whole  is  ren- 
dered stable  and  secure.  And  our  solar  system,  so 
far  as  we  can  see,  is  only  one  of  millions  of  systems, 
all  as  arranged  and  distributed  in  relation  to  one  an- 
other as  to  secure  the  same  result.  While  each  orb 
is  affecting  the  orbit  of  every  other,  while  each  is 
exerting  a  constant  influence  which,  if  left  uncoun- 
teracted,  would  destroy  itself  and  all  the  rest,  all  are 
balanced  in  their  motions  with  such  wondrous  accu- 
racy as  to  convert  the  element  of  danger  into  a 
source  of  strength.  And  so  in  the  structure  of  mat- 
ter we  are  everywhere  confronted  with  the  same 
system  of  definite  proportions,  no  chemical  union 
being  possible  except  where  the  different  elements 
bear  to  each  other  a  definite  numerical  ratio.  The 
least  alteration  of  this  proportion  would  convert  the 
most  wholesome  substances  into  the  most  deadly 
poisons,  and,  instead  of  furnishing  nutriment  to  ani- 
mals and  plants,  spread  everywhere  destruction  and 
death. 

The  reign  of  law  is  then  the  result  which  science 
has  everywhere  reached.    It  lies  at  the  root  of  every 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  ORDER.  105 

conception  we  can  form  of  the  universe,  either  with- 
out us  or  within  us  ;  for  while  regularity  and  order 
are  most  conspicuous  in  the  grand  phenomena  of 
the  external  world,  we  are  not  less  assured  of  their 
pervading  presence  in  the  most  intricate  and  ob- 
scure processes  of  life.  Beginning  with  astronomy, 
the  idea  has  passed  to  every  department  of  science, 
and  to  every  domain  of  thought.  It  refuses  to  be 
excluded  from  any  sphere  where  there  is  change  and 
progress  and  growth.  It  meets  us  at  every  step. 
This  order  which  science  finds  in  nature  may  be  de- 
scribed as  either  general  or  special ;  the  character- 
istic of  the  former  being  regularity,  and  of  the  lat- 
ter adaptation.  In  inorganic  nature,  general  order 
is  more  apparent  ;  in  organic  nature,  special  order. 
By  some  —  for  example,  Professor  Flint  —  these  are 
treated  simply  as  parts  of  the  same  argument ;  but 
it  rather  seems  to  me  that  they  are  distinct,  and  that 
the  latter,  which  is  termed  the  argument  of  design, 
derives  its  main  support  from  the  much  more  com- 
prehensive argument  from  general  laws.  Order  or 
regularity  is  a  simple  fact,  while  design  is  an  infer- 
ence from  a  fact. 

The  argument  from  order,  strictly  speaking,  is  a 
corollary  of  the  idea  of  cause.  If,  as  here  seen,  the 
changes  in  the  phenomenal  universe  carry  us  back 
irresistibly  to  a  cause  not  simply  of  each  individual 
phenomenon,  but  of  the  phenomena  as  a  whole,  the 
order  and  regularity  displayed  in  these  phenomena 
in  the  same  way  suggest  an  intelligent  cause.  As 
the  fact  of  order  is  universal  and  evident,  so  is  the 
inference,  if  made  at  all,  a  necessity  of  thought. 
But  the  end  for  which  things  exist  is  not  self-evi- 
dent ;  it  is  the  consequence  of  an  induction.     We 


106  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

cannot,  therefore,  affirm  that  the  principle  of  finality- 
is  universal  and  necessary,  like  the  principle  of  caus- 
ality. No  doubt,  the  doctrine  of  final  causes,  if  es- 
tablished, gives  an  immense  support  and  extension 
to  the  argument  from  order,  but  the  two  arguments 
rest  upon  different  grounds  :  one  is  the  discussion 
of  a  product,  the  other  of  a  process.  I  am  there- 
fore unable  to  agree  with  Professor  Flint,  that  the 
arguments  are  essentially  identical.1  It  is  true  that 
the  argument  from  design  rests  on  the  recognition 
of  nature  as  displaying  order  and  adjustment,  yet 
the  two  notions  are  not  equivalent  in  the  first  in- 
stance. Thus  no  order  is  more  rigorous  than  the 
order  of  mechanics,  yet  we  have  no  proof  here  of 
final  cause.2 

Proceeding,  then,  first  to  consider  the  argument 
from  order,  at  the  outset  we  shall  need  to  subject 
the  conception  of  natural  law  to  a  brief  examination. 
We  are  accustomed  to  use  the  term  law  in  very 
different  senses.  Thus  we  apply  it  equally  to  de- 
scribe physical,  or  moral,  or  juridical  relations.  We 
speak  of  the  law  which  determines  the  velocity  of  a 
falling  body,  of  the  law  which  conscience  will  not 
suffer  us  to  violate,  of  the  law  which  the -judge  ad- 
ministers upon  the  bench.  Perhaps  the  most  gen- 
eral definition  of  the  word  is  that  made  familiar  to 
us  by  Montesquieu,  "that  laws  are  the  necessary 
relations  which  arise  from  the  nature  of  things." 
On  the  other  hand,  the  late  John  Austin,  who  rigor- 
ously limited  the  definition  of  law  to  the  commands 
of  a  superior,  rejected  Ulpian's  explanation  of  the 
law  of  nature,  and  ridiculed  as  fustian  the  famous 

1  Prof.  R.  Flint,    Theism,  p.  158. 

2  Janet,  Final  Causes  (Edinburgh,  1878),  p.  12. 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  ORDER.  \oj 

description  in  Hooker.  If  we  restrict  the  term  to  its 
original  and  proper  sense,  law  must  be  defined  as 
the  authoritative  expression  of  will,  enforced  by 
power.  But  by  long  usage  the  term  has  come  to 
have  various  derivative  and  secondary  senses,  and  is 
now  habitually  used  by  those  who  would  wholly  re- 
ject its  primary  signification.  It  is  only  in  these 
secondary  senses  that  we  speak  of  the  laws  of  na- 
ture. 

The  primary  and  simplest  sense  in  which  the  term 
"law"  is  applied  to  physical  phenomena,  is  that  in 
which  it  is  used  simply  to  express  an  observed  order 
of  facts,  or,  in  other  words,  facts  which  under  the 
same  conditions  always  follow  each  other  in  the  same 
order.  This  was  the  sense  in  which  the  word  was 
used  by  the  late  Mr.  Buckle,  who  seemed,  at  least  in 
the  earlier  chapters  of  his  work,  to  cherish  the  opin- 
ion that  the  mere  accumulation  of  statistics  was  suf- 
ficient to  furnish  a  basis  not  only  for  physical,  but 
also  for  social  laws.  In  this  sense,  the  laws  of  nature 
are  simply  those  phenomena  which  recur  according 
to  an  empirical  rule.  For  the  application  of  the  term 
in  this  sense,  it  is  not  necessary  thakthe  cause  of  this 
regular  recurrence  should  be  known  or  presumed. 
All  that  was  required  was  that  the  order  should  be 
uniform  and  constant.  The  so-called  laws  of  Kepler 
are  illustrations  of  this  application  of  the  term.  Be- 
ginning with  strange,  mystical  views  of  the  heavenly 
bodies,  and  supposing  at  first  that  the  sun,  stars, 
and  planets  were  divinely  constituted  symbols  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  he  was  led  by  his  instinctive 
search  for  harmony  to  recognize  the  remarkable 
mathematical  relations  between  the  distances  of  the 
different   planets  from  the   sun  and  the  length  of 


108  THE   THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

their  periodic  times,  and  again  between  the  velocity 
of  their  motion  and  the  space  inclosed  between 
corresponding  sections  of  their  orbit.  These  were 
termed  laws,  but  they  were  in  reality  simply  an  order 
of  facts,  established  simply  by  observation,  and  not 
connected  with  any  theoretical  explanation  :  and  the 
larger  part  of  what  are  called  laws,  in  every  science, 
are  simply  facts  of  this  description.  Thus,  in  chem- 
istry, the  relation  of  different  substances  to  each 
other  in  respect  to  combination  and  affinity,  a  rela- 
tion which  is  simply  the  result  of  observation,  and 
concerning  which  all  that  is  known  is  that,  under 
the  same  conditions,  it  will  be  manifested  with  the 
same  regularity,  is  in  the  same  way  defined  as  a  law. 

But  the  ascertainment  of  this  regularity  leads  in- 
stinctively to  the  search  for  a  deeper  explanation. 
For  an  observed  order  of  facts,  to  be  entitled  to  the 
designation  of  law,  must  carry  with  it  the  idea  of 
some  necessity  qnt  of  which  this  uniform  and  reg- 
ular result  arises.  Hence  law  comes  to  mean,  in  the 
second  place,  not  only  an  observed  order  of  facts, 
but  a  persistent  force,  from  the  constant  operation 
of  which  as  an  arranging  cause  this  observed  order 
springs. 

But  the  mind  refuses  to  rest  content  with  this. 
The  conviction  that  some  force  lies  thus  at  the  bot- 
tom of  all  phenomena,  causing  them  thus  to  recur 
with  unfailing  regularity,  prompts  us  next  to  search 
out  the  rule  or  method  by  which  it  operates.  Of 
law  in  this  third  sense  we  have  a  great  example  in 
that  ascertained  by  Newton,  the  discovery  of  which 
ranks  him  so  much  above  Kepler  as  a  philosophical 
investigator.  In  the  Newtonian  theory  of  gravita- 
tion we  have  not  merely  a  force,  but  a  force  accu- 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  ORDER.  log 

rately  defined  according  to  the  mode  and  measure  of 
its  operation,  and  from  which  other  phenomena  arise 
by  necessary  consequence.  So  that  the  law  of  grav- 
itation was  not  merely  an  observed  order,  nor 
merely  an  abstract  conception  assumed  as  a  neces- 
sity of  thought,  but  a  force  the  exact  measure  of 
which  was  numerically  ascertained  and  defined. 
The  three  laws  of  Kepler  were  simply  facts,  the 
grand  discovery  of  Newton  revealed  their  connec- 
tion and  their  cause.  Yet  laws  in  these  three  senses 
simply  explain  the  order  of  subordinate  phenomena. 
They  set  forth  that  order  as  due  to  force.  But  here 
they  leave  us.  There  are  far  more  curious  questions 
which  they  do  not  answer. 

The  law  of  gravitation  is  undoubtedly  the  grand- 
est discovery  connected  with  the  material  universe 
that  the  human  mind  has  yet  made.  It  is  the  most 
universal  of  all  laws,  for  so  far  as  we  can  see  it  per- 
vades all  space.  It  is  the  most  familiar  of  all  laws, 
for  we  cannot  stir  without  confessing  its  operation. 
It  has  been  analyzed  with  mathematical  precision. 
We  know,  with  certainty,  that  it  is  a  force  of  attrac- 
tion operating  "  directly  as  the  mass  and  inversely 
as  the  square  of  the  distance."  Yet  after  all  how 
little  do  we  know  about  it !  It  gives  us  no  explana- 
tion of  itself.  What  is  the  cause  of  this  force,  which, 
so  far  as  we  can  tell,  pervades  all  space ;  what  is  the 
source  of  the  power  which  it  is  ceaselessly  putting 
forth  upon  worlds  beside  which  our  great  globe  it- 
self dwindles  in  insignificance,  and  upon  specks  in 
the  sunbeam  which  only  the  microscope  reveals, 
through  what  medium  it  operates,  how  the  exact 
uniformity  of  its  operations  is  always  and  every- 
where maintained,  —  all  these  are  questions  to  which 


IIO  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

science,  as  yet,  cannot  give  us  any  answer.  With 
strict  and  sober  truth  did  Newton,  after  his  great 
discovery,  describe  himself  simply  as  picking  up  a 
few  pebbles  by  the  shore  of  a  boundless  sea. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  another  fact  quite  as  prom- 
inent as  the  universal  presence  and  prevalence  of 
law,  and  that  is,  the  great  variety  of  laws  that  exist 
around  us  on  every  hand,  and  are  directly  concerned 
in  every  operation  of  nature.     For  no  one  law  deter- 
mines anything  that  we  see  happening  around  us. 
Whatever  happens  is  always  the  result  of  different 
and  opposing  forces,  that  are  nicely  balanced  against 
each  other.     And  the  least  disturbance  in  the  pro- 
portion in  which  each  one  is  allowed    to    operate, 
would  produce  a  total  change  in  the  result.     Thus, 
the  force  of  gravitation  would  wreck  our  solar  sys- 
tem did  not  another  force  act  against  it  and  keep 
the  planets  in  their  paths.     And  the  more  we  study 
nature  the  more  intricate,  do  we  find  these  combina- 
tions of  opposing  forces.     The  most  recent  physio- 
logical research  seems  to  show  that  our  very  mus- 
cles are  thus  seats  of  two  antagonistic  powers,  so 
arranged  that  the  will   by  acting  upon  one  may  reg- 
ulate the  action  of  the  other.      We  are  fearfully  and 
wonderfully  made.      Force  combines  with  force  to 
produce  definite  and  orderly  results.     And  thus  we 
reach  a  fourth  sense  in  which  law  is  used  to  describe 
not   mere  individual   force,  but    an    adjustment    of 
forces  for  the  attainment  of  a  definite  end. 

Nor  can  we  stop  even  here.  It  is  at  once  the  in- 
stinct of  mind  and  the  business  of  science  to  rise 
from  the  visible  to  the  invisible,  from  what  we  ob- 
serve by  sense  to  what  we  infer  by  reason.  And 
here  we  reach  a  fifth  meaning  of  the  term  law,  where 


THE   ARGUMENT  FROM  ORDER.  1 1 1 

it  is  used  to  denote  some  purely  abstract  idea  which 
carries  us  up  to  a  higher  conception  of  what  phe- 
nomena are,  and  how  they  are  caused.  There  may 
be  no  phenomena  known  to  us  within  the  range  of 
experience  which  actually  correspond  to  such  idea, 
and  yet  it  may  be  logically  implied  in  all  phenomena 
around  us.  Thus  what  is  termed  the  first  law  of  mo- 
tion, that  all  motion  in  itself  is  uniform  in  velocity 
and  rectilinear  in  direction,  is  an  abstract  concep- 
tion which  no  student  of  physics  has  ever  seen  ex- 
emplified, yet  it  is  not  the  less  essential  to  a  true 
explanation  of  all  the  motions  that  are  actually  seen. 
It  belongs  to  the  class  of  purely  intellectual  concep- 
tions which  alone  render  intelligible  to  us  this  order 
of  the  material  world.  These  conceptions  have 
guided  all  great  pioneers  of  science  in  the  path  of 
discovery.  These  happy  guesses,  which  are  but  the 
intuitions  of  the  finest  minds,  have  their  origin  in 
an  aptitude  for  comprehending  the  real  facts  of  the 
external  world  under  these  purely  abstract  concep- 
tions.1 

Before  passing  from  these  discriminated  senses  in 
which  we  apply  the  term  law  to  the  material  uni- 
verse, there  are  two  important  considerations  which 
should  not  be  overlooked. 

In  the  first  place,  that  character  of  invariableness 
or  immutability  which  we  are  accustomed  to  attrib- 
ute to  the  laws  of  nature  is  true  only  in  a  single 
sense,  and  that  is  in  the  sense  in  which  we  use  the 
term  law  to  designate  a  single  force.  Thus  gravita- 
tion, so  far  as  we  know,  always  operates  according 
to  a  rigid  mathematical  rule.  But  when  laws  are 
not  conceived  of  as  single,  but  as  combined,  instead 

1  Duke  of  Argyle,  The  Reign  of  Law,  chap.  2. 


112  THE    THE/STIC  ARGUMENT. 

of  being  immutable  in  their  operation  they  are  the 
agencies  of  ceaseless  change.  To  say,  therefore,  as 
is  often  said,  that  all  phenomena  are  governed  by  in- 
variable laws,  is  only  to  express  a  partial  truth,  since 
there  are  no  phenomena  within  the  range  of  human 
experience  of  which  it  can  be  strictly  said  that  they 
are  governed  by  an  invariable  force.  That,  on  the 
contrary,  which  governs  them  is  endlessly  varying 
combinations  of  invariable  forces.  There  is  no  ob- 
served order  of  facts  which  is  not  due  to  a  combina- 
tion of  forces,  and  there  is  no  combination  of  forces 
which  is  not  capable  of  infinite  change.  If  it  be 
true  that  laws  are  invariable,  it  is  not  less  true  that 
they  are  subject  to  endless  variation. 

The  second  consideration  is  that,  so  far  as  we  can 
see,  no  result  is  ever  attained  in  nature  except 
through  the  agency  of  law.  There  is  nowhere  any- 
thing forced,  anything  sudden,  anything  fortuitous. 
All  phenomena  with  which  we  are  acquainted  are 
due  to  causes,  and  these  causes  are  combinations  of 
invariable  forces.  In  the  organic  world  all  things 
around  us  grow.  This  is  not  more  true  of  the 
familiar  operations  of  nature,  which  we  see  on  every 
hand,  than  of  the  extraordinary  results  which  at  first 
startle  and  perplex  us.  In  this  respect  we  simply 
copy  nature.  The  most  elaborate  and  intricate  ma- 
chines contrived  by  human  wit  are  simply  combina- 
tions of  natural  forces  for  producing  some  desired 
result.  The  "  light  out-speeding  telegraph,"  which 
leaps  across  the  frosty  Caucasus  and  glides  beneath 
the  oozy  bottom  of  the  deep,  is  nothing  but  a  contriv- 
ance for  putting  natural  forces  in  operation  ;  and 
the  electric  ray,  with  its  cunningly  devised  battery 
of  hexagonal  cells,  subdivided  by  horizontal  plates, 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  ORDER.  113 

is  nothing  more.  The  laws  enlisted  in  the  works  of 
nature  are  many,  and  various  and  complicated  ;  our 
knowledge  of  them  and  of  their  mode  of  operation  is 
very  limited,  but  we  find  no  result  that  is  not  reached 
through  their  agency. 

Up  to  this  point  in  our  argument  there  is  no  dis- 
pute. The  theist  and  his  opponent  are  equally 
agreed  in  the  interpretation  of  nature  that  has  been 
thus  far  presented.  Both  are  ready  to  admit  that  the 
universe  considered  as  a  whole  presents  this  charac- 
teristic of  order  and  uniformity,  that  its  phenomena 
are  in  all  cases  due  to  the  operation  of  invariable  laws 
or  forces,  and  that  the  operation  of  these  forces  pro- 
ceeds in  accordance  with  methods  and  principles 
which  demand  for  their  explanation  the  most  refined 
analysis  of  modern  science.  The  question  now  arises, 
how  shall  this  be  explained.  What  hypothesis  shall 
we  adopt  to  account  for  the  universal  presence  alike 
in  the  most  sublime  and  in  the  most  insignificant 
of  nature ;  processes  of  what  in  human  operations 
we  should  ascribe  without  hesitation  to  a  directing 
mind  ?  Shall  the  external  world  be  regarded  as  the 
expression  of  a  supreme  intelligence,  an  intelligence 
which  has  reflected  itself  in  the  wondrous  order  and 
in  the  harmonious  combinations,  and  in  the  intricate 
mathematical  relations  which  the  works  of  nature  un- 
doubtedly display ;  shall  the  laws  which  mind  alone 
can  recognize  be  accepted  as  the  necessary  products 
and  operations  of  mind  ? 

No  one  questions  that  this  would  be  the  natural 
and  logical  conclusion  in  dealing  with  any  results  due 
to  human  or  finite  agency.  Have  we  a  right  to  carry 
this  reasoning  into  the  transcendent  region  of  the 
Infinite  ?     Here  let  it  be  noted  that  the  inference 


114  THE   THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

which  the  theist  undertakes  to  draw  from  the  exist- 
ence of  order  in  the  universe,  is  simply  the  inference 
of  an  intelligence  that  produced  that  order.  It  is, 
therefore,  an  unfair  objection  to  urge  that  the  argu- 
ment cannot  prove  anything  as  to  the  creation  of  the 
universe,  but  only  as  to  its  fashioner,  that  it  only  goes 
to  show  that  mind  was  concerned  in  the  orderly  dis- 
position of  that  which  previously  existed.  Let  what 
has  before  been  said  be  borne  constantly  in  mind, 
that  the  argument  for  the  being  of  God  is  manifest, 
and  this  inference  from  the  order  and  harmony  of 
the  world  is  only  part  of  it.  The  argument  for  a 
first  cause  has  already  been  considered,  and  the 
present  argument  does  not  undertake  to  stand  apart 
from  that.  It  must  be  admitted  that  the  immediate 
inference  from  the  order  of  the  universe  is  to  an 
intelligent  framer  of  the  universe,  not  to  a  creator ; 
but  if  the  order  of  the  universe  cannot  have  orig- 
inated with  matter,  the  intelligence  which  formed  it 
must  have  been  an  eternal  intelligence. 

The  argument  which  we  are  now  considering  from 
the  order  of  the  universe  may  be  concisely  stated 
in  these  words  :  there  must  be  a  Supreme  Mind, 
because  such  and  such  organic  structures  must  in 
some  way  have  been  ultimately  due  to  intelligence. 
And  not  only  so,  but  every  phenomenon  in  the  uni- 
verse must  have  been  due  to  the  same  source,  since 
all  are  alike  subject  to  the  same  method  of  sequence, 
so  that  the  argument  becomes  connective,  and  the 
united  effect  of  so  vast  a  body  of  evidence  is  to  point 
us  irresistibly  to  some  one  explanatory  cause.  The 
scope  of  the  argument  is,  the  force,  coextensive  with 
the  universe ;  and  it  is  not  surprising  that  some  of 
the  most  earnest  of  the  recent  opponents  of  theism 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  ORDER.  115 

have  recognized  this  as  the  most  formidable  weapon 
drawn  from  the  armory  of  natural  theology.  It  is 
admitted  that  the  perpetual  and  uninterrupted  uni- 
formity of  method  is  a  cogent  if  not  a  convincing 
proof  of  a  presiding  intelligence,  since  the  progress 
of  science  has  rendered  the  hypothesis  of  fortuity 
irrational.  "  And  let  us  think  of  this  Supreme  Caus- 
ality as  we  may,''  says  one  of  the  ablest  of  these, 
"  the  fact  remains  that  from  it  there  emanates  a 
directive  inference  of  uninterrupted  consistency,  on 
a  scale  of  stupendous  magnitude  and  exact  pre- 
cision, worthy  of  our  highest  possible  conceptions 
of  Deity." 

This  argument  from  the  order  of  the  universe  has 
received  so  powerful  and  lucid  a  statement  from 
Baden  Powell,  that  I  cannot  do  better  than  borrow 
his  words  :  — 

"  The  very  essence  of  the  whole  argument  is  the  inva- 
riable preservation  of  the  principle  of  order ;  not  neces- 
sarily such  as  we  can  directly  recognize,  but  the  universal 
conviction  of  the  unfailing  subordination  of  everything  to 
some  grand  principles  of  law,  however  imperfectly  appre- 
hended in  our  partial  conceptions,  and  the  successive 
subordination  of  such  laws  to  others  of  still  higher  gener- 
ality, to  an  extent  transcending  our  conceptions,  and  con- 
stituting the  true  chain  of  universal  causation  which  cul- 
minates in  the  sublime  conception  of  the  Cosmos. 

"  To  a  correct  apprehension  of  the  whole  argument, 
the  one  essential  requisite  is  to  have  attained  a  complete 
and  satisfactory  grasp  of  this  one  grand  principle  of  law 
pervading  nature,  or  rather  constituting  the  very  idea  of 
nature  ;  which  forms  the  vital  essence  of  the  whole  of  in- 
ductive science,  and  the  sole  assurance  of  those  higher 
inferences  from  the  inductive  study  of  natural  causes, 
which  are  the  indications  of  a  supreme  intelligence  and  a 
moral  cause. 


Il6  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

"  The  whole  of  the  discussion  must  stand  or  fall  with 
the  admission  of  this  grand  principle. 

"  If  we  read  a  book  which  it  requires  much  thought 
and  exercise  of  reason  to  understand,  but  which  we  find 
discloses  more  and  more  truth  and  reason  as  we  proceed 
in  the  study,  and  contains  clearly  more  than  we  can  at 
present  comprehend,  then  undeniably  we  properly  say 
that  thought  and  reason  exist  in  that  book  irrespectively 
of  our  minds,  and  equally  so  of  every  question  as  to  its 
author  or  origin.  Such  a  book  confessedly  exists,  and  is 
ever  open  to  us  in  the  natural  world.  When  the  astron- 
omer, the  physicist,  the  geologist,  or  the  naturalist  notes 
down  a  series  of  observed  facts  or  measured  dates,  he 
is  not  an  author  expressing  his  own  ideas,  he  is  a  mere 
amanuensis  taking  down  the  dictations  of  nature  ;  his 
observation  book  is  the  record  of  the  thoughts  of  another 
mind;  he  has  but  set  down  literally  what  he  himself  does 
not  understand,  or  only  very  imperfectly. 

"That  which  requires  thought  and  reason  to  under- 
stand must  be  itself  thought  and  reason.  That  which 
mind  alone  can  investigate  or  express  must  be  itself  mind. 
And  if  the  highest  conception  attained  is  but  partial,  then 
the  mind  and  reason  studied  is  greater  than  the  mind 
and  reason  of  the  student.  If  the  more  it  be  studied  the 
more  vast  and  complex  is  the  necessary  connection  in 
reason  disclosed,  then  the  more  evident  is  the  vast  extent 
and  compass  of  the  intelligence  thus  partially  manifested, 
and  its  reality,  as  existing  in  the  immutably  connected 
order  of  objects  examined,  independently  of  the  mind  of 
the  investigator. 

"  But  considerations  of  this  kind,  just  and  transcend- 
ently  important  as  they  are  in  themselves,  give  us  no  aid 
in  any  inquiry  into  the  origin  of  the  order  of  things  thus 
investigated,  or  the  nature  or  other  attributes  of  the  mind 
evinced  in  them."  x 

1  Order  of  Nature,  by  Baden  Powell,  quoted  by  "  Physicus "  in 
Theism,  pp.  47-51. 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  ORDER.  \\J 

We  need  to  note  carefully  the  precise  scope  of 
the  argument  here  presented.  It  simply  infers  from 
the  order  of  the  universe  the  presence  of  intelli- 
gence. It  claims  to  go  no  further ;  it  makes  no  con- 
clusion respecting  the  nature  or  attributes  of  this 
creative  mind.  Hence  we  may  at  once  dismiss  as 
irrelevant  some  objections  which  have  been  urged 
against  this  reasoning.  One  of  these  objections  is, 
that  since  the  universe,  as  a  system  of  order,  is  finite, 
we  have  no  right  to  infer  that  the  author  of  this  sys- 
tem is  infinite.  The  argument  from  order  does  not 
undertake  to  prove  this.  It  simply  claims  that  the 
order  shown  in  the  universe  points  unmistakably  to 
intelligence  as  its  source.  The  inference  here  is  as 
direct,  as  valid,  as  the  inference  from  the  intelli- 
gence displayed  in  any  human  work.  When,  there- 
fore, writers  like  Mr.  Spencer  argue  that  the  cause 
of  the  universe  cannot  be  known  to  be  intelligent 
because  the  reason  of  man,  being  finite,  cannot  com- 
prehend the  infinite,  they  forget  that  human  reason, 
while  it  can  never  comprehend  the  infinite,  can  com- 
prehend such  manifestations  of  the  infinite  as  come 
within  its  range.  A  man  may  infer  that  the  au- 
thor of  Hamlet  was  intelligent  without  professing 
to  sound  all  the  depths  of  Shakespeare's  mind. 

It  may  be,  and  indeed  it  seems  highly  probable, 
that  the  entire  visible  universe,  as  disclosed  to  us 
by  the  farthest  search  of  our  most  powerful  tele- 
scopes, the  system  or  systems  that  spread  out  before 
the  bewildered  eye  of  the  astronomer  as  he  consid- 
ers the  starry  heavens,  are  but  the  local  product 
and  temporary  phase  of  a  far  greater  universe  which 
is  itself  but  part  of  another,  till  even  imagination 
droops ;  but  this  does  not  render  any  less  convin- 


Il8  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

ring  the  evidences  of  intelligence  presented  to  our 
view.  It  may  be  that  in  these  other  systems  there 
are  manifestations  of  intelligence,  not  only  unlike 
any  that  are  presented  to  us,  but  manifestations 
which  our  faculties  have  no  capacity  for  apprehend- 
ing ;  but  this  would  not  weaken  in  the  least  such 
inferences  as  our  finite  minds  might  be  capable  of 
drawing.  The  whole  stupendous  order  of  that  na- 
ture which  we  survey  may  be  but  a  ripple  across  the 
universal  and  illimitable  action  of  the  mind  which 
manifests  itself  in  all  things  ;  but  while  our  limited 
and  partial  and  finite  comprehension  can  never  in- 
clude all  this,  we  are  not  shut  up  to  the  conclusion 
that  we  can  draw  no  inference  at  all  from  the  order 
and  harmony  which  we  see  everywhere  above  us 
and  around  us. 

Mr.  Mill  would  have  us  think  that  the  order  of 
the  universe,  so  far  as  it  reveals  a  combination  of 
the  invariable  forces  of  nature  to  produce  a  special 
end,  not  only  does  not  prove  that  the  Intelligence 
that  presided  over  this  was  infinite,  but  even  affords 
convincing  proof  that  it  was  limited  and  finite. 
"There  is  in  nature,"  he  says,  "no  reason  whatever 
to  suppose  that  either  matter,  or  force,  or  any  of 
their  properties,  were  made  by  the  Being  who  was 
the  author  of  the  causations  by  which  the  world  is 
adapted  to  what  we  consider  as  its  purposes ;  or 
that  he  has  power  to  alter  any  of  those  properties. 
It  is  only  when  we  consent  to  entertain  this  nega- 
tive supposition  that  there  arises  a  need  for  wisdom 
or  contrivance  in  the  order  of  the  universe.  The 
Deity  had  on  this  hypothesis  to  work  out  his  ends 
by  combining  materials  of  a  given  nature  and  prop- 
erties.    Out  of  these  materials  he  had  to  construct 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  ORDER.  I  19 

a  world  in  which  his  designs  should  be  carried  into 
effect,  through  given  properties  of  matter  and  force, 
working  together  and  fitting  into  each  other.  This 
did  require  skill  and  contrivance,  and  the  means  by 
which  it  is  effected  are  often  such  as  justly  excite 
our  wonder  and  admiration  ;  but  exactly  because  it 
requires  wisdom  it  implies  limitation  of  force,  or 
rather  the  two  phrases  express  different  sides  of  the 
same  fact."  1 

It  is  difficult  to  treat  with  seriousness  an  argu- 
ment which  when  analyzed  will  be  found  to  be  desti- 
tute of  force.  What  it  amounts  to  is  simply  this  : 
that  working  toward  results  in  regular  and  orderly 
methods  is  proof  of  limitation  in  a  being  who,  if  in- 
finite, could  achieve  results  by  a  direct  and  imme- 
diate exercise  of  power.  In  other  words,  if  every 
chicken  were  called  into  being  by  a  creative  fiat  we 
might  infer  that  the  power  was  infinite  to  which  such 
a  phenomenon  was  due  ;  but  if  this  power  chose  to 
endow  the  egg  with  the  potency  by  which  in  accord- 
ance with  invariable  law  the  chicken  was  to  be  pro- 
duced, we  are  bound  to  infer  from  such  resort  to  an 
indirect  method  of  production,  that  it  was  shut  up 
to  the  employment  of  natural  agencies,  and  hence 
was  finite.  Aside  from  the  strange  omission  to  note 
that  all  the  natural  agencies  called  into  requisition 
to  produce  a  definite  result  are  themselves  the  very 
proof  of  the  intelligence  on  which  the  argument  in- 
sists, this  objection  fails  to  recognize  the  simple 
principle,  that  in  producing  any  definite  results  in- 
finite power  must  always  work  under  limitations,  limi- 
tations not  in  the  power,  but  in  the  method  adopted 
and  in  the  end  purposed. 

1  Essays  on  Religion,  p.  178. 


120  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

These  objections,  however,  as  I  have  said,  have 
nothing  to  do  with  the  argument  which  we  are  now 
considering.  What  that  argument  undertakes  to 
prove  is  simply  that  the  order  of  the  universe  had 
its  origin  in  intelligence.  On  the  further  question 
whether  that  intelligence  is  infinite  or  finite,  it  under- 
takes no  decision.  True,  the  argument  from  order, 
if  admitted  as  conclusive,  must  carry  with  it  the  ir- 
resistible conviction  that  the  intelligence  thus  every- 
where manifested  in  the  works  of  nature  must  be  an 
intelligence  far  surpassing  any  capacity  of  finite 
mind  to  measure  or  search  out.  He  would  be  rash 
and  presumptuous,  indeed,  who  even  from  the  things 
that  are  seen  would  venture  to  fix  any  limit  to  it ; 
and  when  we  bear  in  mind  how  small  a  part  the 
things  that  are  seen  are  of  the  whole  universe  of 
things  that  are  unseen,  the  conclusion  is  one  to 
which  the  reason  is  inevitably  led ;  but  this  conclu- 
sion, whether  legitimate  or  not,  is  no  part  of  the 
argument  which  we  are  now  considering.  And  to 
ascertain  how  far  this  argument  is  valid,  it  is  impor- 
tant for  us  not  to  confuse  it  with  inferences,  or  with 
objections  that  are  not  directly  connected  with  it. 
We  are  only  considering  the  proof  of  intelligence. 

The  order  and  harmony  everywhere  apparent  in 
the  universe  are  conceded  facts.  Those  who  refuse 
to  refer  them  to  intelligence  are  bound  therefore  to 
account  for  them  in  some  other  way.  To  say  that 
they  originated  with  chance,  is  an  explanation  so 
manifestly  absurd  that  it  need  not  be  considered. 
To  believe,  as  some  of  the  ancients  professed  to  do, 
that  this  universal  frame  had  its  origin  in  the  fortui- 
tous concurrence  of  primordial  atoms,  which  after 
passing  through  infinite  combinations  presented  at 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  ORDER.  121 

last  this  present  world,  implies  a  degree  of  credulity- 
such  as  no  religious  system  has  ever  yet  exacted  of 
its  votaries.  Supposing  the  ultimate  molecules  of 
matter  to  have  existed  from  all  eternity,  they  might, 
by  chance  contact,  have  produced  from  time  to  time 
some  strange  combinations ;  but  to  suppose  that  a 
universe,  such  as  science  reveals  to  us,  so  real,  so 
intricate,  so  harmonious,  so  stable,  could  have  been 
called  into  being  by  the  operation  of  blind  chance, 
is  a  hypothesis  that  no  man  in  his  senses,  at  the 
present  day,  would  think  for  a  moment  of  maintain- 
ing. If  modern  science  has  done  nothing  more,  it 
has  at  least  passed  a  final  sentence  of  condemnation 
upon  Democritus  and  Epicurus. 

To  account,  then,  for  this  order  and  harmony  every- 
where so  apparent  in  the  external  world,  we  are 
shut  up  to  one  of  two  hypotheses  :  the  hypothesis  of 
mind,  working  through  the  forces  of  nature  and  co- 
ordinating them  into  a  mutual  adjustment,  or  the  hy- 
pothesis of  matter  endowed  with  inherent  powers 
and  potencies,  and  working  in  an  endless  succession 
of  combination  and  dissolution.  There  is  no  other 
explanation  possible,  and  in  the  present  state  of 
speculative  opinion  no  other  explanation  is  proposed. 
The  choice  lies  between  intelligence  and  blind  force  ; 
between  reason  enthroned  above  physical  causation 
and  the  unconscious  working  of  purely  natural  laws. 
And  this  brings  us  to  the  latest  and  most  powerful 
assault  that  has  been  made  upon  the  argument  from 
order,  an  assault  springing  directly  from  the  modes 
of  scientific  thinking  so  current  at  the  present  time. 
In  this  the  problem,  which  the  order  of  the  universe 
presents  to  human  reason,  is  not  solved  but  rather 
set  aside  by  an  attempted  indication  of  the  process 


122  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

by  which  that  order  has  been  brought  about.  It  is 
claimed  that  this  order  is  sufficiently  accounted  for 
when  its  physical  antecedents  have  been  traced  back 
to  their  presumed  beginning. 

In  view  of  these  conclusions  of  modern  science,  to 
which  reference  has  been  already  made,  it  is  claimed 
that  every  law  controlling  the  universe  both  of  mat- 
ter and  of  mind  follows  as  a  necessary  consequence 
from  the  persistence  of  force  and  from  the  primary 
qualities  of  matter.  It  is  conceded  that  a  generation 
ago  the  argument  from  the  order  of  the  universe,  so 
lucidly  presented  by  Baden  Powell,  must  have  been 
accepted  as  irrefutable.  With  the  conception  of  mat- 
ter which  then  prevailed,  the  most  rational  explana- 
tion of  this  order  would  have  been  the  hypothesis  of 
an  eternal  mind.  But  in  the  light  of  recent  physical 
discovery  all  this  is  changed,  and  the  argument  so 
long  and  so  generally  received  "  that  that  which  it 
requires  thought  and  reason  to  understand  must  it- 
self be  thought  and  reason,"  must  be  forever  aban- 
doned by  reasonable  men.  Hitherto  the  objections 
to  this  argument  have  been  mere  guess  or  unwar- 
rantable assertions  ;  but  now  it  is  claimed  they  are 
no  longer  a  matter  of  unverifiable  opinion,  but  are 
sure  as  the  most  fundamental  axiom  of  science.  That 
the  argument  from  the  order  of  the  universe  will  be 
henceforth  inadmissible  in  scientific  thinking  cannot 
be  a  matter  of  question.  Let  us  glance  at  the 
grounds  for  these  strong  assertions. 

The  problem  before  us  is  to  account  for  a  univer- 
sal order  existing  independently  of  mind.  If  we  in- 
terpret, we  are  told,  the  harmonious  and  mutually  re- 
lated phenomena  of  nature  only  by  the  facts  which 
science  has  revealed,  we  are  driven  to  this  conclu- 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM   ORDER.  123 

sion,  that  from  the  time  when  the  process  first  began 
every  subsequent  change  or  event  was  bound  to  en- 
sue, else  the  doctrine  of  the  persistency  of  force 
must  be  abandoned.  But  how  did  this  process  first 
begin.  In  the  primeval  generation  of  the  universe 
there  was  probably  in  existence  not  more  than  one 
of  the  forces  which  we  term  natural  laws.  This  was 
gravitation.  It  matters  not,  whether  there  was  ever 
a  time  when  gravitation,  or  matter  as  we  now  know 
it,  did  not  exist,  for  if  there  was  such  a  time  there  is 
every  reason  to  conclude  that  the  first  matter  owed 
its  existence  to  law.  Nor  is  it  of  any  consequence 
how  the  law  of  gravitation  came  to  be  associated 
with  matter,  for  it  is  overwhelmingly  probable  that 
if  we  could  push  our  examination  far  enough  it  would 
be  found  to  follow  as  a  necessary  deduction  from 
the  primary  qualities  of  matter  and  force.  We  need 
only  to  start  from  the  three  data  which  science  fur- 
nishes,—  matter,  force,  and  gravitation,  and  ask  the 
question  what  next  must  happen  ? 

Science  affords  us  strong  grounds  for  the  assump- 
tion that  the  matter  which  makes  up  our  solar  sys- 
tem primordially  existed  in  a  highly  diffused  form. 
It  was  an  ethereal  cloud  of  indefinite  and  immeasur- 
able magnitude.  By  mutual  gravitation,  the  sub- 
stance of  this  cloud  began  to  concentrate  upon  itself. 
It  is  frankly  conceded,  that  what  is  termed  the  neb- 
ular hypothesis  is  not  beyond  dispute,  and  that  all 
positive  knowledge  of  the  genesis  of  our  solar  sys- 
tem is  still  of  the  crudest  and  most  uncertain  char- 
acter ;  still  it  is  claimed  that  the  theory  that  evolution 
in  some  form  has  been  the  method  of  the  formation 
of  the  universe  is  placed  beyond  reasonable  doubt, 
and  hence,  that  the  inferences  to  be  drawn  from  it 


124  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

are  as  certainly  true  as  if  we  were  acquainted  with 
each  step  of  the  vast  process.  "  Given,"  says  Mr. 
Herbert  Spencer,  who  may  be  selected  as  undoubt- 
edly the  foremost  representative  of  the  view  which 
we  are  now  considering,  "  a  raw  and  widely  diffused 
mass  of  nebulous  matter,  and  what  are  the  succes- 
sive changes  that  will  take  place  ?  Mutual  gravita- 
tion will  approximate  its  atoms,  but  their  approxima- 
tion will  be  opposed  by  atomic  repulsion,  the  over- 
coming of  which  implies  the  evolution  of  heat." 
That  is,  the  condensation  of  the  nebula  originates 
new  dynamical  relations  among  its  constituent 
parts. 

"As  fast  as  this  heat  partially  escapes  by  radia- 
tion, further  approximations  will  take  place,  attended 
by  further  evolution  of  heat,  and  so  on  continuously ; 
the  processes  not  occurring  separately,  as  here  de- 
scribed, but  simultaneously,  uninterruptedly,  and 
with  increasing  activity."  But  the  previous  essen- 
tial conditions  remaining  the  same,  the  new  relations 
now  established  would,  of  necessity,  give  rise  to  new 
laws,  by  which  is  meant,  simply,  the  occurrence  of 
similar  effects  under  similar  conditions.  Hence, 
"eventually  this  slow  movement  of  the  atoms  to- 
wards their  common  centre  of  gravity,  will  bring 
about  phenomena  of  another  order. 

"Arguing  from  the  well-known  laws  of  atomic 
combination,  it  will  happen  that,  when  the  nebulous 
mass  has  reached  a  particular  stage  of  condensation, 
when  its  internally  situated  atoms  have  approached 
to  within  certain  distances,  have  generated  a  certain 
amount  of  heat,  and  are  subject  to  a  certain  mutual 
pressure,  some  of  them  will  suddenly  enter  into 
chemical  union.     Whether  the  binary  atoms  so  pro- 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  ORDER.  1 25 

duced  will  be  of  kinds  such  as  we  know,  or  whether 
they  be  of  kinds  simpler  than  any  we  know,  which  is 
more  probable,  matters  not  to  the  argument.  It  suf- 
fices that  molecular  combinations  of  some  species 
will  finally  take  place." 

On  the  process  here  traced  is  based  the  doctrine, 
that  the  self-generation  of  the  laws  of  nature  is  a 
necessary  corollary  from  the  principle  of  the  persist- 
ence of  matter  and  force.  For  just  as  in  the  begin- 
ning of  the  process,  the  proto-binary  compounds  of 
matter  gave  rise  to  new  relations,  involving  of  ne- 
cessity their  appropriate  laws,  so  throughout  all  the 
subsequent  stages  of  the  unceasing  evolution,  as 
often  as  matter  acquired  a  new  state,  or  as  often  as 
in  any  of  its  former  states  it  was  thrown  into  new 
relations,  laws  which  before  were  non-existent  and 
impossible,  became  at  once  both  possible  and  neces- 
sary. And  since  there  is  no  reason  for  fixing  a  limit 
to  the  process  once  begun,  if  there  be  only  time 
enough  allowed,  we  arrive  at  last  at  the  marvelous 
complexity  of  things  that  we  see  around  us.  All  its 
harmony  and  order  are  the  product  of  endless  modi- 
fications of  the  original  matter  and  force  in  which 
the  whole  process  had  its  origin.  "  For  aught  that 
speculative  reason  can  ever  show  to  the  contrary," 
says  the  author  of  " Theism,"  "the  evolution  of  all 
the  diverse  phenomena  of  inorganic  nature,  of  life  and 
of  mind,  appears  to  be  as  necessary  and  as  self-de- 
termined as  is  the  being  of  that  mysterious  Some- 
thing which  is  Everything,  the  entity  we  must  all 
believe  in."  * 

Let  it  be  remembered  that,  according  to  this  the- 
ory, human    intelligence,  like   everything  else,  has 

1  "Physicus,"  Theism,  p.  5;. 


126  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

been  evolved.  Mind  is  just  as  much  the  result  of 
this  long  process  as  heat  or  magnetism.  For  the 
evolution  of  intelligence  is  simply  the  establishment 
of  more  and  more  numerous  and  complex  psycholog- 
ical relations.  When,  therefore,  the  question  is  put, 
must  not  the  order  and  harmony  of  the  external  uni- 
verse be  due  to  mind,  since  it  requires  mind  to  in- 
terpret and  understand  it ;  the  answer  is,  that  if  the 
mind  was  itself  evolved  from  these  relations  existing 
in  the  material  universe,  being  ever  continuously 
moulded  into  conformity  with  them  as  the  very  con- 
dition of  its  existence,  then  its  process  of  interpreta- 
tion is  simply  reflecting  in  consciousness  these  ex- 
ternal relations.  In  other  words,  granting  that  such 
orderly  relations  exist  in  the  external  world,  whether 
with  or  without  mind  to  account  for  them,  then  the 
mere  fact  of  our  conscious  intelligence  being  able  to 
recognize  relations  in  the  outer  world,  answering 
to  those  which  they  have  themselves  caused  in  our 
intelligence,  does  not  warrant  the  conclusion  that 
these  external  relations  are  caused  by  an  intelli- 
gence similar  to  our  own.  The  thought  of  the  mind 
within,  simply  answers  to  the  order  of  the  world 
without,  and  both  are  due  to  precisely  the  same 
cause. 

Hence  the  final  conclusion  which  we  reach  is  this  : 
if  all  the  laws  of  the  universe  are  self-evolved,  in- 
cluding among  them  the  laws  of  mind  as  well  as  the 
laws  of  the  external  world,  and  if  human  intelligence 
is  simply  a  subjective  photograph  of  certain  of  the 
relations  of  the  external  world,  then  nothing  is  more 
natural  than  that  the  correspondence  between  the 
two  should  give  rise  to  the  impression  that  the  ex- 
ternal world  instead  of  being  itself  the  cause  of  that 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  ORDER.  \2J 

conformity,  should  be  itself  the  effect  of  some  com- 
mon cause.  Human  intelligence  being  itself  re- 
quired to  think  and  act  in  conformity  to  law,  con- 
founds the  mere  fact  of  action  in  conformity  to  law, 
wherever  manifested  in  the  external  world,  with  the 
existence  and  action  of  a  self-conscious  intelligence. 
Reading  in  external  nature  innumerable  examples  of 
action  in  conformity  with  law,  it  draws  the  unwar- 
rantable conclusion  that  because  its  own  conscious- 
ness reveals  intelligence  acting  according  to  law, 
therefore  all  action  according  to  law  must  proceed 
from  intelligence.  But  it  by  no  means  follows  as  a 
logical  conclusion,  that  because  the  phenomena  of 
the  external  universe  admit  of  being  intelligently 
inquired  into,  they  are  therefore  of  necessity  due  to 
an  intelligent  cause.  Hence,  admitting  the  funda- 
mental axioms  of  science,  the  hypothesis  of  intelli- 
gent cause  is  needless  to  explain  the  varied  phenom- 
ena of  existence.1 

In  considering  the  objection  to  the  argument  from 
order  here  presented,  I  will  not  pause  to  show  that 
it  involves  a  series  of  assumptions  of  the  highest 
moment,  most  of  which  have  not  passed  from  the 
region  of  mere  hypothesis.  Thus  the  assertion  that 
mind  is  evolved  from  matter  is  one  of  which,  it  is 
needless  to  say,  there  has  been  as  yet  no  proof  pre- 
sented. But,  for  the  sake  of  the  present  discussion, 
we  may  concede  the  genejgl_J:ruth_QJL  the  theory  ? 
^oX-ev^httk^r-J-t-is  not  indeed  a  theory,  but  a  fact,/? 
certain  as  any  that  science  has  established,  that 
creation  has  a  history,  and  that  this  history  presents 
unmistakable  evidence  that  the  universe  as  it  now 
stands  was  not  due  to  a  single  act  done  once  for  all, 

1  "  Physicus,  Theism,  p.  63. 


128  THE    THETSTTC  ARGUMENT. 

but  that  it  is  a  work  which  has  been  continuously 
and  progressively  pursued  through  inconceivable 
epochs  of  time.  So  far  as  it  is  possible  for  us  to 
trace  back  this  impressive  record,  it  presents  to  us 
the  same  story  of  one  age  succeeding  another,  and 
one  system  of  relations  formed  out  of  previous  sys- 
tems. And  it  is  not  less  certain  that  these  progres- 
sive changes  have  followed  an  orderly  method.  The 
annals  of  creation,  whether  considered  in  the  or- 
ganic, or  in  the  inorganic  world,  are  inscribed  on 
every  page  with  the  impressive  truth  that  creation 
has  been  in  accordance  with  law. 

But  admitting  all  this,  as  we  are  bound  to  admit 
it,  what  conclusion  follows.  Because  creation  has 
proceeded  according  to  law,  shall  we  infer  that  in- 
telligence has  been  absent  from  it.  To  ascribe  the 
origination  of  order  simply  to  law  is  clearly  an  eva- 
sion of  the  real  problem.  For  order  and  law  in 
nature  are  the  same  thing,  and  law  is  the  very 
thing  to  be  explained.  What  we  call  the  laws  of 
nature  are  not  the  causes,  but  the  expressions  of 
order.  Accepting  the  account  of  the  origin  of  nat- 
ural law  which  Mr.  Spencer  gives  us,  laws  are 
simply  the  results  of  delicate  adjustments,  infinitely 
but  harmoniously  varied.  The  existence  of  a  law, 
in  every  case,  presupposes  the  coexistence  of  several 
conditions,  and  of  conditions  that  are  themselves 
always  related  to  each  other  in  a  way  that  itself  de- 
mands explanation.  Besides,  laws  do  not  act  of 
themselves.  It  is  always  that  which  acts  according 
to  law  which  produces  the  result,  and  the  nature  of 
the  result  depends  upon  the  number  and  character 
of  the  agents,  and  the  manner  in  which  they  are 
disposed  in  relation  to  one  another.     Matter  might 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  ORDER.  129 

be  endued  with  all  its  laws  and  yet  only  contusion 
and  chaos  result  from  their  operation.  Hence,  the 
mere  laws  of  nature  furnish  no  rational  explanation 
of  the  order  and  harmony  that  exist.  ^^J 

All  are  ready  to  concede  that  creation,  as  its  his- 
tory stands  revealed  to  us,  is  a  process,  a  process  to 
which  science  can  assign  no  beginning,  and  of  which 
it  is  as  little  competent  to  determine  the  end.  But 
it  is  a  wholly  erroneous  assumption  that  we  account 
for  the  origin  of  this  process  when  we  simply  trace 
the  method  according  to  which  that  part  which  is 
revealed  to  us  proceeds.  This  method  is  precisely 
the  feature  which  we  have  to  account  for.  That 
the  result  is  arrived  at  through  appropriate  condi- 
tions, which  is  all  the  conclusion  that  science 
reaches  when  it  attempts  to  unfold  the  so-called 
laws  of  nature,  does  not  in  the  least  explain  what  it 
was  that  combined  these  conditions  so  that  the  re- 
sult should  follow.  We  may  grant  that  the  nebular 
theory  implies  the  law  of  gravitation,  and  that  grav- 
itation has  determined  the  cause  of  cosmical  evolu- 
tion ;  but  evidently  this  marvelous  result  could  have  ' 
followed  only  on  the  theory  that  the  nebula  origi- 
nally possessed  a  definite  constitution  ;  that  its  con- 
stituents, whatever  they  may  have  been,  were  en- 
dowed with  certain  properties  and  were  disposed  in 
fixed  relations,  so  that,  in  effect,  we  have  at  the  out- 
set an  order  to  account  for  just  as  truly  as  in  any 
stage  of  the  subsequent  process. 

If  we  do  not  accept  this  view,  we  are  thrown 
back  upon  the  alternative  of  regarding  the  existing 
order  of  the  universe  as  one  special  result  among 
infinite  possibilities  of  disorder,  produced  by  the 
mutual  interaction  of  atoms  of  matter  through  eter- 
9 


130  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT 

nal  epochs  of  time.  We  must  conceive  of  these 
atoms  as  passing  through  all  possible  combinations, 
till  at  last,  after  an  infinite  number  of  failures,  they 
have  fallen  into  a  harmonious  arrangement.  But 
this  is  simply  to  fall  back  upon  the  solution  of  the 
ancient  atomists.  "  For  verily,"  says  the  great  ex- 
pounder of  this  theory,  Lucretius,  "not  by  design 
did  the  first  beginnings  of  things  station  themselves 
each  in  its  right  place,  guided  by  keen-sighted  intel- 
ligence, nor  did  they  bargain,  sooth  to  say,  what 
motions  each  should  assume,  but  because  many  in 
number,  and  shifting  about  in  many  ways  through- 
out the  universe,  they  are  driven  and  tormented  by 
blows  during  infinite  time  past ;  after  trying  motions 
and  unions  of  every  kind,  at  length  they  fall  into  ar- 
rangements such  as  those  out  of  which  this  our  sum 
of  things  has  been  formed."  *  Moreover,  this  hy- 
pothesis has  nothing  whatever  to  support  it  in  what 
we  observe  of  the  process  of  nature.  What  we  find 
everywhere  attested  is  not  blind  chance,  but  the 
reign  of  law. 

Dismissing  as  utterly  untenable  and  irrational  the 
theory  of  chance,  the  two  alternatives  to  which  we 
are  shut  up  to  account  for  the  wondrous  order  and 
harmony  of  the  universe,  are  the  alternatives  of 
mind  or  of  matter.  The  theory  of  the  persistence  of 
force,  which  is  brought  forward  as  supplying  a  cause 
sufficient  to  account  for  this,  if  it  means  anything, 
means  one  of  these  two.  It  is  either  force  directed 
and  controlled  by  intelligence,  or  physical  force 
working  blindly.  But  when  we  ask,  as  we  surely 
have  a  right  to  do,  what  is  precisely  meant  by  this 
mysterious  and  indestructible  potency,  which  is  thus 

1  [Lucretius,  De  Rerwn  Natura,  book  i.,  1021-1028.] 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  ORDER.  131 

represented  as  adequate  to  all  the  work  of  creation, 
we  get  no  definite  answer.  "  The  word  force,"  Mr. 
Lewes  tells  us,  "is  a  symbol  which  has  many  mean- 
ings. It  varies  in  different  works,  and  often  in  dif- 
ferent passages  of  the  ^same  work.  Sometimes  it 
stands  for  the  unknowable,  whose  manifestations 
are  the  objective  universe;  sometimes  it  is  the  com- 
mon measure  by  which  all  phenomena  are  rendered 
intelligible  ;  sometimes  it  is  an  imaginary  entity, 
supposed  to  take  up  its  habitation  in  substances, 
passing  freely  from  one  to  the  other  ;  sometimes  a 
peculiar  kind  of  matter,  very  subtle,  and  endowed 
with  qualities  wholly  unlike  those  of  ordinary  mat- 
ter ;  sometimes  it  is  a  simple  synonym  of  cause 
sometimes  of  strength,  sometimes  of  motion,  now 
confounded  with  and  now  distinguished  from  en- 
ergy." ] 

If,  indeed,  by  conservation  of  force  we  mean  con- 
servation of  actual  energy,  the  doctrine  is  by  no 
means  universally  admitted.  There  is  a  broad  dis- 
tinction between  the  statement  that  the  sum  of 
energies  remains  unaltered,  and  that  the  quantity  of 
force  remains  always  the  same.  For  example,  to 
make  heat  efficient  we  must  have  hotter  and  colder 
bodies.  As  soon  as  all  bodies  are  reduced  to  the 
same  temperature,  though  the  sum  of  energy  re- 
mains the  same,  its  efficiency  or  force  is  gone.  For 
no  transformation  from  one  body  to  the  other  is 
longer  possible.  Now,  according  to  very  high  au- 
thority, there  is  a  tendency  in  the  universe,  from  the 
constant  radiation  of  heat,  to  a  uniform  tempera- 
ture ;  in  other  words,  the  time  is  coming  when  trans- 
formation of  heat  will  cease,  or  when  force  will  be 

1  [Problems  of  Life  and  Mind,  1st  Series,  vol.  ii.,  p.  307.] 


132  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

exhausted.  But  since  all  the  phenomena  of  life  are 
due  to  this  transformation,  this  is  the  same  as  say- 
ing that  the  time  is  coming  when  the  universe,  as  it 
now  stands,  will  no  longer  exist.  And  if  the  pres- 
ent system  of  things  must  thus  have  a  definite  end- 
ing it  must  also  have  had  a  definite  beginning.  So 
the  notion  of  an  eternal  rhythm  of  evolution  and 
dissolution  based  on  the  doctrine  of  the  persistence 
of  force  wholly  falls  to  the  ground.  Physical  sci- 
ence itself,  .rightly  interpreted,  gives  no  support  to 
the  theory. 


LECTURE   V. 

THE    ARGUMENT    FROM   DESIGN. 

I  have  thus  far  aimed  to  show  from  the  order  and 
harmony  everywhere  pervading  the  universe,  that 
it  must  have  had  its  origin  in  mind  ;  for  no  other 
explanation  will  account  for  a  result  so  marvelous. 
This  order,  to  repeat  what  has  been  said  before,  is 
both  general  and  special,  the  former  showing  itself 
in  regularity  and  the  latter  in  adjustment.  Of  the 
former,  astronomy  gives  us  the  most  perfect  illustra- 
tion ;  for  the  latter,  the  examples  are  furnished  us 
in  all  the  departments  of  organic  life.  While  it  may 
be  urged  that  regularity  and  adjustment  are,  after 
all,  but  different  aspects  of  the  same  thing,  since 
the  most  specialized  adjustments  of  organic  structure 
always  presuppose  the  most  general  uniformities  of 
physical  nature,  yet  even  then  such  difference  exists 
between  the  two  arguments  as  to  warrant  a  separate 
treatment.  The  former  argument  infers  the  uni- 
verse to  be  an  effect  of  mind  because  it  is  charac- 
terized by  order  and  harmony,  the  latter  draws  the 
same  inference  because  the  parts  of  which  the  uni- 
verse is  composed  are  so  collocated  and  combined 
as  to  cooperate  in  the  attainment  of  certain  results. 

We  now  proceed  to  consider  this  second  phase  of 
the  general  argument,  or,  as  it  is  commonly  termed, 
the  argument  from  design.  This  designation,  how- 
ever, though  common,  is  inaccurate,  since  the  argu- 


134  TI1E    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

ment  is  not  an  inference  from  design,  but  an  argu- 
ment to  prove  design.  To  assume  that  the  external 
universe  furnishes  proof  of  design,  and  then  from 
this  to  reason  back  to  a  designer,  is  simply  to  beg 
the  question.  In  the  external  world  we  have  law, 
order,  and  arrangement,  but  design  can  have  no  ex- 
istence save  in  intelligence.  What  is  properly  meant 
by  design  in  nature  are  simply  certain  characteris- 
tics which  are  held  to  be  indications  of  intelligence, 
and  which  further  imply  such  adaptation  and  fitness 
as  show  that  the  result  reached  was  a  foreseen  effect. 
From  this  point  of  view  the  argument  of  design  is 
also  termed  the  argument  from  final  causes,  mean- 
ing by  this  the  end  for  which  anything  exists.  Thus 
if  I  form  a  purpose  to  write  a  book,  to  build  a  house, 
to  pursue  a  course  of  study,  this  purpose,  if  realized, 
will  be  the  end  of  a  series  of  steps  or  actions,  and, 
by  a  secondary  signification,  this  end  is  made  to  sig- 
nify a  purposed  result. 

The  phrase,  "argument  from  final  causes,"  now 
in  common  use,  is  also  not  free  from  objection.  The 
expression  "final  cause"  is  an  inheritance  from  the 
scholastic  philosophy,  and  is  used  in  senses  not  al- 
ways carefully  discriminated.  It  is  sometimes  used 
as  signifying  certain  aspects  of  order  or  adaptation, 
and  sometimes  as  signifying  certain  aspects  of  design 
or  intention.  And  in  either  of  these  senses,  it  may 
refer  to  the  intrinsic,  the  extrinsic,  or  the  ultimate 
end  of  things.  Thus,  viewed  simply  as  the  intrinsic 
end  of  what  is  orderly  and  established,  the  stability 
and  movement  of  the  solar  system  may  be  termed  the 
final  cause  of  the  arrangement  by  which  that  result 
is  secured.  So  sight  is  the  final  cause  of  the  eye. 
On  the  other  hand,  final  cause  may  mean  not  merely 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN.  135 

the  end  of  an  arrangement  in  itself,  considered  as  a 
completed  whole,  but  its  relation  to  something  else, 
or  the  end  which  it  serves  as  a  system  included  in 
other  systems.  If  we  admit  one,  we  must  admit  the 
other,  for  nothing  in  nature  stands  alone  ;  it  is  a  sys- 
tem composed  of  systems  within  systems.  Hence 
the  distinction  between  intrinsic  and  extrinsic  ends 
exists,  after  all,  not  so  much  in  the  nature  of  the 
things  themselves  as  in  our  way  of  looking  at  them. 

In  either  of  these  two  senses,  we  may  reason  legit- 
imately from  final  causes.  When  we  affirm  the  ex- 
istence of  final  causes  as  intrinsic  ends,  we  simply 
affirm  that  things  are  systematic  unities,  the  parts  of 
which  are  definitely  related  and  coordinated  to  a 
common  result.  When  we  affirm  the  existence  of 
final  causes  as  extrinsic  ends,  we  simply  affirm  that 
each  system  is  related  to  other  systems,  forming 
parts  of  larger  systems,  and  adjusted  to  more  com- 
prehensive results.  In  this  sense,  final  causes  are 
in  things  ;  but  when  we  affirm  them  in  the  sense  of 
design,  they  are  not  in  things,  but  can  only  exist  in  a 
mind.  The  final  cause  of  a  thing  may  also  mean 
neither  its  intrinsic  nor  its  extrinsic,  but  its  ultimate 
end,  that  is,  its  destination  independent  of  any  of 
the  relations  or  uses  which  science  can  trace.  But 
while  speculation  with  regard  to  final  causes  in  this 
latter  sense  may  be  legitimate  within  certain  bounds, 
it  affords  us  little  help  in  proof  of  a  supreme  intelli- 
gence ;  for  any  proof  must  rest  on  what  we  actually 
perceive,  not  on  what  we  are  able  to  conjecture. 
Only  after  we  have  ascertained  the  Divine  existence 
and  attributes  can  we  draw  any  inferences  with  re- 
gard to  ultimate  ends. 

And  here  two  things  should  be  observed  :    First, 


136  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

A'that  the  argument  of  design  is  not,  as  often  rep- 
''  resented,  a  mere  argument  from  analogy.  Thus 
it  is  said  that  in  this  argument  we  infer,  from  the 
likeness  which  certain  natural  objects  bear  to  artifi- 
cial objects,  that  there  must  be  a  likeness  in  their 
causes.  We  know  that  a  watch  can  only  be  the 
work  of  an  intelligent  maker,  and  hence,  from  the 
wonderful  adjustments  in  the  hand  or  the  eye,  we 
conclude  that  they  in  like  manner  must  have  been 
framed  by  an  intelligent  being.  But,  whatever  anal- 
ogy there  may  be  between  the  operations  of  nature 
and  the  works  of  man,  as  part  of  the  design  argu- 

Bment  it  is  rather  a  means  of  illustration  than  a  con- 
dition of  inference.  When  we  infer  that  the  eye,  or 
the  watch,  are  the  work  of  an  intelligent  being,  there 
is  an  inference  in  either  case,  and  an  inference  of 
precisely  the  same  nature.  It  is  as  direct  and  as  in- 
dependent in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other.  We  have 
no  more  direct  perception  of  the  intelligence  of  our 
fellow  beings  than  we  have  of  a  supreme  mind.  It 
is,  therefore,  impossible  that  our  knowledge  of  the 
one  should  be  dependent  on  our  knowledge  of  the 
other.  In  both  cases  it  depends  on  the  immediate 
consciousness  of  intelligence  in  ourselves.  Hence 
the  argument  of  design  rests  directly  on  the  charac- 
ter of  the  works  of  nature. 

In  the  second  place,  the  argument  of  design  can- 
not be  regarded  as  resting  upon  an  a  priori  or  intui- 
tive basis.  In  other  words,  we  cannot  rank  final 
causation  with  efficient  causation  as  a  first  principle 
or  axiom  of  thought.1  That  there  is  in  the  universe 
an  intelligent  and  wise  adaptation  of  powers  and 
laws  to  rational  ends  is  not  an  intuitive  principle, 

1  See  Porter,  Human  Intellect,  pp.  594-599. 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN.  137 

but  a  conclusion  drawn  from  observation.  To  as- 
sume the  relation  of  means  and  ends  to  be  true  of 
every  event  and  being  in  the  universe,  is  to  assume 
precisely  what  we  are  undertaking  to  prove.  The 
principle  "  that  every  being  has  an  end  "  has  neither 
the  evidence  nor  the  necessity  of  the  principle  "that 
every  event  has  a  cause."  While  causality  is  a  prin- 
ciple, finality  is  the  result  of  an  induction.1  Final- 
ity, in  other  words,  is  a  law  of  nature,  not  a  law  of 
reason.  It  must  be  sought  and  established  by  anal- 
ysis and  discussion.  "The  design  argument,"  says 
Mr.  Mill,  "is  not  drawn  from  mere  resemblances  in 
nature  to  the  works  of  human  intelligence,  but  from 
the  special  character  of  those  resemblances.  The 
circumstances  in  which  it  is  alleged  that  the  world 
resembles  the  work  of  man,  are  not  circumstances 
taken  at  random,  but  are  particular  instances  of  a 
circumstance  which  experience  shows  to  have  a  real 
connection  with  an  intelligent  origin,  the  fact  of  con- 
spiring to  an  end."  Hence  he  terms  it  an  inductive 
argument.2 

This  confusion  of  opinion  with  regard  to  its  mean- 
ing and  scope  is  undoubtedly  the  main  cause  of  the 
discredit  which  has  been  attached  in  our  time  to  an 
argument  which  has  been  advanced  and  defended  for 
two  thousand  years.  In  the  minds  of  many  it  has 
been  connected  with  such  unintelligible  or  preposter- 
ous conclusions  that  it  has  been  set  aside  as  destitute 
of  any  logical  basis.  It  is  thus  of  the  utmost  impor- 
tance to  understand  clearly,  at  the  outset,  what  this 
basis  is.  The  argument  of  design,  then,  is  simply 
this  :  that  there  is  a  certain  interpretation  which  the 

1  Janet,  Final  Causes,  p.  8. 

2  Three  Essays,  etc.,  Theism,  p.  170. 


138  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

facts  of  nature  themselves  call  for  and  necessitate, 
the  interpretation  or  explanation  which  attaches  to 
manifest  arrangement  and  adaptation.  This  expla- 
nation adheres  to  the  facts  of  nature,  and  cannot  be 
separated  from  them.  It  is  stamped  upon  these 
facts.  In  this  sense,  and  in  this  only,  is  it  claimed 
that  design  or  finality  is  in  things.  It  is  not  an  ex- 
planation of  nature  derived  from  theory,  but  one 
forced  upon  the  mind  by  nature  itself.  By  the  con- 
stitution of  our  minds,  and  by  the  laws  of  thought, 
we  are  forced  to  put  this  construction  upon  the  facts 
presented.  Just  as  we  connect  uniform  recurrence 
with  law,  so  we  connect  manifold  coincidence  and 
adaptation  with  design. 

Bacon's  familiar  comparison  of  the  search  for  final 
causes  to  vestal  virgins,  who  were  consecrated  to  God 
and  barren,  has  done  much  to  discredit  the  argument 
of  design ;  but  what  Bacon  meant  was  simply  that 
the  student  of  nature  should  not  be  diverted  from  the 
investigation  of  efficient  causes  by  the  suggestion  of 
ends  or  adaptations,  for  the  appropriate  work  of  the 
interpreter  of  nature  is  to  trace  the  connection  of 
natural  agents  and  laws.  And  in  taking  this  position 
no  one  doubts  that  Bacon  was  right.  For  he  was 
dealing  with  a  set  of  inquirers  who  refused  to  recog- 
nize the  physical  cause  of  a  fact  as  a  subject  of  in- 
quiry on  the  ground  that  the  final  cause  was  a  suf- 
ficient explanation.  This  was  to  put  an  end  to  all 
scientific  progress.  But  the  maxim  which  he  applied 
only  to  the  separate  items  of  nature  has  been  ex- 
tended since  his  time  to  the  whole  system  of  nature, 
while  it  is  the  agreement  and  concurrence  in  the 
system  of  the  separate  facts  which  constitutes  the 
whole  force  of  the  argument.     That  Bacon  did  not 


THE   ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN.  I  39 

deny  that  nature,  in  this  sense,  is  penetrated  and 
illumined  by  the  evidence  of  design  is  proved  clearly 
enough  by  his  own  words  :  "  For  while  the  mind  of 
man  looketh  upon  second  causes  scattered,  it  may 
sometimes  rest  in  them  and  go  no  further,  but  when 
it  beholdeth  the  chain  of  them  confederate  and 
linked  together,  it  must  needs  fly  to  Providence  and 
Deity."  1 

The  definition  here  given  of  the  argument  of  de- 
sign at  once  removes  one  of  the  most  common  objec- 
tions to  it.  Design,  it  is  said,  is  a  human  concep- 
tion, the  essential  offspring  of  a  mode  of  thinking 
which  belongs  to  a  limited  intelligence.  What  right 
have  we  to  attribute  this  to  an  infinite  being;  what 
ground  have  we  for  connecting  this  characteristic 
with  the  supreme  intelligence  ?  This  objection, 
though  urged  by  writers  in  our  own  time  (for  exam- 
ple, Lewes),  is  by  no  means  new.  Even  Descartes, 
who  sought  to  base  an  argument  for  the  existence  of 
God  upon  innate  ideas,  rejected  the  argument  of 
design  on  the  ground  that  we  must  know  God  be- 
fore we  can  attribute  design  to  him.  But,  if  we 
keep  clearly  in  our  minds  the  principle  already  laid 
down,  that  design  is  an  explanation  which  adheres 
to  the  facts  of  nature  as  they  are  manifest  to  us,  this 
objection  is  stripped  of  all  its  force.  If,  by  the  con- 
stitution of  our  minds  we  are  compelled  to  put  a 
certain  construction  upon  certain  facts,  no  insolu- 
ble problem  which  lies  beyond  can  hold  us  back 
from  the  plain  and  irresistible  inference.  We  do 
not  need  to  know  the  infinite  to  argue  from  facts. 
We  start  from  the  finite,  not  from  the  infinite,  side 
of  the  problem  ;  we  assume  no  knowledge  of  an  infi- 
nite mind,  but  simply  argue  towards  it. 

1  [Essays  :  "  Of  Atheism."] 

■ 


140  THE   THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

The  question  which  we  are  discussing  is  not 
whether  nature  had  an  infinite  designer,  but  whether 
we  find  in  nature  evidences  of  design.  "  The  idea 
of  infinity,"  as  Dr.  Mozley  truly  remarks,  "combines 
two  great  and  startling  opposites  :  that  of  being  the 
most  religious,  and  that  of  being  the  most  skeptical 
idea  of  the  human  mind.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  the 
foundation  of  all  that  is  transcendental  and  aspir- 
ing in  human  prospects  ;  on  the  other  hand,  it  is 
the  destruction  of  it  all."  2  Thus,  on  the  one  side, 
it  has  been  the  favorite  idea  of  religious  minds,  while 
on  the  other  it  is  the  great  undoer,  the  great  re- 
verser,  of  all  the  religious  verdicts  of  reason.  Infin- 
ity thus  becomes  nature's  great  recantation,  whereby 
she  gives  up  what  she  held,  and  acknowledges  her- 
self mistaken  and  deceived.  But  into  this  unfath- 
omable deep  we  are  not  required  to  plunge.  We 
are  not  determining  the  scope  of  the  designing  mind 
which  nature  shows.  For  it  is  evident  that,  if  we 
cannot  argue  up  to  a  designing  mind  till  we  have 
first  argued  down  from  one ;  if  we  cannot  interpret 
the  facts  of  nature  till  we  have  explained  the  mind 
which  formed  nature,  then  the  argument  of  design 
would  have  no  validity  until  it  had  ceased  to  have 
any  value. 

If  the  principle  of  final  causes  were,  as  has  been 
claimed  by  some,  an  a  priori  principle,  we  should 
apply  it  at  once  to  all  phenomena,  but  this  is  not 
the  case.  In  a  great  number  of  instances  phenom- 
ena have  no  end  that  we  can  recognize,  or  do  not 
at  once  suggest  the  notion  of  an  end,  while  in  a 
multitude  of  other  cases  this  notion  is  suggested  to 
the  mind  of  the  observer  with  irresistible  force.    We 

1  [Essays,  etc.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  3S1.] 


THE   ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN.  141 

have,  then,  to  ask  the  question,  what  is  it  that 
makes  this  difference,  what  is  it  that  warrants  us 
in  recognizing  this  characteristic  in  some  cases  and 
not  in  others.  We  see  everywhere  in  nature  not 
only  effects  but  a  harmony  and  coincidence  of  ef- 
fects, and  reason  refuses  to  admit  that  this  coinci- 
dence itself  can  have  followed  without  a  cause.  The 
mind  not  only  requires  a  cause  to  explain  phe- 
nomena, but  a  cause  to  explain  the  order  of  phenom- 
ena. Yet,  in  this  combination  simply,  we  have  no 
suggestion  of  finality.  For  example,  the  geomet- 
rical shapes  which  minerals  assume  in  crystallizing 
do  not  directly  suggest  the  notion  of  design.  It  is 
a  phenomenon  that  seems  only  related  to  the  past. 
So  far  as  our  observation  reaches  it  is  a  phenom- 
enon absolutely  finished,  though  doubtless,  in  the 
strict  sense,  this  is  true  of  none  of  nature's  works. 

On  the  other  hand,  when  a  combination  of  phe- 
nomena has,  besides,  the  evident  character  of  having 
been  determined  to  a  future  phenomenon,  no  matter 
whether  near  or  remote,  reason  demands  an  explana- 
tion not  only  of  the  order  or  arrangement  but  equally 
of  that  relation  to  a  future  effect  which  has  given  it 
its  determinate  form.  But  this  correlation  cannot 
be  explained  unless  the  resulting  phenomenon,  in 
some  sense,  preexisted  in  the  cause ;  and  when  the 
combination,  to  become  intelligible,  is  thus  referred, 
at  the  same  time,  to  its  anterior  cause,  and  to  its 
future  effect,  we  have  not  simply  a  relation  of  cause 
and  effect,  but  a  relation  of  means  to  end.  When  a 
great  number  of  phenomena,  very  different  in  every 
other  point  of  view,  yet  present  one  common  and 
constant  circumstance,  this  circumstance  may  be 
given  as  the  cause.     "We  are  warranted,"  says  Mr. 


142  THE   THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

Mill,  "  by  the  canons  of  induction  in  concluding  that 
what  brought  all  these  elements  together  was  some 
cause  common  to  them  all."1  Hence  it  follows  that 
the  criterion  of  final  cause  is  the  determination  of 
the  present  with  reference  to  the  future.  In  other 
words,  "the  agreement  of  certain  phenomena,  bound 
together  with  a  future  phenomenon,  implies  a  cause 
in  which  that  future  phenomenon  is  ideally  repre- 
sented." 2 

Let  us  now  glance  at  some  of  the  more  obvious 
facts  in  nature  which  seem  to  illustrate  this  deter- 
mination of  phenomena  with  reference  to  a  definite 
and  future  end.  The  operations  of  nature  in  which 
the  character  of  finality  is  most  strikingly  displayed 
are  of  two  kinds  :  functions  and  instincts.  The 
former  are  shown  in  the  interior  operation  of  organs, 
and  the  latter  in  their  exterior  actions.  In  the 
former  that  which  is  most  striking  is  the  structure, 
while  in  the  latter  it  is  the  operation.  These  illus- 
trations, for  the  most  part,  are  so  obvious,  and  have 
been  so  frequently  employed,  that  it  will  be  impos- 
sible to  treat  this  part  of  my  subject  without  making 
free  use  of  familiar  facts. 

Of  all  instances  of  apparent  adaptation  in  the 
structure  of  the  organ,  the  most  striking  is  the 
structure  of  the  eye  in  its  relation  to  the  act  of 
vision.  For  this  the  primary  condition  is  the  exist- 
ence of  a  nerve  sensible  to  light.  But  a  nerve  sim- 
ply sensible  to  light  would  serve  only  to  distinguish 
light  from  darkness ;  to  discriminate  between  ob- 
jects an  optical  apparatus  is  required,  and  it  is  in  the 
construction  of  this  apparatus  that  the  nice  adjust- 
ment of  means  to  ends  is  most  clearly  manifested. 

1  \Tlirce  Essays,  etc.,  Theism,  p.  171.] 

2  Janet,  Final  Causes,  p.  55. 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN.  143 

A  great  German  physiologist,  Miiller,  remarks 
upon  this  point :  "  In  order  that  the  light  may  pro- 
ject upon  the  retina  the  image  of  the  objects  from 
which  it  proceeds,  that  which  conies  from  certain 
definite  parts  of  the  external  bodies,  whether  imme- 
diately or  by  reflection,  must  not  put  in  action  more 
than  corresponding  parts  of  the  retina,  a  thing  which 
recognizes  certain  physical  conditions.  The  light 
which  emanates  from  a  luminous  body  diffuses  itself 
by  radiating  in  all  directions  when  it  meets  no  ob- 
stacle to  its  passage  ;  a  luminous  point  will  there- 
fore lighten  a  whole  surface,  not  a  single  point  of 
that  surface.  If  the  surface  which  receives  the  light 
radiating  from  a  point  is  the  united  surface  of  the 
retina,  the  light  of  that  point  causes  the  sensation 
of  light  in  the  whole,  and  not  merely  in  a  part  of 
the  nervous  membrane."  There  then  would  be  no 
vision,  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word,  but  only  the 
sensation  of  light.  "  Consequently,  in  order  that 
the  external  light  may  produce  in  the  eye  an  image 
corresponding  to  the  bodies,  it  is  indispensable  that 
there  should  be  arrangements  to  cause  the  light 
given  forth  from  certain  points  to  act  on  isolated 
parts  of  the  retina  arranged  in  the  same  order,  and 
which  prevent  one  point  of  that  membrane  from 
being  illuminated  at  once  by  several  points  of  the 
external  world."  x 

In  order  to  attain  the  result  here  desired,  two  dif- 
ferent systems  have  been  employed.  The  first  of 
these,  which  are  called  composite  eyes,  is  seen  in 
the  case  of  insects.  The  method  here  adopted  con- 
sists in  placing  before  the  retina,  and  perpendicular 
to  it,  an  innumerable  quantity  of  transparent  cones 

1  Janet,  p.  58. 


144  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

which  allow  only  the  light  which  follows  the  direc- 
tion of  their  axis  to  reach  the  nervous  membrane, 
while  all  which  strikes  obliquely  is  absorbed  by  the 
pigment  which  lines  their  walls.  Here  nature  pro- 
ceeds precisely  like  the  chemist  in  his  laboratory, 
when,  in  order  to  study  a  phenomenon,  he  seeks  first 
to  isolate  it,  that  surrounding  circumstances  may  not 
disturb  his  experiment.  This  combination  of  trans- 
parent cones  with  absorbing  walls,  allowing  the  light 
to  come  in  one  direction,  and  absorbing  it  in  every 
other,  however  it  may  be  explained,  is  evidently  the 
same  process.  But  what  makes  the  contrivance  of 
the  eye  vastly  more  marvelous  than  the  precaution 
of  the  chemist,  is  the  amazing  quantity  of  combina- 
tions which  the  system  requires,  amounting  to  12,000 
or  even  20,000  cones  in  a  single  eye,  to  which  must 
exactly  correspond  in  the  cornea  as  many  little  geo- 
metrical divisions  without  which  the  result  intended 
would  not  follow.  Can  such  wonderful  contrivances 
fail  to  suggest  design  ? 

But  more  striking  even  than  this  is  the  structure 
of  the  human  eye.  With  insects  the  method  con- 
sists in  excluding  the  rays  which  would  prevent  the 
effect  from  being  produced.  With  man  the  same 
result  is  obtained  with  more  precision,  and  greater 
intensity  of  effect,  by  concentrating  upon  one  point 
the  divergent  rays  which  emanate  from  another. 
The  human  eye  is,  in  fact,  a  camera,  and  is  con- 
structed on  the  principle  of  the  instrument  which 
photography  has  rendered  so  familiar.  We  have  a 
solid  membrane,  enclosing  the  globe  of  the  eye, 
made  transparent'  at  one  point,  this  transparent  part 
corresponding  exactly  with  the  opening  of  the  orbit. 
Behind   this   transparent   opening   are    placed    con- 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN.  1 45 

vergent  media  to  unite  the  luminous  rays.  And 
lastly,  in  the  very  axis  of  the  transparent  cornea, 
and  of  the  crystalline  lens,  is  placed  the  retina 
which  receives  the  image  of  the  object  Nor  is  this 
all  ;  but  the  degree  of  curvature  of  the  crystalline 
lens  is  always  exactly  adapted  to  the  medium  in 
which  the  animal  is  called  to  live,  whether  it  be  air 
or  water,  and  the  eye  possesses  a  faculty  of  accom- 
modation, by  which  it  is  enabled  to  see  with  equal 
distinctness  objects  placed  at  different  distances. 
And  still  another  remarkable  property  of  the  eye  is 
its  achromatic  power,  which,  if  not  perfect,  is  yet 
sufficient  for  practical  use. 

While  considering  this  complicated  internal  struc- 
ture of  the  human  eye,  the  part  which  the  external 
organs  play  should  not  be  overlooked.  The  eye  is 
protected  from  injury  by  a  lid,  which  is  further  pro- 
vided with  lashes.  For  a  long  time  it  was  supposed 
that  these  organs  served  simply  to  prevent  injurious 
substances  from  entering  the  eye,  but  recent  re- 
search has  shown  that  they  have  another  and  far 
more  delicate  function  ;  that  is,  that  they  have  the 
power  of  partially  arresting  what  are  termed  the 
ultra-violet  rays,  or  the  luminous  rays  which  lie  be- 
youd  the  violet  in  the  solar  spectrum,  and  which  act 
in  a  very  injurious  manner  upon  the  retina.  Precise 
experiments  have  also  shown  that  these  protecting 
media  have  also  the  power  of  arresting  almost  the 
whole  of  the  obscure  radiating  heat  which  always 
accompanies  light  in  considerable  proportion,  and 
which  might,  if  allowed  to  strike  upon  the  retina, 
affect  its  very  delicate  tissue.  But,  in  consequence 
of  this  arrest,  only  those  rays  are  transmitted  which 
are  required  for  producing  vision.     Here  we  have 


I46  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

an  arrangement  which  is  no  part  of  the  organic 
structure  of  the  eye  itself,  but  which  is  externally 
combined  with  it,  simply  that  the  eye  may  be  pro- 
tected in  the  work  it  has  to  perform.  We  have  the 
adjustment  of  one  organ  to  another  and  wholly  dis- 
tinct organ. 

Now  I  am  well  aware  that  the  human  eye  has 
been  the  object  of  severe  criticism,  and  that  some 
physicists  have  not  hesitated  to  declare  that  it  is  by 
no  means  the  perfect  and  admirable  organ  that  has 
been  represented.  Some  have  complained  of  the 
uselessness  of  the  crystalline  humor,  since  the  blind 
operated  on  for  cataract,  can  do  without  it.  Helm- 
holtz  has  shown,  to  his  own  satisfaction,  that  consid- 
ered as  a  mere  instrument,  the  eye  has  imperfections 
and  defects ;  while  a  French  writer  declares  that 
there  is  no  maker  of  optical  instruments  who  could 
not  make  a  better  one  than  Nature  has  furnished 
to  man.  But  we  are  not  discussing  the  question 
whether  the  eye  is  an  absolutely  perfect  instrument, 
nor  are  we  called  on  here  to  pronounce  an  opinion 
as  to  whether  a  German  or  a  French  professor  could 
make  a  better.  The  only  question  before  us  is 
whether  the  eye,  as  it  stands,  shows  the  character- 
istics of  design.  Placing  before  us  its  delicate  and 
complicated  structure,  its  exact  adjustments,  the 
careful  manner  in  which  it  is  protected  in  the  per- 
formance of  its  important  functions,  shall  we  say 
that  it  was  intelligently  planned  with  reference  to 
a  definite  end,  or  shall  we  explain  it  from  the  blind 
operation  of  mere  physical  causes  ? 

Another  striking  class  of  facts  on  which  the  argu- 
ment of  design  is  based  is  that  illustrated  in  the 
instincts  of  the  lower  animals.     Little  as  we  know 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN.  147 

of  the  real  nature  of  instinctive  acts  in  distinction 
from  those  which  we  term  intelligent  or  rational, 
this  much  seems  certain,  that  they  are  not  executed 
with  any  foresight  on  the  part  of  the  animal  of  the 
result  attained,  and  are  not  acts  of  judgment  derived 
from  any  previous  experience.  Facts  without  num- 
ber in  proof  of  this  might  be  supplied  from  the  most 
cursory  observation.  The  young  bee  is  hardly  able 
to  move  its  wings  when  it  leaves  the  hive  in  search 
of  flowers,  and  begins  to  labor  not  to  supply  its  own 
immediate  wants,  but  for  a  common  and  future  good. 
The  spider  has  not  so  much  as  seen  the  insects 
which  will  serve  for  its  food  when  it  hastens  to  lay 
a  snare  for  them  by  weaving  its  curious  web.  The 
spinning  machinery  which  is  set  up  in  its  body  is 
not  more  accurately  adjusted  to  the  secretion  of 
which  its  web  is  formed,  than  is  its  instinct  directed 
to  the  construction  of  the  web,  and  to  the  selection 
of  suitable  places  for  the  capture  of  its  prey.  Each 
step  it  takes  is  adapted  to  a  determinate  result. 
And  this  determination  appears  more  striking  as  we 
descend  the  scale  of  nature,  and  as  the  parents  are 
more  released  from  personal  care  of  their  offspring. 
All  creatures  are  under  a  like  impulse  to  provide  for 
the  nourishing  of  their  young,  but  while  animals  dis- 
charge only  a  purely  physical  function  in  giving 
suck,  birds  have  their  nests  to  build,  and  after  hatch- 
ing their  young,  must  gather  food  adapted  to  the 
period  of  growth,  while  insects  go  much  farther,  and 
in  some  instances,  as  with  bees,  are  charged  with 
the  selection  of  nourishment  which  has  the  power 
of  producing  organic  changes  in  the  young,  so  that 
certain  selected  individuals  can  be  made  the  queens 
of  future  hives.     Here  we  have  a  vast  series  of  ad- 


I48  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

justments,  not  only  between  the  bodily  organs  and 
instincts  of  the  individual,  but  between  the  instincts 
of  animals  and  those  forces  of  surrounding  nature 
which  are  related  to  them.  The  foresight  is  not  in 
the  animals  themselves.  They  simply  walk  in  a  path 
which  has  been  marked  for  them.  We  have,  in  all 
this,  the  criterion  of  finality,  the  determination  of 
the  present  by  the  future.  Nor  is  this  evidence  any 
less  striking  if  we  allow  that  instinct  in  the  higher 
animals  is  often  coupled  with  intelligence,  and  that 
it  may  be  modified  by  experience,  or  by  hereditary 
transmission.1 

A  consideration  of  these  instances,  which  might 
be  multiplied  without  end,  will  now  enable  us  to 
recognize  more  clearly  the  truth  of  the  principle 
that  has  been  already  asserted,  that  the  argument 
of  design  is  simply  an  explanation  or  interpretation 
of  facts.  The  general  conclusion  of  order  belongs 
to  the  category  of  mental  inferences,  but  each  par- 
ticular instance  of  purpose  on  which  this  general  in- 
ference is  based,  is  not  a  mental  inference  but  a 
physical  fact.  Of  nothing  can  we  say  that  we  see 
its  ultimate  purpose,  but  the  immediate  purpose  lies 
directly  before  our  eyes,  and  is  all  with  which  we 
have  to  do.  The  function  of  an  organ  is  a  matter 
of  purely  physical  investigation,  but  this  function  is 
not  merely  what  it  does,  but  what  its  construction 
enables  it  to  do.  The  idea  of  function  cannot  be 
separated  from  the  idea  of  purpose.  The  function 
of  an  organ  is  its  purpose,  and  the  adjustment  of  its 
various  parts  as  well  as  of  its  complex  whole  to  that 
purpose  is  as  much  a  fact  as  any  other  phenomenon 
of  which  science  can  take  note.     It  is,  therefore,  a 

1  Flint,  Theism,  p.  383. 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN.  1 49 

manifest  misunderstanding  of  the  truth  to  assert 
that  the  idea  of  purpose  belongs,  not  to  science,  but 
to  the  domain  of  metaphysics  and  theology.1 

There  is  no  doubt  a  sense,  and  an  important 
sense,  in  which  all  science  rests  at  last  on  meta- 
physical conceptions.  Yet  the  idea  of  purpose  and 
adjustment  is  by  no  means  so  metaphysical  as  other 
ideas  which  are  not  only  freely  adopted  into  physical 
science,  but  are  even,  in  some  instances,  made  its 
fundamental  postulates.  The  relation  of  a  given 
structure  to  its  function  or  end  is  certainly  a  physi- 
cal fact  far  more  simple,  direct,  and  unmistakable, 
than  the  relation  of  the  same  structure  to  a  corre- 
sponding part  in  a  wholly  different  animal  on  which 
the  whole  doctrine  of  homologies  is  based.  Classi- 
fication, on  which  all  science  is  founded,  is  simply 
an  arrangement  of  facts  in  an  ideal  order,  or  in  con- 
formity to  certain  laws  of  thought.  But  mere  phys- 
ical facts  can  have  no  such  close  relation  to  an 
ideal  order,  as  the  organs  of  an  animal  have  to  the 
precise  function  which  they  are  meant  to  discharge 
in  the  animal  economy.  The  marvelous  adjust- 
ment, then,  which  we  have  presented  in  the  natural 
world  is  simply  a  question  of  fact.  It  is  a  fact  to 
be  ascertained  and  recognized  in  each  particular 
case,  and  the  question  of  its  existence  has  nothing 
to  do  with  the  question  of  any  larger  or  ultimate 
purpose. 

Before  leaving  this  part  of  our  discussion,  it  is 
important  to  observe  that  these  numberless  facts 
which  illustrate  contrivance  or  design  in  nature  not 
only  do  not  conflict  with  what  has  been  asserted, 
in   a  previous    lecture,  of   the  order   and   harmony 

1  Duke  of  Argyle,  Reign  of  Law,  p.  86. 


I50  THE    THE  I  STIC  ARGUMENT 

everywhere  displayed  in  the  physical  universe,  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  only  serve  to  render  it  more 
striking.  For  the  necessity  of  contrivance  is  a  di- 
rect result  of  the  immutability  of  natural  forces. 
These  forces  must  always  be  conformed  to  and 
obeyed,  and  therefore,  when  they  cannot  directly 
serve  a  given  purpose,  they  can  only  be  made  to  do 
so  by  combination  and  contrivance.  Hence  we  may 
lay  it  down  as  an  evident  principle  that  when  a 
/universe  is  governed  by  constant  and  invariable 
laws  contrivance  will  follow  by  a  logical  necessity. 
Instead,  therefore,  of  suggesting  any  unworthy  con- 
ception of  the  universe,  or  of  the  intelligence  that 
everywhere  manifests  itself  through  the  universe, 
this  adaptation  of  means  to  ends,  or  contrivance  for 
the  accomplishment  of  purpose,  is  inseparably  bound 
up  with  the  conception  of  the  universe  as  it  exists. 
Even  had  we  no  facts  to  prove  it,  we  might  infer 
contrivance  as  a  consequence  of  the  inflexible  de- 
mands of  law. 

And,  as  we  follow  out  and  understand  more 
thoroughly  each  instance  of  contrivance,  this  fea- 
ture will  be  more  distinctly  recognized.  Nowhere 
is  it  more  strikingly  displayed  than  in  the  way  in 
which  nature  accomplishes  that  in  which  man  has 
always  failed  —  the  navigation  of  the  air.  This  point 
has  received  such  apt  and  beautiful  illustration  from 
the  Duke  of  Argyle  that  I  cannot  do  better  than 
borrow  the  substance  of  his  reasoning. 

Among  the  great  mysteries  of  nature  has  always 
been  reckoned  the  flight  of  birds.  It  seemed  a  vio- 
lation of  one  of  the  most  familiar  and  ever-present 
forces  of  nature.  How,  in  defiance  of  the  known 
effects  of  gravity,   could  heavy  -bodies  float  them- 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN.  151 

selves  in  thin  air,  or  sweep  at  will,  in  headlong 
plunge,  with  movements  more  easy,  more  rapid, 
more  certain,  than  could  be  executed  by  animals 
upon  the  solid  eartti?  Well  did  Solomon  say  of 
"the  way  of  an  eagle  in  the  air,"  that  "  he  knew  itl 
not."  Anything  more  beautiful  and  more  striking* 
is  not  presented  to  us  in  the  realm  of  organic  life. 
Yet,  when  we  come  to  study  and  understand  it,  we 
find  it  simply  an  illustration  of  the  way  in  which 
contrivance  has  bent  to  its  purposes  the  most  rigid 
and  universal  of  laws. 

In  the  first  place,  we  have  to  note  that  the  force 
which  seems  so  adverse,  the  force  of  gravitation,  is 
the  very  thing  which  renders  the  flight  of  birds  pos- 
sible. Birds  do  not  fly  because  they  are  lighter  than 
air,  but  because  they  are  heavier.  Were  they  lighter 
they  might  float  like  a  balloon,  but  they  could  not 
fly.  What  makes  it  impossible  to  direct  the  course 
of  a  balloon,  what  causes  it  to  drift  helplessly  in  the 
upper  space,  is  the  simple  fact  that  it  possesses  no 
active  force  which  enables  it  to  resist  the  varying 
currents  in  which  it  is  immersed.  It  is  part  of  the 
atmosphere,  and  must  go  with  the  wind  that  blow- 
eth  where  it  listeth.  But  the  bird,  being  always 
greatly  heavier  than  the  air,  is  endowed  with  a  force 
which  supplies  momentum,  and  therefore  is  capable 
of  overcoming  any  lower  force,  and  even  heavy 
gales  of  wind.  Gravitation  is,  therefore,  an  essential 
element  in  the  flight  of  birds ;  and  hence  the  heavy 
birds  are  always  the  most  vigorous  on  the  wing,  and 
can  wrestle  victoriously  with  the  rudest  blasts.  It 
is  because  the  law  of  gravity  is  always  acting  that 
the  eagle  swoops  from  his  mountain  nest,  and  the 
wild  goose  wings  his  rapid  flight  across  a  continent 
in  search  of  his  winter  home. 


152  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

But,  coupled  with  this,  is  another  principle  which, 
at  first  sight,  would  seem,  like  gravity,  only  an  im- 
pediment to  flight.  This  is  the  resisting  force  of  the 
atmosphere,  in  which  the  requisite  balance  to  the 
force  of  gravity  is  supplied.  Now  that  the  force  of 
air  should  be  made  effectual  for  this  purpose,  it  must 
be  used  under  peculiar  conditions.  The  force  of  air 
is  a  force  acting  in  all  directions,  and  if  it  can  pre- 
vent a  body  from  falling  it  can  also  prevent  it  from 
advancing.  Hence  it  must  be  called  into  action  in 
a  direction  as  much  as  possible  opposed  to  the  force 
of  gravity,  and  as  little  as  possible  in  any  other. 
These  conditions  are  met  by  the  great  breadth  of 
surface  presented  perpendicularly  by  the  bird's  ex- 
panded wing,  and  by  the  narrow  line  presented  hori- 
zontally. But  mere  pressure  of  air  is  not  enough. 
More  must  be  invoked  to  accomplish  flight,  and  that 
is  the  air's  immense  elasticity.  To  enable  a  crea- 
ture heavier  than  the  air  to  support  itself  against 
the  force  of  gravity,  it  must  be  able  to  strike  down- 
ward with  such  force  as  to  cause  a  corresponding 
rebound.  These  conditions  are  all  met  in  the  enor- 
mous vigor  of  the  muscles  which  move  the  wings  of 
birds.  In  many  birds  the  pulsations  of  the  wing 
are  so  rapid  as  utterly  to  defy  any  attempt  to  count 
them. 

Without  pausing  to  dwell  on  the  obvious  adapta- 
tion of  the  structure  of  the  wings  to  the  work  they 
have  to  do,  we  pass  to  another  arrangement  which 
shows  in  a  manner,  if  possible  more  striking  still, 
how  a  difficulty  opposed  by  natural  laws  is  over- 
come. It  is  plain  that  if  a  bird  is  to  support  itself 
by  trie  downward  stroke  of.  its  wings  upon  the  air, 
it  must  lift  the  wings  again,  and  that  each  upward 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN.  I  53 

stroke  is  in  danger  of  neutralizing  the  opposite.  It 
must  be  made  with  equal  velocity  and  must  hence 
produce  equal  resistance.  If  this  difficulty  were  not 
overcome  flight  would  still  be  impossible.  But  by 
two  contrivances,  it  is  evaded.  One  is  that  the 
upper  surface  of  the  wing  is  made  convex,  so  that 
the  air  escapes  readily  on  all  sides,  and  compara- 
tively little  resistance  is  produced,  and  the  other 
consists  in  the  fact  that  the  feathers  of  the  wing  are 
made  to  underlap,  so  that  in  the  downward  stroke 
they  are  closed,  while  in  the  upward  they  are  separ- 
ated, the  air  rushing  freely  between  them  at  every! 
point. 

But  rapid  blows  thus  struck  against  the  air  might 
enable  the  bird  simply  to  lift  itself  straight  up.  The 
power  of  forward  motion  is  given  by  the  direction 
in  which  all  the  wing  feathers  are  set,  and  by  the 
structure  given  to  each  individual  feather.  The  wing 
feathers  are  all  set  in  a  rigid  frame,  and  in  a  direc- 
tion opposite  to  that  in  which  the  bird  is  meant  to 
move,  and  each  feather  while  rigid  at  its  base  is 
extremely  flexible  and  elastic  at  the  end.  In  conse- 
quence of  this  disposition  of  the  parts,  the  air  which 
is  struck  and  compressed  in  the  hollow  of  the  wing, 
being  unable  to  escape  through  the  wing,  owing  to 
the  closing  upwards  of  the  feathers,  and  unable  to 
escape  forwards  on  account  of  the  rigidity  of  the 
frame  and  of  the  quills  in  that  direction,  is  com- 
pelled to  pass  out  behind.  In  thus  escaping  back- 
wards it  lifts  by  its  force  the  elastic  ends  of  the 
feathers,  and  thus,  in  obedience  to  the  law  of  action 
and  reaction,  communicates  along  the  entire  edge  of 
both  wings  a  corresponding  push  forwards  to  the 
body  of  the  bird.     By  this  elaborate  contrivance  the 


154  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

same  volume  of  air  that  yields  pressure  enough  to 
sustain  the  bird  against  the  force  of  gravity  commu- 
nicates a  forward  motion.  The  bird  has  simply  to 
repeat  its  perpendicular  blows,  and  as  a  direct  con- 
sequence of  this  peculiar  structure  of  its  wings,  the 
same  blow  supports  and  propels  it.  Thus  it  appears 
that  gravity  Supplies  birds  with  an  internal  force 
which,  acting  through  nicely  adjusted  instruments 
upon  the  external  force  of  air,  is  the  explanation  of 
their  wondrous  evolutions.  Could  we  ask  for  a  more 
convincing  proof  that  it  is  the  very  immutability  of 
law  that  renders  contrivance  a  necessity  ? 

But  while  the  argument  of  design  may  rest  on 
this  broad  basis  of  undisputed  fact,  there  are  objec- 
tions to  it,  the  most  formidable  of  which  also  appeal 
to  facts,  and  which  require  candid  consideration  at 
our  hands.  Many  objections  that  have  been  urged 
against  contrivance,  or  finality,  have  been  already 
disposed  of  by  the  careful  limitation  of  the  argu- 
ment on  which  we  have  already  insisted.  One  who 
defends  this  argument  at  the  present  day  is  by  no 
means  called  upon  to  defend  all  the  ill-grounded  and 
preposterous  applications  that  have  been  made  of  it. 
That  the  study  of  final  causes  is  not  opposed  to  the 
study  of  physical  causes,  and  that  in  the  investiga- 
tion of  final  causes  we  do  not  assume  to  gather  the 
ultimate  purposes  of  the  Supreme  Intelligence,  has 
been  already  shown.  To  borrow  on  this  latter  point 
an  illustration  from  Robert  Boyle  :  "  A  peasant,  en- 
tering the  garden  of  a  famous  mathematician  and 
seeing  there  a  curious  astronomical  instrument, 
would,  no  doubt,  be  guilty  of  great  presumption 
should  he  believe  himself  capable  of  comprehending 
all  the  ends  for  which  it  had  been  constructed ;  but 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN.  155 

if  he  sees  on  it  a  plate  and  index  casting  a  shadow 
of  the  sun,  he  might  infer  that  one  part  of  its  pur- 
pose was  to  mark  the  hours." 

An  abuse  of  final  causes  which  long  prevailed  con- 
sisted in  rejecting  facts  on  the  ground  of  their  in- 
consistency with  some  final  cause  supposed  to  be 
ascertained.  Thus,  in  the  last  century,  the  exist- 
ence of  double  stars  was  denied  by  a  celebrated 
astronomer,  on  the  ground  that  one  luminous  body 
did  not  need  another  revolving  round  it.  So  the 
theory  that  the  earth  was  a  mere  satellite  of  the  sun 
had,  for  a  long  time,  to  contend  with  the  notion  that 
man  was  the  final  cause  of  the  creation,  and  was, 
therefore,  entitled  to  a  central  position  in  the  uni- 
verse. Final  causes  have  at  times  been  used  to 
account  for  phenomena  that  had  no  existence.  Even 
Fenelon  maintained  that  the  moon  was  created  to 
give  the  earth  light  in  the  absence  of  the  sun,  for- 
getting that  we  are  often  deprived  of  the  light  of 
both.  Some  applications  of  the  doctrine  are  almost 
too  absurd  for  mention.  Thus  the  author  of  "  Paul 
and  Virginia"  asserted  that  dogs  were  usually  of 
two  opposite  colors,  light  and  dark,  that  they  might 
be  distinguished  from  the  furniture  of  a  room,  and 
that  a  melon  had  been  divided  into  sections  by  nat- 
ure to  adapt  it  to  family  eating.  Voltaire  did  not  go  n 
beyond  this  when  he  affirmed,  "  Noses  are  made  to// 
bear  spectacles  ;  let  us  wear  them." 

But,  leaving  these  objections,  which  spring  from 
misconceptions  or  misapplications  of  the  argument, 
I  pass  to  consider  one  that  is  very  old,  and  that 
touches  the  very  centre  of  the  problem.  The  the- 
ory of  final  causes,  it  is  claimed,  inverts  the  order 
of  the  facts  by  taking  the  effect  for  the  cause.     The 


156  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

eye  sees,  not  because  it  was  made  for  sight,  but 
because  it  is  capable  of  seeing  ;  the  bird  flies,  not 
because  he  was  made  for  flight,  but  because  he  is 
so  made  that  he  can  fly.  For  the  most  forcible  ex- 
pression of  this  doctrine  we  may  turn  to  the  great 
Roman  poet,  whose  theory  coincides  so  precisely 
with  some  of  the  currents  of  modern  thought :  — 

"But  before  all,  be  on  your  guard  against  too 
common  an  error  :  believe  not  that  the  shining  orb 
of  our  eyes  has  only  been  created  to  procure  for  us 
the  sight  of  objects  ;  that  these  legs  and  these  mov- 
able thighs  have  only  been  reared  on  the  basis  of 
the  feet  to  give  greater  extent  to  our  paces  ;  that 
the  arms,  in  fine,  have  only  been  formed  of  solid 
muscles,  and  terminated  by  the  right  and  left  hands, 
to  be  the  ministers  of  our  wants  and  of  our  pres- 
ervation. By  such  interpretations,  the  respective 
order  of  effects  and  causes  has  been  reversed.  Our 
members  have  not  been  made  for  our  use,  but  we 
have  made  use  of  them  because  we  have  found  them 
made."  : 

But  the  objection  here  urged,  which  has  been  more 
accurately  stated  by  Spinoza,  is  the  very  problem  here 
at  issue.  For  if  there  are  final  causes,  the  effect  is 
no  longer  merely  an  effect,  it  is  at  the  same  time  a 
cause.  The  question,  whether  there  are  not  effects 
which  are  at  the  same  time  causes,  is  the  point  on 
which  the  whole  discussion  hinges.  Or  rather,  to 
speak  with  entire  accuracy,  it  is  not  the  effect  itself 
which  is  the  cause,  but  the  idea  of  the  effect.  The 
objection  would,  therefore,  hold  only  against  the 
theory  of  an  unconscious  finality.  But  if,  by  final- 
ity, we  mean  an  intelligent  foresight  of  the  end,  the 

1  Lucretius,  Nature  of  Things,  b.  iv.   822  :    (Janet,  p.  200.) 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN.  I  57 

objection  has  no  force.  For  in  this  sense  there  is  no 
contradiction  in  the  assertion  that  an  effect  may  be 
a  cause.  But,  still  further,  this  objection  does  not 
touch  the  real  point  at  issue.  If  we  assume  the  ex- 
istence of  the  eye,  no  one  denies  that  sight  is  the 
necessary  result.  But  how  came  the  eye  itself,  with 
all  its  complex  adjustments,  to  exist  ?  The  harmony 
between  the  internal  and  the  external  conditions 
once  established,  and  the  effect  follows  as  a  thing 
of  course  ;  but  the  problem  how  that  harmony  was 
first  brought  about  is  in  no  way  solved  by  the  asser- 
tion that  man  sees  simply  because  he  has  eyes  give 
him. 

A  far  more  formidable  objection  to  the  argument 
of  design  is  drawn  from  the  vast  armory  from  which 
the  arguments  in  support  of  it  are  furnished,  that 
is  from  the  facts  of  nature.  If  the  generality  of 
facts  support  the  law,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the 
apparent  exceptions  are  also  numerous  and  striking. 
The  theory  rests  on  the  adaptation  of  organ  to  func- 
tion, but  in  many  instances  this  adaptation  cannot  be 
made  out.  Numerous  cases  might  be  cited  among 
the  lower  animals  where  the  same  organ  performs 
at  the  same  time  wholly  different  functions.  In  the 
hydra,  the  animal  may  be  turned  inside  out  like  a 
glove,  and  the  exterior  surface  will  then  perform  the 
functions  of  digestion.  In  the  animal  kingdom,  two 
distinct  organs,  in  the  same  individual,  may  simul- 
taneously perform  the  same  function.  Thus  the  air- 
bladder  found  in  certain  fishes,  originally  constructed 
to  aid  in  floating,  may  be  converted  into  an  appa- 
ratus for  Breathing.  The  tail,  a  nullity  for  man, 
fulfills  the  office  of  a  fifth  hand  for  monkeys,  and 
serves  as  a  leg  to  the  kangaroo.     An  organ  is  not, 


158  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

therefore,  always  characterized  by  its  use,  and  we 
are  compelled  to  admit  that  we  cannot  trace  in  na- 
ture an  absolute  and  necessary  correlative  between 
organ  and  function.1 

There  are,  also,  organs  appealed  to  against  final 
causes  that  seem  to  have  no  function.     These  seem- 
ingly useless  organs  are  of  two  kinds,  complete  or 
rudimentary.     With  the  advance  of  science  the  for- 
mer class  are  continually  becoming  less.     It  would 
be  presumption  to  say  that  an  organ  has  no  use  be- 
cause its  use  has  not  been  discovered.     An  organ, 
like  the  spleen,  may  be  of  use,  without  being  essen- 
tial  to  existence.      On   this   point   Mr.    Darwin  re- 
marks, with  his  habitual  caution  :  "  We  are  much  too 
ignorant  regarding  the  whole  economy  of  any  one 
organic  being  to  say  what  slight  modifications  would 
be  of  importance  or  not."  2    As  he  proceeds  to  show, 
even  characteristics  in  an  animal  apparently  so  su- 
perficial as  color  may  be  of  essential  use,  and,  if  this 
be  true,  we  can  hardly  affirm  positively  of  any  organ 
that  it  serves  no  purpose.      Since  the  law  of  the 
utility  of  organs  and  of  their  adaptation  finds  suffi- 
cient verification  in  such  a  vast  multitude  of  cases, 
it  seems  far  more  reasonable  to  suppose   that  the 
apparent  exceptions  spring  from  our  ignorance  rather 
than  from  any  failure  of  the  principle.     For  a  long 
time  there  were  apparent  exceptions  in  some  of  the 
heavenly  bodies  to  Nature's  law,  yet  when  analyzed 
they  have  only  furnished  a  new  verification  of  it. 

But  when  we  pass  from  complete  organs  to  rudi- 
mentary organs  the  case  is  different.  Here  we  en- 
counter a  real  difficulty,  which  cannot  be  removed 

1  See  Janet,  p.  223. 

2  {Origin  of  Species,  c.  vi.  (Am.  ed.,  p.  190.)] 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN.  I  59 

by  appealing  to  human  ignorance.  Thus  the  woman 
bears  on  her  bosom  the  organs  destined  to  support 
her  child.  In  man  they  exist,  but  in  a  rudimentary 
state,  and  serve  no  useful  purpose.  Horses  can 
move  their  skin,  and  thus  drive  away  the  flies  that 
trouble  them.  Man  has  the  muscle  with  which  this 
movement  is  accomplished,  but  he  has  no  power  to 
contract  it  voluntarily.  The  marsupials,  such  as 
the  kangaroos,  are  'furnished  with  a  pouch,  in  which 
their  young  are  carried  during  the  period  of  lactation. 
Man  bears  the  traces  of  the  same  arrangement  in 
the  processes  of  the  pubis,  and  the  pyramidal  mus- 
cles, but  they  are  manifestly  without  use.  He  has 
in  the  calf  of  his  leg  a  long  slender  muscle,  inca- 
pable of  energetic  action,  which  in  the  tiger,  the- 
panther,  and  the  leopard,  explains  the  prodigious 
leaps  with  which  they  pounce  upon  their  prey.  The 
human  intestine  has  an  appendix,  represented  by  a 
large  fold  in  the  herbivorous  animals,  which  in  man 
serves  no  purpose  of  digestion,  yet  may  become  a 
source  of  danger  and  even  of  death.  He  has  an 
organ  not  only  without  use  but  positively  detri- 
mental to  him.1 

The  existence  of  such  useless  rudimentary  organs 
can,  however,  be  accounted  for  in  two  ways  :  on  the 
theory  of  the  unity  of  type,  or  on  the  theory  of  the 
atrophy  of  organs  by  disuse.  In  the  first,  we  can 
easily  see  that  the  type  remaining  the  same,  nature, 
whether  by  amplifying  it,  or  inverting  it,  or  chang- 
ing its  proportions,  may  adapt  it  to  various  circum- 
stances, and  that  the  organs  thus  rendered  useless 
survive  only  as  a  souvenir  of  the  original  plan.  Or, 
adopting  the  second,  if  the  organs  have  ceased  to  be 

1  See  Janet,  p.  228. 


l6o  THE    THEISTJC  ARGUMENT. 

of  service,  and  thus  have  been  reduced  to  a  mini- 
mum, it  does  not  follow  that  they  cannot  have  been 
of  use  at  some  former  time.  But  neither  of  these 
two  explanations  contradicts  in  the  least  the  theory 
of  finality.  It  is  by  no  means  implied  in  this  theory 
that  plan  should  be  subordinated  to  use  ;  and  nothing 
conforms  more  exactly  to  it  than  the  gradual  disap- 
pearance of  useless  organs.  "Those  who  maintain 
final  causes  are  not  bound  to  maintain  that  they 
must  always  prevail  over  efficient  causes.  Nature 
is  not  bound  to  conform  itself,  in  all  things,  to  the 
utility  of  living  beings,  but  the  organization  must 
be  considered  as  a  mean  taken  between  the  interest 
of  the  organized  being  and  the  general  laws  that 
render  his  structure  possible."  1 

"  At  first  sight,"  says  the  Duke  of  Argyle,  "  it  may  ap- 
pear as  if  there  were  facts  not  to  be  reconciled  with  the 
supremacy  of  purpose,  —  at  first  sight,  but  at  first  sight 
only.  For  as  we  look  at  them  and  wonder  at  them,  and 
set  ourselves  to  discover  how  many  of  a  like  nature  can 
be  found,  our  eye  catches  sight  of  an  order  which  has  not 
been  at  first  perceived.  Exceptions  to  our  narrow  rule, 
such  as  we  might  have  laid  down  and  followed  for  our- 
selves, they  are  now  seen  to  be  in  strict  subordination  to 
a  larger  rule  which  it  would  never  have  entered  into  our 
imagination  to  conceive.  These  useless  members,  these 
rudimentary  or  aborted  limbs  which  puzzle  us  so  much, 
are  parts  of  a  universal  plan.  On  this  plan  the  bony 
skeletons  of  all  living  animals  have  been  put  together. 
The  forces  which  have  been  combined  for  the  moulding 
of  organic  forms  have  been  so  combined  as  to  mould 
them  after  certain  types  or  patterns.  And  when  compar- 
ative anatomy  has  revealed  this  fact  as  affecting  all  the 
animals  of  the  existing  world,  another  branch  of  the  same 
1  Janet,  p.  234. 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN.  \6l 

science  comes  in  to  confirm  the  generalization,  and  extend 
it  over  the  innumerable  creatures  which  have  existed  and 
have  passed  away.  This  one  plan  of  organic  life  has 
never  been  departed  from  since  time  began. 

"  When  we  have  grasped  this  great  fact,  all  the  lesser 
facts  which  are  subordinate  to  it  assume  a  new  signifi- 
cance. In  the  first  place,  a  plan  of  this  kind  is  in  itself 
a  purpose.  An  order  so  vast  as  this,  including  within 
itself  such  variety  of  detail,  and  maintained  through  such 
periods  of  time,  implies  combination  and  adjustment 
founded  upon,  and  carrying  into  effect,  one  vast  concep- 
tion. It  is  only  as  an  order  of  thought  that  the  doctrine 
of  animal  homologies  is  intelligible  at  all.  It  is  a  men- 
tal  order,  and  can  only  be  mentally  perceived.  For  what 
do  we  mean  when  we  say  that  this  bone  in  one  kind  of 
animal  corresponds  to  such  another  bone  in  another  kind 
of  animal  ?  Corresponds  in  what  sense  ?  Not  in  the 
method  of  using  it,  for  very  often  limbs,  which  are  homo- 
logically  the  same,  are  put  to  the  most  diverse  and  oppo- 
site uses.  To  what  standard,  then,  are  we  referring  when 
we  say  that  such  and  such  two  limbs  are  homologically 
the  same  ?  It  is  to  the  standard  of  an  ideal  order,  a 
plan,  a  type,  a  pattern  mentally  conceived."  1 

Two  distinct  ideas  are,  in  fact,  interwoven  in  or- 
ganic life,  —  the  ideas  of  homology  in  structure  and 
of  analogy  in  use.  One  represents  unity  of  design, 
the  other  variety  of  function,  and  the  two  constantly 
modify  each  other. 

I  pass  to  another  objection  urged  against  the  ar- 
gument of  design,  the  objection  on  which  altogether 
most  stress  is  laid  at  the  present  time,  an  objection 
which,  in  the  opinion  of  not  a  few,  has  removed  from 
nature  all  evidence  of  a  final  cause.  I  refer  to  the 
doctrine  which  derives  all  the  wonderful  adaptations 

1  Reign  of  Law,  p.  206. 


1 62  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

of  the  physical  universe,  simply  from  antecedent 
conditions  of  existence.  The  objection  already  con- 
sidered, that  in  the  argument  of  design  the  effect  is 
put  for  the  cause,  implies  that  any  given  organism 
is  simply  an  effect  resulting  from  certain  given 
causes,  and  that  those  causes  are  all  contained  in 
the  series  of  successive  steps  by  which  the  organism 
has  come  into  existence.  This  objection  in  itself  is 
not  new,  but  may  be  traced  back  as  far  as  Aristotle  ; 
but  it  has  recently  derived  great  additional  force 
from  the  new  illustration  it  has  received  at  the  hands 
of  some  eminent  observers  of  the  facts  of  nature. 
According  to  this  theory,  design  is  no  longer  needed 
to  connect  organs  with  the  function  they  discharge ; 
but  another  principle,  drawn  from  nature  itself,  af- 
fords an  adequate  explanation.  This  is  the  principle 
of  Mr.  Darwin  which  has  become  familiar  in  the 
phrase,  "survival  of  the  fittest." 

It  is  an  error  to  speak  of  Mr.  Darwin  as  the  orig- 
inator of  the  theory  of  natural  selection.  It  was 
advocated  in  a  general  form  by  many  before  his 
time.  But  the  great  English  naturalist  was  the  first 
who  attempted  to  trace  with  precision  the  steps  by 
which  the  process  was  carried  on,  and  from  his  un- 
rivaled powers  of  observation  the  theory  was  set 
forth  with  a  wealth  of  illustration  that  gave  it  alto- 
gether a  new  character.  As  presented  by  him,  the 
theory  did  not  pretend  to  account  for  the  origin  of 
sensation,  or  of  animal  or  vegetable  life.  Assum- 
ing the  existence  of  some  of  the  lowest  forms  of 
organic  life,  in  which  are  found  no  complex  adapta- 
tions, and  no  traces  of  contrivance,  and  assuming, 
as  was  not  unreasonable,  that  many  small  variations 
from  those  simple  types  would  be  thrown  out  in  all 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN.  163 

directions,  which  might  be  transmitted  by  inherit- 
ance, some  of  which  would  be  advantageous  to  the 
creature  in  its  struggle  for  existence  and  others  dis- 
advantageous, the  former  would  tend  to  survive, 
while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  latter  would  tend  to 
perish.  And  thus,  by  a  slow  but  constant  modifi- 
cation of  the  type,  adapting  itself  to  different  condi- 
tions of  existence,  it  might  develop  into  all  the  va- 
rieties that  now  present  themselves.1 

In  thus  explaining  the  evolution  of  higher  from 
lower  forms  of  life,  Mr.  Darwin  appeals  to  physical 
agencies  that  are  visibly  in  action.  Whether  spe- 
cies are  changing  or  not  at  the  present  cannot,  in- 
deed, be  determined  by  observation  ;  but  the  entire 
period  during  which  man  has  watched  the  operations 
of  nature  is  but  an  infinitesimal  portion  of  the  vast 
epoch  that  has  elapsed  since  this  process  of  nat- 
ural selection  began.  Yet  man's  experience,  short 
as  it  is,  furnishes  abundant  illustration  of  the  method 
by  which  these  modifications  have  taken  place.  The 
mode  in  which  the  existing  breed  of  race-horses  has 
been  produced  is  a  case  in  point.  Simply  by  taking 
a  score  of  horses  and  selecting  from  these  the  fleetest 
to  pair  together,  and  then  again  selecting  the  fleet- 
est of  their  offspring,  he  will  soon  produce  an  animal 
whose  speed  far  exceeds  that  of  the  native  race  from 
which  he  sprung.  The  different  kinds  of  dogs,  so 
unlike  in  all  their  external  characteristics,  —  the 
mastiff,  the  greyhound,  the  terrier,  —  have  all  been 
developed  from  allied  varieties  of  the  wolf  and  jackal. 
Our  domestic  pigeons,  where  the  divergences,  due  in 
most  cases  to  human  fancy,  are  still  more  remark- 
able, are  all  descended  from  a  single  species  of  wild 
pigeon. 

1  Mill,  Three  Essays,  etc.,  Theism,  D.  172. 


164  THE   THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

To  comprehend  how  nature  conducts  her  long 
process  of  natural  selection  we  must  remember  that 
the  reproductive  capacity  of  plants  and  of  the  lower 
animals  almost  transcends  belief.  Thus,  a  minute 
alpine  plant  (proto-coccus)  is  said  to  multiply  so  fast 
in  a  single  night  as  to  color  many  acres  of  snow 
blood-red.  A  single  codfish  is  estimated  to  lay  six 
million  eggs  within  a  year.  This  enormous  increase 
can  only  be  kept  within  just  bounds  by  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  greater  number.  Of  the  six  million  em- 
bryo codfish  but  a  small  number  reach  maturity. 
This  is  what  is  meant  by  the  struggle  for  existence, 
the  universal  law  of  the  natural  world.  Those  only 
survive  and  propagate  their  kind  which  are  best 
adapted  to  the  conditions  in  which  they  live.  By  a 
stern  method  nature  saves  from  the  general  slaugh- 
ter only  those  who  are  best  able  to  support  them- 
selves. But,  during  this  process,  the  external  con- 
ditions are  also  changing.  Modifications  of  the 
earth's  surface,  in  the  moisture  of  the  atmosphere, 
in  the  intensity  of  solar  heat,  are  ever  going  on,  and 
thus,  in  the  constant  struggle,  no  constant  race  re- 
mains, but  new  varieties  are  constantly  produced, 
once  more  under  new  conditions,  to  renew  and  per- 
petuate the  endless  struggle.  Only  time  is  needed 
to  explain  all  phenomena  of  variation. 

But  without  dwelling  at  greater  length  upon  a 
theory  which  has  been  rendered  familiar  to  us  all 
by  recent  discussion,  let  us  ask  the  only  question 
with  which  we  are  here  concerned,  how  does  it  af- 
fect the  argument  of  design  ?  For  the  sake  of  the 
argument  let  us  concede  that  the  theory  of  natural 
selection  is  well  established.  To  what  conclusion 
does  it  lead?     It  has  been  hastily  inferred  that  the 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN.  165 

doctrine  of  finality  has  received  its  death-blow  from 
this  theory.  Is  this  a  logical  result?  Taking  Mr. 
Darwin's  own  account,  natural  selection  is  evidently 
not  an  agent,  but  simply  a  result.  It  is  nothing 
more  than  the  success  of  one  animal  in  its  strug- 
gle with  another.  Thus,  by  fleeing  for  generations 
from  its  enemies,  the  swiftness  of  the  antelope  has 
been  developed.  By  seeking  its  food  from  trees,  the 
long  neck  of  the  giraffe  has  gradually  been  drawn 
out.  But  the  primal  productive  agency  in  both  these 
cases  was  not  natural  selection.  Natural  selection 
was  simply  a  negative  condition.  It  created  noth- 
ing ;  it  simply  destroyed  a  large  part  of  that  already 
in  existence.  When  we  are  told  that  natural  selec- 
tion " effects  improvement,"  that  it  "develops  struc- 
ture," this  language  can  be  only  metaphor.  For 
natural  selection  can  do  nothing.  It  can  produce 
no  new  variety,  but  only  determines  what  new  vari- 
ety, under  favorable  circumstances,  shall  survive. 

Now  what  strikes  us  most  forcibly  in  the  natural 
world  is  not  simply  the  fact  of  development,  but  the 
fact  that  this  development  has  been  progressive, 
and  that  it  proceeds  in  accordance  with  an  orderly 
method,  a  method  which  results  in  the  constant  for- 
mation of  more  highly  organized  species.  How  shall 
this  be  accounted  for  ?  There  are  but  two  explana- 
tions possible  :  chance  variation  running  through 
long  periods  of  time,  or  variation  according  to  pre- 
arranged order.  Only  let  us  have  an  infinity  of  time, 
it  is  urged,  and  the  right  variation  will,  sooner  or 
later,  take  place,  and  be  perpetuated.  But  these  va- 
riations join  on,  in  every  instance,  to  what  has  been 
produced  before,  forming  a  harmonious  fabric,  and 
they  occur  not  as  fluctuating  and  vanishing  products, 


1 66  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT 

but  as  fixed  and  permanent  modifications.  Let  us 
go  back  to  the  illustration  of  the  eye.  Accepting 
this  explanation,  we  are  forced  to  the  conclusion 
that  this  organ,  not  only  with  its  inimitable  contri- 
vance for  adjusting  the  focus  to  different  distances, 
for  admitting  different  amounts  of  light,  for  the  cor- 
rection of  spherical  and  chromatic  aberration,  but 
with  its  nerve  unlike  any  other  in  the  system,  its 
external  mechanism  of  lid  and  lashes,  is  the  result 
of  chance.  Such  a  hypothesis  violates  moral  pos- 
sibility ;  it  is,  in  fact,  nothing  but  the  discarded  doc- 
trine of  Lucretius  and  the  Epicureans. 

We  have  only  left  the  other  hypothesis,  that  nat- 
ural selection  works  according  to  fixed  laws.  But 
laws  in  nature  are  simply  uniform  facts.  And  as 
soon  as  we  look  at  them  clearly,  we  see  everywhere 
coincidence,  correspondence,  correlation.  If  they 
result  finally  in  elaborate  and  intricate  system,  they 
must  contain  system  and  imply  system.  Hence  the 
so-called  law  of  variability  must,  itself,  be  taken  as 
the  expression  of  a  purpose.  For  the  variation  of 
an  organism  must  be,  in  some  measure,  at  least,  de- 
termined by  the  original  constitution  of  the  organ- 
ism. Nobody  expects  to  gather  figs  of  thistles.  And 
this  variation  proceeds  just  as  much  in  a  definite 
direction.  In  the  nature  of  things  there  is  no  more 
reason  for  improvement  than  for  deterioration. 
Why  is  improvement  and  advance  the  rule  ?  Sim- 
ply because  the  internal  constitution  of  the  organ- 
ism is  in  every  case  adjusted  to  external  circum- 
stances. Natural  selection  cannot  account  for  this 
adjustment.  So  the  law  of  over-production,  which 
results  in  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  is  obviously  sim- 
ply a  means  of  attaining  a  desired  result.     It  may 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  DESIGN.  \6j 

seem  to  us  a  mysterious  law,  involving  so  much  as 
it  seems  to  do  of  privation,  pain,  and  death  ;  but  it 
is  not  the  less  the  method  by  which  nature  works, 
and  by  which  ultimate  order,  harmony,  and  perfec- 
tion are  secured  among  living  creatures. 

The  law  of  natural  selection,  therefore,  not  only 
does  not  conflict  with  the  argument  of  design,  but 
affords  new  illustration  of  it.  It  is  a  contrivance || 
for  securing  a  desired  result.  The  proofs  which'' 
have  been  brought  forward  so  abundantly  to  estab- 
lish the  theory  of  natural  selection,  are  in  reality 
new  arguments  in  favor  of  finality  in  nature.  The 
works  of  Mr.  Darwin  himself  are  rich  in  such  ex- 
pressions as  "beautiful  contrivances"  and  "marvel- 
ous adjustments."  The  human  mind  seems  instinc- 
tively to  adopt  this  mode  of  interpreting  the  facts 
of  nature. 

"  The  issue,"  says  Professor  Gray,  "  between  the„ 
skeptic  and  the  theist  is  only  the  old  one,  long  agol 
argued  out,  namely,  whether  organic  nature  is  a« 
result  of  design  or  of  chance.  Variation  and  natural 
selection  open  no  third  alternative  ;  they  concern 
only  the  question  how  the  results,  whether  fortuitous 
or  designed,  may  have  been  brought  about.  Organic 
nature  abounds  with  unmistakable  and  irresistible 
indications  of  design,  and,  being  a  connected  and 
consistent  system,  this  evidence  carries  the  implica- 
tion of  design  throughout  the  whole.  On  the  other 
hand,  chance  carries  no  probabilities  with  it,  can 
never  be  developed  into  a  consistent  system,  but 
when  applied  to  the  explanation  of  orderly  or  bene- 
ficial results,  heaps  up  improbabilities  at  every  step 
beyond  all  computation."  i 

1  Dariviniana,  p.  153. 


LECTURE  VI. 

EVOLUTION    AND    FINAL    CAUSE. 

In  my  argument  thus  far,  I  have  sought  to  show 
/  that  the  universe,  as  it  exists,  implies  a  cause ;  that 
from  the  order  and  harmony  which  it   everywhere 
displays  we   have   a  right  to  infer  the  presence  of 
2 intelligence,  and  that  from  the  manifold  adjustments 
3  which  are  not  less  manifest,  we  have  a  further  right 
to  clothe  this  intelligence  with  the  characteristics  of 
purpose  and  finality.     All  this  by  no  means  amounts 
to  a  complete  theistic  proof,  nor  would  the  argument, 
in  this  incomplete  form,   satisfy  the  legitimate  de- 
mands of  the  religious  nature.    We  need  to  go  much 
further  and  embrace  much  more  within  the  scope  of 
our  conclusions  before  the  great  problem  of  natural 
theology  is   solved.     But   before   proceeding  to  the 
next  stage  of  the  discussion,  something  is  needed  to 
complete  what  has  been  already  said.    In  the  course 
of  my  remarks,  I  have  repeatedly  referred  to  a  the- 
ory which  is   so   fundamental   and  characteristic  a 
feature  of  modern  thought  that  its  bearing  upon  nat- 
ural theology  requires  to  be  submitted  to  a  somewhat 
more  detailed  examination.     I  refer  to  the  doctrine 
of  evolution. 

In  noticing  the  objections  urged  against  intelli- 
gence and  against  design,  I  have  already  considered 
briefly  some  specific  forms  which  this  theory  has 
assumed,  but   its  prominence  at  the  present  time 


EVOLUTION  AND  FINAL   CAUSE.  169 

makes  it  incumbent  on  us,  before  going  further,  to 
consider  it  as  a  whole.  For  the  doctrine  of  evolu- 
tion may  be  said  to  sum  up  and  comprehend  the 
speculative  movement  of  our  time.  It  is  the  word 
which  science  pronounces  as  a  solution  of  the  riddle 
of  existence,  the  characteristic  form  in  which  the 
thought  of  the  present  age  has  shaped  itself.  As 
formulated  in  its  widest  compass,  by  its  leading  ex- 
ponent, the  unhesitating  claim  is  made  that  it  has 
involved  the  exercise  of  intellectual  gifts  not  less 
supreme  than  those  required  to  demonstrate  the 
law  of  gravitation,  while  for  the  grandeur  of  the  con- 
ception it  involves,  as  well  as  for  the  vastness  of  its 
consequences,  and  the  extent  of  the  revolution  it 
is  destined  to  effect  in  human  thought,  the  work 
achieved  by  Spencer  must  be  regarded,  we  are  told, 
as  fully  on  a  par  with  that  which  has  made  Newton 
immortal.  And,  with  whatever  abatement  of  the 
praise  due  any  single  individual,  the  fact  must  be 
conceded  that  the  doctrine  of  evolution  has,  in  our 
day,  gained  a  rapid  and  widespread  ascendency. 

This  doctrine  must  be  accepted  then  as  the  char- 
acteristic note  of  contemporary  thought,  and  any 
discussion  of  natural  theology  would  be  incomplete 
which  did  not  recognize  its  various,  direct,  and  im- 
portant bearings.  The  doctrine,  considered  in  it- 
self, I  do  not  undertake  to  criticize.  It  would  be 
wholly  foreign  to  the  purposes  of  this  discussion  to 
pass  in  review  the  scientific  grounds  by  which  it 
claims  to  be  established.  It  is  sufficient  that  it  has 
now  a  wide  acceptance,  and  seems  winning  a  wider 
acceptance  every  day.  It  is  enough,  in  illustration 
of  what  the  doctrine  is,  to  refer  to  the  familiar  fact, 
established  by  the  researches  of  physiologists  two 


170  THE    THEISTIC   ARGUMENT. 

centuries  ago,  that  every  animal  without  exception, 
at  the  outset  of  its  existence,  consists,  simply  of  a 
minute,  structureless,  and  homogeneous  germ.  In 
this  primitive  stage,  from  which  we  have  all  alike 
emerged,  the  man,  the  monkey,  the  dog,  the  parrot, 
cannot  be  distinguished  from  one  another.  So  far 
as  the  closest  scrutiny  of  science  has  been  able  to 
push  its  examination,  they  all  begin  their  varied 
careers  at  precisely  the  same  point,  —  and  not  only 
this,  but  every  part  of  each  of  these  germs  is  pre- 
cisely like  every  other  part,  in  texture,  in  composi- 
tion, in  temperature,  and  in  specific  gravity.  Yet  out 
of  this  simple  and  homogeneous  beginning  springs 
all  the  wonderful  variety  that  the  world  of  ani- 
mated nature  shows.  From  this  one  source  comes 
man  with  his  wide  discourse  of  reason,  the  ape 
with  his  grimaces,  the  hound  with  his  keen  scent, 
the  bird  with  his  thick  warbled  note  and  his  brill- 
iant plumage.  And  not  only  is  this  true  of  all  that 
now  exists,  but  it  is  not  less  true  of  all  that  has  for- 
merly existed.  The  idea  is  fruitful,  and  capable  of 
quick  and  wide  extension.  If  the  marvelously 
complicated  and  diverse  structures  which  we  see 
around  us  can  be  evolved,  as  we  see  them  every 
day,  from  such  simple  beginnings,  why  may  not  all 
life,  all  organic  beings,  all  nature,  whether  in  its 
grandest  or  its  humblest  forms,  be  traced  back,  in 
the  same  way,  through  numberless  ages,  to  a  similar 
origin  ?  Derived,  in  the  first  instance,  from  physi- 
ology, the  theory  has  at  last  been  made  to  include 
not  only  the  physical,  but  the  moral  and  the  intel- 
lectual sphere.  Zoology,  geology,  astronomy,  his- 
tory, politics,  morals,  have  all  been  brought  within 
its   sway.      Evolution   is   affirmed   as   the  principle 


EVOLUTION  AND  FINAL   CAUSE.  171 

that  underlies  all  existence,  the  conception  that 
gives  unity  and  cohesion  to  all  manifestations  of 
life  and  force. 

Freed,  as  far  as  possible,  from  mere  technical  and 
abstract  phraseology,  the  principle  of  evolution  may 
be  reduced  to  this  statement  :  that  nothing  in  na- 
ture is  produced  in  a  complete  or  finished  form,  but 
on  the  contrary  everything  commences  in  a  rudi- 
mentary state,  and  by  a  slow  succession,  through 
modifications  slight  in  degree  but  infinite  in  num- 
ber, it  at  last  appears  in  its  final  determinate  form, 
then  again,  by  a  reversing  of  the  process,  to  be  car- 
ried back  again  to  its  original  condition.  These 
changes,  produced  by  forces  inherent  in  matter,  are 
what  make  up  the  endless  rhythm  of  evolution  and 
dissolution,  and  to  this  law  the  appeal  is  made  to 
explain  as  well  the  beginning  as  the  end  of  the  ma- 
terial universe.  Thus  the  great  globes  that  revolve 
in  space  are  compacted  out  of  nebulous  ether,  and 
thus,  having  performed  their  appointed  rounds,  their 
solid  mass  is  resolved  again  into  thin  air.  For  it  is 
claimed  that  the  universe,  both  as  a  whole  and  in 
all  its  parts,  is  subject  to  this  law,  which  explains 
not  only  the  organization  of  matter,  but  the  origin 
and  development  of  life,  and  the  long  succession  of 
organic  species.  Nature  is,  in  fact,  an  endless 
change  from  the  indefinite  to  the  definite,  from  the 
simple  to  the  complex,  from  the  unrelated  like  to 
the  related  unlike.  _ 

To  give  the  form  of  this  theory  with  a  little  more 
precision,  it  may  be  stated  that  the  co-existence  of 
antagonistic  forces,  throughout  the  knowable  uni- 
verse, necessitates  a  universal  rhythm  of  motion  ; 
and  that  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  forces  any- 


172  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

where  concerned  in  producing  a  given  set  of  mo- 
tions, the  resulting  rhythms  are  complex.  Hence, 
as  a  result  of  each  rhythm,  must  occur  a  redistribu- 
tion of  matter  and  motion.  That  redistribution  in- 
volves, on  the  one  hand,  an  integration  of  matter, 
with  a  concomitant  dissipation  of  motion,  and  on 
the  other,  a  disintegration  of  matter,  with  a  con- 
comitant absorption  of  motion.  The  former  pro- 
cess, which  results  in  the  acquirement  of  individual 
existence,  is  termed  evolution,  and  the  latter,  which 
results  in  a  loss  of  individual  existence,  is  termed 
dissolution.  Without  pushing  further  this  abstruse 
analysis  of  the  factors  concerned  in  evolution,  it 
will  be  enough  to  give  the  modern  statement  of  the 
principle,  which  is  that  "  the  integration  of  matter 
and  concomitant  dissipation  of  motion,  which  pri- 
marily constitutes  evolution,  is  attended  with  a  con- 
tinuous change  from  indefinite,  incoherent  homoge- 
neity to  definite  coherent  heterogeneity  of  structure 
and  function,  through  successive  differentiations 
and  integrations." 

Aside  from  this  extremely  abstract  form,  into 
which  it  has  been  cast  by  Mr.  Spencer,  .the  doctrine 
of  evolution  contains  nothing  new.  The  idea  did 
not  originate  with  him,  nor  in  our  own  time,  but  may 
be  certainly  traced  back  as  far  as  Leibnitz.  It  was 
this  great  thinker  who  uttered  the  maxim,  "  the  pres- 
ent is  big  with  the  future,"  and  in  this  maxim  the 
modern  idea  of  evolution  is  virtually  contained.  As 
Leibnitz  advanced  the  theory  it  was  opposed  to  a 
mechanical  conception  of  nature  prevailing  in  his 
day,  but  in  his  mind  it  did  not  stand  in  any  antago- 
nism to  theistic  belief.  It  did  not,  in  the  least,  con- 
tradict the  notion  of  a  first  cause,  nor  was  it  in  the 


EVOLUTION  AND  FINAL    CAUSE.  1 73 

slightest  degree  incompatible  with  the  theory  of  final 
cause.  What  Leibnitz  maintained  strenuously,  in  all 
his  philosophy,  was  that  the  highest  idea  which  we 
can  form  of  a  creator  is  to  suppose  him  creating  a 
world  capable  of  developing  itself  by  its  own  laws, 
without  requiring  a  constant  interference  on  his 
part  to  sustain  and  govern  it.  Nothing  was  further 
from  his  purpose  than  to  weaken  our  conception  of 
a  divine  agency  in  nature.  He  simply  held  that  the 
Almighty  had  implanted,  at  the  beginning,  in  each 
creature  the  law  by  which  its  whole  subsequent  de- 
velopment was  shaped. 

In  this  sense,  the  idea  of  evolution  was  simply 
opposed  to  the  doctrine  of  special  creation,  and  of 
a  constant  divine  interference  to  shape  the  course 
of  the  world.  First  in  our  own  time  has  this  doc- 
trine, based  on  a  wider  induction  and  set  forth 
with  more  scientific  precision,  been  clothed  with  an 
anti-theistic  meaning.  In  virtue  of  this  secret  and 
incessant  and  long  continued  process,  it  is  claimed, 
by.  which  everything  that  exists  is  continually 
changing  its  form,  and  accommodating  itself  to  the 
medium  in  which  it  lives,  the  functions  and  adap- 
tations everywhere  displayed  in  nature  are  suffi- 
ciently accounted  for.  The  explanation  which  the 
race  has  so  long  cherished  is  dismissed  as  a  need- 
less hypothesis,  and  the  endless  rhythm  of  evolu- 
tion and  dissolution  is  put  forward  as  a  satisfying 
explanation,  at  once,  of  the  mystery  and  harmony 
of  things.  This  theory,  it  is  claimed,  meets  better 
than  any  other  the  claims  of  reason.  The  legiti- 
mate demand  of  reason  is  for  unity,  for  there  can 
be  but  one  ultimate  ground  for  what  exists,  and  by 
this  theory  alone  the  whole  universe  is  explained, 


174  THE   THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

as  a  homogeneous  and  coherent  system,  naturally 
evolved  out  of  a  single  primary  substance.  It  is  a 
simple  explanation,  as  it  asks  for  nothing  outside 
itself. 

That  there  is  any  universal  law  of  evolution  or 
dissolution,  and  that  one  is  united  with  the  other  by 
a  mystic  rhythmic  harmony,  such  as  the  followers  of 
Mr.  Spencer  imagine,  is  a  doctrine  which,  it  need 
hardly  be  said,  is  destitute  as  yet  of  any  scientific 
proof ;  but  evolution  in  the  limited  sense  that  na- 
ture presents  to  us  an  infinite  variety  of  movements 
up  and  down,  may  be  accepted  as  an  established 
principle.  No  one  will  deny  it  who  has  ever  sown 
seed  with  the  expectation  that  it  would  spring  up, 
or  has  hatched  chickens  out  of  eggs.  Evolution  in 
this  sense  is  merely  a  process  of  nature,  a  process 
which  implies  constituent  elements  and  conditions, 
and  which  proceeds  in  accordance  with  regular 
method.  It  is  true  that  the  process  may  be  traced 
back  to  a  point  where  the  characteristic  constituent 
elements  cannot  be  discriminated,  where  to  all  ap- 
pearance the  germ  of  the  man,  the  monkey,  and  the 
parrot,  are  just  alike;  but  no  one  doubts  that  even 
here,  though  the  most  minute  scrutiny  of  science 
cannot  detect  it,  a  difference  exists,  and  that  all 
the  later  modifications  of  the  being  produced  are 
simply  the  result  of  this  original  distinction. 

Evolution,  with  whatever  accumulation  of  elaborate 
phraseology  we  may  dress  it  up,  remains  still  an  evo- 
lution out  of  something.  Far  back  as  we  may 
|go,  we  cannot  go  back  so  far  that  we  do  not  encoun- 
ter existence,  in  however  simple  and  homogeneous 
a  form.  (Evolution  is  a  process,  but  a  process  which 
implies  material  to  be  evolved.)   What  this  original 


EVOLUTION  AND  FINAL   CAUSE.  1 75 

material  was  is  mere  matter  of  conjecture,  but  its 
existence  is  a  fact  which  must  be  assumed,  and  for 
which  evolution,  as  a  mere  process,  manifestly  can- 
not account.  So  far  as  the  great  problem  of  the 
beginning  of  things  is  concerned,  we  are  left  by  this 
theory  precisely  where  we  were  before.  We  may 
assume  as  proved  the  nebular  hypothesis,  and  be- 
lieve that  the  sun  and  planets  once  existed  in  space 
as  a  fiery  cloud.  But  the  solar  system  evidently 
could  not  have  been  evolved  out  of  its  nebulous  state 
if  the  nebula  had  not  possessed,  at  the  outset,  a  cer- 
tain mass,  form,  and  constitution ;  in  short,  a  sys- 
tem presenting  to  the  reason  a  problem  demanding 
solution  no  less  than  the  existence  of  the  planets. 
We  have  pushed  the  problem  beck,  but  it  remains 
the  same  problem  still. 

Unless  we  have  recourse  to  the  fanciful  theory  of 
rhythmic  evolution  and  dissolution,  —  the  universe, 
through  eternal  ages,  with  no  directing  intelligence 
enacting  the  strange  drama  of  slowly  forming  itself 
from  chaos  and  developing  into  the  varied  and  per- 
fected forms  of  life  with  which  we  are  familiar,  only 
once  more  to  be  dissolved  into  its  original  elements, 
all  things  without  form  and  void,  as  they  were  in 
the  beginning,  a  hypothesis  not  only  destitute  of  all 
scientific  proof,  but  contradicted  by  all  the  analogies 
of  nature  that  we  see  around  us,  —  we  are  driven  to 
assume  that  this  visible  universe  had  a  beginning  in 
time.  Scientific  reasoning  points  to  this  conclusion  ; 
at  this  point  evolution  began,  and  for  all  that  existed 
up  to  this  point,  evolution  does  not  account.  But 
evidently  evolution,  taken  in  this  sense,  does  not  con- 
flict with  the  idea  of  an  intelligent  cause.  Des- 
cartes, a  devout  believer,  in  his  famous  discourse  on 


176  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT 

method,  clearly  recognizes  the  principle  that  even  if, 
at  the  beginning,  there  existed  nothing  but  chaos, 
still,  if  the  laws  of  nature  were  established,  it  is 
more  easy  to  conceive  of  all  things  coming  in  time 
to  exist  as  they  now  do,  than  to  conceive  of  them  as 
created  by  one  act.1 

Mr.  Spencer  himself  clearly  recognizes  this  when 
he  tells  us  :  "  The  genesis  of  an  atom  is  no  eas- 
i,  ier  to  conceive  than  the  genesis  of  a  planet."  In- 
I  deed,  far  from  rendering  the  universe  less  mysteri- 
ous than  before,  this  theory  makes  a  greater  mystery 
of  it.  Creation  by  fabrication  seems  less  wonderful 
than  creation  by  evolution  ;  a  man  can  bring  a  ma- 
chine together;  he  cannot  make  a  machine  that  de- 
velops itself.  That  our  harmonious  universe  should 
formerly  have  existed  potentially  in  the  state  of  dif- 
fused matter,  without  form,  and  that  it  should  grad- 
ually have  attained  its  present  organization,  is  much 
more  marvelous  than  its  formation  according  to  the 
artificial  method  supposed  by  the  vulgar  would  be. 
Those  who  consider  it  legitimate  to  argue  from  phe- 
nomena to  noumena,  have  good  right  to  maintain 
that  the  nebular  hypothesis  implies  a  primary  cause 
"  as  superior  to  the  mechanical  god  of  Paley  as  that 
is  to  the  fetish  of  the  savage."  So  that,  whatever 
ground  we  may  have  for  believing  in  a  first  cause, 
or  in  an  intelligent  first  cause,  that  ground  is  not 
in  the  slightest  degree  impaired  by  the  doctrine  of 
evolution.  For  evolution  is  only  a  method,  and  leads 
us  inevitably  back  to  our  great  original. 

It  may  be  said  that  in  this  reasoning  we  assume 
that  matter  has  been  created,  whereas  physical  sci- 
ence has  demonstrated  beyond  doubt  that  matter  is 

1  Discours  de  la  Mithode :  Janet,  Final  Causes,  p.  254. 


EVOLUTION  AND  FINAL    CAUSE.  177 

absolutely  incapable  of  increase  or  diminution,  of 
creation  or  of  annihilation.  I  reply  that  physical 
science  has  done,  and  can  do,  no  such  thing.  Phys- 
ical science,  as  understood  and  taught  by  its  ablest 
professors,  does  not  undertake  to  draw  any  such 
conclusions.  Its  inferences  are  bounded  by  experi- 
ence. It  does  not  venture  to  define  what  is  possible 
or  impossible  beyond  the  line  traced  by  its  own  ex- 
periment. All  that  it  affirms  is,  that  matter  cannot 
be  destroyed  by  any  of  the  methods  known  to  man, 
and  that  it  is  not  destroyed  by  any  of  the  processes 
revealed  in  nature.  This  is  simply  affirming  that, 
in  the  physical  system  which  is  known  to  us,  matter 
is  indestructible.  Science  has  a  perfect  right  to  say 
that  matter  has  no  beginning  and  no  end,  for  it 
has  none  in  any  of  the  processes,  and  the  relations, 
that  science  traces  ;  any  inference  beyond  this  is 
purely  unscientific  reasoning.  We  may  conclude, ' 
then,  that  any  theory  of  evolution  which  includes 
as  a  premise  the  doctrine  that  matter  is  eternal,  is 
a  theory  which  science  will  not  recognize. 

And,  if  evolution  cannot  be  explained  from  the 
eternity  of  matter,  as  little  can  it  be  rested  on  mere 
force.  We  are  told  that  force  is  inherent  in  matter  ; 
that  matter  has  an  inherent  activity  ;  that  matter 
and  force  are  inseparable,  and  that  both  have  existed 
from  eternity.  These  are  bold  assertions,  and  in 
striking  contrast  with  the  cautious  words  of  Newton, 
who  wrote  :  "that  gravity  should  be  innate,  inherent, 
and  essential  to  matter,  so  that  one  body  may  act 
upon  another  at  a  distance  through  a  vacuum,  with- 
out the  mediation  of  anything  else,  by  and  through 
which  their  action  and  force  may  be  conveyed  from 
one  to  another,  is  to  me  so  great  an  absurdity,  that 


178  THE    THE  I  STIC  ARGUMENT 

I  believe  no  man,  who  has  in  philosophical  matters 
a  competent  faculty  of  thinking,  can  ever  fall  into 
it."  1  I  know  that  physical  science  has  made  great 
advance  since  Newton's  time,  and  that  the  scientific 
conception  of  matter  to-day  is  very  different  from 
what  it  was  two  centuries  ago  ;  but  the  doctrine  that 
matter  is  endowed  with  potencies  which  make  it 
continually  self-active,  and  go  far  to  identify  it  with 
spirit,  is  a  doctrine  that  cannot  be  claimed  as  a 
demonstrated  result  of  science. 

Yet,  leaving  out  of  the  discussion  as  irrelevant 
the  question  whether  matter  is  eternal  or  created, 
and  granting  that  evolution  does  not  do  away  with 
a  first  cause,  it  may  still  be  objected  that  this  cause 
is  removed  so  far  back  as  to  strip  the  idea  of  any 
practical  effect.  A  first  cause  carried  back  through 
incalculable  epochs  of  time,  and  only  felt  and  recog- 
nized to-day  through  a  process  of  necessary  trans- 
formations, that  imagination  can  no  more  conceive 
than  it  can  conceive  the  limitless  abysses  of  space, 
is  virtually  taken  out  of  the  sphere  of  human 
thought  and  action.  But  this  objection  wholly  mis- 
conceives the  process  of  evolution  as  expressed  in 
the  specific  forms  which  the  theory  has  assumed. 
The  law  of  natural  selection,  for  example,  implies 
not  only  an  original  germ  as  the  starting-point,  but 
a  long  series  of  favorable  conditions.  The  presence 
of  these  external  conditions  is  an  essential  part  of 
the  theory,  and  these  external  conditions  are  not 
fixed  once  for  all,  at  the  beginning,  but  must  con- 
tinually vary  with  the  transformation  of  the  individ- 
ual. For  evolution  can  continue  only  upon  the  con- 
dition of  this  harmony  between  the  individual  and 
its  surroundings  at  every  successive  stage  of  growth. 

1  [Letter  to  Bentley :  Newton,  Opera,  iv.  p.  438.] 


EVOLUTION  AND  FINAL    CAUSE.  179 

Evolution  is  not,  then,  the  blind  working  of  me- 
chanical forces ;  for,  on  that  hypothesis,  we  are  log- 
ically driven  back  to  the  ancient  doctrine,  that  the/ 
universe  had  its  origin  in  the  mere  fortuitous  con-| 
currence  of  atoms.  Its  order,  its  harmony,  its  con- 
stant progress  from  a  lower  to  a  higher  state,  cannot 
be  accounted  for  on  such  a  theory.  We  have  the 
favorable  conditions  as  a  part  of  the  process.  These 
favorable  conditions  are  ever  varying  ;  they  result 
from  intricate  combinations  of  invariable  forces.  We 
have,  in  all  this,  more  than  the  idea  of  intelligent 
cause ;  we  have  an  ever-acting  cause ;  hence  evolu- 
tion, instead  of  pushing  far  back  the  transcendental 
ground  of  being,  reveals  that  ground  as  a  present 
source  of  phenomena  that  surround  us  at  every 
stage  of  our  progress.  Evolution  could  not  go  on 
without  the  constant  action  of  this  ever-present 
cause.  Evolution,  then,  is  simply  a  method  by 
which  the  Supreme  Cause  acts.  In  the  words  of 
the  Duke  of  Argyle,  "  Creation  by  law,  evolution 
by  law,  development  by  law,  or,  as  including  all 
these  kindred  ideas,  the  reign  of  law,  is  nothing  but 
the  reign  of  creative  force  directed  by  creative  knowl- 
edge, worked  under  the  control  of  creative  power, 
and  in  fulfillment  of  creative  purpose."  1 

In  discussing  this  subject  we  must  keep  carefully 
in  mind  the  distinction  between  evolution  as  a  the- 
ory of  the  universe,  a  law  claiming  to  be  universal 
and  all-pervading  as  gravitation,  and  to  account  for 
all  forms  of  organic  and  inorganic  being ;  and  evolu- 
tion in  the  more  limited  and  modest  sense  in  which 
it  is  asserted  by  most  men  of  science,  and  in  which 
it  professes  to  be  based  directly  upon  facts  of  nat- 

1  Reign  of  Law,  p.  294. 


180  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

ure.  In  this  sense,  it  is  to  be  accepted  precisely  like 
other  facts  ;  not  to  be  rashly  set  in  opposition  to 
them,  but  to  be  interpreted  in  accordance  with  them. 
One  class  of  natural  phenomena  illustrates  every 
other  class.  The  sound  conclusions  of  science  must 
be  drawn  from  these  phenomena,  taken  as  a  whole, 
not  from  any  one  exclusive  class  considered  by  itself. 
The  recognition  of  evolution,  as  a  method  of  nature, 
has  unquestionably  worked  already  a  great  modifica- 
tion in  our  conception  of  the  physical  universe,  and 
no  doubt  is  destined  to  work  still  greater  in  the 
future ;  for  a  mechanical  it  has  substituted  a  dy- 
namical conception  ;  it  has  correlated  and  explained 
phenomena  that  seemed  disconnected  and  apart ;  still 
as  a  law  it  has,  as  yet,  received  no  generally  accepted 
statement. 

As  a  method  of  accounting  for  the  origination  of 
living  things,  it  simply  stands  in  opposition  to  the 
doctrine  of  separate  acts  of  creation  by  the  imme- 
diate fiat  of  a  supreme  being.  When  applied  to 
animals,  it  signifies  that  the  various  kinds  are  genet- 
ically connected,  and  that  the  different  species  have 
arisen,  not  from  an  independent  source,  but  by  a 
gradual  process  of  transmutation.  But  among  men 
of  science  who,  in  a  modified  sense,  adopt  the  theory, 
there  are  very  wide  diversities  of  opinion  as  to  the 
extent  to  which  it  may  be  applied  in  explanation  of 
the  various  groups  of  natural  objects.  Many  hold 
to  special  acts  of  creative  agency  at  particular  stages 
of  transition  in  the  long  process,  and  some  would 
regard  the  introduction  of  man  himself  upon  the 
stage  as  one  of  these  acts.  Mr.  Darwin  holds  that 
animal  life,  including  the  human  species,  is  traceable 
to  a  few  primitive  germs.     Others  think  that  evolu- 


EVOLUTION  AND  FINAL    CAUSE.  l8l 

tion  spans  what  seems  at  first  the  wide  chasm  be- 
tween animal  and  vegetable  life,  and  even  between 
vegetable  and  inorganic  existence.  But  that,  in  the 
present  stage  of  science,  much  of  this  is  mere  con- 
jecture is  illustrated  from  Mr.  Huxley's  confident 
prediction  about  the  diffusion  of  protoplasm  at  the 
bottom  of  the  ocean,  which  recent  marine  explora- 
tion has  placed  in  the  realm  of  mare's-nests. 

It  is  obvious,  if  we  consider  the  matter  fairly, 
that  evolution,  in  any  sense  in  which  the  doctrine 
can  lay  claim  to  a  scientific  footing,  relates  to  the 
operation  simply  of  second,  or  what  are  termed  ef- 
ficient causes.  It  undertakes  to  account  for  the  ac- 
tual condition  of  the  world  as  we  see  it  and  know 
it.  It  does  not,  as  a  scientific  theory,  go  a  step 
beyond  this  ;  it  does  not  treat  the  problem  of  the 
ultimate  origin  of  the  world  ;  it  does  not  necessa- 
rily raise  the  question  whether  the  world,  as  we  see 
it,  is  the  result  of  intelligence  ;  it  neither  affirms 
nor  denies  a  divine  agency  in  the  operations  of  na- 
ture. It  is  purely  a  hypothesis  of  natural  science, 
and  as  such  has  nothing  to  do  with  supernatural 
problems.  The  man  of  science  who  applies  him- 
self, in  the  light  of  its  guidance,  to  trace  out  the 
links  of  causal  connection  in  the  phenomena  of  na- 
ture is  following  a  perfectly  legitimate  path.  The 
doctrine  of  natural  selection  is  one  to  be  proved  or 
to  be  disproved  simply  by  appealing  to  facts.  If 
Mr.  Darwin's  conjecture  as  to  the  origin  of  man 
should  be  fully  established  it  would  no  more  conflict 
with  theism  than  the  fact  that  each  living  individ- 
ual has  been  born  and  not  made. 

Conceding,  then,  the  great  importance  in  modern 
science  of  the  theory  of  evolution,  conceding  that 


1 82  THE   THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

it  is  destined  indirectly  to  modify  not  only  scientific 
but  theological  conceptions,  I  deny  that  the  doc- 
trine, in  any  form  in  which  science  accepts  it, 
Vstands  in  the  least  antagonism  with  the  fundamen- 
tal ideas  on  which  all  theistic  belief  rests.  If  there 
'is  anything  in  the  theory  of  evolution  inconsistent 
with  that  belief  it  must  be,  not  in  the  theory  itself, 
but  in  some  hypothesis  made  in  connection  with  it. 
It  can  only  be  made  the  basis  of  materialism  by  be- 
ing brought  into  alliance  with  another  class  of  as- 
sumptions, with  which  it  has  no  necessary  connec- 
tion whatever.  The  eternity  of  matter  and  spon- 
taneous generation  are  no  part  of  the  doctrine  of 
evolution.  Evolution,  I  repeat,  is  a  fact  to  be  ex- 
plained in  the  light  of  other  facts.  One  universal 
characteristic  of  evolution  is  that  it  proceeds  ac- 
cording to  law,  and  is  carried  on  by  means  of  intri- 
cate and  harmonious  adjustments.  This  order,  and 
these  adjustments,  are  just  as  much  facts  as  evolu- 
tion itself,  and  in  seeking  to  explain  the  one,  we  are 
bound  never  to  lose  sight  of  the  other.  Evolution 
does  not  destroy,  but  confirms,  the  proof  of  intelli- 
gent cause. 

If  there  is  nothing  in  evolution  which  contradicts 
the  notion  of  a  first  cause,  we  have  next  to  ask 
whether  evolution  renders  irrational  and  needless 
the  conception  of  final  cause.  It  is  against  the 
theory  of  finality  in  nature  that  evolution  has  been 
most  decidedly  arrayed,  and  some  of  those  who 
have  adopted  this  latest  explanation  of  the  phenom- 
ena of  nature  have  hastened  to  proclaim  that  by  it 
the  mechanical  God  of  Paley  has  been  forever  set 
aside.     Thus,  Mr.  Huxley  says  :  — 

"  In  Paley's  famous  illustration,  the  adaptation  of  all 


EVOLUTION  AND  FINAL   CAUSE.  183 

the  parts  of  the  watch  to  the  function  or  purpose  of 
showing  the  time,  is  held  to  be  evidence  that  the  watch 
was  specially  contrived  to  that  end,  on  the  ground 
that  the  only  cause  we  know  of  competent  to  produce 
such  an  effect  as  a  watch  which  shall  keep  time,  is  a  con- 
triving intelligence,  adapting  the  means  directly  to  that 
end.  Suppose,  however,  that  any  one  had  been  able  to 
show  that  the  watch  had  not  been  made  directly  by  any 
person,  but  that  it  was  the  result  of  the  modification  of 
another  watch  which  kept  time  but  poorly,  and  that  this, 
again,  had  proceeded  from  a  structure  which  could  hardly 
be  called  a  watch  at  all,  seeing  that  it  had  no  figures  on 
the  dial,  and  the  works  were  rudimentary,  and  that  going 
back  and  back  in  time  we  come,  at  last,  to  a  revolving 
barrel  as  the  earliest  traceable  rudiment  of  the  whole 
fabric  ;  and  imagine  that  it  had  been  possible  to  show 
that  all  these  changes  had  resulted  first,  from  a  tendency 
in  the  structure  to  vary  indefinitely,  and  secondly,  from 
something  in  the  surrounding  world  which  helped  all  va- 
riations in  the  direction  of  an  accurate  time-keeper,  and 
checked  all  those  in  other  directions,  —  then  it  is  obvi- 
ous that  the  force  of  Paley's  argument  would  be  gone."1 

On  the  contrary  Dr.  Paley,  had  he  been  alive, 
would  probably  have  replied  to  Professor  Huxley 
that  by  this  ingenious  and  complicated  hypothesis 
his  argument  was  not  weakened  in  the  least.  For 
we  have  now  to  account  for  the  existence  of  a  re-, 
volving  barrel,  capable  of  such  extraordinary  trans-j 
formation,  and  of  that  mysterious  something  in  its) 
surroundings  which  helped  all  its  variations  in  one 
direction  and  checked  them  in  every  other.  We 
are  forced  to  admit  some  primordial  arrangement  in 
accordance  with  which  all  these  transformations 
were  directed,  and  the  greater  the  interval  between 

1  [Lay  Sermons,  pp.  330,  331  (Flint,  Theism,  p.  197).] 


184  THE    THE/STIC  ARGUMENT. 

the  original  barrel  and  the  final  completed  watch  — 
the  greater  the  number  of  connecting  steps  between 
the  first  and  the  last  of  these  two  terms  —  the  more 
convincing  the  evidence  of  the  purpose  which 
worked  itself  out  through  the  entire  process. 

I  Let  us  now  ask,  is  there  anything  in  the  doctrine 
of  evolution  which  renders  irrational  the  theory  of 
a  final  cause  ?  There  is  certainly  nothing  in  human 
experience  which  would  lead  to  such  a  conclusion. 
In  all  the  operations  of  man  the  existence  of  a  final 
cause  harmonizes  with  the  law  of  evolution.  Every 
plan  that  we  form  for  the  future,  every  combination 
that  we  make  for  achieving  some  purpose,  involves 
a  final  cause,  yet  the  execution  is  gradual,  and  in- 
volves many  intermediate  steps.  Thus,  I  form  a 
purpose  to  write  a  course  of  lectures,  but  the  exe- 
cution of  this  purpose  proceeds  by  steps,  and  by  a 
law  of  evolution.  In  all  human  industry  the  whole 
chain  of  successive  steps  is  prepared  and  directed 
to  attain  the  final  end.  True,  in  human  industry, 
we  constantly  interpose,  so  that  we  do  not  have  a 
perfect  illustration  of  evolution  ;  but  it  is  easy  to 
conceive  of  an  operation  directed  by  so  much 
greater  power  and  wisdom  that  only  a  single  initial 
purpose  should  suffice  for  endless  combinations. 
Evolution,  in  its  idea,  then,  not  only  does  not  ex- 
clude final  cause,  but  seems  naturally  to  imply  it. 
For  evolution  is  simply  development,  and  develop- 
ment implies  tendency  towards  an  end.  If  we  ad- 
mit a  tendency  we  thereby  admit  finality. 

The  theory  of  evolution,  instead  of  rendering  the 
notion  of  final  cause  absurd,  leads  to  a  conception  of 
finality  that  is  grander  and  more  impressive.  When, 
for  example,  we  consider  the  marvelous  structure  of 


EVOLUTION  AND  FINAL    CAUSE.  185 

the  eye,  and  realize  that  it  has  been  gradually  pro- 
duced by  organizing  forces  which  have  fashioned  it 
through  the  agency  of  complex  organs  working  har- 
moniously toward  this  one  result,  we  have  a  much 
more  complicated  problem  presented  than  in  the 
case  of  simple  mechanism.  It  explains  nothing  to 
say  that  this  result  has  been  brought  about  by  vir- 
tue of  a  law  inherent  in  the  species,  for  here,  in 
place  of  one  organism,  we  have  countless  similar  or- 
ganisms, and  the  problem  is  only  endlessly  compli- 
cated. If  we  carry  the  process  a  step  backwards, 
and  bring  in  the  more  general  law  of  transforma- 
tion, we  have  only  a  vaster  organism,  moved  and 
guided  from  the  beginning  in  the  same  direction. 
If  we  go  still  further  back  to  the  inherent  laws  of 
matter,  we  have  still  the  question,  would  not  the 
force  which  by  a  single  act  produced  this  whole  at 
the  beginning,  be  superior  to  that  needed  to  fashion 
any  one  of  the  parts  ?  There  is  manifestly  nothing 
in  the  mere  idea  of  evolution  which  cannot  be 
brought  into  harmony  with  the  existence  of  final- 
ity.i 

Next  let  us  ask,  is  there  anything  in  the  doctrine  1 
of  evolution  that  renders  the  hypothesis  of  final  I 
cause  unnecessary?  It  may  be  conceded  that  the 
more  we  allow  to  nature  the  grander  will  be  the 
exhibition  of  intelligence  in  her  operations,  provided 
the  presence  of  intelligence  be  admitted  ;  but  why, 
it  may  be  objected,  need  we  make  this  admission  ? 
If  all  the  phenomena  of  nature  are  thus  bound  to- 
gether in  this  endless  chain  of  evolution,  why  are 
they  not  sufficiently  explained,  and  why  do  we  re- 
quire any  additional  hypothesis  ?  In  short,  is  not 
1  See  Janet,  p.  258. 


1 86  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

the  whole  notion  of  a  final  cause  a  purely  subjective 
hypothesis,  which  the  constant  extension  of  objec- 
tive physical  laws  is  rendering  gratuitous  ?  Does 
not  final  cause  flee  from  us  as  we  recognize  physical 
causation  ? 

But  when  we  affirm  means  and  ends  in  nature,  we 
have  only  in  mind  a  cause  perfectly  proportioned  to 
its  effect.  Where  the  cause  is  not  thus  propor- 
tioned to  the  effect,  there  is  nothing  whatever  that 
leads  us  to  infer  finality.  In  the  case  of  a  phenome- 
non where  the  cause  is  wholly  concealed  from  us, 
we  have  simply  the  emotion  of  wonder  roused,  but  are 
not  led  on  to  the  recognition  of  wisdom.  Hence  it 
is  plain  that  our  conviction  of  final  cause  is  precisely 
proportioned  to  our  recognition  of  efficient  cause. 
If  the  physical  cause,  in  other  words,  was  not  seen 
to  be  sufficient,  it  would  not  be  recognized  as  means, 
and  consequently  would  carry  with  it  no  idea  of  end. 
Thus  it  follows  that  enlarged  knowledge  of  physical 
causes  cannot  render  needless  the  hypothesis  of 
final  cause,  since  one  is  simply  the  completion  of 
the  other.  No  doubt  we  are  led  to  infer  final  causes 
because  we  regard  physical  causes  as  insufficient  to 
account  for  the  whole  phenomenon  ;  but  why  are  we 
led  to  this  ?  Simply  because  of  the  agreement  of 
divergent  and  heterogeneous  causes  in  a  phenom- 
enon which  can  only  result  from  such  agreement. 
The  further  we  ascend  from  cause  to  cause,  the  more 
difficult  does  it  become  to  account  for  the  multi- 
plicity of  these  agreements,  so  that  the  more  we  sim- 
plify causes,  in  a  merely  physical  point  of  view,  the 
more  difficult  is  it,  from  a  physical  cause,  to  account 
for  the  phenomenon  resulting  from  these  agree- 
ments.    The  physical  cause  is  simply  the  possibility 


E I  'OL  UTION  AND  FINAL   CA  USE.  1 8 7 

of  a  given  effect ;  we  have  yet  to  ascertain  what  de- 
termines these  possibilities  to  a  given  result,  and 
what  circumscribes  within  a  certain  limit  their  end- 
less variations.  Far  back  as  we  can  trace  the  pro- 
cess of  evolution,  matter  remains  simple  matter,  and 
force  simple  force.  We  have  not  explained  how, 
from  primitive  chaos,  a  regular  order  has  emerged. 

We  have  looked  at  the  question  only  in  its  gen- 
eral aspects.  If  we  now  glance  at  the  special  forms 
which  the  theory  has  assumed,  we  shall  be  just  as 
much  impressed  with  the  fact  that  the  idea  of  final- 
ity is  by  no  means  set  aside.  The  first  to  assert  the 
now  familiar  doctrine  of  transmutation  was  La- 
marck, who  made  use  of  three  principles  to  explain 
the  organic  adaptations  and  progressive  develop- 
ment of  animals.  These  three  principles  were,  me- 
dium, habit,  and  need.  The  influence  exerted  by 
physical  medium,  or,  in  other  words,  by  the  combi- 
nation of  external  circumstances  surrounding  any 
animal,  is  too  evident  to  be  denied  by  any  one  ;  but 
it  does  not  appear  that  the  organization  is  deter- 
mined by  the  medium,  for  who  would  venture  to 
assert  that  it  is  the  light  that  has  made  the  eye  ? 
The  fundamental  law  in  the  development  of  ani- 
mals is  the  progressive  complication  of  organs.  But 
to  account  for  this,  even  in  Lamarck's  view,  we  must 
suppose  something  more  than  medium  ;  we  must 
recognize  what  he  terms  "a  power  of  life."  Accord- 
ing to  this,  medium  is  only  a  modifying  cause ;  it 
simply  produces  deviations  ;  it  is  only  an  obstacle  to 
the  regular  and  harmonious  development  of  organic 
forms. 

We  have  left  this  need  and  habit ;  the  former  pro- 
duces organs,  while  the  latter  develops  and  strength- 


1 88  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT 

ens  them.  In  the  hypothesis  of  medium  the  modi- 
fying power  is  purely  external ;  we  have  only  such 
transformation  as  is  effected  when  rocks  are  hol- 
lowed out  into  curious  forms  by  the  action  of  swift- 
running  water  ;  but  when  we  allege  need  and  habit  we 
are  evidently  dealing  with  internal  causes.  It  is  no 
longer  the  mere  physical  surroundings,  but  an  internal 
power  cooperating  with  the  external  forces.  There 
is  a  capacity  of  accommodation  to  external  circum- 
stance ;  and  how  shall  we  account  for  this  ?  Is  this 
accommodation  the  result  of  mere  mechanical  causes, 
and  therefore  of  chance  ?  To  affirm  this  is  simply  to 
go  back  to  the  hypothesis  of  Epicurus.  And  grant- 
ing that  habit  can  develop  organs,  does  it  follow  that 
need  can  create  them  ?  The  blacksmith's  arm  is 
made  stronger  by  striking ;  but  did  striking  create 
the  arm  ?  But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  we  reject  as  in- 
sufficient the  explanation  that  this  accommodation  is 
the  result  of  chance,  if  we  allow  that  the  modifica- 
tions of  an  organ  are  the  result  of  some  more  or 
less  conscious  tendency  which  serves  as  a  directing 
principle,  then  we  are  brought  to  recognize  finality 
as  the  very  foundation  of  nature. 

The  insufficiency  of  this  explanation  of  Lamarck 
is  shown  by  the  fact  that  it  has  been  given  up.  Mr. 
Darwin  tells  us  that  he  has  no  great  confidence  in 
such  agents  as  the  French  rationalist  suggests,  and 
he  gives  us  in  place  of  them  his  famous  theory  of 
Natural  Selection.  Granting  that  this  law  is  well 
established,  let  us  ask  how  it  acts.  According  to 
this  hypothesis  the  adaptation  results  from  a  coinci- 
dence between  the  accidental  production  of  an  ad- 
vantage derived  from  heredity,  and  an  accidental 
change  of  medium.     Hence  arise  different  varieties, 


EVOLUTION  AND  FINAL   CAUSE.  189 

well  armed  for  the  struggle  of  life.  Those,  on  the 
other  hand,  which  have  adhered  to  the  original  type, 
having  acquired  no  new  advantage  fitted  to  preserve 
them  in  the  new  conditions  which  have  arisen,  per- 
ish. A  popular,  but  wholly  ill-founded  objection  to 
Mr.  Darwin's  theory  may  here  be  mentioned.  He 
not  only  never  asserted  that  man  was  descended  from 
an  ape,  but  according  to  his  theory  such  an  origin 
for  man  would  be  impossible.  For,  had  man  de- 
scended from  an  ape,  he  would  have  conquered  and 
destroyed  the  ape  in  the  struggle  of  life.  What  Mr. 
Darwin  claims  is,  that  man  and  the  ape  are  both 
divergent  deviations  from  some  original  type  which 
has  long  passed  away. 

Mr.  Darwin's  theory  appeals  for  support  to  the 
results  obtained  in  the  artificial  breeding  of  animals. 
But,  in  making  the  transition  from  artificial  to  nat- 
ural selection,  we  have  to  account  for  the  fact  that 
nature,  working  blindly,  by  mere  coincidence  of  cir- 
cumstances, attains  precisely  the  same  end  that  man 
attains  by  a  premeditated  plan.  In  order  that  nat- 
ural selection  might  obtain  the  same  results  that 
man  obtains,  nature  would  have  to  be  capable  of 
choice.  But  how  can  we  admit  that  an  animal 
which  has  undergone  a  mere  chance  modification, 
should  seek  out  another  individual,  affected  by  pre- 
cisely the  same  modification,  for  the  sake  of  perpet- 
uating itself  ?  And  granting  that,  in  one  instance, 
this  took  place,  can  we  account  for  the  fact  that  it  is 
repeated  for  successive  generations  ?  According  to 
Mr.  Darwin,  nature  practices  an  unconscious  selec- 
tion, and  those  species  most  favored  necessarily  pre- 
vail by  right  of  the  strongest.  Evidently,  however, 
if  the  cause  of  change  is  simply  natural  selection, 


I90  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

there  is  no  reason  why  it  should  not  take  place  while 
the  surrounding  circumstances  remain  unchanged, 
and  species  ought  to  vary  before  our  eyes.  If  hu- 
man industry  creates  new  varieties  with  such  rapid- 
ity, why  should  not  nature  produce  similar  changes  ? 
£>  This  line  of  argument  is  not  directed  against  the 
general  truth  of  the  doctrine  of  natural  selection, 
but  is  only  designed  to  show  that  too  much  is 
claimed  for  it.  The  principle  of  natural  selection, 
even  when  combined  with  the  additional  force  de- 
rived Trom  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  cannot  have  the 
importance  which  Mr.  Darwin  ascribes  to  it.  Con- 
ceding the  utmost  that  can  be  legitimately  claimed, 
it  still  fails  to  explain  the  origin  of  organized  forms. 
Here  some  internal  principle  of  transformation  must 
be  admitted,  and  thus  we  are  brought  directly  face 
to  face,  again,  with  the  idea  of  finality.  Mere  nat- 
ural selection,  when  the  surrounding  circumstances 
remain  the  same,  can  only  in  accidental  cases  be- 
come a  principle  of  modification  and  change.  True, 
it  is  claimed,  that  it  is  where  the  external  conditions, 
for  some  reason,  come  to  be  different,  that  the  law 
of  natural  selection  will  be  found  to  work  most  pow- 
erfully. But  here  we  have  to  encounter  the  grave 
difficulty,  that  animal  structures  are  bound  together 
by  organic  correlations,  and  that,  consequently,  if  a 
chief  organ  from  external  causes  undergoes  an  im- 
portant modification,  all  the  other  essential  organs 
must  be  modified  in  the  same  direction. 

Mr.  Darwin  meets  this  objection  by  admitting 
what  he  terms  a  correlation  of  growth,  that  is,  that 
there  are,  in  animals,  connected  and  sympathetic 
variations  which  occur  at  the  same  time,  and  in  the 
same  manner.    But  if  these  correlations  are,  in  every 


EVOLUTION  AND  FINAL    CAUSE.  191 

instance,  precisely  those  required  to  meet  the  change 
in  the  external  conditions  of  the  animal,  the  question 
at  once  arises,  why  should  organs,  that  can  only  act 
in  harmony,  be  modified  at  the  same  time  and  in  the 
same  way  ?  The  theory  of  mere  fortuitous  modifi- 
cation is  thus  seen  to  present  insuperable  difficulties 
when  applied  to  the  formation  of  organs.  Applied 
to  the  explanation  of  instinct,  the  theory  will  serve 
no  better.  In  short,  the  more  closely  we  study  any 
of  the  various  theories  of  transmutation,  the  greater 
will  the  difficulty  become  of  explaining  the  origin  of 
organic  forms  by  mere  external  and  mechanical 
causes.  And  it  should  be  observed  that  the  ablest 
expounders  of  the  doctrine  of  evolution  habitually 
fall  into  the  use  of  language  which  implies  finality. 
They  speak  of  an  intrinsic  and  innate  property  in 
nature,  "of  a  power  which  harmonizes  each  member 
with  the  whole,  by  adapting  it  to  the  function  it 
must  fulfill  in  the  general  organism."  :  And  what  is 
this  but  final  cause  ? 

The  theory  of  evolution,  as  is  well  known,  has 
been  most  precisely  formulated,  and  has  been  pushed 
to  its  farthest  extreme  by  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer.  By 
him  it  has  been  elevated  to  the  rank  of  a  universal 
principle  which  accounts  for  everything.  All  the 
infinite  multiplicity  of  transformations  which  have 
been  required  to  convert  the  nebulous  mass  of  which 
the  universe  once  consisted  into  its  present  orderly 
arrangement,  and  the  whole  series  of  living  organ- 
isms from  the  lowest  vegetable  form  up  to  the  brain 
of  Shakespeare  or  La  Place,  can  be  explained  from 
the  operation  of  this  ever-acting  and  everywhere 
present  principle.     Yet  Mr.  Spencer  is  emphatic  in 

1  See  Janet,  p.  295. 


I92  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

his  rejection  of  finality.  Even  Lamarck  and  Darwin 
seem,  from  their  language,  at  times,  to  admit  the 
possibility  of  a  plastic  principle  which  gives  form  to 
matter.  But  Mr.  Spencer  systematically  excludes 
this.  With  him  everything  can  be  derived  from 
the  laws  of  force  and  motion.  To  quote  his  own 
words :  — 

"  In  whatever  way  it  is  formulated,  or  by  whatever  lan- 
guage it  is  obscured,  this  ascription  of  organic  evolution 
to  some  aptitude  naturally  possessed  by  organisms,  or 
miraculously  imposed  upon  them,  is  unphilosophical.  It 
is  one  of  those  explanations  which  explain  nothing,  —  a 
shaping  of  ignorance  into  the  semblance  of  knowledge. 
The  cause  assigned  is  not  a  true  cause,  —  not  a  cause 
assimilable  to  known  causes  ;  not  a  cause  that  can  be 
anywhere  shown  to  produce  analogous  effects.  It  is  a 
cause  unrepresentable  in  thought ;  one  of  those  illegiti- 
mate, symbolical  conceptions  which  cannot  by  any  men- 
tal process  be  elaborated  into  a  real  conception.  In 
brief,  this  assumption  of  a  persistent  formative  power,  in- 
herent in  organisms,  and  making  them  unfoldjnto  higher 
forms,  is  an  assumption  no  more  tenable  than  the  as- 
sumption of  special  creations,  of  which,  indeed,  it  is  but 
a  modification,  differing  only  by  the  fusion  of  separate 
unknown  processes  into  a  continuous  unknown  process."  1 

If  we  analyze  the  system  of  Mr.  Spencer,  we  find 
that  the  two  fundamental  principles  by  which  he 
seeks  to  account  for  life  and  organization  are,  inter- 
nal coordination,  and  external  correspondence  with 
the  medium.  Life,  he  says,  is  a  coordination  of  ac- 
tions, imperfect  coordination  is  disease,  and  arrest 
of  coordination  is  death.  Low  organisms  display 
but  little  coordination,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  as 

1  Quoted  by  Janet,  p.  299,  from  Spencer,  Biology,  P.  iii.  ch.  viii. 


EVOLUTION  AND  FINAL   CAUSE.  1 93 

we  rise  in  the  scale  of  life,  we  find  the  extent  and 
the  complexity  of  the  coordinations  constantly  in- 
creasing. 

But  this  is  not  enough  ;  we  must  add  a  second 
principle,  which  is  supplied  in  what  is  termed  the 
correspondence  of  the  medium,  or  the  continued  ad- 
justment of  internal  to  external  relations.  We  have  a 
striking  illustration  of  this  in  the  embryo  where,  from 
beginning  to  end,  there  is  a  gradual  and  continued 
adjustment,  all  the  phases  of  the  organism  corre- 
sponding strictly  to  the  phases  of  the  medium.  Thus 
the  embryos  of  viviparous  animals  are  fed  in  the 
womb  by  direct  communication  with  the  mother ; 
but  at  a  given  moment  this  communication  ceases, 
and  a  complete  separation  between  the  two  beings 
is  effected.  Does  death  ensue  in  consequence  ?  By 
no  means.  The  new-born  creature  is  adjusted  to  a 
new  medium.  But,  is  it  not  evident  that  such  new 
adjustment  is  only  rendered  possible  from  the  fact 
that  it  has  been  anticipated  and  prepared  for  ?  >  and 
how  can  such  preparation  be  explained  from  the 
blind  working  of  mere  mechanical  forces  ?  So  that, 
granting  the  proposition  that  coordination  and  cor- 
respondence are  the  two  constituent  principles  of 
life,  what  do  we  find  after  all  to  be  involved  in  these 
two  principles  or  aptitudes  but  the  essential  and 
characteristic  marks  of  that  fundamental  law  which 
we  term  finality  ? 

Mr.  Spencer  seeks  to  establish  two  propositions 
as  representing  in  the  most  general  form  the  tenden- 
cies of  all  the  changes  in  the  universe.  These  are, 
first,  that  nature  tends  to  proceed  from  the  homo- 
geneous to  the  heterogeneous  ;  and,  secondly,  that  it 
tends  to  proceed  from  the  indefinite  to  the  definite. 


194  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

Without  discussing  the  grounds  on  which  these  prin- 
ciples are  made  to  rest,  we  need  only  ask,  in  this  con- 
nection, what  do  they  amount  to  ?  The  sole  ques- 
tion at  issue  is,  whether  blind  mechanical  forces  are 
adequate  to  explain  what  we  see  everywhere  around 
us.  The  mere  abstract  statement  of  the  law  by 
which  these  changes  proceed  does  not,  in  the  least, 
solve  this  problem.  State  the  question  as  we  please, 
we  are,  at  last,  shut  up  to  the  alternative  that  or- 
ganic forces  are  either  the  result  of  fortuitous  com- 
binations, or  are  the  product  of  intelligence.  The 
theory  of  evolution  means,  therefore,  nothing  more 
than  the  doctrine  that  organic  beings  have  risen  by 
degrees  from  less  to  more  perfect  forms,  a  doctrine 
that  contains  nothing  whatever  opposed  to  the  the- 
ory of  final  causes,  or  else  it  must  be  reduced  to  a 
new  statement  of  the  old  doctrine  of  chance,  a  doc- 
trine which  the  intelligence  of  mankind  rejects  as  a 
childish  explanation  of  the  origin  of  the  universe. 

That  the  theory  of  evolution  is  radically  opposed 
to  the  doctrine  of  final  cause,  and  that  as  it  is  ex- 
tended it  tends  more  and  more  to  push  final  causes 
out  of  sight,  has  been  loudly  asserted  by  some  of 
the  disciples  of  Mr.  Spencer.  It  is  claimed  that 
the  whole  conception  of  final  causes  rests  on  the  as- 
sumption that  the  Deity  entertains  intentions  and 
purposes  closely  resembling  the  intentions  and  pur- 
poses of  men,  and  that  hence,  although  it  involves  a 
more  refined  conception  than  the  mediaeval  notion 
of  an  arbitrary  providence,  it  still  retains  a  strong 
element  of  anthropomorphism.  "  The  career  of  the 
theory,  it  is  said,  has  consequently  been  that  of  a 
perishable  hypothesis,  born  of  primeval  habits  of 
thought,  rather  than  that  of  a  permanent  doctrine 


EVOLUTION  AND  FINAL   CAUSE.  195 

obtained  by  the  employment  of  scientific  methods." 
"  Hence,  with  the  steady  advance  of  knowledge  the 
search  for  final  causes  has  been  discarded  in  the 
simpler  sciences,  until  it  is  kept  up  only  in  the  com- 
plex and  difficult  branches  of  biology  and  sociol- 
ogy." J  From  these  remaining  strongholds  it  has 
now  almost  been  driven  by  recent  discoveries,  and 
the  prospect  now  is  that  with  every  advance  of 
science  this  anthropomorphic  conception  will  be 
robbed  of  some  part  of  its  jurisdiction. 

It  was  Mr.  Darwin,  it  is  claimed,  who  first,  by  his 
theory  of  natural  selection,  furnished  the  champions 
of  science  with  the  resistless  weapon  by  which  to 
vanquish,  in  their  chief  stronghold,  the  champions  of 
theology.  For,  in  natural  selection,  there  has  been 
assigned  an  adequate  cause  for  the  marvelous  phe- 
nomena of  adaptation,  which  had  formerly  been  re- 
garded as  clear  proofs  of  beneficent  contrivance. 
"  And  we  have  only  to  take  into  account  the  other 
agencies  in  organic  evolution,  besides  the  one  illus- 
trated by  Mr.  Darwin,  to  remember  that  life  is  essen- 
tially a  process  of  equilibration,  in  order  to  be  con- 
vinced that  the  doctrine  of  evolution  has,  once  for 
all,  deprived  natural  theology  of  the  materials  upon 
which  until  lately  it  has  subsisted."  The  apparent 
indications  of  creative  forethought  are,  in  fact,  so 
many  illustrations  of  the  scientific  theorem  that 
life,  whether  physical  or  psychical,  is  the  continuous 
adjustment  of  inner  relations  to  outer  relations.  In 
other  words,  it  is  not  that  the  environment  has  been 
adapted  to  the  organism  by  an  exercise  of  creative 
intelligence,  but  the  organism  is  of  necessity  fitted 
to  the  environment  only  because  the  fittest  survive. 

1  Fiske,  Cosmic  Philosophy,  vol.  ii.,  p.  385. 


I96  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT 

The  so-called  proofs  of  creative  foresight  are,  there- 
fore, the  mind  reflecting  itself. 

If  I  have  not  wholly  failed  of  my  aim  in  the  pre- 
ceding discussion,  I  have  already  sufficiently  shown 
the  utter  groundlessness  of  these  loud  assertions. 
I  have  shown  that  evolution  is  perfectly  consistent 
with  the  idea  of  final  cause ;  that  it  does  not  render 
the  hypothesis  of  final  cause  superfluous ;  and  the 
extension  of  our  knowledge  of  physical  causation,  in- 
stead of  putting  final  causes  out  of  sight,  only  adds 
to  the  evidence  in  their  favor.  Evolution,  how  far 
soever  we  may  extend  it,  can  neither  account  for 
the  origin  of  the  universe  as  a  whole,  nor  for  the 
order  and  adjustment  of  its  parts.  An  element  en- 
ters into  the  problem  for  which  the  mind  demands 
another  and  a  more  satisfactory  solution  than  mere 
physical  causation  can  furnish.  To  affirm  that  life 
is  the  continuous  adjustment  of  inner  relations  to 
outer  relations,  is  to  affirm  nothing  to  the  point, 
since  the  adjustment  is  the  very  fact  for  which  we 
are  seeking  to  account.  And  in  accounting  for  this, 
as  I  have  before  said,  carry  our  investigation  into 
physical  causes  as  far  back  as  we  may,  we  are  at 
last  shut  up  to  the  two  alternatives  with  which  we 

j  began,  that  the  universe  had  its  origin  in  mind  or  in 

(chance. 

And  not  only  is  it  an  altogether  hasty  and  unwar- 
ranted assertion  that  the  theory  of  natural  selection 
has  driven  the  doctrine  of  final  causes  off  the  field, 
but  when  we  call  to  mind  the  fact  that,  so  far  as 
has  yet  been  observed,  natural  selection  never  has 
its   cause   in    mere  external   influences,  and   never 

\  occurs  at  random,  we  have  every  reason  to  believe 

\  that  the  law  of  natural  selection,  when  it  comes  to 


EVOLUTION  AND  FINAL   CAUSE.  1 97 

be  more  perfectly  understood,  will  become  one  of 
the  strongest  supports  of  the  argument  of  design. 
The  vast  array  of  facts  which  Mr.  Darwin  has  accu- 
mulated with  such  untiring  industry,  and  such  un- 
rivaled penetration,  all  point  in  this  direction  ;  and 
it  is  by  no  means  impossible  that  from  his  well  fur- 
nished armory  will  be  drawn  the  most  effective 
weapons  in  defense  of  the  doctrine  to  which  he  has 
been  so  unwarrantably  opposed.  There  is  an  evi- 
dent chasm  in  his  theory  which  has  never  yet  been 
filled  ;  his  hypothesis  requires  another  hypothesis  to 
make  it  work.  For  not  only  is  natural  selection 
perfectly  in  harmony  with  design,  but  it  absolutely 
requires  the  recognition  of  design  to  render  it  a 
complete  and  rational  hypothesis. 

In  the  preceding  discussion,  however,  it  has  not 
been  my  purpose  to  press  evolution  into  the  service 
of  natural  theology,  but  simply  to  establish  the  neg- 
ative' proposition  that  it  does  not  conflict  with  any 
of  the  grounds  which  have  been  advanced  for  be- 
lieving in  a  first  cause  and  in  final  causes.  What- 
ever positive  religious  value  the  theory  of  evolution 
may  prove  to  have  remains  to  be  seen.  It  is  still  a 
hypothesis,  and  if  undeniably  winning  its  way  to  the 
acceptance  of  scientific  men,  must  still  be  regarded 
as  incomplete.  For  the  present,  it  is  enough  to 
show  that  there  is  nothing  in  it  that  is  opposed  to 
Theism.  To  put  in  few  words  the  substance  of 
what  I  have  endeavored  to  show,  evolution  is  simply 
a  scientific  interpretation  of  the  facts  of  nature.  It 
is  to  be  proved  or  disproved  by  an  appeal  to  facts, 
and,  in  this  respect,  rests  on  precisely  the  same 
basis  as  the  argument  of  design.  As  a  scientific 
interpretation  of  nature  it  deals  only  with  physical 


I98  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

or  second  causes,  and  instead  of  being  reproached 
for  not  going  beyond  this  limit,  it  would  sacrifice 
its  claim  to  be  accepted  as  a  scientific  theory  if  it 
undertook  to  deal  with  anything  beyond.  Confined 
to  its  legitimate  field,  it  does  not  touch  one  of  the 
problems  with  which  natural  theology  deals. 

As  a  theory  simply  to  account  for  natural  phe- 
nomena, evolution  may  be  likened  to  gravitation. 
Before  Newton's  law  of  gravitation  was  understood 
it  was  met  with  theological  objections.  To  some 
devout  men  it  seemed  to  substitute  the  action  of  a 
physical  force  for  the  direct  action  of  Deity.  It 
removed  God  from  the  world  by  the  hypothesis  of 
constant  and  omnipresent  law.  But  no  one  would 
now  for  a  moment  claim  that  a  universe  governed 
by  laws  was  a  universe  without  God  :  on  the  con- 
trary, the  presence  and  uniform  operation  of  law  is 
one  of  the  strongest  proofs  of  the  divine  existence 
to  which  natural  theology  makes  her  appeal.  In 
the  same  way,  to  some,  evolution  seemed,  at  first 
sight,  inextricably  bound  up  with  atheism.  To  ex- 
plain the  complex  from  the  simpler  forms  of  being 
wore,  at  first  sight,  the  aspect  of  a  materialistic  hy- 
pothesis. But  a  little  consideration  must  convince 
any  candid  mind  that  while  evolution  pushes  the 
first  cause  a  little  further  back,  it  does  not  lessen,  in 
the  least,  the  intellectual  necessity  which  forces  the 
conception  of  a  first  cause  upon  the  mind.  And,  in 
furnishing  us  with  a  hypothesis  of  the  method  of 
creation,  it  does  not  in  the  least  account  for  the 
method  as  an  actual  fact. 

Some  justification,  it  should  in  fairness  be  added, 
for  this  misapprehension  of  the  real  meaning  of  evo- 
lution on  the  part  of  those  who  would  jealously  main- 


EVOLUTION  AND  FINAL   CAUSE.  1 99 

tain  the  fundamental  truths  cf  theism,  may  be  found 
in  the  fact  that  by  a  certain  class  of  writers  the  con- 
clusions of  Mr.  Darwin  have  been  loudly  asserted  in 
the  interest  of  atheism  and  materialism.  To  these 
extreme  advocates  of  evolution  the  theistic  concep- 
tion has  not  only  seemed  modified  by  it,  but  has 
been  stripped  of  all  rational  ground  of  support,  and 
the  operations  of  nature,  whether  in  the  physical 
or  intellectual  spheres,-  are  sufficiently  explained  in 
the  terms  of  matter  and  motion.  In  this  view,  God 
is  a  figment  of  the  imagination,  and  matter  in  mo- 
tion the  only  real  existence.  With  this  distortion 
of  the  doctrine  of  evolution  I  am  not  here  dealing. 
Those  who  draw  such  conclusions  from  it  are  no 
longer  arguing  as  men  of  science.  To  hold  that 
Mr.  Darwin's  theory,  that  a  certain  aggregate  of 
phenomena  now  existing  has  had  for  its  antecedent 
a  certain  other  and  different  aggregate  of  phenom- 
ena, affects  in  any  way  the  proof  of  the  existence  of 
a  Supreme  Being,  is  an  absurd  misconception  that 
deserves  notice  here  only  to  show  that  folly  is  by 


no  means  con 


fined  to  theologians. 


&' 


"Darwinism,"  to  quote  the  words  of  a  recent  writer 
who  has  stated  this  question  with  much  fairness,  "  may 
convince  us  that  the  existence  of  highly  complicated  or- 
ganisms is  the  result  of  an  infinitely  diversified  aggregate 
of  circumstances  so  minute  as  severally  to  seem  trivial  or 
accidental ;  yet  the  consistent  theist  will  always  occupy 
an  impregnable  position  in  maintaining  that  the  entire 
series,  in  each  and  every  one  of  its  incidents,  is  an  imme- 
diate manifestation  of  the  creative  action  of  God. 

"  The  business  of  science  is  simply  to  ascertain  in  what 
manner  phenomena  coexist  with  each  other,  or  follow 
each  other ;  and  the  only  kind  of  explanation  with  which 


200  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT 

it  can  properly  deal  is  that  which  refers  one  set  of  phe- 
nomena to  another  set.  In  pursuing  this,  its  legitimate 
business,  science  does  not  trench  on  the  province  of  the- 
ology in  any  way,  and  there  is  no  conceivable  occasion 
for  any  conflict  between  the  two.  In  short,  no  matter 
how  far  the  scientific  interpretation  of  nature  may  be  car- 
ried, it  can  reveal  to  us  only  the  fact  that  the  workings  of 
the  ultimate  existence  of  which  nature  is  the  phenomenal 
expression,  are  different  from  what  they  were  supposed 
to  be  by  uninstructed  thinkers  of  former  times."  1 

1  Fiske,  Darwinism,  pp.  7,  54. 


LECTURE   VII. 

IMMANENT    FINALITY. 

From  the  order  everywhere  displayed  in  nature 
we  have  been  forced  to  recognize  Intelligence,  and 
this  conviction  has  been  further  strengthened  by  the 
manifest  adjustment  of  means  to  ends,  from  which 
we  infer  design.  We  have  also  seen  that  the  theory 
of  evolution,  instead  of  detracting  from  the  force  of 
this  argument,  really  supplies  it  with  a  more  com- 
plex and  elaborate  basis.  But  having  established 
this,  we  now  come  in  contact  with  a  different  ques- 
tion, a  question  which  we  can  only  answer  by  turn- 
ing our  investigation  from  the  outer  to  the  inner 
world.  The  problem  is  this.  Admitting  that  we 
have,  in  the  order  of  nature,  the  evidence  of  intelli- 
gence, and  that  we  have,  in  its  manifold  arrange- 
ments and  adaptations,  the  proof  of  design,  still  what 
is  there  that  compels  us  to  believe  that  this  intel-J 
ligence  is  anything  distinct  from  nature  herself  ?/ 
What  authorizes  us  to  argue  from  the  fact  of  finality 
to  the  cause  of  finality  ?  Because  nature  has  ends, 
are  we,  therefore,  justified  in  concluding  that  there 
is  an  intelligent  cause  distinct  from  nature  which  has 
consciously  coordinated  its  several  parts  with  refer- 
ence to  a  final  purpose  ? 

This  brings  us  directly  face  to  face  with  the  most 
subtle  objection  with  which  Theism  has  to  deal. 
The  doctrine  of  evolution,  perfectly  consistent  with 


202  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT 

Theism  when  considered  as  a  mere  hypothesis  of 
the  method  of  creation,  totally  changes  its  aspect 
when  we  regard  nature  as  a  great  living  force,  realiz- 
ing itself  by  its  own  inherent  energy,  and  in  accord- 
ance with  its  own  laws.  Now  evolution  is  no  longer 
a  mere  method  which  a  Supreme  Intelligence  has 
chosen,  for  the  sake  of  carrying  out  its  own  pur- 
poses, but  becomes  a  process  through  which  nature 
passes,  by  an  inner  necessity,  and  without  the  direc- 
tion of  any  superintending  mind.  Those  who  hold 
this  view  admit  intelligence,  but  not  an  intelligence 
distinct  from,  only  an  intelligence  identical  with,  na- 
ture. They  admit  the  fact  of  adjustment  of  means 
to  ends,  but  it  is  not  an  adjustment  planned  and 
arranged  by  a  power  in  whose  hands  the  forces  of 
nature  were  mere  plastic  agencies,  but  an  adjust- 
ment resulting  from  the  presence  in  nature  of  a  uni- 
versal energy,  working  without  any  conscious  volition 
towards  harmonious  and  rational  results. 

This  mode  of  looking  at  nature  has  possessed,  in 
all  ages,  a  singular  charm.  We  trace  its  presence 
in  the  most  widely  separated  regions,  and  with  races 
whose  moral  and  intellectual  characteristics  seem  to 
stand  in  the  sharpest  contrast.  It  has  had  a  wide 
foothold  among  the  dreamy  nations  of  the  East ;  it 
swayed  with  almost  unsuspected  presence  the  posi- 
tive religious  faith  of  the  Middle  Ages ;  it  has  cu- 
riously interwoven  itself  with  the  philosophy,  the 
poetry,  the  science  of  modern  times.  It  has  been 
understood  in  the  widest  variety  of  senses,  and  has 
been  made  to  include  the  loftiest  as  well  as  most 
groveling  forms  of  speculative  opinion.  The  gross- 
est schools  of  modern  materialism  have  sheltered 
themselves  beneath  its  name,  and  by  some  of  the 


IMMANENT  FINALITY.  203 

warmest  defenders  of  Christian  truth  it  has  been 
identified  with  the  teachings  of  the  most  spiritual  of 
the  apostles.  It  is  a  remarkable  fact,  that  the  gos- 
pel, which  sternly  opposed  every  form  of  ancient  ma- 
terialism, seems  to  have  given  a  new  impulse  to  this 
method  of  interpreting  the  external  universe.  The 
early  church  abounded  with  schools  whose  specula- 
tion was  colored  by  this  subtle  belief. 

Any  precise  definition  of  a  doctrine  held  in  so 
many  forms  it  would  be  difficult  to  give.  In  general, 
this  mode  of  explaining  the  existence  of  the  universe 
may  be  stated  as  the  theory  "  which  regards  all 
finite  things  as  merely  aspects,  modifications,  or 
parts  of  one  eternal  and  self-existent  being  ;  which 
views  all  material  objects,  and  all  particular  minds, 
as  necessarily  derived  from  a  single  infinite  sub- 
stance. This  one  absolute  substance,  this  one  all- 
comprehensive  being,  it  calls  God.  Thus  God,  ac- 
cording to  it,  is  all  that  is,  and  nothing  is  which  is 
not  essentially  included  in,  or  which  has  not  been 
necessarily  evolved  out  of  God."  1 

This  theory  is  the  opposite  of  theism.  While  the- 
ism views  the  Supreme  Being  as  existing  alone  and 
apart  from  the  world,  this,  on  the  contrary,  denies 
that  God  and  nature  either  do  or  can  exist  apart.  It 
regards  God  without  nature,  as  a  cause  without  effect, 
or  as  a  substance  without  qualities,  and  nature  with- 
out God,  as  an  effect  without  a  cause,  or  as  qualities 
without  a  substance.  God  and  nature  are  conceived 
as  eternally  and  necessarily  coexistent,  the  contrasted 
phases  of  an  indissoluble  unity,  the  inner  and  the 
outer  sides  of  the  same  eternal  whole.2 

1  Prof.  R.  Flint,  Anti-Theistic  Theories,  p.  336. 

2  Anti-Theistic  Theories,  p.  339. 


204  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

This  doctrine  has  been  rendered  familiar  to  us  by 
our  enlarged  knowledge  of  the  religions  and  philos- 
ophy of  the  East.  While  it  is  an  error  to  regard 
India  as  the  fountain-head  of  this  wide-spread  ten- 
dency, we  find  it  nowhere  so  deeply  rooted.  The 
rich  literature  of  this  mysterious  land  furnishes  us 
with  the  most  striking  illustrations  of  it.  In  the 
Indian  religion  Brahma  was  conceived  as  the  uni- 
versal life  in  which  the  world  is  absorbed,  and  from 
which  it  issues.  All  subsequent  Hindoo  specula- 
tion evolved  this  idea.  Thus,  in  the  later  Vedanta 
philosophy,  the  central  doctrine  is  that  there  is  only 
one  real  being,  of  which  all  material  things  and 
finite  minds  are  simple  emanations.  Whoever 
knows  Brahma  becomes  Brahma.  But  it  is  not  only 
on  the  banks  of  the  Ganges  that  we  find  these  theo- 
ries prevailing.  All  the  pre-Socratic  schools  of  Greek 
philosophy,  with  one  exception,  that  of  Democritus, 
were  more  or  less  inclined  to  the  same  opinion.  Par- 
menides,  with  his  doctrine  of  absolute  being,  can 
hardly  be  distinguished  from  the  Hindoo  thinkers. 
And  even  Heraclitus,  asserting  a  different  doctrine, 
that  the  universe  is  merely  a  process  of  incessant 
change,  arrived  at  the  same  result. 

In  modern  times  the  head  and  front  of  this  an- 
cient theory  has  been  Benedict  Spinoza,  who  in  his 
"Ethics"  summed  up, from  a  great  variety  of  sources, 
and  elaborated  with  unrivaled  precision,  the  doctrine 
which  from  his  hands  may  be  said  to  have  received 
its  final  form.  Assuming  that  philosophy  was  a 
purely  deductive  science,  its  truths  needing  only  to 
be  analyzed  and  demonstrated  like  the  propositions 
of  geometry,  Spinoza  identified  the  order  of  knowl- 
edge with  the  order  of  existence.     Beginning  with 


IMMANENT  FINALITY.  205 

a  definition  of  God  as  the  first  and  self-existent  be- 
ing, he  next  proceeded  to  prove  the  identity  of  the 
two  ideas  of  God  and  of  substance  ;  and  from  this 
his  whole  system  flowed.  God  is  conceived  as  think- 
ing substance  when  apprehended  by  the  mind  under 
the  attribute  of  thought,  and  as  extended  substance 
when  conceived  under  the  attribute  of  extension  ; 
but  thinking  substance  and  extended  substance  are 
not  two  substances  distinct  from  one  another ;  but 
the  one  substance  apprehended  by  the  mind  of  man, 
now  under  this  attribute  and  now  under  that.  The 
universe,  including  not  alone  sun  and  stars  and 
earth,  but  all  human  intelligence,  all  human  experi- 
ence, all  human  history,  are  but  modes  of  the  abso- 
lute, man's  soul  a  divine  thought,  his  body  a  divine 
extension. 

In  the  Ions:  line  of  seekers  after  truth,  who  have 
set  themselves  resolutely  and  patiently  to  solve  the 
great  enigmas  of  life,  there  is  no  one  to  whom  we 
turn  with  more  sincere  respect  and  with  deeper  in- 
terest, than  to  the  Jew  Spinoza.  It  is  a  strange  cir- 
cumstance, that  the  race,  distinguished  above  all 
others  for  its  stern  and  uncompromising  theism, 
should  have  produced  the  founder  of  modern  pan- 
theism. The  scanty  record  preserved  of  his  humble 
career  presents  his  private  character  in  the  most 
admirable  and  winning  light.  The  only  account  we 
have  of  him  we  owe  to  a  clergyman  who  distorted 
his  theories,  but  who  could  detect  no  flaw  in  his 
blameless  character.  Driven  in  wrath  from  the  re- 
ligious communion  in  which  he  was  born  and  edu- 
cated, disinherited,  left  when  still  a  mere  boy  in  pen- 
ury to  seek  his  livelihood,  he  sought,  in  his  own  lan- 
guage, to  substitute  certainty  for  conjecture,  and  by 


206  THE    THE  I  STIC  ARGUMENT. 

placing  himself  in  contact  with  the  bare  facts  of  life, 
to  find  where  the  real  good  of  man  actually  lay.  He 
refused  pensions,  legacies,  and  calls  to  honorable 
positions,  which  might  in  the  least  lessen  his  per- 
sonal independence.  He  chose  to  earn  a  scanty 
subsistence  by  grinding  glasses  for  optical  instru- 
ments, rather  than  have  anything  interfere  with  his 
honest  quest  for  truth. 

No  great  thinker  has  been  more  variously  esti- 
mated.    Denounced  on  the  one  hand  as  an  atheist, 
and  as  a  teacher  of  doctrines  subversive  of  all  mo- 
rality, on  the  other  hand  he  has  been  eulogized  as  a 
Christian,  and  represented    as  a  "  god-intoxicated " 
man.     The  most   severe  and  methodical  of  reason- 
ers,  clothing  his  thoughts  in  words  as  precise  as  the 
language  of  geometry,  has  been  identified  with  tran- 
scendental   mystics.     But  with  whatever  difference 
of  opinion  respecting  his  views,  there  is  no  question 
as  to  the  deep  mark  he  has  cut  in  modern  thought. 
Not  so  much  his  precise  method  and  his  specific  con- 
clusions, as  his  general  habit  of  thinking,  has  given 
him  his  enduring  influence.     Few  but  professed  stu- 
dents now  open  his  "  Ethics  "  ;  but  the  underlying 
spirit  which  pervades  his  ethics  has  worked  itself 
widely  into  the  modern  mind.     It  appeared  in  the 
pantheistic  philosophy  of  Hegel  and  Schelling,  and 
in  the  pantheistic  Christianity  of  Herder  and  Schlei- 
ermacher.    It  possessed  an  irresistible  fascination -for 
the  penetrating  intellect  of  Goethe.     In  an  anecdote 
which  has  been  preserved,  relating  to  his  very  last 
days,  we  have  a  striking  illustration  of  the  keen  in- 
terest with  which  the  great  poet  watched  the  devel- 
opment of  these  new  theories  of  nature.  . -r- 

To  this  mode  of  viewing  the  external  universe 


IMMANENT  FINALITY.  207 

may  be  traced  some  of  the  most  remarkable  scien- 
tific conceptions  of  modern  times.  From  Schelling's 
doctrine  of  nature,  a  doctrine  set  forth  in  lofty  and 
eloquent  language,  and  illustrated  from  a  wide  range 
of  scientific  knowledge,  came  the  now  familiar  the- 
ories of  vegetable  morphology,  the  homologies  of  the 
skeleton,  and  even  the  later  hypothesis  of  the  origin 
of  species.  This  new  philosophy  was  a  protest 
against  the  lower  materialism  of  the  last  century, 
and  received  an  impulse  from  the  powerful  reaction 
against  the  ideas  of  the  eighteenth  century  which 
the  nineteenth  has  shown  in  so  many  ways.  Nature, 
was  now  looked  upon,  no  longer  as  apart  from  God, 
but  as  the  agent  and  manifestation  of  the  absolute. 
It  was  viewed  as  one  organic  whole,  independent 
and  self-sustained,  a  system  of  forces  and  agencies 
acting  upon  and  limiting  each  other,  yet  all  derived 
from  one  original  source  and  all  working  by  one 
universal  law.  The  individual  was  simply  a  momen- 
tary bubble  floating  along  on  this  everlasting  flood. 
The  rapid  progress  of  the  physical  sciences  helped 
the  tendency  ;  for  there  was  a  fascination  in  thus 
giving  variety  to  physical  facts  by  speculative  ideas, 
and  binding  the  mysterious  phenomena  of  nature 
into  a  living  organism. 

But,  after  all,  the  subtle  influence  of  this  theory 
was  made  effective  less  as  a  clearly  conceived  sci- 
entific system,  than  as  a  mode  of  looking  at  things. 
What  made  it  popular  was  its  appeal  to  that  poetic 
instinct  which  exists  to  a  greater  or  less  extent  in 
all  of  us.  .We  have  it  nowhere  more  adequately 
embodied  than  in  the  familiar  lines  of  Wordsworth  : 

"  I  have  felt 
A  sense  sublime 


208  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

Of  something  far  more  deeply  interfused, 
Whose  dwelling  is  the  light  of  setting  suns, 
And  the  round  ocean,  and  the  living  air, 
And  the  blue  sky,  and  in  the  mind  of  man ; 
A  motion  and  a  spirit  that  impels 
All  thinking  things,  all  objects  of  all  thought, 
And  rolls  through  all  things.     Therefore  am  I  still 
A  lover  of  the  meadows  and  the  woods 
And  mountains,  and  of  all  that  we  behold 
From  this  green  earth  ;  of  all  the  mighty  world 
Of  ear  and  eye,  both  what  they  half  create 
And  what  perceive  ;  well  pleased  to  recognize 
In  nature,  and  the  language  of  the  sense, 
-  The  anchor  of  my  purest  thoughts,  .  .  .  and  soul 
Of  all  my  moral  being."  * 

In  this  passage  we  have  the  key-note  of  a  large 
part  of  our  modern  speculative  natural  science. 

Starting  with  this  conception,  all  that  we  have 
claimed  as  evidence  of  mind,  and  even  of  finality, 
in  nature  is  readily  conceded,  but  it  is  argued  that 
this  mind  is  in  nature,  and  not  above  it  or  distinct 
from  it.  That  there  is  everywhere  in  the  external 
universe  proof  of  intelligence  is  not  for  a  moment 
doubted,  but  the  question  is  asked,  Why  should 
this  intelligence  be  conceived  of  as  apart  from  na- 
ture ;  why  should  we  be  constrained  to  go  out  of 
nature  to  account  for  its  origin  ?  The  ordinary  ar- 
gument of  design,  it  is  claimed,  proceeds  upon  a 
superficial  analogy.  There  are,  it  is  true,  certain 
products  of  nature  which  at  first  glance  seem  to  re- 
semble the  works  of  man,  but  this  resemblance  is 
only  in  appearance.  The  works  of  man  are  prod- 
ucts of  an  intelligence  distinct  and  apart  ;  the 
pieces  of  a  machine,  for  example,  are  strangers  to 
each  other,  and  the  unity  and  motion  that  they 
possess  are  impressed   upon  them   from    without  ; 

1  [Lines  on  Tiiitem  Abbey.] 


IMMANENT  FINALITY.  209 

but  in  the  products  of  nature  the  force  is  internal, 
and  the  end  realizes  itself.  Organized  structures, 
such  as  we  are  and  see  around  us,  are  not  mere 
machines,  but  are  always  endowed  with  an  inner 
energy,  and  possess  a  formative  force. 

The  distinction  here  insisted  on  between  the 
works  of  man  and  the  products  of  nature  is  too  ob- 
vious to  be  denied.  A  moment's  glance  is  enough 
to  show  that  the  operations  of  nature  are  distin- 
guished by  three  characteristic  signs,  which  are 
never  found  in  any  human  works  :  — 

1.  In  nature  the  organized  being  has  a  formative 
energy,  in  virtue  of  which  the  original  germ  succes- 
sively assimilates  all  the  particles  which  it  borrows 
from  the  external  world,  and  which  constitute  its 
growth. 

2.  It  is  endowed  with  a  reparative  power,  by  vir- 
tue of  which  it  repairs  any  injury  that  it  may  suffer, 
and  so  effectually  that  it  is  a  maxim  of  the  healing 
art  that  nature  is  the  best  physician. 

3.  It  has  a  reproductive  power,  by  which  the  in- 
dividual is  perpetuated  from  one  generation  to  an- 
other. 

These  characteristics  draw  so  broad  a  line  be- 
tween the  artificial  works  of  man  and  the  sponta- 
neous products  of  nature  that  it  is  evident  that  any 
analogical  reasoning  from  one  to  another  can  have 
no  force  whatever. 

From  this  distinction  has  been  drawn  the  theory 
which  we  are  now  considering,  the  theory  of  what 
is  termed  immanent  finality.  The  first  hint  of  it  was 
given  in  an  acute  distinction  of  Kant  between  what 
he  termed  external  and  internal  finality.  In  the 
former,  things  are  never  considered  as  means,  but 
14 


210  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

in  the  latter  all  the  parts  are  reciprocally  means  and 
ends.  As  afterwards  developed  and  stated  by 
Hegel,  the  doctrine  of  immanent  finality  included 
three  fundamental  points  :  — 

i.  There  are  final  causes  in  nature,  and  not  only 
so,  but  the  final  cause  is  the  sole  veritable  cause, 
for  it  alone  has  in  itself  the  reason  of  its  own  de- 
termination. The  domain  of  efficient  causes  is 
simply  that  of  blind  necessity. 

2.  It  is  not,  however,  necessary  to  conceive  the 
final  cause  in  the  form  which  it  assumes  in  human 
consciousness,  that  is  as  an  anticipated  representa- 
tion of  the  end.  There  are  two  ways  of  attaining 
an  end  :  one  voluntary  and  the  result  of  conscious 
choice,  like  that  in  man,  the  other  rational  but  un- 
conscious, the  activity  of  nature. 

3.  The  finality  of  nature  is  immanent  and  inter- 
nal, where  the  cause,  the  means,  and  the  end  are 
simply  three  terms  of  one  process,  the  cause  at- 
taining its  end  without  going  out  of  itself,  by  self- 
development. 

The  physical  theology  of  the  eighteeenth  cen- 
tury, for  the  most  part,  conceived  of  the  supreme 
cause  as  wholly  distinct  from  the  universe,  framing 
the  world  with  conscious  design,  much  in  the  same 
way  as  an  architect  fashions  a  house.  Making  all 
allowance  for  the  imperfection  of  human  language 
when  attempting  to  represent  the  divine  operations 
under  analogies  derived  from  man's  works,  it  must 
still  be  acknowledged  that  the  reproach  was,  to  a 
great  extent,  well  founded.  Paley's  famous  illustra- 
tion of  the  watch  carries  with  it  a  mechanical  con- 
ception of  the  divine  working,  though  it  was  far 
from  his  thought  to   suggest  any  such  idea.     The 


IMMANENT  FINALITY.  2 1 1 

argument  of  design  was  founded  on  external  final- 
ity, that  is,  on  utility,  and  this  explains  why  it  was 
so  much  abused,  and  at  length  brought  to  such  gen- 
eral contempt.  We  certainly  owe  this  debt  to  Spi- 
noza and  to  Schelling,  and  it  is  a  debt  that  we  need 
not  fear  to  acknowledge,  that  they  have  given  us  a 
far  more  worthy  conception  of  the  divine  working, 
and  supplied  us  with  a  far  more  satisfactory  theory 
of  the  relation  of  the  spiritual  and  the  material  uni- 
verse. Incomplete  and  unsatisfactory  as  was  their 
theory,  it  has  served  to  build  something  far  better 
than  the  doctrine  it  destroyed. 

The  theory  of  immanent  finality,  like  the  theory 
of  evolution,  contains  nothing  that  of  necessity  con- 
tradicts the  theistic  conception  of  a  supreme  cause. 
In  either  case  the  fact  of  antagonism  has  been  far 
too  hastily  assumed.  A  little  reflexion  will  show 
that  such  antagonism  has  really  no  existence.  Im- 
manence and  transcendence  do  not  exclude  each 
other.  Those  who  accept  one  view  are  not  logically 
required  to  reject  the  other.  A  transcendent  cause 
and  an  immanent  cause  are  simply  different  sides  of 
the  same  fact.  For  the  conception  of  a  transcendent 
cause,  if  that  cause  is  at  the  same  time  recognized 
as  a  cause  ever  present  and  operative,  carries  with 
it,  of  necessity,  the  notion  of  immanence.  Abso- 
lute transcendence  would  be  such  entire  separation 
of  the  supreme  cause  from  the  actual  creation  that 
there  would  no  longer  be  any  bond  of  connection 
between  them,  and  the  most  pronounced  theist  has 
never  for  a  moment  dreamed  that  the  relation  of 
God  to  the  world  was  of  this  kind.  To  assert  this 
would  be,  in  effect,  not  to  assert  theism,  but  to  as- 
sert atheism  ;  it  would  be  the  most  complete  exclu- 


212  7 HE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

sion  of  the  infinite  from  the  sphere  and  knowledge 
of  the  finite. 

On  the  other  hand,  an  absolute  immanence  would 
be  such  utter  blending  and  confounding  of  God  and 
the  world  that  cause  and  effect,  ground  and  phe- 
nomenon, absolute  and  relative,  would  be  terms  no 
longer  possessing  any  meaning.  But  those  who  as- 
sert most  emphatically  the  divine  immanence  have 
never  gone  to  the  extreme  of  asserting  this.  Even 
accepting  the  ancient  hypothesis  of  a  soul  of  the 
world,  the  distinction  between  God  and  the  world 
would  still  remain.  Hence  we  are  fully  justified  in 
the  assertion  that  the  doctrine  of  a  supreme  cause, 
above  nature  and  distinct  from  nature,  does  not  in 
any  way  exclude  the  notion  of  a  cause  at  the  same 
time  immanent  in  nature ;  and  that  the  idea  of  na- 
ture as  endowed  with  an  internal  activity,  and  work- 
ing to  an  internal  finality,  contains  nothing  that  ex- 
cludes a  supra-mundane  cause.  In  other  words,  the 
supreme  cause  may  be,  at  the  same  time,  within  and 
outside  of  nature.  Experience  goes  strongly  to 
confirm  this  view,  for  wherever  a  theistic  faith  has 
been  most  earnest  it  has  instinctively  allied  itself 
with  the  practical  persuasion  that  the  Supreme  Be- 
ing was  not  remote  from  the  world,  but  was  work- 
ing in  all  things  and  through  all  things,  and  bring- 
ing all  things  to  pass. 

But,  though  it  may  be  conceded  that  there  is  no 
necessary  contradiction  between  the  true  concep- 
tions of  a  mind  above  nature,  and  a  mind  working 
in  and  through  nature,  yet  the  question  still  remains 
'  Having  the  evident  proof  of  one  why  need  we  infer 
the  other  ? '  Order  and  finality  are,  as  we  have  seen, 
facts  in  nature,  but  when  we  undertake  to  reason 


IMMANENT  FINALITY.  213 

from  these  facts  to  their  cause  we  pass  to  a  wholly 
different  sphere.  What  right  have  we  to  conclude 
that  the  finality  of  nature  is  conscious  and  voluntary, 
like  the  purposes  formed  by  man  ?  Those  who  deny 
that  the  finality  of  nature  is  the  result  of  any  con- 
scious choice  appeal  to  the  instinct  of  the  lower 
animals.  Instinct  is  the  activity,  which  without 
conscious  purpose,  achieves  a  definite  end.  The 
difference  between  the  rational  man  and  the  irra- 
tional brute  is  that  the  latter  does  not  know  his  ends 
as  ends.  The  beaver  builds  his  house  with  no  plan 
before  him  ;  the  bee,  without  calculation,  constructs 
his  cells  in  accordance  with  the  most  refined  geo- 
metrical laws.  So  far  as  we  can  ascertain,  there  is 
no  conscious  intelligent  purpose  in  the  marvelous 
structures  which  rival  the  most  elaborate  creations 
of  human  skill. 

Thus  instinct  presents  us  with  the  type  of  uncon- 
scious finality,  and  by  showing  its  possibility  at  the 
same  time  furnishes  us,  it  is  claimed,  with  the  true 
explanation  of  external  nature.  Conscious  purpose, 
intelligent  choice,  such  as  we  see  displayed  in  man,  is 
after  all  but  one  form  of  finality,  and  by  no  means  its 
highest  and  absolute  form.  Man,  limited  in  his  range, 
limited  in  his  powers,  works,  with  a  preconceived  pur- 
pose, towards  a  definite  end  ;  but  nature  works  on  a 
larger  scale  and  according  to  a  different  rule.  Yet, 
according  to  those  who  take  this  view,  there  is  no 
contradiction  whatever  in  admitting  that  this  uncon- 
scious, plastic  force  of  nature  creates  works,  which, 
to  the  human  understanding,  appear  as  means  con- 
formed to  an  end.  Unconscious  adjustment  of  means 
to  ends  implies,  therefore,  no  contradiction ;  and  the 
denial  of  a  personal,  intelligent  creator  consciously 


214  THE    THE  I  STIC  ARGUMENT 

accomplishing  his  ends,  no  more  involves  a  denial 
of  the  order  and  adjustments  of  nature,  than  a  denial 
of  the  harmony  of  the  human  organs  follows  from 
the  doctrine  that  plants  and  animals  are  formed  by 
an  organic,  plastic  force.  The  order  springs  from  a 
tendency  in  nature. 

This  theory  of  unconscious  finality,  first  suggested 
by  Hegel,  has  been  carried  to  its  extreme  by  later 
writers.  Thus  Schopenhauer  writes  :  "The  admira- 
tion and  astonishment  which  are  wont  to  seize  us 
in  view  of  the  infinite  finality  manifested  in  the  con- 
struction of  the  organized  being,  rests  at  bottom  on 
the  natural  but  false  supposition  that  this  agreement 
of  the  parts  with  each  other  and  with  the  whole  of 
the  organism,  as  well  as  with  its  external  ends,  is 
realized  by  the  same  principle  that  enables  us  to 
conceive  and  judge  it,  and  consequently  by  means 
of  representation;  that,  in  a  word,  as  it  exists  for 
the  understanding  so  it  exists  by  the  understanding. 
No  doubt,  we  can  realize  nothing  regular  nor  con- 
formed to  an  end,  except  under  the  condition  of  the 
conception  of  that  end ;  but  we  are  not  warranted 
to  transfer  these  conditions  to  nature,  which  is  itself 
a  prius  of  all  intellect,  and  whose  action  is  absolutely 
distinct  from  ours.  It  brings  to  pass  what  appears 
to  us  so  wonderfully  teleological,  without  reflection 
and  without  concept  of  the  end,  for  it  is  without  rep- 
resentation, a  phenomenon  of  secondary  origin."1 
Nature,  he  adds,  has  given  us  a  brilliant  comment 
on  its  productive  activity  in  the  artistic  instinct  of 
the  lower  animals. 

Building  in  the  main  on  the  same  foundations 
as  Schopenhauer,  and  arriving  often  at  results  that 

1  Die  Welt  als  Wille,  t.  ii.  c.  xxvi.     See  Janet,  p.  378. 


IMMANENT  FIN  A  LITY.  2 1 5 

seem  identical,  Hartmann  has  somewhat  modified  the 
view.  Without  adopting  the  conception  of  intelli- 
gent finality,  he  yet  opens  a  way  of  returning  to  it. 
Schopenhauer  had  completely  separated  the  will  from 
that  which  was  presented  to  consciousness.  The 
presentation,  in  his  view,  was  wholly  secondary. 
The  unconscious  purposes  of  the  will  could  be  com- 
pletely realized  without  it.  But,  on  the  contrary, 
Hartmann  strongly  asserts  the  necessary  connection 
between  these  two.  A  mere  unconscious  tendency 
he  terms  but  the  empty  form  of  will,  and  as  empty 
form  is  always  pure  abstraction,  actual  volition  can 
exist  only  in  relation  to  the  actual  cognition  by  the 
mind  of  something  present  or  future.  In  other  words, 
no  one  can  really  will  without  willing  to  accomplish 
some  definite  end.  But,  while  thus  affirming  that 
the  will  cannot  exist  as  will  without  intelligence,  he 
maintains  that  this  presentation  is  at  first  uncon- 
scious. The  aim  of  his  philosophy  is  to  show  that 
there  is  omnipresent  in  nature  one  will  and  intelli- 
gence, acting  in  unconscious  union  with  one  another, 
by  whose  agency  all  phenomena  may  be  accounted 
for. 

As  a  necessary  preliminary  step  towards  proving 
this  presence,  throughout  all  nature,  of  one  will  and 
intellect,  distinct  from  what  appears  in  the  mind  of 
man,  Hartmann  is  obliged  to  analyze  the  idea  of 
purpose  or  final  cause,  and  to  show  that  physiological 
and  psychological  processes,  indeed  all  the  phenom- 
ena of  nature,  cannot  be  accounted  for  in  a  satisfac- 
tory manner,  save  on  the  hypothesis  that  they  were 
first  arranged,  and  are  ever  after  directed  and  kept  in 
activity  by  one  governing  purpose ;  in  other  words, 
that  we   find  everywhere  in  the  universe  the   evi- 


2l6  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

dences  of  intelligent  design.  He  argues  that  the 
conception  of  final  cause  by  no  means  excludes  that 
of  efficient  cause,  but  rather  presupposes  it,  and  that 
one  could  not  be  carried  out  except  through  the 
other.  But  an  intelligent  will  is  surely  one  efficient 
cause  among  others.  Thus,  while  in  the  structure 
of  the  eye  we  have  the  evidence  that  many  physical 
agencies  have  cooperated  in  building  up  that  com- 
plex and  nicely  adjusted  organ,  yet  these  agencies 
would  not  so  have  harmoniously  cooperated  had  they 
not  been  combined  and  directed  by  an  intelligent 
will.  Yet  the  eye  is  only  one  out  of  innumerable 
instances  that  go  to  multiply  the  probability  that  the 
order  of  the  universe  is  due  to  a  designing  intellect 
and  will. 

Still,  according  to  Hartmann,  in  all  these  manifold 
and  wonderful  adaptations  of  the  organic  world  we 
see  only  the  working  of  unconscious  intellect  and 
will.  In  proof  of  this,  he  calls  attention  to  the  inde- 
pendent or  self-regulating  functions  of  the  ganglia, 
or  lower  nervous  centres,  connected  with  the  spinal 
cord  and  the  sympathetic  system.  These,  without 
any  communication  with  the  brain,  and  therefore  un- 
consciously, maintain  complicated  movements  nicely 
adjusted  to  each  other.  In  all  of  these,  too,  a  cer- 
tain purpose  is  evident,  and  in  the  more  complex 
movements  this  purpose  is  strikingly  apparent.  The 
conscious  mind  knows  nothing  of  these  movements  ; 
they  are  regulated  by  a  power  distinct  from  our 
proper  selves.  Even  what  are  regarded  as  the  vol- 
untary movements  of  the  limbs  and  muscles  cannot 
be  effected  without  the  cooperation  of  the  uncon- 
scious. I  simply  will  the  movements  of  my  hand  in 
executing  a  piece  of  music  upon  the  piano,  without 


IMMANENT  FINALITY.  2\J 

being  in  the  least  conscious  of  the  complicated  ap- 
paratus of  nerves,  muscles,  and  tendons  by  which 
the  movements  are  executed,  without  even  knowing 
what  part  of  the  brain  must  be  touched  to  bring  all 
this  apparatus  into  play.  Consciousness  does  not, 
in  fact,  belong  to  the  essence,  but  only  to  the  phe- 
nomenal manifestation  of  the  individual. 

The  direct  answer  which  at  once  suggests  itself 
to  all  this  is  that,  granting  the  fact  of  this  uncon- 
scious activity  in  nature,  why  look  to  this  alone  for 
the  explanation  of  nature's  processes  ?  To  solve 
the  great  problem  of  life  we  need  to  utilize  our 
very  highest  resources  ;  we  ought  to  look  for  the 
solution  we  are  in  search  of,  not  in  the  lowest,  but 
in  the  highest  form  of  life  and  being.  Why  turn  to 
the  instinct  of  brutes,  about  which  we  know  so  little, 
when  we  have  directly  before  us  the  intelligence  of 
man,  of  which  we  know,  through  our  consciousness, 
so  much  ?  Granting  that  instinct,  as  Schopenhauer 
asserts,  is  a  commentary  on  creative  activity,  yet 
is  it  a  commentary  any  easier  to  read  or  to  com- 
prehend than  the  intelligence  of  man  ?  There  are 
three  distinct  modes  of  action  of  which  nature  fur- 
nishes us  the  illustration.  These  three  are,  mechan- 
ism, instinct,  and  intelligence.  Of  these  three  we 
dismiss  the  first  as  yielding  no  help  in  the  problem 
we  have  to  solve.  Of  the  remaining  two  instinct  is 
confessedly  the  most  obscure,  and  the  least  under- 
stood ;  why  should  we  turn  to  this  alone  for  an  ex- 
planation of  the  method  by  which  the  purposes  of 
nature  are  accomplished  ? 

But  the  hypothesis  of  instinctive  finality  not  only 
compels  us  to  appeal  to  a  more  obscure  class  of 
facts,   it    really  presents    much   greater    difficulties 


2l8  THE    THE  I  STIC  ARGUMENT. 

than  the  hypothesis  of  intelligence.  For,  on  this 
theory,  the  question  still  remains,  how  can  a  cause 
attain  an  end  by  appropriate  means  without  hav- 
ing either  known  that  end,  or  selected  those  means  ? 
Out  of  an  infinite  number  of  directions  in  which 
the  cause  might  have  acted,  what  limited  it  to  that 
one  direction  which  alone  would  produce  the  de- 
sired result  ?  If,  in  the  very  nature  of  the  cause, 
every  direction  but  one  was  excluded,  then  the  idea 
of  finality  is  set  aside.  We  have  only  left  the  neces- 
sary determination  of  Spinoza.  In  short,  while  the 
doctrine  of  immanent  finality,  that  is,  the  theory  of 
an  intelligence  working  in  nature,  presents  no  diffi- 
culties, and  does  not  stand  in  any  antagonism  with 
the  conception  of  a  supreme  cause  distinct  from 
nature,  when  we  proceed  to  affirm  that  this  imma- 
nent finality  is  unconscious,  we  are  at  once  involved 
in  difficulties  and  contradictions.  For,  if  the  final- 
ity displayed  in  the  universe  only  exists,  as  Scho- 
penhauer asserts,  for  intelligence,  but  not  by  intelli- 
gence, it  is  pure  illusion,  and  in  reality  does  not  exist 
at  all. 

To  answer  the  question  before  us,  what  reason 
we  have  for  inferring  that  the  source  of  the  intelli- 
gence displayed  in  the  external  universe  must  be 
sought,  not  in  nature,  but  in  a  sphere  above  nature, 
and  transcending  nature,  we  must  turn  from  the 
phenomena  of  matter  to  the  phenomena  of  mind. 
Only  let  it  be  observed  that  our  object  here  is  not 
to  repeat  the  old  argument  of  Locke,  that  the  ex- 
istence of  finite  intelligence  is  a  fact  that  can  only 
be  adequately  explained  by  going  back  to  an  in- 
finite intelligence  as  its  cause,  since  mind  must 
have  had  its  origin  in  mind,  but  simply  to  make  use 


IMMANENT  FINALITY.  219 

of  the  facts  of  consciousness,  and  of  the  processes 
of  human  intelligence,  to  explain  the  facts  of  ex- 
ternal nature,  and  the  processes  of  organic  life.  In 
other  words,  we  are  making  use  of  the  phenomena 
of  mind  for  the  purpose  of  completing  and  perfect- 
ing the  argument  from  order  and  design.  The 
force  of  this  argument  depends  upon  its  connection 
with  the  facts  of  human  consciousness.  It  fails  to 
satisfy  unless  combined  with  this  additional  proof 
derived  from  an  independent  source.  The  validity 
and  impressiveness  both  depend  on  the  support 
which  it  derives  from  the  knowledge  of   ourselves 

as  conscious  and  voluntary  agents.     

We  have  a  perfect  right  to  make  this  appeal,  for 
the  facts  of  human  consciousness  are  as  strictly  and 
truly  facts  as  any  of  the  phenomena  of  the  external 
world.  It  is  true  that  Comte  and  the  early  posi- 
tivists  denied  the  right  of  psychology  to  be  re- 
garded as  an  independent  science.  According  to 
his  view,  there  could  be  no  science  worthy  of  the 
name  founded  upon  the  observation  and  comparison 
of  states  of  consciousness,  and  psychology  could 
only  claim  attention  as  a  department  of  biology. 
That  is,  the  study  of  mind  was  simply  the  study  of 
nervous  phenomena.  The  legitimate  conclusion 
from  this  postulate  was  a  blank  materialism.  The 
intellectual  limitations  of  this  writer  are  nowhere 
more  conspicuously  shown  than  in  a  doctrine  which 
would  reduce  to  nonsense  the  greatest  achievements 
of  human  thought.  That  there  is  such  a  fact  in  na- 
ture as  mind,  that  its  laws  may  be  unfolded,  that  its 
operations  may  be  traced,  that  it  furnishes  us  with 
a  basis  of  scientific  reasoning  as  evident,  as  certain, 
as  comprehensive,  as  anything  supplied  by  the  ex- 


220  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

ternal  universe,  is  a  principle  respecting  which  the 
most  opposite  schools  have  no  dispute.  Leibnitz 
and  Kant  and  Mill  and  Spencer  here  stood  upon 
the  same  ground. 

So  far  as  our  present  argument  is  concerned  we 
do  not  need  to  discuss  the  various  conflicting  the- 
ories respecting  the  nature  or  origin  of  mind. 
These  have  no  direct  bearing  on  the  existence  and 
operation  of  mind  as  a  fact  of  human  conscious- 
ness. Intellectual  processes,  in  themselves  consid- 
ered, are  as  real  as  gravitation  or  electricity,  and  it 
is  with  these  processes  alone  that  we  are  here  con- 
cerned. It  is,  however,  important  to  observe  that, 
however  close  and  intricate  the  relations  of  mind  to 
organized  and  living  matter,  modern  physical  science 
has  not  yet  advanced  a  single  step  in  the  direction 
of  proving  that  they  are  not  radically  and  essen- 
tially distinct.  We  may  concede  to  the  materialist 
that  we  know  the  phenomena  of  mind  only  as  man- 
ifested through  a  material  organization,  and  that,  so 
far  as  our  experience  can  inform  us,  no  mind  has 
ever  existed  except  in  connection  with  a  material 
frame.  We  may  concede  that  the  powers  and  fac- 
ulties of  the  mind  are  always  arranged  in  close  cor- 
respondence with  the  energies  and  functions  of  this 
material  structure.  We  may  concede  that  mind  is 
always  dependent  on  some  material  organization  for 
the  exercise  of  many  of  its  activities,  yet  the  inher- 
ent and  radical  distinction  between  the  two  reveals 
itself  to  the  most  superficial  survey. 

Mr.  Huxley,  indeed,  tells  us  that  "  all  vital  action 
may  be  the  result  of  the  molecular  forces  of  the  pro- 
toplasm which  displays  it.  And  if  so,  it  must  be 
true  in  the  same  sense,  and  to  the  same  extent,  that 


IMMANENT  FINALITY.  221 

the  thoughts  to  which  I  am  now  giving  utterance, 
and  your  thoughts  regarding  them,  are  the  expres- 
sion of  molecular  changes  in  that  matter  of  life 
which  is  the  source  of  our  other  vital  phenomena." 
And  again,  "  as  the  electric  force,  the  light  waves, 
and  the  nerve  vibrations,  caused  by  the  impact  of 
the  light  waves  on  the  retina,  are  all  expressions  of 
the  molecular  changes  which  are  taking  place  in  the 
elements  of  the  battery,  so  consciousness  is  in  the 
same  sense  an  expression  of  the  molecular  changes 
which  take  place  in  that  nervous  matter  which  is 
the  organ  of  consciousness." 1  Yet  Mr.  Huxley 
finds  it  necessary  to  recognize  a  clear  distinction 
between  brain-movements  and  thoughts,  and  he 
indorses  the  opinion  of  Tyndall  that  "  the  passage 
from  the  physics  of  the  brain  to  the  correspond- 
ing thoughts  of  consciousness  is  unthinkable."  We 
cannot  reason,  Dr.  Tyndall  declares  emphatically, 
from  physical  to  mental  phenomena.  How  these 
two  classes  of  facts  are  connected  we  cannot  tell. 
"  The  chasm  between  them "  still  remains  for  us 
"intellectually  impassable."2 

Dr.  Carpenter  has  put  this  distinction  clearly  in  a 
passage  which  I  will  quote  :  — 

"  The  connection  between  mind  and  body  is  such  that 
the  actions  of  each  have,  in  their  present  state  of  existence 
....  a  definite  causal  relation  to  those  of  the  other,  so 
that  the  actions  of  our  minds,  in, so  far  as  they  are  carried 
on  without  any  interference  from  our  will,  may  be  consid- 
ered as  functions  of  the  brain.  Ori  the  other  hand,  in 
the  control  which  the  will  can  exert  over  the  direction  of 
the  thoughts,  and  over  the  motive  force  exerted  by  the 

1  Physical  Basis  of  Life  {Lay  Sertnoiis,  etc.,  N.  Y.,  187 1),  p.  138. 

2  Address  at  Norwich  (1868). 


222  THE   THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

feelings,  we  have  the  evidence  of  a  new  and  independent 
Power,  which  may  either  oppose  or  concur  with  the  auto- 
matic tendencies,  and  which,  according  as  it  is  habitually 
exerted,  tends  to  render  the  ego  a  free  agent.  And  truly 
in  the  existence  of  this  Power,  which  is  capable  of  thus 
regulating  the  very  highest  of  these  operations  that  are 
causally  related  to  corporeal  states,  we  find  a  better  evi- 
dence than  we  gain  from  the  study  of  any  other  part  of 
our  psychical  nature,  that  there  is  an  entity  wherein  man's 
nobility  essentially  consists,  which  does  not  depend  for 
its  existence  on  any  play  of  physical  or  vital  forces,  but 
which  makes  these  forces  subservient  to  its  determina- 
tions. It  is,  in  fact,  in  virtue  of  the  will  that  we  are  not 
mere  thinking  automata."  * 

This  does  not  in  the  least  explain  the  connection 
of  mind  and  body,  but  simply  asserts,  as  an  indis- 
putable fact,  their  inherent  and  radical  distinction. 
The  various  explanations  which  have  been  proposed 
on  the  side  of  physical  science,  of  the  relation  be- 
tween the  physical  and  mental  processes,  may  be 
reduced  to  three  :  — 

i.  The  theory  that  mental  acts  are  distinct  from 
nerve-changes,  yet  in  some  way  products  of  them. 

2.  The  theory  which  conceives  the  alliance  be- 
tween mental  and*  physical  processes  to  be  so  inti- 
mate that  they  are  not  successive  and  distinct,  but 
strictly  concomitant  and  inseparable  acts,  forming, 
in  reality,  but  one  series  with  two  sides. 

3.  The  extreme  theory  which  converts  this  insep- 
arable concomitance  into  absolute  identity.  In  this 
view  matter  and  mind  are  one.  The  statement  of 
the  theories  is  enough  to  show  that  physical  science 
is  wholly  incompetent  to  deal  with  the  problem.     In 

1  Mental  Physiology,  pp.  26,  27. 


IMMANENT  FINALITY.  223 

short,  the  only  legitimate  attitude  of  physical  science 
towards  mental  phenomena  is  to  ignore  them  alto- 
gether. For  if  we  proceed  to  the  logical  extreme 
of  identifying  mind  and  matter,  it  virtually  amounts 
to  saying  that  the  material  universe,  with  its  phenom- 
ena, has  no  existence. 

Nor  are  we  any  more  debarred  from  appealing  to 
the  facts  of  consciousness  by  any  theory  of  the  ori- 
gin of  mind.  What  we  have  to  do  with,  in  our  pres- 
ent argument,  is  mind  as  it  now  exists,  and  as  its 
workings  are  revealed  to  us  in  our  own  conscious 
personality,  not  with  mind  in  its  primordial  begirt 
nings.  Suppose  it  could  be  shown,  as  is  claimed  by 
Mr.  Spencer,  that  what  we  are  conscious  of  as  intel- 
ligence is  simply  the  climax  of  a  series  of  existences, 
rising  from  one  another  in  an  orderly  and  progres- 
sive gradation,  each  one  preparing  the  way  for  the 
next,  and  all  at  last  represented  in  that  crowning  and 
consummate  result,  —  the  mind  of  man.  According 
to  this  view,  the  lowest  form  of  matter  obeyed  only 
mechanical  laws.  The  particles  were  held  together 
by  cohesive  attraction.  In  the  series  next  above 
appeared  bodies  endowed  with  chemical  properties 
and  combinations.  Still  higher,  were  shown  the 
crystalline  arrangement  of  matter.  Next  appeared 
the  lowest  types  of  organized  existence,  and  these, 
under  the  requisite  conditions,  developed  from  veg- 
etable to  animal  life,  and  so  at  length,  in  connection 
with  more  perfectly  and  delicately  organized  struc- 
tures, the  phenomena  of  mind  began  to  appear,  re- 
quiring for  their  perfect  manifestation  all  the  lower 
forms  of  life. 

But  conceding,  for  the  moment,  the  possibility  of 
this  daring  hypothesis,   the  appeal  which  we   now 


224  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

are  making  to  the  facts  of  consciousness  would  not 
be,  in  the  least,  invalidated.  Even  going  to  the  full 
extent  of  assuming  that  mind,  by  this  process,  is 
evolved  from  matter,  inconceivable  as  such  a  suppo- 
sition must  seem,  the  real  existence  of  mind  as  mind 
would  not  be  disproved.  To  those  who  believe  in  a 
first  cause,  and  who  recognize  design  in  the  works  of 
nature,  this  would  simply  be  a  method  of  creative 
action.  Suppose  we  were  able  to  trace  "  the  myriad 
stages  of  the  composition  of  mind  from  the  reflex 
contractions  of  a  rudimentary  fin,  up  to  the  general- 
izations of  an  Aristotle  or  a  Newton,"  matter  and 
mind,  as  they  are  now  presented  to  us,  would  remain 
equally  distinct,  and  as  the  last  and  crowning  result 
of  the  long  process,  mind  would  be  more  than  ever 
the  source  of  our  highest  knowledge  of  the  method 
of  creation,  and  from  the  phenomena  of  mind,  with 
far  more  assurance  than  from  the  phenomena  of 
matter,  might  we  reason  respecting  the  nature  and 
operations  of  that  supreme  cause  from  which  the 
phenomena  of  matter  and  of  mind  alike  proceed. 
Man  would  remain  the  highest  and  most  perfect  ex- 
pression of  the  method  of  nature. 

In  now  passing,  as  I  have  shown  that  we  are  fully 
justified  in  doing,  from  the  phenomena  of  matter  to 
the  phenomena  of  mind,  there  is  one  truth  that  we 
need  to  keep  clearly  in  view,  —  that  we  do  not  pass 
from  the  region  of  law.  We  have  seen,  in  an  ear- 
lier stage  of  our  discussion,  that  the  universal  reign 
of  law  is  the  one  great  fact  that  we  are  everywhere 
forced  to  recognize.  Its  presence  is  more  apparent 
in  the  world  without  us.  It  is  first  suggested  to  us 
in  the  uniform  motion  of  the  heavenly  bodies.  It  is 
the  primitive  and  common  speech  that  day  every- 


IMMANENT  FINALITY.  225 

where  utters  unto  day.  But  science  has  taught  us 
that  not  alone  the  regular  and  uniform  occurrences 
of  nature,  but  what  seem,  at  first  sight,  its  most  sur- 
prising and  inexplicable  phenomena,  are  all  corre- 
lated under  the  same  principle,  and  that  the  further 
we  push  our  search  the  more  evident  does  it  become 
that  one  single  force  manifests  itself  under  all  these 
manifold  and  changing  aspects.  The  phenomena  of 
mind  are  more  obscure  :  they  inevitably  lead  us  back 
to  a  more  remote  region  of  inquiry  ;  yet  here,  too, 
as  we  advance,  we  find  facts  ranging  themselves 
under  an  observed  order,  and  cannot  doubt  that  the 
chain  of  causes  and  effects  is  equally  indissoluble. 

This  principle  is,  in  fact,  the  necessary  postulate 
of  all  mental  science.  All  that  we  term  science  is 
simply  the  tracing  of  laws,  and  the  combination  of 
manifold  and  various  laws  under  a  common  princi- 
ple. So  that  there  can  be  no  science  of  mind  unless 
there  be  an  observed  order  of  mental  phenomena, 
and  unless  these  phenomena  are  capable  of  being 
reduced  under  some  common  principle.  One  palpa- 
ble form  in  which  this  subjection  of  mind  to  law  is 
presented  to  us  is  in  the  close  connection  of  mental 
phenomena  with  our  physical  organism.  In  the  ex- 
ercise of  the  higher  faculties  of  our  reason  we  seem, 
indeed,  to  be  wholly  independent  of  our  bodies.  We 
pass,  at  will,  from  one  mental  state  to  another ;  we 
revive  trains  of  thought  long  buried  in  the  past  ;  in 
imagination  we  surround  ourselves  with  ideal  scenes  ; 
we  pass  on  to  the  distant  future,  we  fly  with  wings, 
fleeter  than  those  of  light  itself,  to  the  remotest 
bounds  of  space  ;  we  seem  free  from  dependence 
upon  any  material  organism  ;  but  the  instant  that 
fatigue  or  disease  comes,  we    realize  how  closely, 


226  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT 

after  all,  we  are  bound  up  with  the  material  condi- 
tions of  our  being.  At  one  moment  we  are  in  the 
heavens,  at  the  next  we  are  creatures  of  the  earth. 

In  proceeding  to  analyze,  more  closely,  these  men- 
tal phenomena,  we  are  brought  into  contact  with  dif- 
ferent classes  of  facts.  We  have  already  seen  that 
mental  are  distinguished  from  physical  phenomena 
by  differences  far  greater  than  those  which  mark 
mere  physical  phenomena.  It  is  a  difference  wholly 
distinct  and  peculiar.  Matter,  as  we  all  know,  may 
pass  through  many  transformations  ;  it  may  assume 
many  shapes  ;  it  may  disguise  itself  under  very  dif- 
ferent masks,  and  may  seem  to  perform  very  differ- 
ent functions,  yet,  after  all,  it  never  ceases  to  be  an 
object  of  sense.  No  experiment  has  ever  yet  suc- 
ceeded in  converting  a  material  substance  into  an 
idea  ;  it  remains,  after  all  its  protean  changes,  some- 
thing extended,  divisible,  movable,  an  object  of 
sense,  qualities  which  pure  thought  never  possesses. 
Those,  even,  who  assert  most  strongly  that  matter 
and  mind  are  but  two  sides  of  a  double-faced  unity, 
have  never  succeeded  in  showing  that  these  con- 
trasted qualities  can  cohere  in  a  single  substance, 
that  thought  can  be  combined  with  extension  or 
weight.  We  have  also  seen,  from  the  acknowledg- 
ments of  the  foremost  men  of  science,  that  no  in- 
vestigation of  molecular  changes  in  the  brain  has 
advanced  us  a  step  towards  explaining  mental  states. 
They  are  as  inexplicable  as  ever. 

But  there  are  other  facts  revealed  in  conscious- 
ness which  we  have  not  yet  considered.  The  first 
of  these  is  the  mysterious  unity  of  consciousness, 
which  many  regard  as  the  most  invincible  argument 
against   materialism.      How  can  this  be  explained 


IMMANENT  FINALITY.  227 

if  the  mind  be  regarded  as  nothing  but  successive 
physical  states  of  the  brain  ?  Connected  closely  with 
this,  is  the  consciousness  of  personal  identity,  a  fact 
as  clearly  revealed  as  the  fact  of  existence  itself,  and 
amply  attested  in  every  moment  of  our  lives,  but  a 
fact  that  we  seek,  in  vain,  to  harmonize  with  the 
theory  that  man  is  merely  a  material  existence,  the 
elements  and  atoms  of  which  are  in  a  state  of  per- 
petual change.  In  this  consciousness  of  personal 
identity,  the  mind  distinguishes  itself,  not  only  from 
external  objects,  but  just  as  much  from  its  own 
body,  and  even  from  its  brain.  But,  beyond  all  this, 
—  and  here  is  the  point  at  which  all  along  I  have 
been  aiming  to  arrive,  —  the  mind  is  conscious  of  an 
internal  spontaneity.  It  is  not  only  conscious  of 
itself,  as  distinct  from  the  external  world,  and  from 
its  own  body,  but  is  no  less  conscious  of  itself  as  an 
active,  willing  agent,  producing  results,  by  its  own 
volition,  in  itself  and  in  the  world  without. 

And  here  we  are  brought  face  to  face  with  the 
most  astonishing  and  inexplicable  fact  that  nature 
anywhere  presents,  the  phenomena  of  the  human 
will.  The  existence  of  this  will  we  need  have  no 
hesitation  in  affirming  as  a  fact.  The  difficult  prob- 
lems connected  with  its  nature  and  mode  of  oper- 
ation we  need  not  here  discuss.  That  our  wills 
should  be  determined  by  motives,  that  in  so  many 
cases  where  consciousness  assures  us  that  we  are 
acting  freely  we  should  be  governed  by  underlying 
impulses,  of  which  we  have  no  consciousness,  that 
what  seem  our  voluntary  actions  should,  in  so  many 
instances,  follow  a  course  marked  out  for  them  by 
conditions  over  which  we  had  no  control,  and  which 
we  even  fail  to  recognize,  —  all  these  are  aspects  of 


228  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

the  question  with  which  we  need  not  here  concern 
ourselves.  What  we  have  now  to  do  with  is  volition, 
simply  as  it  emerges  into  consciousness,  with  the 
will  as  it  reveals  itself  in  the  higher  processes  of 
our  being,  where  we  directly  know  ourselves  as  act- 
ive and  free  agents.  That,  by  the  exercise  of  his 
will,  man  can  produce  changes  in  himself,  and  in 
the  external  world,  is  a  fact  which  we  need  not  stop 
to  prove. 

It  is  not  at  all  with  the  nature  or  origin  of  will, 
but  simply  with  its  mode  of  operation  that  we  are 
here  dealing.  We  are  conscious  of  a  volition,  we 
put  forth  an  effort,  —  we  produce  a  result,  that  is 
the  simple  and  familiar  chain  of  facts  which  we  need 
to  keep  before  us.  And,  in  this  process,  we  find  the 
highest  proof  of  our  personal  existence,  the  supreme 
and  ineradicable  fact  that  separates  our  conscious, 
thinking  selves  from  the  physical  universe  with 
which  we  are  so  closely  and  in  so  many  ways  con- 
nected. The  phenomenon  which  we  here  perceive 
we  have  no  reason  for  separating  from  other  phe- 
nomena. Whether  we  study  the  influence  of  matter 
upon  mind,  or  the  influence  of  mind  upon  matter, 
we  have  no  reason  for  supposing  that  we  are  exempt 
from  that  reign  of  law  which  we  have  recognized  as 
everywhere  present.  Here,  as  always,  we  have  an 
order  of  facts,  and,  like  every  other  order  of  facts, 
it  implies  a  force,  or  an  arrangement  of  forces,  out 
of  which  this  order  has  come.  This  exercise  of  voli- 
tion, in  the  accomplishment  of  a  definite  purpose, 
with  which  we  are  so  familiar,  is  part  and  parcel  of 
the  great  order  and  harmony  which  pervades  the 
universe. 

Let  us  now  return  to  two  principles  which  we  have 


IMMANENT  FINALITY.  229 

already  discussed,  —  the  principle  of  causality  and 
the  doctrine  of  the  conservation  of  energy.  Modern 
science  has  brought  us  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
phenomena  of  nature  are  not  simply  a  series  of  se- 
quences, not  simply  an  infinite  variety  of  observed 
facts  occurring  in  orderly  succession,  but  that  they 
also  afford  evidence  of  the  presence  and  constant 
operation  of  a  mysterious  power  or  force.  What  we 
perceive  by  the  senses  are  indeed  but  a  series  of 
phenomena,  and  what  we  term  the  laws  of  nature 
are  the  generalized  expression  of  these  facts.  But 
this  is  not  the  whole.  We  cannot  rest  at  this  point. 
Every  change  is  a  revelation,  not  only  of  succession, 
but  of  causal  power.  No  matter  where  we  take  our 
stand,  no  matter  whether  we  contemplate  physical 
or  mental  phenomena,  this  conviction  is  forced  upon 
us.  But  what  is  this  mysterious  force  ?  No  keen 
scrutiny  of  science  has  ever  been  able  to  detect  it. 
It  announces  its  presence  in  every  change  that  takes 
place  around  us,  but  when  we  look  for  it,  it  hides  its 
face  from  us.  The  mighty  masters  of  science  have 
wrestled  with  it,  yet  like  the  angel  who  wrestled 
with  Jacob,  it  will  not  reveal  its  name. 

But  one  fact  has  been  established,  which  ranks  as 
one  of  the  greatest  discoveries  of  modern  times,  that 
all  forms  of  force  are  convertible  among  themselves. 
In  other  words,  they  are  ultimately  identical,  and  are 
endlessly  passing  and  repassing  into  one  another. 
So  that,  at  last,  we  are  brought  to  the  recognition 
of  one  supreme  force,  everywhere  present,  every- 
where acting,  the  fountain  of  all  changes,  pulsating 
in  every  part,  in  the  grandest,  and  in  the  minutest, 
forms  of  the  mighty  whole.  This  force,  while  end- 
lessly assuming  new  shapes,  is  never  increased  or 


230  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

lessened  ;  nothing  adds  to  it,  nothing  takes  from  it, 
it  never  slumbers  nor  sleeps.  In  striving  to  reason 
back  to  the  real  nature  of  this  mysterious  entity,  we 
cannot  reach  an  abstract  conception  by  eliminating, 
what  is  peculiar  in  each  of  its  manifestations,  for 
while  present  in  all,  it  is  identified  with  none.  Each 
individual  phenomenon  is  simply  its  passing  shape. 
We  must  base  our  inferences  respecting  it  upon  the 
highest  exhibition  of  force  which  nature  presents, 
and  that  is  our  own  will.  It  is  only  through  the 
consciousness  of  power  within  us  that  we  can  com- 
prehend power  as  manifested  in  the  changes  of  nat- 
ure. It  is  our  own  personality  that  first  flashes  light 
across  the  external  universe. 

To  answer,  then,  the  question  whether  the  intel- 
ligence revealed  in  nature  is  simply  in  nature,  or 
whether  it  is  an  intelligence  above  nature,  and  direct- 
ing the  processes  of  nature  by  its  own  free  deter- 
mination, we  must  look  at  the  facts  revealed  within 
ourselves.  But,  let  it  not  be  supposed  that  this  argu- 
ment means  that  because  we  are  free  and  independ- 
ent of  nature,  that  therefore  the  power  involved  in 
nature  is.  We  have  no  right  to  leap  to  this  bold 
conclusion.  Some  of  those  who  seek  in  human  per- 
sonality the  clue  to  the  operation  of  the  supreme 
cause,  have  urged  this  argument  in  the  place  of  any 
other,  and  have  thrown  aside  as  worthless  all  proof 
derived  from  a  first  cause,  from  the  universal  order, 
and  from  finality.  To  my  mind,  when  thus  advanced 
as  an  independent  argument,  it  does  not  carry  full 
conviction.  We  cannot  thus  reason  from  our  own 
consciousness  simply  to  the  constitution  of  the  ex- 
ternal universe.  For  what  we  regard  as  our  own 
voluntary  action  may  be  but  part  of  a  universal  sys- 


IMMANENT  FINALITY.  23  I 

tern,  and  to  infer  that  the  universe  results  from 
intelligence  and  freedom  because  we  ourselves  are 
intelligent  and  free  is  assuming  that  the  laws  of 
human  nature  are  universal.  We  make  man  the 
measure  of  all  things. 

The  force  of  the  foregoing  argument  is  wholly  de- 
rived from  what  has  been  already  proved,  —  that  the 
world  had  an  intelligent  cause.  What  we  are  now 
seeking  to  discover  is,  whether  that  intelligent  cause 
was  in  nature  or  above  it.  And,  in  answering  this 
question,  we  have  a  perfect  right  to  reason  from  the 
highest  type  of  causal  power  which  nature  presents 
to  us.  Those  who  defend  the  doctrine  of  immanent 
finality  appeal  to  instinct  as  affording  the  most  sat- 
isfactory explanation  of  the  method  of  nature,  and 
hence  infer  that  the  finality  displayed  in  nature  is 
unconscious  ;  in  other  words,  the  brute  creation  is 
made  the  type  of  the  supreme  causal  power  that 
frames  the  world.  But  the  argument  which  I  have 
here  presented  reasons  not  from  the  lowest,  but  from 
the  highest  exhibition  of  causal  power  revealed  in 
nature,  and  claims  that  this  should  be  regarded  as 
the  type  of  the  supreme  cause,  and  hence  that  the 
power  that  made  the  world  is  intelligent  and  free. 
The  argument  proceeds  upon  the  same  ground,  in 
either  case,  and  hence  must  be  accepted  as  equally 
legitimate.  It  is  simply  reasoning  respecting  the 
nature  of  a  cause,  the  existence  of  which,  on  both 
sides,  is  conceded. 

The  positive  philosophy  began  with  the  lowest 
grade  of  forces,  the  mechanical,  and  from  that 
ascended  to  the  higher.  The  more  spiritual,  and 
more  satisfactory,  conception  of  nature  to  which  the 
school   of   Schelling:  introduced  us,   recognized   the 


,;_,  .**>.»     V^^V^V*  ^^,  .^WV^J 


232  THE   THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

presence  of  intelligence,  but  insisted,  in  the  case 
of  Schopenhauer  and  Hartmann,  on  illustrating  the 
operations  of  that  intelligence  from  the  most  ob- 
scure processes  of  mind  known  to  us,  the  instinct  of 
the  lower  animals.  Our  argument  appeals,  on  the 
contrary,  to  the  highest  known  type  in  intelligent 
action,  the  type  revealed  in  our  own  consciousness, 
with  which  we  are  best  acquainted,  and  from  which 
is  derived  our  only  notion  of  a  power  outside  our- 
selves. For,  it  is  only  through  the  consciousness 
of  power  or  energy  in  our  own  voluntary  actions 
that  we  arrive  at  any  conception  of  power  or  energy 
in  the  external  world ;  we  must  come  back  to  the 
human  will  for  any  explanation  of  what  we  see  dis- 
played around  us.  And  as  the  force  of  will  is  both 
higher  and  better  known  to  us  than  the  mere  me- 
chanical, chemical,  or  vital  forces  of  nature,  we  are 
perfectly  warranted,  on  philosophical  grounds,  in 
thus  explaining  the  lower  from  the  higher,  rather 
than  reducing  the  higher  to  the  lower. 

Professor  Huxley,  it  is  true,  assures  us  that  mod- 
ern science  is  banishing  gradually  from  all  regions 
of  human  thought  what  we  call  spirit  and  spontane- 
ity. But  when  modern  science  shall  have  succeeded 
in  doing  this,  it  will  involve  not  only  the  destruction 
of  all  evidence  that  the  universe  is  the  result  of  a 
free  intelligent  cause,  but  that  any  events  whatever 
are  due  to  such  an  origin.  The  reasoning  which 
obliterates  a  supreme  cause,  obliterates  every  human 
cause  just  as  much.  So  that,  if  science  succeeds  in 
proving  that  the  phenomena  of  nature  do  not  pro- 
ceed from  will,  it  will  demonstrate,  just  as  conclu- 
sively, that,  in  the  most  ordinary  acts  of  life,  we  do 
not  bring  things  to  pass  by  the  exercise  of  volition. 


IMMANENT  FINALITY.  233 

In  other  words,  mere  science  seeks  in  vain  to  ex- 
plain the  realization  of  a  purpose.  It  cannot  trace 
the  connection  between  mental  states  and  physical 
changes.  So  far  as  physical  science  is  concerned, 
the  acts  of  the  will  are  on  exactly  the  same  level 
as  the  operations  of  nature.  Purpose  and  intelli- 
gence are  nowhere  presented  to  its  view.  In  fact, 
the  problem  of  freedom  and  the  problem  of  design 
are  fundamentally  the  same.  With  respect  to  a 
directing  intelligence  no  line  can  be  drawn  between 
the  processes  of  nature  and  the  works  of  man. 


LECTURE  VIII. 

CONSCIENCE  AND  A  MORAL  ORDER. 

In  turning  as  we  have,  in  the  course  of  our  argu- 
ment, from  the  phenomena  of  the  external  world  to 
the  wholly  different  class  of  phenomena  revealed  in 
man's  inner  consciousness,  we  have  thus  far  sur- 
veyed only  a  part  of  the  field  presented  to  us.  We 
have  looked  at  man  as  a  creature  of  intelligence,  as 
a  being  endowed  with  reason,  as  capable  of  choice, 
as  forming  conscious  resolves,  and  as  acting  in  ac- 
cordance with  preconceived  purpose.  From  these 
undeniable  characteristics  of  man  we  have  reasoned 
respecting  the  processes  revealed  in  nature  around 
him.  And  we  have  taken  the  ground  that  to  ex- 
plain these  processes,  to  account  for  the  manifest 
working  towards  definite  ends  that  nature  so  unmis- 
takably shows,  it  is  at  once  more  natural  and  more 
legitimate  to  argue  from  these  higher  operations  of 
intelligence  so  directly  revealed  to  us  in  conscious- 
ness, than  to  argue  from  the  lower  operations  of 
instinct  only  obscurely  presented  in  the  brute  crea- 
tion. And  thus  we  have  reached  the  conclusion  that 
the  finality  shown  in  nature  is  the  operation  of  a 
conscious  intelligence  distinct  from  and  above  nat- 
ure. 

But  in  thus  reasoning  we  have  accomplished  only 
part  of  our  task  ;  we  have  surveyed  only  a  portion 
of  the  phenomena  that  consciousness  presents.     For 


CONSCIENCE  AND  A   MORAL   ORDER.  235 

it  is  not  more  certain  that  man  is  a  rational  and  in- 
telligent creature,  than  that  man  is  a  moral  creature. 
If  it  be  evident  that  he  is  endowed  with  reason,  it  is 
not  less  evident  that  he  is  endowed  with  conscience. 
The  proof  of  these  two  propositions  rests  upon  pre- 
cisely the  same  ground,  and  if  we  accept  the  one  we 
must  accept  the  other  also.  And  if  we  have  a  right 
to  reason  from  one  class  of  facts  which  conscious- 
ness attests,  we  have  the  same  right  to  reason  from 
the  other.  The  argument  in  either  case  is  perfectly 
direct  and  simple.  It  is  an  argument  from  obvious, 
clearly  attested  facts,  facts  which  can  only  be  ig- 
nored or  denied  by  denying  the  existence  of  human 
nature  itself.  Unless  we  are  prepared  to  go  to  the 
extreme  of  regarding  human  consciousness  as  a  mere 
delusion,  unless  we  are  willing  to  reduce  the  opera- 
tions of  mind  to  mere  physical  modifications  of  the 
brain,  and  make  volition  the  inevitable  sequence  of 
cause  and  effect,  we  cannot  deny  the  existence  of  a 
moral  sense. 

Let  us  bear  in  mind  that  in  this  whole  argument, 
we  are  reasoning  simply  from  facts.  All  that  I  now 
claim  is  that  man  himself,  and  the  phenomena  of  his 
inner  consciousness,  are  just  as  much  facts  as  any- 
thing we  can  note  in  the  world  around  us.  If  then 
we  are  willing  to  admit  that  man  himself  is  anything 
more  than  an  illusion,  that  his  active  powers  are 
anything  more  than  a  passing  fancy  with  which  he 
deceives  himself  during  the  few  short  years  of  his 
conscious  existence  on  earth,  we  must  admit,  not 
only  that  he  is  an  intelligent,  but  a  moral  being  :  that 
he  is  capable  of  distinguishing  between  right  and 
wrong,  that  he  is  influenced  by  moral  emotions,  and 
that  he  recognizes  the  existence  of  moral  laws.     The 


236  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

question  here  raised  is  simply  a  question  of  fact,  and 
the  fact  that  there  is  an  external  world  is  not  a  fact 
more  directly  attested  than  the  fact  that  man  has 
a  conscience  which  forces  him  to  an  approbation  of 
the  right  and  a  condemnation  of  the  wrong.  When 
we  reason  respecting  the  laws  of  the  external  world, 
or  respecting  the  subtle  properties  of  matter,  we 
are  not  dealing  with  facts  so  clear  and  so  incon- 
testible  as  when  we  reason  respecting  the  moral 
sense.  The  facts  with  which  we  are  here  brought 
so  closely  in  contact  reveal  themselves  in  our  daily 
lives,  and  in  all  our  acts.  They  are  not  far  off,  but 
lie  close  at  hand.  They  are  not  inferences  from  other 
facts,  but  facts  of  which  we  are  directly  conscious  ; 
not  reported  to  us  upon  the  testimony  of  others,  but 
part  and  parcel  of  our  very  selves.  If  we  exist, 
these  exist  as  the  essential  constituent  of  our  very 
being.  If  we  cannot  assume,  as  established  beyond 
doubt,  these  universal  and  distinctive  characteristics 
of  man's  moral  nature,  we  have  no  basis  for  any  in- 
ference that  we  may  draw  respecting  any  phenom- 
ena whatever.  For  the  test  of  all  knowledge  must  be 
found  in  consciousness.  If  we  cannot  confide  in 
consciousness  when  consciousness  reveals  to  us  the 
existence  of  moral  distinctions,  we  cannot  implicitly 
trust  in  what  consciousness  attests  respecting  our 
intellectual  processes.  The  absolute  validity  of  con- 
sciousness is  not  less  the  basis  of  philosophy  than 
the  basis  of  morals.  Hence  Leibnitz  truly  says: 
"  If  our  immediate  internal  experience  could  possi- 
bly deceive  us,  there  could  no  longer  be  for  us  any 
truth  of  fact  ;  nay,  nor  any  truth  of  reason."1 
And  let  it  further  be  observed  that,  as  our  argu- 

1  [Nouveaux  Essais,  lib.  ii.  c.  27,  §  13.] 


CONSCIENCE  AND  A   MORAL   ORDER.  237 

ment  proceeds  simply  from  facts,  we  are  not  at  pres- 
ent concerned  with  any  speculations  respecting  the 
origin  of  what  is  termed  the  moral  sense,  or  with 
any  subtle  analysis  of  its  nature  and  working. 
These  are  questions  important  in  themselves,  but 
they  have  no  immediate  connection  with  what  we 
are  now  discussing.  We  are  simply  looking  at  man 
as  he  is,  and  are  not  asking  how  he  came  to  be  so. 
We  are  dealing  with  the  phenomena  of  conscious- 
ness simply  as  facts  of  universal  experience.  The  ex- 
planation of  these  facts  is  another  matter.  No  man 
can  doubt  that  the  moral  sense  exists.  We  have 
each  of  us  only  to  look  within  ourselves  for  the  un- 
mistakable proofs  of  its  presence  and  reality.  There 
is  not  one  of  us  who  has  not  bowed  to  its  impera- 
tive sway.  It  exists  as  a  distinct  consciousness  of 
moral  law,  as  recognizing  a  rule  of  duty,  as  always 
involving  a  sense  of  responsibility.  It  sits  in  judg- 
ment on  us.  Human  nature  would  not  exist,  human 
life  would  be  stripped  of  its  significance,  the  com- 
plex relations  we  sustain  to  one  another  would  be 
divested  of  value,  if  this  element  were  lacking. 

It  is  not  more  evident  that  man  is  the  supreme 
fact  in  nature,  than  that  the  possession  of  a  moral 
sense  is  the  supreme  fact  in  man.  It  is  this,  rather 
than  reason,  that  draws  the  line  between  him  and 
the  brute  creation.  The  fact  that  he  recognizes  the 
imperative  obligations  of  a  moral  law  is  the  distinct- 
ive fact  about  him.  In  the  oft-quoted  words  of 
Kant :  "  Two  things  there  are  which,  the  oftener  and 
more  steadfastly  they  are  considered,  fill  the  mind 
with  an  ever  new  and  ever  rising  admiration  and 
reverence,  —  the  starry  heavens  above  me,  and  the 
moral  law  within  me.     Of  neither  am  I  compelled 


238  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

to  seek  out  the  reality,  as  veiled  in  darkness,  or 
only  to  conjecture  the  possibility  as  lying  beyond 
the  hemisphere  of  my  knowledge.  Both  I  contem- 
plate lying  clear  before  me,  and  connect  them  im- 
mediately with  my  consciousness  of  existence.  The 
one  departs  from  the  place  I  occupy  in  the  outer 
world  of  sense,  and  expands  the  physical  connec- 
tions in  which  I  stand  beyond  the  bounds  of  imag- 
ination, with  worlds  rising  beyond  worlds,  and  sys- 
tems embraced  in  systems."  "  The  other  departs 
from  my  invisible  self,  from  my  personality,  and 
represents  me  in  a  world,  truly  infinite  indeed,  but 
with  which  my  connection,  ....  unlike  the  relation 
I  stand  in  to  the  worlds  of  sense,  I  am  compelled  to 
recognize  as  universal  and  necessary."1 

The  most  recent  theory  of  the  origin  of  the  moral 
sense,  and  the  only  one  that  we  need  to  refer  to  here, 
is  the  theory  which  accounts  for  it  as  the  conse- 
quence of  evolution,  as  a  development  either  in  the 
experience  of  individuals  or  in  the  course  of  ages, 
out  of  pleasure  and  pain,  out  of  benefits  and  inju- 
ries, and  which  traces  the  convictions  and  feelings 
implied  in  it  to  the  course  of  circumstances  under 
which  it  has  grown  up.  Those  who  give  this  ex- 
planation readily  concede  all  that  we  have  thus  far 
asserted,  —  the  existence  of  a  moral  sense  and  of 
moral  intuitions  in  civilized  man.  It  is  admitted 
that  man,  in  his  present  highly  developed  state,  is 
endowed  with  a  complex  group  of  emotions  leading 
him  to  seek  the  right  and  to  avoid  the  wrong  with- 
out any  reference  to  considerations  of  utility.  It  is 
further  admitted,  that  the  intuitions  of  right  and 
wrong,  like  the  intuitions  of  time  and  space,  are  in- 

1  \Kritik  der  praktischen  Vernunft,  Beschluss.] 


CONSCIENCE  AND   A    MORAL    ORDER.  239 

dependent  of  mere  individual  experience.  In  this 
respect,  those  who  hold  to  the  evolution  theory  of 
morals  really  approach  nearer  to  the  lofty  view  of 
Kant  than  to  the  utilitarian  theory  which  referred 
moral  distinction  to  the  experiences  which  each  man 
has  of  pleasure  and  pain. 

The  evolution  theory  accounts  for  moral  distinc- 
tion, not  from  the  experience  of  the  individual,  but 
from  the  long-continued  and  ever  advancing  experi- 
ence of  the  race.  The  explanation  is  the  same  as 
in  the  case  of  physical  or  intellectual  growth.  Pleas- 
ure and  pain  furnish  the  starting-point.  Pleasure, 
says  Mr.  Spencer,  is  "  a  feeling  which  we  seek  to 
bring  into  consciousness  and  retain  there,"  while 
pain  "  is  a  feeling  which  we  seek  to  get  out  of  con- 
sciousness and  keep  out."  And  supposing  a  race  of 
animals  could  come  into  existence  which  should  ha- 
bitually seek  baneful  actions  as  pleasurable  and  shun 
useful  actions  as  painful,  natural  selection  would  im- 
mediately exterminate  it.  Only  those  races  can  ex- 
ist whose  feelings,  on  the  average,  result  in  actions 
which  are  in  harmony  with  environing  relations. 
Thus  we  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  pleasure  is  a 
state  of  consciousness  accompanying  the  relatively 
complete  adjustment  of  inner  to  outer  relations, 
while  pain  is  a  state  of  consciousness  attendant  upon 
the  discordance  between  inner  and  outer  relations. 
The  satisfaction  that  men  sometimes  find  in  injuri- 
ous activities  does  not  invalidate  the  general  rule, 
that  pleasures  and  pains  are  positive  or  negative 
conditions  of  self-preservation. 

But  we  have  thus  far  reached  no  proper  basis  for 
ethical  distinction.  We  can  do  this  only  when  we 
so  far  enlarge  our  conception  of  pleasure  and  pain 


240  THE   THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

as  to  take  into  the  account  not  only  what  concerns 
the  well-being  of  the  individual,  but  the  well-being 
of  the  whole  body  of  which  he  is  but  a  single  mem- 
ber. And  bearing  in  mind  that  this  whole  body, 
which  at  first  was  but  the  family  or  tribe,  has  come 
to  include  the  whole  race,  we  have  for  a  basis  of 
ethical  distinction,  the  principle  that  actions  mor- 
ally right  are  those  which  are  beneficial  to  human- 
ity, while  actions  morally  wrong  are  those  which  are 
detrimental  to  humanity.  It  is  not  correct  to  say, 
however,  that  the  doctrine  of  evolution  teaches  that 
the  moral  sense  is  due  merely  to  the  registration 
through  countless  ages  that  some  actions  benefit 
humanity,  while  others  injure  it,  and  that  from  a 
gradual  organization  of  such  inductions  all  our 
moral  distinctions  have  arisen.  It  is  equally  true 
that  there  is  also  a  highly  complex  feeling  of  sym- 
pathy, the  product  of  a  slow  emotional  evolution, 
which  prompts  us  to  certain  lines  of  conduct  irre- 
spective of  any  conscious  estimate  of  pleasure  or 
utility.1 

By  the  more  enthusiastic  adherents  of  the  doc- 
trine of  evolution  it  is  claimed  that  in  no  depart- 
ment of  inquiry  is  it  illustrated  with  more  truth 
and  grandeur  than  in  its  application  to  the  prov- 
ince of  ethics,  and  in  the  explanation  that  it  fur- 
nishes of  the  origin  of  moral  distinctions.  But, 
while  in  this  deeper  synthesis  supplied  by  the  the- 
ory it  is  claimed  that  a  common  ground  is  furnished 
on  which  the  intuitional  school  and  the  school  of  ex- 
perience, the  disciples  of  Kant  and  the  disciples  of 
Locke,  may  stand  together,  it  is  not  maintained 
that  we  possess  an   instinctive  and  inherited  moral 

1  Fiske,  Cosmic  Philosophy \  vol.  ii.,  pp.  339,  356. 


CONSCIENCE   AND  A   MORAL   ORDER.  24 1 

sense,  so  that  anterior  to  education  or  experience, 
we  possess  an  organic  preference  for  good  actions, 
or  an  organic  repugnance  to  bad  actions  ;  but  simply 
that  when  we  are  taught  that  an  action  is  right  or 
wrong  we  follow  or  shun  it,  without  taking  in  all  its 
ultimate  consequences  ;  nor  is  it  denied  that  when 
the  intelligence  is  very  high  there  is  likely  to  arise 
a  deliberate  pursuit  of  moral  excellence,  attended 
by  a  distinct  knowledge  of  the  elements  in  which 
such  excellence  consists.  Such  conscious  devotion 
to  ends  conducive  to  the  happiness  of  society  is  the 
latest  and  highest  product  of  social  evolution. 

I  have  not  introduced  this  brief  summary  of 
what  is  awakening  wide  discussion  just  at  this  mo- 
ment as  a  theory  of  ethics,  for  the  purpose  of  in- 
quiring what  elements  of  truth  are  involved  in  it, 
or  how  far  it  is  likely  to  render  any  efficient  service 
in  reconciling  theories  that  heretofore  have  stood 
opposed.  We  may  concede,  without  hesitation,  that 
it  is  an  advance  upon  the  theory  of  the  old  utili- 
tarians ;  we  may  accept  as  sound  the  principles  in- 
volved in  its  representation  of  the  progression  of 
nature,  that  nature  makes  for  happiness,  and  that 
nature  gradually  prepares  the  way  for  the  introduc- 
tion of  morality.  We  may  go  further  than  this,  and 
grant  that  the  "  intuitions  of  the  moral  faculty  are 
the  slowly  organized  results  of  experience  received 
by  the  race,"  and  still  our  reasoning  from  the  facts 
of  moral  consciousness  would  not  be  in  the  least  af- 
fected by  these  admissions.  Grant,  for  the  sake  of 
the  argument,  that  the  present  moral  consciousness 
of  the  race  is  wholly  the  product  of  evolution,  and 
that  man  as  a  moral  being  has  come  to  be  what  he 
is  by  a  process  strictly  analogous  to  that  by  which 
16 


242  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

his  physical  organs  have  been  developed,  any  infer- 
ences deduced  from  man's  moral  nature,  instead  of 
being  weakened,  would  rather  be  strengthened  by 
it ;  for  we  have  already  seen  that  evolution  is  sim- 
ply a  process,  and  a  process  that  in  no  way  conflicts 
with  the  idea  of  design.  Whether  the  moral  sense 
is  a  faculty  implanted  in  man  by  a  supreme  intelli- 
gence, or  whether  the  moral  sense  is  the  result  of  a 
long  process  of  development  which  a  supreme  intel- 
ligence has  designed  and  superintended,  are  ques- 
tions which  do  not  in  the  least  affect  the  authority  of 
conscience,  or  the  validity  of  the  distinctions  which 
it  shows.  Nay,  if  we  accept  this  explanation  of  the 
genesis  of  man's  moral  nature,  we  must  be  driven 
to  admit  that  his  moral  being,  as  the  last  term  in 
the  stupendous  series  of  cosmical  changes  which 
began  with  the  massing  together  of  nebulous  mat- 
ter in  the  distant  past,  represents  the  highest  plane 
of  existence  yet  attained,  and  that  in  reasoning  from 
it  we  are  reasoning  on  the  highest  plane  to  which  it 
is  possible  to  rise.  For  those,  therefore,  who  hold 
to  evolution,  the  moral  argument  must  be  of  neces- 
sity the  supreme  argument.  The  bar  of  man's 
moral  consciousness  is  the  very  highest  tribunal  to 
which  we  can  make  our  appeal. 

Having  established  this  important  point,  that  the 
argument  deduced  from  the  phenomena  of  man's 
moral  consciousness  is  wholly  independent  of  any 
theory  as  to  the  origin  of  his  moral  nature,  let  us 
now  set  distinctly  before  us  the  new  stage  in  our 
discussion  on  which  we  are  about  to  enter,  and  its 
relation  to  what  has  been  accomplished  up  to  this 
point.  It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  under- 
stand precisely  what  it  is  that  we  are  attempting  to 


CONSCIENCE  AND  A   MORAL    ORDER.  243 

prove,  and  to  see  clearly  how  far  our  argument  legit- 
imately extends.  In  the  argument  presented  in  the 
last  lecture  from  human  intelligence,  it  will  be  re- 
membered that  it  was  not  claimed  that  human  intel- 
ligence, in  itself,  furnished  the  proof  of  the  existence 
of  a  supreme  being,  but  that  the  existence  of  a  su- 
preme cause,  having  been  inferred  on  the  grounds 
of  human  intelligence,  this  latter  afforded  us  the 
highest  illustration  of  its  method  of  working.  In 
other  words,  having  derived  from  the  facts  pre- 
sented in  the  external  universe  the  idea  of  intelli- 
gent cause,  the  phenomena  of  human  volition  enti- 
tled us  to  infer  that  intelligence  holds  the  same  rel- 
ative supremacy  in  the  universe  that  it  holds  in  us. 
The  argument  which  I  am  now  presenting  from 
man's  moral  nature  rests  upon  precisely  the  same 
basis,  and  has  precisely  the  same  scope.  I  make 
this  explanation  here  because  by  many  the  moral 
argument  has  been  carried  much  farther.  The  phe- 
nomena of  conscience  are  so  impressive  and  so  dis- 
tinctly revealed,  they  possess,  in  contrast  with  mere 
physical  phenomena,  a  character  so  imperative  and 
constraining,  they  force  themselves  so  powerfully 
upon  us  as  the  mandates  of  a  superior  power,  that 
some  have  not  hesitated  to  infer  that  conscience  is 
itself  the  very  will  of  God  in  the  soul,  and  that  in 
the  mere  fact  of  the  existence  of  a  moral  sense,  we 
have  a  proof  of  the  divine  existence  complete  in 
itself,  and  not  needing  to  be  supplemented  by  any 
further  evidence.  This  was  the  result  at  which 
Kant  arrived.  After  having  exerted  to  the  utmost 
his  unequaled  logical  powers,  to  prove  that  the  un- 
aided reason,  by  whatever  path  it  searches  after 
God,  inevitably  loses  itself   in  a  maze  of   self-con- 


244  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

tradictions,  he  ends  by  appealing  to  the  moral  fac- 
ulty as  affording  an  assurance  of  the  divine  exist- 
ence which  no  cavil  of  skepticism  could  affect. 

Sir  William  Hamilton  has  also  given  the  weight 
of  his  authority  to  the  opinion  that  "the  only  valid 
arguments  for  the  existence  of  God,  and  for  the  im- 
mortality of  the  human  soul,  rest  on  the  ground  of 
man's  moral  nature,"1  or  as  he  has  elsewhere  ex- 
pressed it,  "  Theology  is  wholly  dependent  on  psy- 
chology, for  with  the  proof  of  the  moral  nature  of 
man  stands  or  falls  the  proof  of  the  existence  of  a 
Deity."  2  Thus  the  moral  nature  of  man  is  not  made 
use  of  as  furnishing  illustration  of  the  attributes  of 
a  being  whose  existence  has  been  already  inferred 
from  other  sources,  but  is  exclusively  appealed  to  in 
proof  of  the  existence  of  that  Being.  The  argument 
thus  presented  by  Hamilton  is  essentially  the  argu- 
ment of  adequate  cause,  and  its  validity  depends 
upon  the  principle  that  whatever  exists  must  have 
had  an  antecedent  at  least  equal  to  itself,  and  hence 
that  man's  moral  constitution  must  have  proceeded 
from  a  cause  itself  moral.  But  it  is  clear  that  this 
argument  can  have  no  weight  unless  we  have  first 
ascertained  precisely  how  it  was  that  man's  moral 
constitution  came  to  exist.  Divorced  from  the  doc- 
trine of  a  first  cause  it  comes  to  nothing. 

But  the  argument  for  the  divine  existence,  derived 
from  conscience,  has  been  presented  in  still  another 
form,  where  without  any  reference  to  the  origin  of 
the  moral  sense  the  simple  phenomena  of  conscience 
are  alone  taken  into  account.  The  force  of  this 
argument  rests,  not  on  the  existence  of  the  moral 

1  [The  Works  of  Reid,  vol.  ii.,  p.  974  (note  U).] 

2  [Lectures  on  Metaphysics  (Lect.  ii.),  vol.  i.,  p.  33.] 


CONSCIENCE  AND  A   MORAL    ORDER.         245 

sense,  as  a  fact  in  nature  needing  to  be  accounted 
for,  but  on  its  character,  and  the  nature  of  its  teach- 
ings. Conscience  is  here  viewed  as  a  spontaneously 
admonishing  influence  which  acts  independently  of 
our  own  volition,  and  which  thus  forces  upon  us  the 
conviction  of  something  distinct  from  and  above 
ourselves.  The  monitions  of  conscience  come  to 
us  as  a  mandate,  and  carry  with  them  the  neces- 
sary recognition  of  something  superior  to  ourselves. 
When  we  attentively  regard  the  operations  of  con- 
science, it  is  urged  by  those  who  hold  this  view,  the 
chief  thing  forced  upon  our  attention  is  that  we  find 
ourselves  face  to  face  with  a  purpose,  a  purpose  not 
our  own,  yet  one  that  dominates  us,  and  makes  itself 
felt  as  ever  present,  and  one  that  we  cannot  disso- 
ciate from  a  purposer,  who  thus  furnishes  unmis- 
takable indication  of  his  own  character.1 

By  no  one  has  this  argument  been  presented  with 
more  force  and  beauty  than  by  Dr.  Newman,  a  writer 
whose  pure  and  lucid  language  I  am  glad  to  have 
any  excuse  for  quoting  :  — 

"  If,  as  is  the  case,  we  feel  responsibility,  are  ashamed, 
are  frightened,  at  transgressing  the  voice  of  conscience, 
this  implies  that  there  is  One  to  whom  we  are  responsi- 
ble, before  whom  we  are  ashamed,  whose  claims  upon  us 
we  fear.  If,  on  doing  wrong,  we  feel  the  same  tearful, 
broken-hearted  sorrow  which  overwhelms  us  on  hurting 
a  mother;  if,  in  doing  right,  we  enjoy  the  same  sunny 
serenity  of  mind,  the  same  soothing,  satisfactory  delight, 
which  follows  on  our  receiving  praise  from  a  father,  — 
we  certainly  have  within  us  the  image  of  some  person  to 
whom  our  love  and  veneration  look,  in  whose  smile  we 
find  our  happiness,  for  whom  we  yearn,  towards  whom 

1  See  Flint,  Theism,  p.  402. 


246  THE   THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

we  direct  our  pleadings,  in  whose  anger  we  are  troubled 
and  we  waste  away.  These  feelings  in  us  are  such  as  re- 
quire for  their  exciting  cause  an  intelligent  being  ■  we  are 
not  affectionate  towards  a  stone,  nor  do  we  feel  shame 
before  a  horse  or  a  dog;  we  have  no  remorse  or  com- 
punction in  breaking  mere  human  law  :  yet  so  it  is  ;  con- 
science excites  all  these  painful  emotions,  —  confusion, 
foreboding,  self-condemnation;  and,  on. the  other  hand, 
it  sheds  upon  us  a  deep  peace,  a  sense  of  security,  a  res- 
ignation, and  a  hope  which  there  is  no  sensible,  no  earthly 
object  to  elicit.  '  The  wicked  flees  when  no  one  pursu- 
eth ; '  then  why  ,does  he  flee  ?  whence  his  terror  ?  Who 
is  it  that  he  sees  in  solitude,  in  darkness,  in  the  hidden 
chambers  of  his  heart  ?  If  the  cause  of  these  emotions 
does  not  belong  to  this  visible  world,  the  Object  to  which 
his  perception  is  directed  must  be  supernatural  and  di- 
vine ;  and  thus  the  phenomena  of  conscience  as  a  dictate 
avail  to  impress  the  imagination  with  the  picture  of  a  su- 
preme governor,  —  a  judge,  holy,  just,  powerful,  all-seeing, 
retributive."  1 

But,  beautiful  and  impressive  as  this  statement 
is,  to  my  mind  it  is  not  conclusive.  On  the  con- 
trary, when  carefully  analyzed,  it  will  be  found  itself 
to  furnish  the  evidence  that  it  is  only  when  the 
moral  emotion  is  illuminated  and  instructed  by  ideas 
derived  from  a  different  source  that  it  awakens  in  the 
mind  such  clear  conviction  of  the  divine  existence. 
The  mere  fact  that  conscience  is  independent  of 
will  is  equally  true  of  all  our  emotions. 

Hence  I  find  myself  unable  to  agree  with  those 
who  would  make  the  moral  nature  of  man  the  sole 
and  exclusive  basis  of  the  argument  for  the  divine 
existence.  It  is  true  that  conscience  makes  us  di- 
rectly cognizant  of  moral  law,  and  awakens  through 

1  Grammar  of  Assent,  pp.  105,  106. 


CONSCIENCE  AND  A   MORAL   ORDER.         247 

reflection  the  idea  of  a  moral  order.  But  to  affirm 
that  conscience  is  distinctively  and  exclusively  the 
religious  organ  of  the  soul,  to  represent  its  primary 
function  to  be  direct  and  immediate  communion  with 
God,  is  going  much  beyond  this.  In  its  essence 
conscience  is  ethical,  not  religious.  What  we  imme- 
diately apprehend  through  conscience  is  the  right 
and  wrong  in  actions.  I  grant  that  conscience  is  the 
supreme  faculty  in  man,  and  that  the  logical  infer- 
ences to  be  deduced  from  the  nature  and  operations 
of  conscience  carry  us  farther  in  our  understanding 
of  the  Supreme  Being  than  the  arguments  derived 
from  any  other,  or  from  all  other  sources,  but  they 
do  this  only  when  combined  with  those  other  argu- 
ments. Man  does  not  reach  his  final  conviction  of 
religious  truth  through  any  one  faculty  or  organ. 
He  is  framed  for  religion  by  the  whole  make  and 
constitution  of  his  nature. 

Let  me  here  repeat  what  I  said  in  a  former  lec- 
ture, that  the  argument  for  the  divine  existence 
which  we  are  here  following  out  is  complex  and  cor- 
relative. Not  from  one,  but  from  many  sources  is 
the  evidence  derived,  and  its  force  lies  in  the  whole, 
not  in  any  of  the  separate  parts.  Neither  the  phe- 
nomena of  man's  rational  nature,  nor  the  phenomena 
of  his  moral  nature,  taken  by  themselves,  would  be 
sufficient  to  prove  the  divine  existence.  But  having 
inferred,  from  a  wholly  different  source,  the  exist- 
ence of  a  supreme  cause,  we  may  reason  with  confi- 
dence from  the  highest  phenomena  which  nature 
presents,  —  man's  intellectual  and  moral  nature, — 
respecting  the  nature  and  attributes  of  that  cause. 
Having  established  that  something  must  exist  be- 
yond and  above  ourselves,  we  may  legitimately  infer, 


248  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

from  what  we  find  in  ourselves,  what  that  something 
must  be.  Hence  we  are  enabled  to  see  clearly  the 
force  and  scope  of  the  argument  from  conscience. 
It  does  not  claim  to  prove  the  existence  of  a  supreme 
being,  but  recognizing  the  existence  of  that  being  as 
already  proved,  it  proceeds  to  clothe  him  with  his 
highest  and  most  impressive  attributes. 

What,  then,  let  us  next  ask,  may  we  infer  respect- 
ing the  Supreme  Being  from  the  moral  constitution 
of  man  ? 

In  the  first  place,  since  the  moral  constitution  of 
man  is  part  of  the  general  system  of  nature,  the 
same  method  of  reasoning  which  we  have  made  use 
of  in  dealing  with  the  facts  of  external  nature,  we 
may  make  use  of  here.  Conscience,  as  we  have 
already  seen,  exists  within  us  as  the  recognition  of 
moral  law.  It  is  an  inward  judge  ;  it  continually  ac- 
cuses or  excuses  ;  it  condemns  or  approves  ;  it  fills 
the  soul  with  the  blissful  sense  of  self-approval,  or 
drives  it  to  remorse  and  despair  with  the  bitter  feel- 
ing of  self-condemnation ;  it  asserts  an  imperious 
sway  over  body  and  mind,  over  appetites  and  affec- 
tions and  faculties  ;  yet  it  never  claims  to  do  this  by 
any  authority  of  its  own.  It  does  not  lay  down  a 
law,  but  simply  warns  us  of  the  existence  of  a  law. 
Its  authority  is  not  original,  but  derived ;  in  its 
sternest  accents  it  never  speaks  but  with  a  delegated' 
voice.  The  law  of  conscience  is  not  set  by  any  man 
for  himself,  for  the  characteristic  of  conscience  which 
is  most  unmistakable,  is  that  it  claims  obedience  from 
the  will. 

Hence,  while  the  direct  function  of  conscience  is 
to  discriminate  the  right  and  wrong  in  actions,  while 
its  immediate  sphere  is  the  human  will,  it  goes  far 


CONSCIENCE  AND  A   MORAL   ORDER.  249 

beyond  this.  In  fact  it  can  perform  those  functions 
only  in  this  way.  It  carries  the  soul  outside  of 
itself,  and  brings  the  will  before  a  bar  independent  of 
its  own  impulses.  It  inevitably  awakens  in  the  soul 
the  perception  of  a  moral  law,  —  universal,  unchange- 
able, binding  under  all  circumstances,  in  short  of  a 
moral  order  of  the  world  analogous  to  the  physical 
order  which  it  is  the  province  of  science  to  trace  and 
illustrate.  The  moral  consciousness  of  man  re- 
fuses to  stop  short  of  this  conclusion.  Man  feels 
himself,  not  merely  related  to  physical  laws,  but  even 
more  closely  and  more  vitally  related  to  moral  laws, 
laws  which  not  only  enter  into  the  structure  of  his 
own  being,  and  go  to  form  the  framework  of  human 
life,  but  laws  which  extend  beyond  himself  and  his 
own  hopes  and  struggles,  and  assert  themselves  as 
everywhere  supreme.  Such  recognition  of  the  moral 
order  of  the  world  is  not  only  the  highest,  but  the 
only  conclusion  that  can  satisfy  the  educated  moral 
consciousness  of  mankind. 

This  universal  moral  order  supplies  us  a  basis  of 
reasoning  like  the  physical  order  which  we  consid- 
ered in  a  former  lecture.  As  from  the  reason  man- 
ifest in  creation  we  argued  back  to  the  intelligence 
of  the  first  cause,  so  in  the  same  way  from  the  moral 
order  we  may  reason  back  to  the  moral  attributes  of 
the  first  cause.  We  did  not  infer,  in  the  first  in- 
stance, that  the  complex  mathematical  laws  illustrated 
in  the  movements  of  the  heavenly  bodies  were  cre- 
ated by  the  first  cause,  but  simply  that  they  illus- 
trated, and  revealed,  and  made  manifest,  some  of  the 
characteristics  of  that  cause ;  and  so  here  we  do  not 
affirm  that  the  moral  order  of  the  world,  the  un- 
changeable distinction  of  right  and  wrong,  sprang 


250  THE    THE  IS  TIC   ARGUMENT. 

from  a  supreme  will,  but  that  they  afford  us  the 
means  of  forming  conclusions  respecting  that  will ; 
for  it  is  inconceivable  that  the  Supreme  Being  should 
not  himself  be  in  harmony  with  what  is  highest  and 
most  perfect.  The  laws  which  we  can  only  conceive 
of  as  universal  and  unchangeable,  must  be  the  laws 
of  his  own  being.  We  therefore  reach  the  conclu- 
sion, that  the  supreme  cause  must  be  not  only  su- 
premely intelligent,  but  supremely  righteous  and 
good. 

It  may  be  objected  that  we  make  a  bold  leap  in 
thus  reasoning  from  the  phenomena  of  our  inner  con- 
sciousness to  the  nature  of  an  absolute  being.  But 
let  it  always  be  borne  in  mind  that  we  are  reason- 
ing, not  to  his  existence,  but  simply  to  his  attributes, 
and  if  the  inferences  which  we  have  already  made 
from  the  phenomena  of  the  external  universe  were 
legitimate,  these  that  we  are  now  making  from  the 
facts  of  moral  consciousness  cannot  be  less  so.  They 
are  equally  a  part  of  the  whole  system  of  things  ; 
and  even  conceding  what  is  claimed  by  the  school  of 
evolutional  moralists,  that  the  moral  sense  in  man  is 
the  result  of  the  progressive  experience  of  the  race, 
refined,  disciplined,  consolidated  through  countless 
generations,  the  moral  perceptions  being  conditioned 
by  the  growth  of  the  nervous  organism,  yet  this 
would  not  detract  from,  but  would  only  add  to,  the 
force  of  the  argument,  since  this  conviction  of  a 
moral  order,  and  all  the  inferences  logically  flowing 
from  it,  would  stand  revealed  as  the  highest  result 
of  human  development,  and  as  the  last  and  highest 
phenomenon  which  would  furnish  the  most  authori- 
tative postulates  for  reasoning. 

But  we  may  go  further  than  this.     The  moral  con- 


CONSCIENCE  AND   A   MORAL    ORDER.         25 1 

stitution  of  man,  like  his  physical  constitution,  does 
more  than  illustrate  the  presence  and  operation  of 
law ;  it  not  less  clearly  reveals  the  indications  of  a 
purpose.  When  we  closely  study  it,  we  find  mani- 
fest evidence  that  it  is  a  means  to  an  end.  The  eye 
is  not  more  distinctly  made  for  seeing  and  the  ear 
for  hearing,  than  is  the  conscience  fashioned  to  ena- 
ble man  to  discriminate  between  good  and  evil.  We 
instinctively  recognize  this  fact  when  we  term  it  the 
moral  sense.  But  this  purpose  which  conscience 
reveals  is  no  more  our  purpose  than  is  the  law  which 
it  recognizes  our  law.  It  is  the  purpose  of  another, 
which  it  is  our  mission  in  life  to  realize.  Our  own 
purposes  are  often  in  conflict  with  it ;  our  inner  con- 
sciousness is  often  tortured  and  rent  asunder  by  the 
conflict  that  thus  ensues ;  but  the  ends  purposed  in 
our  moral  constitution  remain  just  as  certain  and  as 
unmistakable.  We  cannot  throw  off  the  conviction 
that  this  constant  aim  is  our  own  moral  improve- 
ment. We  are  endowed  with  this  supreme  faculty 
that  we  may  more  and  more  eschew  evil  and  habit- 
uate ourselves  to  do  right. 

The  moral  education  and  discipline  of  man  is, 
therefore,  revealed  as  the  ultimate  and  highest  end 
of  his  being.  Whatever  may  be  the  subordinate 
ends  set  before  him  to  realize,  the  highest  and  ulti- 
mate end  is  the  conformity  of  his  nature  to  the  su- 
preme law  of  existence,  and  this  law  is  moral.  Moral 
perfection  is  the  mark  set  before  him,  a  mark  which 
in  his  deepest  degradation  and  ignorance  he  is  never 
able  to  lose  wholly  out  of  sight.  But  if  we  reason 
from  the  evidences  of  purpose  shown  in  physical 
nature,  we  may  also  reason  from  these  evidences  of 
purpose  in  man's  moral  constitution.      If  we  may 


252  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

infer  that  the  first  cause  of  nature  is  rational  and 
free,  we  may  just  as  confidently  argue  that  he  is 
righteous  and  holy.  Only  to  such  a  being  could  this 
ultimate  purpose,  revealed  in  man's  moral  nature,  be 
referred.  All  the  feelings  and  emotions  of  the  soul 
which  are  involved  in  the  apprehension  of  right  and 
wrong,  —  the  approval  of  conscience  when  we  follow 
the  path  of  duty,  its  unfailing  condemnation  when 
we  wander  from  that  path,  —  point  us  to  a  righteous 
cause  of  arrangements  so  distinctive  and  universal. 

And  here  again  let  us  note  that  our  conclusion  is 
independent  of  any  theory  of  the  origin  of  man's 
moral  nature.  Let  us  take  the  latest  and  most  elab- 
orate statement  of  the  evolutional  theory  of  ethics 
from  Mr.  Spencer's  recent  volume ;  yet  even  here, 
though  Mr.  Spencer  would  not  acknowledge  it,  we 
find  clearly  indicated  the  constant  and  elaborate  real- 
ization of  purpose.  When  he  asserts  that  nature  in 
all  her  changes  is  progressive,  and  that  this  prog- 
ress tends  to  happiness,  and  that  this  tendency  is 
secured  by  many  and  intricate  adjustments,  what 
have  we  in  all  this  but  indications  of  a  purpose  ?  This 
adjustment  to  an  end,  being  itself  an  effect,  implies 
a  cause,  and  if  the  end  is  happiness  the  cause  must 
be  benevolent.  The  grand  law  of  beneficent  prog- 
ress, revealed  in  the  whole  history  of  the  race,  is 
surely  as  impressive  a  witness  to  the  character  of  the 
supreme  cause  as  anything  in  the  physical  constitu- 
tion of  man.  But  there  is  another  and  a  higher  end 
in  nature  than  happiness.  We  have  seen  that  man's 
moral  constitution  points  to  a  moral  end.  The  two 
concur,  yet  they  are  distinct.  In  bringing  man  to 
recognize  this  highest  end,  evolution  furnishes  proof 
of  design. 


CONSCIENCE  AND  A   MORAL    ORDER.  253 

But,  I  repeat,  that  this  argument  proceeds  simply 
from  conscience  as  a  fact.  We  have  only  to  ask, 
what  have  we  indubitably  given  in  conscience,  just 
as  we  asked,  in  a  former  lecture,  what  did  we  have 
given  in  the  facts  of  the  external  world.  Our  whole 
reasoning,  up  to  this  point,  has  been  reasoning  from 
facts.  Doubtless,  reasoning  from  the  facts  of  the 
inner  consciousness  should  be  pursued  with  caution. 
The  facts  lie,  indeed,  near  to  each  one  of  us,  yet 
in  the  nature  of  the  case  they  are  liable  to  miscon- 
ception. But  the  argument  has  not  been  rested  on 
single  and  exceptional  phenomena  of  individual  ex- 
perience, but  on  the  general  and  distinctive  and  ac- 
knowledged characteristics  of  man's  moral  nature. 
I  have  been  careful  to  assert  nothing  the  truth  of 
which  would  not  be  at  once  conceded.  The  argu- 
ment cannot,  therefore,  be  affected  by  the  possible 
objection,  that  man's  moral  perceptions  show  every 
degree  of  development,  and  that  they  are  often  de- 
graded and  false.  In  reasoning  back,  as  we  have, 
to  the  character  and  attributes  of  the  supreme 
cause,  we  have  reasoned  from  human  nature,  as  we 
had  a  right  to  do,  not  in  its  lowest,  but  in  what  is 
acknowledged  to  be  its  highest  stage  of  develop- 
ment. 

According  to  that  school  with  whose  conclusions 
we  are  now  most  directly  concerned,  the  answer  to 
the  great  question  of  human  life  must  be  sought 
in  a  complete  survey  of  the  history  of  the  universe, 
as  far  as  it  is  revealed  to  human  faculties.  This  sur- 
vey shows  us  that  throughout  all  the  provinces  of 
nature  may  be  traced  the  aspect  of  a  stupendous 
process  of  evolution,  which  is  alike  exemplified  in 
the  development   of   our  planetary  system  from    a 


254  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

relatively  homogeneous  mass  of  vapor,  in  the-  in- 
creasing physical  and  chemical  diversity  and  inter- 
dependence of  the  various  portions  of  the  surface  of 
our  cooling  earth,  and  in  the  wonderful  differentia- 
tions by  which  solar  radiance  is  metamorphosed 
into  the  countless  forms  of  energy  manifested  in 
winds  and  waves,  in  plants  and  animals,  and  in  rea- 
soning men.  The  progress  has  always  been  from  the 
lower  to  the  higher,  —  life,  whether  in  its  lower  or 
its  higher  forms,  consisting  in  a  series  of  adjust- 
ments between  the  organism  and  its  environments, 
till,  at  length,  as  the  crown  and  glory  of  the  com- 
plicated movement,  man  appeared,  endowed  with 
intellect  and  with  moral  sense,  the  mark  toward 
which  nature  had  all  along  been  striving. 

Now  all  that  I  claim  is  that  in  any  reasoning  re- 
specting the  ultimate  ground,  or  first  cause  of  this 
stupendous  process,  man  himself,  as  the  last,  the 
highest,  the  most  clearly  comprehended  result, 
should  be  the  starting-point  and  postulate  of  our 
argument.  I  care  not  whence  he  came,  or  how  he 
was  fashioned  in  the  womb  of  unrecorded  time ;  I 
take  him  just  as  he  is,  as  the  most  wonderful  fact 
that  nature  has  to  show.  As  from  the  phenomena 
of  man's  will,  rather  than  from  the  instinct  of 
brutes,  we  reasoned  respecting  the  nature  of  that 
causal  power  which  lies  behind  the  ever-changing 
phenomena  of  the  physical  world,  so  from  man's 
moral  nature,  as  confessedly  the  highest  manifesta- 
tion of  conscious  life  known  to  us,  we  have  rea- 
soned respecting  the  moral  character  and  attributes 
of  that  being  by  whom  this  moral  sense  was  called 
into  existence.  From  the  highest  known  we  reason 
respecting  the  highest  unknown.     Not  in  the  starry 


CONSCIENCE  AND  A   MORAL   ORDER.  255 

heavens,  not  in  the  wonderful  adaptations  and  ar- 
rangements of  organic  nature,  not  in  the  lower 
forms  of  conscious  life,  but  in  man,  the  crown  and 
glory  of  all,  do  we  have  the  clearest  image  of  the 
invisible  maker. 

Reasoning  from  this  lofty  premise  of  man's  moral 
nature,  we  are  led  to  the  conclusion  that  man  is  sub- 
ject to  a  moral  law,  and  this  moral  law  resolves  it- 
self into  a  universal  moral  order,  the  counterpart  of 
the  order  and  harmony  shown  in  the  physical  uni- 
verse. We  are  led  to  accept  the  contents  of  the 
moral  law  as  a  revelation  of  the  moral  attributes  of 
the  supreme  cause,  precisely  as  we  are  led  to  accept 
the  characteristics  of  the  physical  universe  as  evi- 
dence of  his  rational  attributes.  If  the  facts  pre- 
sented authorize  the  inference  in  the  one  case,  they 
authorize  it  equally  in  the  other.  We  are  not  adopt- 
ing any  different  method  of  reasoning,  and  are  not 
pushing  the  argument  to  any  greater  extreme.  In 
either  case,  the  reasoning  is  inductive,  and  the  ar- 
gument rests  on  the  basis  of  fact.  And  the  facts, 
in  either  case,  are  acknowledged  by  all.  The  phe- 
nomena of  the  external  world  are  shown  in  the 
speech  which  day  utters  to  day,  and  the  knowledge 
which  night  showeth  to  night,  and  the  phenomena 
of  the  moral  consciousness,  however  we  may  ac- 
count for  them,  are  uttered  not  less  distinctly  in 
every  language  spoken  under  heaven  ! 

But  precisely  at  this  point  in  our  argument  we 
are  brought  face  to  face  with  grave  difficulties,  — 
difficulties  that  must  be  met  and  fairly  considered 
before  we  can  proceed  further.  Granted  that  the 
soul  of  man  is  conscious  of  these  moral  emotions  ; 
granted    that   it  inwardly  realizes   a   moral    law   to 


256  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

which  it  owes  obedience ;  granted  that  in  view  of 
its  relation  to  this  law  it  is  rewarded  with  approval 
or  tortured  with  remorse,  still  what  reason  have  we 
to  infer  that  there  exists  any  external  reality  corre- 
sponding with  these  emotions?  If  these  phenom- 
ena go  to  prove  the  existence  of  moral  laws,  and  of 
a  moral  order,  are  there  not  other  facts  which  go 
as  much  to  prove  the  opposite  ?  Are  there  not 
anomalies  in  human  life  which  are  inconsistent  with 
the  idea  of  moral  government ;  are  there  not  dark 
facts,  and  these  not  few  in  number,  but  countless 
and  various  and  everywhere  present,  which  contra- 
dict this  testimony  of  the  moral  sense,  and  forbid 
us  to  believe  that  there  is  any  such  moral  order  of 
the  world  as  conscience  attests  ?  Is  the  presence 
of  so  much  misery  and  sin  to  be  reconciled  with 
the  idea  of  a  moral  government  ? 

In  proceeding  to  consider  this  objection,  let  us 
note  at  the  outset  that  the  facts  here  alleged  in  op- 
position to  the  doctrine  of  a  moral  government, 
facts,  let  us  frankly  avow,  which  cannot  be  denied 
or  gainsaid,  will  be  found  on  examination  to  be  anal- 
agous  to  similar  defects  in  the  physical  world,  which 
have  in  the  same  way  been  used  as  arguments 
against  the  divine  wisdom  and  power.  In  the  case 
of  physical  phenomena,  however,  the  advance  of 
science  has  steadily  tended  to  remove  these  diffi- 
culties. To  the  first  savage  who  gazed  with  wonder 
at  the  heavens,  the  movements  of  the  celestial 
bodies  must  have  seemed  full  of  anomalies.  Only 
after  long  and  repeated  observation  was  a  correct 
and  coherent  theory  of  their  movements  reached. 
And  not  till  the  most  refined  analysis  of  mathemat- 
ical science  was  called  into  requisition,  was  it  finally 


CONSCIENCE   AND  A   MORAL    ORDER.         257 

demonstrated  that  what  seemed  their  most  anom- 
alous and  eccentric  movements  were  only  more 
striking  and  convincing  illustrations  of  the  simple 
and  universal  law  which  caused  the  tides  to  rise  and 
fall,  and  steered  with  unerring  precision  the  course 
of  the  comet  in  its  furthest  flight.  The  seeming 
disorder  was  not  in  nature,  but  in  man's  limited  and 
partial  vision. 

I  know  there  have  been  those,  even  in  our  own- 
time,  who  have  claimed  that  the  general  arrange- 
ments of  the  universe  might  be  very  considerably 
improved.  Thus  the  founder  of  the  positive  phi- 
losophy has  argued  that  there  is  no  evidence  of  in- 
telligence or  design  in  the  solar  system,  because  its 
elements  and  members  have  not  been  disposed  of 
in  the  most  advantageous  manner.  As,  however, 
Comte  himself  has  declared  that  we  know  nothing 
whatever  of  final  causes,  and  hence  can  know  noth- 
ing of  the  purpose  which  the  arrangements  of  na- 
ture were  meant  to  accomplish,  it  is  not  easy  to  see 
how  we  are  qualified  to  form  an  opinion  on  the  ques- 
tion whether  these  arrangement's  are  the  best  or 
not.  If  I  am  shown  an  intricate  machine,  the  pur- 
pose of  which  I  not  only  do  not  know,  but  am  in- 
capable of  comprehending,  of  how  much  worth  is 
my  opinion  as  to  the  usefulness  of  that  machine. 
Or  if  I  stand  at  the  beginning  of  a  road,  and  do 
not  know  where  it  leads,  it  would  seem  somewhat 
presumptuous  in  me  to  claim  that  I  can  point  out  a 
more  direct  route  to  the  same  destination.  Criti- 
cism of  the  arrangements  of  nature,  absurd  in  any 
case,  are  a  self-contradiction  in  such  as  deny  design. 

These  arguments  urged  against  the  inorganic 
world  have  been  urged  even  more  strongly  against 
17 


258  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT 

organic  nature.  Here,  it  is  claimed,  we  are  con- 
fronted with  more  striking  anomalies,  and  with 
more  inexplicable  contradictions.  Thus  there  are 
organs,  it  is  said,  which  have  no  use,  and  other  or- 
gans so  imperfectly  developed  as  to  be  capable  of 
serving  no  useful  function.  And  even  those  organs 
which  are  most  highly  developed,  and  the  elaborate 
arrangements  of  which  seem  most  apparent,  have 
been  subjected  to  a  searching  criticism  and  pro- 
nounced ill  adapted  to  the  purpose  claimed  for 
them.  Thus  it  has  been  argued  that  the  eye  itself 
is  not  a  perfect  optical  instrument,  and  that  a  much 
better  might  be  contrived.  And  it  has  been  claimed 
that  many  arrangements  in  nature  serve  only  to 
inflict  pain  or  cause  destruction.  And  finally,  the 
abortions  and  monstrous  productions  of  nature  are 
arrayed  against  the  doctrine  that  the  first  cause  of 
organic  existence  was  wise  and  good.  If  we  fairly 
weigh,  it  is  argued  by  those  who  hold  this  view, 
all  the  phenomena  of  nature,  the  difficulties  which 
we  encounter  will  fully  offset  any  argument  to  be 
derived  from  the  proofs  of  intelligence  and  benev- 
olence. 

No  one  can  deny  these  facts,  and  no  thoughtful 
person  can  close  his  eye  to  the  dark  shadow  cast 
over  nature  by  the  universal  presence  of  physical 
evil.  The  history  of  suffering  began  on  our  planet 
ages  before  man  existed.  Geology  shows  that  the 
earth  was  a  scene  of  suffering  and  destruction,  of 
violence  and  disease  and  agony  and  death,  from  the 
earliest  epoch  of  animated  existence.  And  not 
only  were  all  creatures  made  subject  to  suffering, 
but  as  they  advanced  in  the  stages  of  growth,  and 
became  more  highly  organized,  their  suffering  be- 


CONSCIENCE  AND  A   MORAL   ORDER.         259 

came  more  acute.  Physical  pain,  instead  of  being 
gradually  eliminated,  constantly  increased,  and  the 
higher  and  more  varied  the  endowments  of  any 
creature,  the  more  acute  became  his  sensibility 
alike  to  pleasure  and  pain,  till,  at  last,  man,  the 
crown  and  completion  of  organic  nature,  curiously 
summing  up  and  reflecting  in  himself  the  functions 
and  attributes  of  the  lower  creatures,  was  racked 
and  tortured  by  pains  of  which  they  could  have  no 
conception.  He  purchases  life  by  the  physical  tor- 
ture of  another,  and  at  last  longs  for  the  grave,  as 
the  only  place  where  the  weary  are  at  rest. 

The  general  answer  to  these  objections  lies  on 
the  surface.  We  need  only  briefly  to  restate  what 
has  been  often  urged.  Even  could  it  be  proved 
that  undeniable  defects  may  be  discerned  in  the  ar- 
rangements of  the  external  universe,  there  might 
still  remain  sufficient  proof  of  the  wisdom  and 
goodness  of  its  author.  Because  intelligence  and 
goodness  are  not  everywhere  shown,  it  does  not 
follow  that  there  is  no  proof  of  intelligence  and 
goodness  whatever.  The  question  whether  the  uni- 
verse had  its  origin  in  intelligence  is  entirely  differ- 
ent from  the  question  whether  the  intelligence 
shown  in  the  universe  is  perfect;  and  at  this  stage 
of  the  argument  the  two  questions  should  not  be 
confounded. 

But  further,  in  undertaking  to  show  that  there 
are  defects  and  imperfections  in  the  present  system 
of  things,  it  is  obvious  that  we  ought  to  proceed 
with  caution.  From  our  present  point  of  view 
these  defects  may  be  apparent,  but  it  does  not  fol- 
low, of  necessity,  that  they  are  real.  The  inquiry 
upon  which  we  here  enter  is  a  very  large  one,  and 


260  THE   THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

there  are  many  considerations  that  should  be  borne 
in  mind  before  we  undertake  to  answer  it.  We  are 
throwing  our  plummet  into  water  that  is  very  deep. 

If  it  would  be  gross  presumption  in  us  to  un- 
dertake to  criticise  a  complicated  piece  of  mech- 
anism, the  design  of  which  we  very  imperfectly  com- 
prehend, it  surely  becomes  us  to  pause  before  pro- 
nouncing with  confidence  upon  the  structure  of 
the  universe.  We  see  but  a  very  small  portion  of 
it,  and  understand  but  little  of  that  we  see.  While 
this  limited  knowledge  need  not  prevent  us  from 
recognizing  such  indications  of  intelligence  as  fall 
clearly  and  unmistakably  _within  the  range  of  our 
survey,  it  ought  to  deter  us  from  pronouncing  an 
opinion  with  regard  to  things  the  wisdom  of  which 
we  fail  to  recognize.  That  they  are  unmixed  and 
absolute  evils  does  not  follow  from  the  mere  fact 
that  we  do  not  perceive  that  they  are  good.  In 
other  words,  we  have  a  positive  argument,  which  is 
not  invalidated  by  an  argument  which  may  be  only 
apparently  negative.  Most  of  the  anomalies  which 
at  first  perplexed  us  in  the  inorganic  world  have 
faded  away  in  the  increasing  light  of  scientific  re- 
search ;  and  reasoning  from  analogy,  we  should  be 
prepared  to  expect  that  the  seeming  incongruities 
and  contradictions  in  organic  nature  will  be  ex- 
plained in  a  wider  comprehension  of  the  whole  sys- 
tem of  things. 

For  we  cannot  bear  too  strongly  in  mind  the 
great  principle,  which  every  advance  in  science 
tends  to  establish,  that  all  nature  forms  one  great 
whole,  the  parts  of  which  are  curiously  related  and 
interdependent,  and  that  the  manifold  uses  and  re- 
lations of  all  these  parts  to  one  another  must  be 


CONSCIENCE  AND  A   MORAL   ORDER.  26 1 

taken  into  account  before  we  can  undertake  to  pass 
any  judgment  upon  them.  Could  we  survey  the 
whole  universe,  and  mark  how  all  its  parts  are 
related  to  each  other  and  to  the  whole,  we  might  de- 
termine whether  an  apparent  defect  in  it  was  real, 
but  not  before.  Nor  is  it  simply  by  the  present  re- 
lations of  these  parts  to  one  another  that  they  are 
to  be  judged,  but  by  their  relation  to  all  the  past 
and  to  all  the  future  of  the  whole  system  -of  things. 
A  child  may  view  the  complicated  engine  of  a  great 
modern  steamer.  He  has  been  taught  the  general 
theory  on  which  engines  are  constructed  ;  he  under- 
stands the  properties  of  steam  ;  his  mechanical 
knowledge  enables  him  at  once  to  comprehend  the 
function  of  the  piston  and  the  crank,  and  to  see 
how  power  is  transmitted  to  the  shaft.  But  he  will 
be  puzzled  by  many  elaborate  contrivances,  some 
of  which  will  not  be  called  into  play  till  a  wholly 
new  emergency  arises. 

The  existence  of  so  much  actual  pain  and  suffer- 
ing presents  a  darker  problem,  a  problem  which  the 
human  mind,  with  its  present  knowledge,  may  not 
be  able  to  solve.  Yet  there  are  considerations  here 
which  deserve  attention.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  pain 
serves  some  useful  purposes.  It  has  a  preservative 
use,  and  supplies  a  needed  warning  against  the  ap- 
proach of  danger.  Without  this  constant  monition 
animals  would  be  continually  running  into  peril.  To 
this  extent,  therefore,  pain  may  be  regarded  as  a 
proof  of  benevolence  on  the  part  of  the  author  of 
nature.  Again,  pain  is  a  powerful  stimulus  to  exer- 
tion. The  keen  sense  of  hunger  stirs  us  to  secure 
food,  and  those  animals  which  depend  most  on  their 
own  energies  for  self  support  are  precisely  the  ani- 


262  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

mals  which  rank  highest  in  the  scale  of  animated 
beings.  And  here  it  should  be  noticed  that  if  the 
theory  of  evolution  be  accepted  as  established,  all 
these  seeming  defects  and  anomalies  of  the  organic 
world  afford  new  proofs  of  a  wise  and  benevolent 
purpose  in  the  arrangement  of  things,  since  they 
must  all  be  regarded  as  the  necessary  means  and 
conditions  of  the  preservation  and  improvement  of 
successive  races.  Evolution  removes  many  difficul- 
ties in  the  natural  world. 

I  do  not  urge  these  considerations  as  a  solution  of 
the  mystery  of  physical  pain  and  suffering,  but  sim- 
ply as  showing  that,  with  our  limited  understanding 
of  the  matter,  pain  and  suffering  cannot  be  fairly 
shown  to  conflict  with  the  positive  proofs  of  benevo- 
lence which  the  universe  presents.  The  same  line 
of  argument  will  help  us  when  we  advance  to  the 
darker  mystery  of  moral  evil.  The  same  reasons 
which  forbid  us  to  infer  that  suffering  is  inconsistent 
with  the  divine  goodness,  will  make  us  shrink  from 
the  conclusion  that  moral  evil  is  inconsistent  with 
the  divine  righteousness.  In  neither  case  can  hu- 
man reason  reach  any  complete  solution  of  the  prob- 
lem, yet  with  regard  to  both  these  questions  we  may 
safely  take  the  ground  that  positive  proof,  on  the 
one  hand,  is  not  invalidated  by  partial  knowledge  on 
the  other.  That  there  is  a  law  of  right,  is  revealed 
to  us  in  consciousness,  that  the  government  of  the 
world  must  conform  to  this  supreme  law  is  a  convic- 
tion which  is  forced  upon  the  mind  with  a  power  too 
overwhelming  to  be  shaken  by  any  doubts  or  mis- 
givings which  may  arise  when  we  fail  to  trace  this 
law  in  the  tangled  web  of  human  experience. 

We  may  ask  the  old  question,  why  a  perfectly  holy 


CONSCIENCE  AND  A   MORAL   ORDER.         263 

being  should  permit  sin  to  exist  at  all.  No  doubt  we 
can  conceive  of  intelligent  creatures  so  formed  as 
always  to  follow  the  path  of  right.  Why  then  should 
a  man  have  been  brought  into  existence  certain  to 
go  astray  ?  But  we  have  seen,  in  the  physical  world, 
that  sensibility  to  pain  and  suffering  keeps  pace  with 
higher  endowment,  and  that  those  who  enjoy  most 
are  also  liable  to  suffer  most.  As  we  rise  from  the 
sphere  of  physical  to  the  sphere  of  moral  life,  the 
same  rule  holds,  and  the  greater  the  endowment 
the  greater  becomes  the  liability  to  its  abuse.  The 
highest  endowment  of  all  is  the  free  agency,  in  the 
very  nature  of  which  is  involved  the  possibility  that 
man  may  rebel  against  the  moral  law.  If  moral  be- 
ings were  to  exist  in  the  universe  at  all,  so  far  as  we 
can  see  they  could  only  exist  under  this  condition. 
The  question,  therefore,  whether  moral  evil  should 
exist,  resolves  itself  into  the  question,  whether  man 
himself  should  exist.  But  the  question,  why  the 
world  should  have  been  constituted  as  it  is,  or  why 
it  should  not  have  been  a  different  world,  is  a  ques- 
tion which  we  are  not  here  discussing. 

All  that  we  have  to  show  is  that  the  existence  of 
moral  evil  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  idea  of  moral 
government.  We  have  seen  that  liability  to  sin  is 
involved  in  the  idea  of  free  agency  ;  it  is  not  less  true 
that  the  existence  of  moral  disorder  implies  moral 
order.  For,  it  is  evident,  that  moral  disorder  can 
exist  only  as  the  counterpart  and  antithesis  of  moral 
order,  for  the  very  notion  of  moral  evil  implies  a  good 
which  it  contravenes,  and  a  moral  law  by  which  it  is 
condemned.  We  cannot  conceive  of  a  being  as  per- 
verted and  depraved,  unless  we  have  in  our  minds 
the  idea  of  a  moral  standard  to  which  that  being  has 


264  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

failed  to  conform.  Sin  is  not  primary  and  original, 
but  secondary  and  derivative.  We  can  only  be  con- 
scious of  it  as  violation  of  law.  If,  then,  we  admit 
the  existence  in  the  universe  of  any  such  thing  as 
moral  evil,  we  must  admit  the  presence  and  impera- 
tive sway  of  moral  law.  The  two  conceptions  are 
correlates  of  one  another.  We  may  take  the  ground 
that  the  sense  of  sin  in  man  is  a  delusion,  we  may 
confound  the  distinction  between  moral  and  physical 
impulses,  but  if  we  recognize  the  mystery  of  moral 
evil  we  must  recognize  the  reality  of  moral  law. 

Furthermore,  in  considering  the  problem  of  moral 
evil  we  should  have  always  in  mind  what  was  shown 
with  regard  to  physical  evil :  that  the  narrow  field 
open  to  our  vision  is  only  part  of  a  general  system 
of  things.  The  laws  of  the  moral,  like  the  laws  of 
the  physical  world,  are  connected  together  and  form 
a  great  whole;  and  the  wisdom  or  justice  of  any 
specific  arrangement  can  be  estimated  rightly  only 
by  one  to  whose  gaze  the  whole  is  revealed.  We 
can  clearly  perceive  that  much  of  the  moral  evil 
existing  in  the  world  is  incidental  to  such  a  system. 
If  this  principle  fails  to  yield  a  complete  evolution 
of  the  problem,  we  are  still  not  authorized  to  con- 
clude that  the  unknown  remainder  is  in  conflict  with 
the  results  already  reached.  The  solid  fact  on  which 
we  stand  is  the  moral  sense.  We  have  clearly  revealed 
in  moral  consciousness  the  existence  and  authority 
of  moral  law.  Many  of  the  facts  of  human  life  tend 
powerfully  to  confirm  this  testimony ;  some  seem  to 
contradict  it.  But  contradictions,  the  real  import 
and  force  of  which  we  have  no  means  of  estimating, 
cannot  weigh  against  a  testimony  of  which  we  are 
directly  conscious. 


LECTURE   IX. 

HISTORY    AND    A    MORAL   PURPOSE. 

In  reasoning  back,  as  we  have  thus  far,  from  the 
facts  of  man's  moral  consciousness  to  the  existence 
of  a  moral  law,  and  as  a  legitimate  inference  from 
this,  to  the  existence  of  moral  attributes  in  the  first 
cause,  we  have  considered  the  facts  of  consciousness 
simply  as  presented  in  the  individual.  Our  starting- 
point  has  been  what  each  one  of  us  knows  of  him- 
self. This  self-consciousness  we  have  assumed  as  a 
fact  directly  revealed,  and  we  have  reasoned  from  it 
precisely  as  we  reason  from  any  fact  given  in  nature. 
Man,  whatever  else  we  may  say  of  him,  is  a  natural 
phenomenon,  and  all  that  belongs  to  man  must  be 
accepted  as  part  of  the  whole  system  of  things.  His 
moral  consciousness  is  as  indubitable  a  fact  as  any- 
thing presented  in  the  physical  universe.  All  that 
is  required  for  the  validity  of  the  argument  is  to 
discriminate  carefully  between  what  belongs  simply 
to  the  individual  and  what  belongs  to  man  as  man. 
Or,  in  other  words,  the  argument  from  moral  con- 
sciousness makes  its  appeal  to  facts  in  man's  moral 
nature  which  are  recognized  as  universal. 

But  this  argument  may  be  greatly  extended  and 
strengthened  by  being  considered  from  a  different 
point.  Man  is  something  more  than  an  individual  ; 
he  is  a  member  of  a  race  ;  he  is  an  integral  part  of  a 
great  human  family.     It  is  not  more  certain  that  he 


266  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

exists,  than  that  he  exists  in  connection  with  other 
beings  like  himself,  and  that  his  existence  is  condi- 
tioned by  theirs.  The  individual  is  part  of  the  whole, 
and  all  are  members  one  of  another.  No  one  of  us 
could  be  precisely  what  he  is  but  for  others  existing 
around  us.  Nor  are  we  determined  simply  by  these 
present  conditions.  Not  only  those  who  exist  with 
us,  but  all  those  who  have  existed  before  us,  are  in  a 
certain  sense  a  part  of  ourselves.  Their  existence 
was  just  as  much  the  condition  of  our  existence,  and 
no  one  of  us  could  be  what  he  is  but  for  influ- 
ences which  they  have  put  in  motion.  Thus  each 
one  of  us  was  shaped  by  influences  that  existed  be- 
fore he  was  born,  influences  that  were  not  only 
immediate,  but  remote,  and  that  go  back  to  the  be- 
ginning of  time.  So  we  are  led  back  to  the  most 
impressive  fact  presented  in  human  history,  —  that 
of  the  unity  of  the  race. 

The  question  which  now  presents  itself  is,  whether 
we  can  apply  to  the  race  the  same  method  of  reason- 
ing which  we  have  applied  to  the  individual.  As 
we  have  deduced  from  the  facts  of  individual  con- 
sciousness the  presence  and  binding  authority  of 
moral  law,  can  we  deduce  the  same  conclusion  from 
the  facts  of  human  history  considered  on  a  large 
scale.  From  the  long  and  checkered  story  of  the 
human  race,  from  its  incessant  struggles,  from  its 
ever-changing  and  apparently  confused  and  bewil- 
dering phases,  from  its  alternating  epochs  of  decay 
and  growth,  of  decline  and  progress,  can  we  draw 
any  valid  and  satisfactory  inference  respecting  a 
moral  government  of  the  world.  The  question  is 
evidently  the  supreme  question  of  historical  study. 
It  dominates  over  every  other,  and  unless  it  can  be 


HISTORY  AND  A   MORAL   PURPOSE.  267 

answered,  all  other  historical  questions  can  claim 
only  a  very  limited  and  secondary  interest.  Ques- 
tions as  to  the  origin  of  races  and  of  nations,  as  to 
the  source  and  growth  of  political  institutions,  as  to 
the  rise  and  fall  of  dynasties,  sink  into  insignificance 
when  we  once  set  before  us  this  solemn  question  as 
to  the  meaning  of  human  history  itself. 

And  while,  for  convenience,  we  here  consider  the 
argument  from  individual  consciousness  and  the  ar- 
gument from  history  as  separate  and  apart,  yet  it  is 
evident  that  they  are  closely  connected,  and  that  one 
depends  upon  the  other.  The  facts  of  history  are 
so  complicated  and  confused,  they  present,  when 
looked  at  externally,  so  little  evidence  of  order  and 
connection,  that  we  should  seek  in  vain  to  wind  our 
way  through  the  labyrinth  without  the  clew  that  in- 
dividual consciousness  affords.  Without  the  light 
cast  upon  the  facts  of  history  by  our  own  inner  con- 
viction of  the  reality  of  a  moral  law,  we  should  find 
that  law  nowhere  printed  on  its  pages.  The  argu- 
ment from  history  must  therefore  follow,  and  not  pre- 
cede, the  argument  from  the  moral  sense.  Unless 
we  have  first  satisfied  ourselves,  beyond  a  doubt, 
that  man  is  a  moral  creature,  and  that  he  recognizes 
his  responsibility  to  a  moral  law,  we  shall  see  human 
history  as  a  mere  physical  progression,  such  as  that 
which  the  slow  growth  of  the  oak,  through  centuries 
of  storm  and  sunshine  shows,  or  the  restless  heaving 
of  an  ocean,  whose  alternating  ebb  and  flow  show  no 
orderly  progression.  | 

The  specific  inquiry  which  presents  itself,  then,  at 
this  stage  of  our  argument,  is  this  :  whether  the  his- 
tory of  the  race,  considered  as  a  whole,  confirms  the 
testimony  of  the  individual  consciousness  as  to  the 


268  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

existence  of  a  moral  order.  But  to  reach  a  satisfac- 
tory answer  to  this  question,  we  have  evidently  first 
to  ascertain  whether  any  conception  of  order,  or  uni- 
formity, or  law,  can  be  applied  to  history.  Unless 
we  can  first  demonstrate  that  such  a  conception  of 
human  society  as  brings  it  within  the  domain  of  law 
is  not  absurd  or  self-contradictory,  it  will  be  idle  to 
attempt  to  trace  the  presence  of  moral  law.  The 
progress  of  science  has  accustomed  us  to  recognize 
the  presence  and  reign  of  law  throughout  the  nat- 
ural world.  Not  only  the  orderly  phenomena  pre- 
sented in  the  motions  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  but 
what  seemed  the  most  discordant  and  irregular  and 
abnormal  processes  of  nature,  are  now  seen  to  be 
reduced  under  this  common  principle.  Our  charts 
are  no  longer  confined  to  the  solid  shore,  but  mark 
out  as  well  the  windings  of  ocean  currents,  and  we 
turn  with  confidence  to  our  morning  papers  for  the 
indications  of  the  storm  that  is  slowly  gathering  on 
the  slopes  of  the  Rocky  Mountains. 

But  when  we  turn  our  gaze  from  external  nature 
to  those  voluntary  acts  of  man  which  form  the  sum 
and  substance  of  human  history,  we  shrink  from  ap- 
plying this  universal  rule.  At  first  sight  it  seems  to 
us  that  we  have  passed  to  a  wholly  different  sphere, 
where  the  principles  which  regulate  the  physical  uni- 
verse cannot  apply.  We  are  now  dealing,  not  with 
the  phenomena  of  matter,  but  with  the  phenomena 
of  spirit ;  and  we  instinctively  refuse  to  submit  our 
consciousness  of  free  agency  to  a  principle  which 
seemingly  reduces  all  human  acts  to  inevitable  fate. 
The  application  of  law  to  history  seems  to  place  the 
phenomena  of  human  consciousness  on  a  level  with 
physical  facts,  and  human  life  becomes  like  the  flow- 


HISTORY  AND  A   MORAL  PURPOSE.  269 

ering  of  a  plant,  or  like  the  certain  evolution  of  the 
tree  from  its  seed.  Hence  the  attempt  to  apply  to 
history  the  methods  of  science,  the  mere  suggestion, 
even,  that  the  phenomena  of  history  can  be  grouped 
under  general  principles,  that  the  movements  of  hu- 
man society  have  conformed  to  any  fixed  and  ascer- 
tainable laws,  has  awakened  in  many  quarters  an 
earnest  opposition,  on  the  ground  that  such  a  view 
is  inconsistent  with  any  religious  theory  of  human 
life. 

Yet,  in  spite  of  the  repugnance  at  first  awakened 
by  the  suggestion  that  human-  history  is  thus  gov- 
erned by  general  laws,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the 
tendency  of  human  thought,  when  earnestly  applied 
to  the  study  of  history,  has  been  in  this  direction. 
The  human  mind  is  so  made  that  it  instinctively  re- 
coils from  the  recognition,  in  any  sphere,  of  nothing 
but  disorder  and  confusion.  And  when,  by  its  more 
profound  and  accurate  study  of  physical  phenomena 
it  had  been  trained  in  the  habit  of  tracing  every- 
where the  presence  of  law,  it  all  the  more  shrank 
from  the  conclusion  that,  in  the  highest  sphere 
of  natural  operations,  law  should  not  somehow  be 
found  acting.  The  ancient  observer,  with  his  frag- 
mentary and  discordant  view  of  nature,  might  rest 
content  with  likening  human  history  to  a  restless 
waste  of  waters  ;  but  the  modern  mind,  by  the  intel- 
lectual methods  to  which  it  has  become  habituated, 
is  forced  to  trace  unity  and  order  in  all  phenomena, 
and  reject  as  incredible  the  notion  that  a  principle 
so  clearly  and  so  universally  manifested  in  all  the 
lower  stages  of  creation,  should  be  wholly  suspended 
or  annulled  when  we  turn  our  investigation  to  the 
higher. 


270  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

The  historic  method  has  been  aptly  and  truly  de- 
scribed as  the  characteristic  intellectual  habit  of  the 
present  age.  We  study  facts,  not  simply  as  they 
are  presented  to  us  at  the  present  instant,  but  in  the 
whole  course  of  their  development.  To  know  the 
human  functions  in  their  full  action  we  go  back  even 
to  man's  embryonic  life,  and  trace  the  successive 
stages  by  which  each  part  has  come  to  be  precisely 
what  it  is.  To  comprehend  the  laws  of  speech,  and 
the  subtle  analogies  of  language,  we  are  not  content 
to  study  the  literature  of  a  nation  at  its  epoch  of 
supreme  perfection,  or  even  to  trace  the  history  of  a 
single  tongue,  but  compare  dialect  with  dialect,  and 
syntax  with  syntax,  in  all  the  successive  stages  of 
their  growth,  till  we  go  back  beyond  recorded  time 
and  lift  the  mysterious  veil  that  hides  the  beginnings 
of  nations  and  tribes.  And,  in  doing  this,  we  recog- 
nize the  great  truth,  that  both  the  human  frame  and 
human  speech  have  passed  through  successive  but 
connected  states,  that  each  state  has  been,  in  turn, 
a  cause  and  an  effect ;  and  a  common  law  of  growth 
and  evolution  has  bound  them  all  together,  leading 
on  to  a  definite  result. 

Comparative  philology,  with  all  the  splendid  infer- 
ences derived  from  it  respecting  the  early  history 
and  migrations  of  the  human  family,  rests  upon  the 
postulate  that  language  is  an  evolution,  that  this 
evolution  conforms  to  fixed  laws,  and  that  these  laws 
can  be  ascertained.  But  the  growth  of  language  is 
a  rational  process,  for  the  possession  of  language 
is  the  universal  characteristic  which  marks  man  as 
a  rational  being.  It  is  not  a  part  of  his  physical 
structure,  but  springs  out  of  his  supreme  intellectual 
endowments.     The  growth  of  language  is  the  most 


HISTORY  AND  A   MORAL   PURPOSE.  27 1 

evident  and  certain  index  of  his  rational  develop- 
ment, the  delicacy  and  refinement  and  precision  of 
his  modes  of  speech  always  keeping  pace  with  his 
mental  stature.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  man  in 
his  intellectual  growth  is  subject  to  law,  and  that  his 
mental,  not  less  than  his  physical  characteristics, 
are  evolved  in  regular  succession,  and  in  accordance 
with  definite  methods.  No  other  conclusion  than  this 
can  be  reconciled  with  the  facts  which  the  history  of 
language,  and  the  history  of  human  society,  alike 
present.  We  trace  everywhere  the  presence  of  uni- 
formity, of  order,  of  law. 

And  if,  granting  all  this,  it  may  be  objected  that 
the  law  thus  manifested  in  human  actions,  and  in 
human  society,  must  be,  after  all,  a  wholly  different 
kind  of  law  from  that  so  clearly  revealed  in  the  oper- 
ations of  physical  nature,  we  may  ask  in  reply  what 
proof  is  there  of  this.  For  we  have  already  seen,  in 
an  earlier  part  of  our  discussion,  that  what  we  term 
laws  of  physical  nature  are  simply  the  operation  of 
forces,  and  that  the  tendency  of  science  is  to  reduce 
all  these  to  the  manifestations  of  a  single  force,  of 
which  they  are  but  modifications,  and  into  which 
they  continually  pass,  and  so  far  as  we  can  see  this 
ultimate  force  may  be  simply  will.  So  far  as  we  can 
see  in  nature,  the  principles  of  arrangement  which 
govern  the  relations  of  forces  are  purely  mental, 
and  the  most  adequate  conception  wre  can  form  of 
force  is  derived  directly  from  our  own  consciousness 
of  vital  power.  If  this  be  true,  it  follows  that  the 
law  which  manifests  itself  in  the  phenomena  of  mat- 
ter, and  the  law  which  manifests  itself  in  the  phe- 
nomena of  mind,  may  be  the  same  law,  or  law  in 
precisely  the  same  sense  is  equally  present  and 
equally  operative  in  either  sphere. 


272  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

The  conclusion  here  reached  is  one  of  so  much 
importance  that  it  may  be  well,  before  going  further, 
to  indicate  more  fully  the  grounds  on  which  it  rests. 
And  here  let  me  repeat  what  I  have  stated  before, 
that  this  whole  argument  in  which  we  are  engaged 
proceeds  from  facts.  I  am  not  attempting  an  a  pri- 
ori, but  an  a  posteriori,  demonstration.  My  steady 
aim  from  the  beginning  has  been,  not  to  reason  from 
abstract  premises,  but  from  the  evident  and  acknowl- 
edged phenomena  of  nature  and  of  life,  not  from  the 
unknown  to  the  known,  but  from  the  known  to  the 
unknown.  We  began  with  the  facts  given  in  the  ex- 
1  ternal  world  ;  from  those  we  argued  back  to  an  in- 
telligent cause  ;  we  proceeded  next  to  the  facts  of 
human  consciousness,  and  from  those  argued  back 
to  a  moral  cause.  We  are  now,  in  the  same  way, 
dealing  with  the  facts  of  human  history,  viewed  on 
a  large  scale,  and  in  their  manifest  connections.  But 
our  present  starting-point,  just  as  much  as  when  we 
fixed  our  gaze  upon  the  uniform  movements  of  the 
heavenly  bodies,  or  the  arrangements  of  man's  phys- 
ical frame,  is  the  domain  of  facts.  Of  these  human 
history,  in  its  various  forms  of  written  annals,  lit- 
erature, art,  institutions,  manners,  philosophy,  relig- 
ion, is  simply  the  record.  Not  only  is  the  history 
of  man,  taken  as  a  whole,  a  great  fact,  but  it  is  the 
greatest  of  all  facts  of  which  we  can  have  any  direct 
knowledge.  Without  any  disparagement  of  the  nat- 
ural sciences,  and  recognizing  to  the  fullest  extent 
the  enormous  and  splendid  progress  of  physical  dis- 
covery in  our  own  time,  I  still  assert,  with  confi- 
dence, that  man  and  his  achievements  still  form  the 
noblest  and  most  interesting  subject  of  human  in- 
quiry.    As  the  highest  product  of  nature  is  human 


HISTORY  AND   A   MORAL  PURPOSE.  273 

intelligence  and  human  character,  so  the  investiga- 
tion of  the  phenomena  presented  in  human  life  opens 
the  highest  field  of  human  research.  We  are  borne, 
in  this  generation,  on  a  great  wave  of  physical  dis- 
covery ;  we  are  dazzled,  for  the  moment,  by  the  bril- 
liancy of  the  results  which  modern  methods  of  phys- 
ical research  have  reached,  yet  the  time  can  never 
come  when  moral  and  spiritual  problems  will  not 
assert  their  rightful  supremacy,  and  when,  in  our 
sober  moments  of  reflection,  we  shall  not  acknowl- 
edge that  man's  destiny  possesses  for  us  a  more 
vital  interest  than  any  other  question. 

Now,  contemplating  human  history  as  a  whole, 
we  are  shut  up  to  one  of  two  alternatives.  We  may 
look  at  its  successive  phases  simply  as  a  series  of 
disconnected  facts,  without  order  or  design,  without 
coherence  or  connection,  without  mutual  dependence 
or  relation.  We  may  regard  the  great  events  of 
history  as  following  one  another  in  time,  with  no 
connection  or  relation  as  causes  or  effects,  with  no 
natural,  or  necessary,  or  designed  antecedence  or 
consequence.  According  to  this  theory,  we  may 
take  any  single  event,  or  any  given  series  of  events, 
and  may  suppose  that  the  antecedent  course  of 
events  may  have  been  wholly  different,  or  even  con- 
trary, or  we  may  take  any  event,  or  series  of  events, 
and  suppose  that  the  consequences  may  have  been 
wholly  different  or  contrary.  Thus  we  may  suppose 
that  our  recent  civil  war  may  have  broken  out  pre- 
cisely as  it  did,  even  had  slavery  never  existed  on 
this  continent,  and  had  these  States  never  been  com- 
bined in  a  federal  Union  ;  or  that  the  American  Rev- 
olution may  have  pursued  the  precise  course  it  did, 
and  yet  the  great  republic  of  the  New  World  never 
18 


274  rHE    THE  I  STIC  ARGUMENT. 

have  been  called  into  existence.  For,  according  to 
this  view,  all  events  are  disconnected  and  independ- 
ent, and  one  series  of  events  has  no  causal  relation 
to  another.  A  theory  so  directly  in  the  face  of  the 
manifest  course  of  history  might  seem  too  absurd  to 
be  seriously  maintained,  yet  it  has  found,  at  times, 
its  theoretical  defenders,  and  is  practically  main- 
tained in  some  current  maxims  and  recognized  prac- 
tices of  society.  And,  at  first  sight,  it  must  be 
admitted  that  some  facts  go  to  establish  it.  As  in 
nature,  so  in  human  life  there  are  many  phenom- 
ena which  refuse  to  be  brought  under  any  established 
theory  ;  and  the  story  of  man  is  the  story  of  so  much 
suffering,  so  much  crime,  so  much  bloodshed,  so 
much  oppression  of  the  weak  by  the  strong,  so  much 
triumph  of  evil  over  good,  of  so  much  disappoint- 
ment of  cherished  hopes,  and  so  much  failure  to 
realize  lofty  ideals,  that  in  hours  of  disappointment 
and  despondency  and  sorrow  it  is  not  strange  that 
even  earnest  souls  have  harbored  the  harrowing  sus- 
picion that  while  law  rules  the  physical  world,  only 
disorder  and  anarchy  and  blind  chance  control  the 
movements  of  that  higher  sphere  where  man  is  left 
as  a  free  agent  to  shape  his  own  course. 

But,  if  we  refuse  to  rest  in  this  comfortless  con- 
clusion, there  is  but  one  alternative  remaining,  and 
that  is  to  accept  the  view  already  stated;  that  law 
pervades  the  spiritual  as  it  pervades  the  natural 
world.  One  of  these  two  conclusions  we  must  adopt 
if  we  reflect  upon  human  history  and  human  des- 
tiny at  all.  In  accepting  the  alternative,  we  are  not 
required  to  define  the  precise  sense  in  which  we  use 
the  term  law,  we  only  assert  it  as  the  denial  of  an- 
archy and  disorder.     The  choice  is  between  chance 


HISTORY  AND  A   MORAL  PURPOSE.  275 

or  law ;  how  we  are  to  interpret  law  is  a  question  to 
be  considered  later.  Law  is  simply  the  contradic- 
tion of  chance  ;  it  denies  what  the  theory  of  chance 
affirms,  —  incoherence  and  disorder  in  the  sequence 
of  events ;  and  it  affirms  what  the  theory  of  chance 
denies,  —  coherence  and  order  in  the  sequence  of 
events.  If,  therefore,  we  accept  this  theory  of  human 
history,  events  will  be  no  longer  viewed  as  discon- 
nected and  discontinuous,  but  as  intimately  related 
to  each  other,  as  inseparably  interwoven,  and  as  mu- 
tually dependent.  It  regards  the  successive  phases 
of  human  history,  like  the  successive  phases  of  indi- 
vidual life,  as  issuing  one  from  another,  and  as  stand- 
ing in  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect. 

And,  however  in  moments  of  despondency  we 
may  be  inclined  to  view  the  course  of  human  history 
as  an  unmeaning  and  aimless  struggle  of  conflicting 
forces,  when  we  calmly  review  its  successive  phases 
in  the  light  of  sober  reason  we  cannot  content  our- 
selves with  anything  short  of  this  second  view.  We 
are  forced  to  regard  the  events  of  history  in  the 
relation  of  cause  and  effect.  And,  if  the  study  of 
history  has  made  any  progress  in  modern  times,  it 
has  been  precisely  in  the  direction  of  viewing  history 
as  a  connected  whole,  where  the  phenomena  of  one 
epoch  find  their  rational  explanation  in  the  phenom- 
ena of  a  preceding.  We  instinctively  take  this  view. 
In  our  habitual  speech  we  talk  of  the  growth  of  in- 
stitutions and  of  nations.  He  would,  indeed,  only 
expose  himself  to  contempt  and  ridicule  who  should 
adopt  any  other  language.  We  look  upon  the  English 
constitution  as  having  its  roots  far  back  in  feudal 
society ;  we  account  for  the  atrocities  of  the  Reign 
of  Terror  from  the  shameless  immorality  and  unbe- 


276  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

lief  of  the  old  regime.     Thus  we  recognize  the  prin- 
ciple that  the  course  of  history  is  not   swayed  by 
chance,  but  that  each  age  is  what  it  is  because  of 
(the  ages  that  have  gone  before  it. 

The  principal  objection  to  this  view  of  history 
springs  from  its  supposed  antagonism  to  the  free- 
dom of  the  human  will.  Those  who  deny  that  the 
course  of  human  history  and  the  successive  phases 
of  human  society  show  any  regular  sequence  and 
any  trace  of  a  pervading  law,  do  so,  for  the  most 
part,  on  the  ground  that  such  a  theory  would  inevi- 
tably degrade  human  action  to  the  level  of  mere 
physical  causation.'  Thus,  for  example,  Goldwin 
Smith,  in  combating  the  idea  that  any  scientific 
method  can  be  applied  to  history,  asserts  that  it 
would  make  man  a  beast  or  a  blade  of  grass,  that 
it  establishes  a  contradiction  between  our  outward 
observation  and  our  inner  consciousness,  and  makes 
us  render  up  our  personality,  and  become  a  mere 
link  in  a  chain  of  causation,  a  mere  grain  in  a  mass 
of  being.  If  history  is  governed  by  fixed  laws,  con- 
science becomes  an  illusion,  and  any  rule  of  right 
action  is  rendered,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  impos- 
sible. Such  an  objection,  if  well  grounded,  is  a  most 
formidable  one,  and  if  consequences  like  these  inev- 
itably follow,  it  is  not  strange  that  so  many  have 
revolted  from  the  notion  that  there  is  a  necessary 
sequence  in  human  events. 
t  But  no  one  will  question  for  a  moment  that  indi- 
:  vidual  character  is  a  growth,  and  that  from  infancy 
and  youth  to  mature  years  there  is  in  each  one  of 
us  a  continuous  process  of  development,  where  each 
stage  is  the  result  of  preceding  stages,  and  where  the 
whole  conforms  to  a  uniform  and  regular  order.     AH 


HISTORY  AND  A   MORAL   PURPOSE.  2  J  J 

our  systems  of  education  are  based  upon  this  princi- 
ple. Yet,  in  thus  developing  according  to  a  law  of 
growth,  we  do  not  suppose  that  the  will  is  fettered, 
or  that  personality  suffers  any  invasion  of  its  rights. 
I  do  not  design  here  to  enter  into  any  discussion  of 
the  old  problem,  in  what  the  freedom  of  the  will 
consists  ;  all  that  I  wish  to  assert  is,  that  whatever 
view  we  may  take  of  the  freedom  of  the  human  will, 
we  do  not  view  it  as  inconsistent  with  a  develop- 
ment of  the  individual  such  as  is  seen  to  be  in  ac- 
cordance with  uniform  laws.  And,  when  we  turn 
from  the  individual  to  the  larger  man  which  we  term 
society,  there  is  no  more  reason  to  suppose  that  there 
is  any  necessary  conflict.  In  other  words,  if  we 
admit  a  sequence  in  the  individual  there  is  no  rea- 
son for  denying  it  in  the  race.  If  the  freedom  of 
the  will  is  reconcilable  with  the  one  hypothesis,  it 
must  be  reconcilable  with  the  other  also. 

But,  in  fact,  the  freedom  of  the  will  is  a  purely 
metaphysical  problem  with  which  the  student  of  his- 
tory, as  such,  has  nothing  to  do.  His  concern,  as  I 
have  said  before,  is  simply  with  the  facts  that  history 
presents.  If  these  facts,  viewed  on  a  large  scale,  are 
seen  to  be  connected,  if  they  manifestly  follow  a  cer- 
tain order,  if  they  are  shown,  beyond  doubt,  to  be 
connected  as  cause  and  effect,  as  antecedent  and 
consequent,  the  student  of  history  has  no  right  to 
ignore,  or  to  set  aside,  such  phenomena  simply  for 
the  reason  that  he  cannot  reconcile  them  with  his 
theory  of  human  freedom.  He  is  bound  to  reason 
from  the  facts  as  they  are,  not  from  the  facts  as  he 
would  like  to  find  them.  And  if  he  holds  fast  to  the 
testimony  of  his  own  consciousness  that  he  is  a  free 
and  responsible  agent,  he  is  bound  to  believe  that 


2?8  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT, 

this  is  not  irreconcilable  with  regular  development 
of  historical  events,  even  though  he  does  not  see 
how  such  reconciliation  can  be  effected.  But  the 
immediate  question  is  simply  one  of  fact,  and  this 
question  must  be  answered,  not  by  analyzing  con- 
sciousness, but  by  searching  the  broad  page  of  his- 
tory itself.  Here  we  must  look  for  the  proof  that 
human  affairs  conform  to  law. 

We  may  dismiss,  then,  without  hesitation,  as  in- 
conclusive and  irrelevant,  any  objection  to  the  doc- 
trine that  law  pervades  and  controls  the  development 
of  human  society  that  is  derived  from  the  supposed 
conflict  of  such  a  theory  with  human  freedom.  And 
not  only  may  we  take  this  negative  ground,  but  we 
may  go  further  and  assert  without  hesitation,  that 
as  human  character  cannot  be  conceived  of  apart 
from  the  shaping  influence  of  law,  so  human  society 
cannot  be  conceived  of  if  law,  in  the  same  way,  does 
not  enter  into  it.  For,  as  we  have  seen,  there  are 
but  two  alternatives,  chance  or  law  ;  no  third  hy- 
pothesis is  possible.  So  that,  unless  we  are  pre- 
pared to  admit  that  all  the  marvelous  growth  of  hu- 
man civilization  is  the  product  of  blind  chance,  the 
actual  result  being  simply  one  out  of  countless  myr- 
iads of  possible  results  that  might  have  come  to 
pass  but  did  not,  we  must  adopt  the  only  other  hy- 
pothesis, that  the  course  of  human  society,  from  the 
beginning,  has  been  shaped  by  some  guiding  princi- 
ple, and  that  even  into  those  phenomena  which  seem 
most  wayward  and  anomalous,  the  causes  of  which 
elude  our  closest  scrutiny,  law  has  also  entered. 

The  question,  then,  whether  the  phenomena  of 
society,  considered  on  a  large  scale,  indicate  a  pres- 
ence and  operation  of  law  analogous  to  that  wit- 


HISTORY  AND  A   MORAL  PURPOSE.  2?g 

nessed  in  the  physical  universe,  is  a  question  of  fact, 
to  be  determined  simply  by  an  investigation  of  the 
phenomena  themselves.  And  here  it  is  needless  to 
remark  that,  in  entering  upon  such  an  investigation, 
we  must  be  prepared  to  encounter  difficulties  far 
more  formidable  than  any  which  we  encounter  in  the 
study  of  mere  physical  phenomena.  We  not  only 
have  presented  a  different  class  of  facts,  but  facts 
which  submit  themselves  far  less  readily  to  analysis 
and  comparison.  The  facts  comprised  in  this  survey 
are  all  the  facts  which  relate  to  man  as  a  spiritual 
being.  While  in  one  sense,  as  facts  of  conscious- 
ness, they  lie  before  each  one  of  us,  in  another  sense, 
as  a  series  of  historical  phenomena,  they  lie  far  re- 
moved from  us,  and  cannot  be  accurately  ascertained. 
It  is  only,  in  fact,  when  we  regard  them  in  their 
broadest  aspects,  and  in  their  most  general  relations 
and  tendencies,  that  we  can  reason  about  them  with 
entire  confidence.  It  is  only  to  the  larger  phases 
and  aspects  which  humanity  presents  that  we  can 
make  our  appeal. 

Astronomy  was  the  earliest  science  to  become  es- 
tablished, and  for  the  simple  reason  that  astronomy 
dealt  with  phenomena  about  which  there  could  be  no 
dispute,  and  which  were  perpetually  recurring.  The 
speech  which  one  night  uttered  was  repeated  by  the 
next.  The  observer  who  was  in  doubt  respecting 
the  movements  of  one  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  had 
but  to  turn  again  his  optic  glass  to  the  same  quarter, 
and  he  saw  the  same  movement  a  second  time.  So 
in  physical  investigation,  if  there  is  any  doubt  re- 
specting the  result  of  an  experiment,  the  same  ex- 
periment can  be  repeated.  The  chemist  has  on  his 
table  all  the  conditions  of  his  search.     But  in  the 


280  THE   THE/STIC  ARGUMENT. 

evolution  of  society,  neither  do  the  phenomena  re- 
cur, nor  can  they  be  repeated  at  the  will  of  the 
observer.  There  is  an  endless  succession  of  phe- 
nomena, a  stream  of  causes  and  effects,  in  whose 
restless  tide  the  observer  himself  is  borne  along.  It 
is  therefore  obvious  that  we  cannot  speak  of  the  laws 
of  history  in  the  same  precise  sense  in  which  we 
speak  of  mathematical  or  physical  laws.  What  we 
mean  by  social  or  historical  laws  are  simply  certain 
tendencies  seen  when  we  view  the  events  of  history 
on  a  larg  5  scale  and  for  long  successive  periods. 

A  favorite  argument  with  those  who  reject  the 
doctrine  that  the  movements  of  human  society  re- 
veal the  presence  of  general  laws,  is  based  on  the 
objection  that  the  so-called  science  of  history  has 
shown  itself  thus  far  unable  to  predict  the  course  of 
events.  The  astronomer,  we  are  told,  can  predict 
an  eclipse ;  if  the  study  of  history  is  capable  of  be- 
ing reduced  to  scientific  method,  let  the  student  of 
history  predict  a  revolution.  Mr.  Froude  and  Prof. 
Goldwin  Smith  have  both  urged  this  objection  as  a 
conclusive  settlement  of  the  dispute.  Can  you  im- 
agine a  science,  asks  the  former,  which  could  have 
foretold  such  movements  as  Mohammedanism  or 
Buddhism?1  "Prediction,"  says  the  latter,  "the 
crown  of  all  science,  the  new  science  of  man  and  his- 
tory has  not  yet  ventured  to  put  on.  That  preroga- 
tive, which  is  the  test  of  her  legitimacy,  she  has  not 
yet  ventured  to  exert."2  But  in  the  objection  here 
urged,  there  is  a  singular  confusion  of  ideas.  In 
what  sense  is  prediction  the  crown  of  science  ?  The 
title  of  science  will  hardly  be  refused  to  geometry, 

1  [Short  Studies  on  Great  S?ibjects  (The  Science  of  History),  p.  20-1 

2  [Lectures  on  the  Study  of  History  (New  York  :   1866),  p.  56.] 


HISTORY  AND  A   MORAL   PURPOSE.  28 1 

yet  in  what  sense  does  geometry  predict  ?  Geology 
is  reckoned  among  the  sciences  ;  but  does  geology 
undertake  to  show  what  changes  will  be  witnessed 
hereafter  in  the  structure  of  the  earth  ?  And  even 
of  astronomy,  it  is  evident  that  prediction  can  be 
affirmed  only  in  a  very  limited  and  partial  sense, 
Strictly  speaking,  the  astronomer  predicts  nothing ; 
he  only  conditionally  affirms  that,,  if  the  conditions 
of  the  physical  universe  continue  to  be,  at  some 
future  time,  precisely  what  they  are  to-day,  certain 
results  will  follow.  Thus  he  is  able  to  say  that,  if 
the  solar  system  remains  precisely  as  it  now  is,  a 
transit  of  Venus  will  take  place  a  thousand  years 
from  now  ;  but  whether  the  solar  system  will  remain 
the  same  he  has  no  means  of  knowing.  We  only 
know  that  our  whole  solar  system  is  rushing  with 
inconceivable  rapidity  through  space ;  what  danger 
may  awrait  it  as  it  approaches  other  constellations 
the  wisest  astronomer  will  not  venture  to  affirm. 
When  wre  turn  to  a  science  like  biology,  the  range  of 
prevision  is  very  small  indeed.  He  would  be  a  bold 
physician  who  would  undertake  to  tell  the  day  and 
hour  when  any  one  of  us  is  destined  to  shuffle  off 
his  mortal  coil ;  yet  we  do  not  doubt  that  physiology 
is  a  science,  that  the  modifications  in  our  physical 
frames  are  governed  by  fixed  laws,  and  that  the 
causes  are  now  in  operation  destined,  sooner  or  later, 
to  bring  about  the  death  of  every  one  of  us.  So 
little  is  prediction  the  crown  of  science ! 

All  that  can  be  fairly  claimed  for  a  science  of  his- 
tory, or  of  human  society,  is  that  the  phenomena  of 
history  undeniably  exhibit  certain  tendencies  ;  that 
these  tendencies  are  uniform  and  point  to  a  definite 
result,  and  that  this  can  be  rationally  accounted  for 


282  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

only  on  the  hypothesis  that  certain  fixed  and  uni- 
form principles  pervade  and  control  the  entire  pro- 
cess. Beyond  this  we  cannot  go.  The  pretentious 
claims  that  have  been  put  forward  in  certain  quar- 
ters, the  crude  generalizations  that  have  been  set  up 
as  ascertained  laws,  the  audacious  assertion  that  the 
course  of  human  events  can  be  dissected  and  anal- 
yzed and  set  forth,  in  its  necessary  relations  with  the 
precision  and  certainty  with  which  we  determine  the 
movements  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  or  ascertain  the 
affinities  of  chemical  elements,  or  trace  the  complex 
phenomena  of  organic  life,  have  served  only  to  bring 
the  most  elevated  and  inspiring  of  all  studies  into 
the  contempt  of  sober  and  cautious  thinkers  ;  and 
no  one  has  contributed  more  to  this  unfortunate  re- 
sult than  a  writer  with  whom  the  scientific  study  of 
history  has  been  in  our  own  time  especially  identi- 
fied, the  late  Henry  Thomas  Buckle. 

The  simple  question  that  we  have  to  consider  is 
whether  the  history  of  the  race,  surveyed  from  its 
beginning,  shows  a  consecutive  and  onward  move- 
ment from  one  condition  to  another.  In  other 
words,  has  there  been  any  such  thing  as  progress  in 
human  history.  Such  an  inquiry  would  seem  to  be 
one  that  answers  itself.  How  can  we,  it  may  be 
asked,  for  a  moment  question  that  such  is  the  fact. 
How  can  we  give  the  most  cursory  glance  at  human 
history,  and  doubt  that  advancement  has  been  its 
constant  and  unmistakable  characteristic  ?  The 
problem  is,  however,  less  simple  than  at  first  sight 
may  appear.  When  we  note,  not  simply  the  more 
favored  races,  but  the  whole  human  family,  not 
progress,  but  stagnation,  or  even  decline,  seems  to 
be  the  rule.     We  see  more  signs  of  decay  and  of 


HISTORY  AND  A   MORAL   PURPOSE.  283 

death  than  of  life.  Social  and  intellectual  move- 
ment seems  effectually  checked.  Sir  Henry  Maine 
asserts  that  the  communities  that  have  attained  a 
conspicuous  degree  of  civilization  are,  after  all,  but 
the  minority  of  mankind.  And  when  we  survey 
the  whole  course  of  history,  we  are  struck  with  the 
fact  that  certain  memorable  epochs  were  epochs  of 
undeniable  decline. 

When,  therefore,  we  assert  progress  as  the  law  of 
human  society,  it  is  obvious  that  this  cannot  be  as- 
serted as  a  universal  and  constant  characteristic. 
Neither  is  progress  characteristic  of  any  one  state 
of  society,  considered  as  a  whole,  nor  is  it  the  uni- 
form characteristic  of  each  successive  state.  By 
the  side  of  progressive  nations  are  seen  nations 
whose  social  state  is  stagnant,  and  between  epochs 
of  onward  movement  come  epochs  of  decline.  By 
some  of  the  earliest  in  modern  times  who  main- 
tained man's  progressive  nature,  progress  was  as- 
serted as  something  necessary  and  universal,  as  an 
occult  tendency  in  society,  always  and  everywhere 
manifesting  its  presence.  A  more  comprehensive 
study  of  the  history  of  the  race  has  modified  this 
view.  Man  is  no  longer  contemplated  as  moving 
towards  perfection  in  accordance  with  a  uniform  and 
universal  law,  as  in  the  dreams  of  some  of  the 
social  reformers  of  the  last  century.  All  that  is 
claimed  is  that,  on  the  whole,  there  is  a  progress 
from  worse  to  better,  and  that,  in  the  long  run, 
the  history  of  the  race  affords  indubitable  proof 
that  man  has  advanced,  and  that  this  progress  is  the 
prominent  feature,  if  not  of  the  most  numerous,  yet 
of  the  most  conspicuous  races  of  men. 

In  ascertaining,  therefore,  the  fact  of  progress,  it 


28  J.  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT 

is  not  necessary  to  prove  that  progress  has  been  the 
characteristic  of  all  races,  or  of  all  ages.  Yet  it 
seems  evident  that  these  states  of  society  which 
now  appear  most  fixed,  where  all  onward  movement 
has  been  completely  arrested,  must  at  some  time 
have  been  progressive,  simply  to  have  reached  the 
present  state.  Hence  the  characteristic  in  which 
they  are  now  most  conspicuously  deficient  they 
must  have  unmistakably  exhibited  at  some  earlier 
stage  of  their  existence.  And  so,  too,  epochs  of 
decline  may  be  conditions  of  new  epochs  of  prog- 
ress ;  the  receding  wave  only  adding  to  the  force 
and  volume  of  the  next  rush  of  waters.  The  fall  of 
the  Western  Empire  paved  the  way  for  the  new  and 
more  vigorous  civilization  of  the  Middle  Age,  and 
the  corruptions  of  Latin  Christianity  furnished  a 
most  powerfur~stimulus  to  the  reform  of  the  six- 
teenth century.  So  that  when  we  look  at  the  his- 
tory of  the  race  as  a  whole,  when  we  study  its  suc- 
cessive epochs  in  their  relation  one  to  another,  we 
shall  find  little  difficulty  in  assenting  to  the  propo- 
sition that  progress  has  been  the  characteristic  of 
human  society. 

To  furnish  a  proof  of  this  broad  proposition,  even 
in  its  merest  outline,  would  carry  me  far  beyond  the 
limits  of  the  present  discussion.  The  proof  is  the 
whole  history  of  man,  viewed  in  every  line  of  his 
social,  his  political,  or  his  intellectual  life.  And 
not  simply  that  brief  portion  of  his  career  covered 
by  written  records,  or  traditions  preserved  in  litera- 
ture, but  all  that  has  been  recovered  of  his  primeval 
story  by  comparison  of  languages,  and  by  the  labo- 
rious accumulation  of  the  rude  memorials  that  he 
has  left  behind  of  his  early  presence  on  our  earth. 


HISTORY  AND  A   MORAL  PURPOSE.  285 

From  all  this  vast  array  of  facts  but  one  conclusion 
can  be  derived,  and  that  is  that  the  human  race  has 
reached  its  present  high  stage  of  civilization  by  a 
slow  and  gradual  process,  a  process  not,  indeed, 
always  uniform,  nor  always  constant,  but  yet  so 
marked  and  evident  in  its  results  as  to  constitute 
the  great  and  decisive  fact  in  human  history.  It  is, 
indeed,  as  a  great  writer,  the  late  M.  Guizot,  has 
truly  said,  what  we  mean  by  civilization.  We  can- 
not disconnect  the  term  from  the  idea  of  progress, 
either  in  the  individual  or  in  society.  Nor  is  there 
any  accounting  for  man's  present  state,  save  on  this 
hypothesis. 

In  thus  asserting  the  fact  of  progress  it  is  not 
necessary  for  us  to  commit  ourselves  to  any  of  the 
explanations  of  it  that  have  been  attempted.  How 
much  of  truth  there  may  be  in  any  of  these  theories 
is  a  question  that  should  be  kept  distinct  from  the 
main  question  that  we  are  now  considering.  We  may 
dismiss  without  hesitation  the  theories  of  Vico  and 
Comte  and  Buckle,  but  that  will  not  affect,  in  the 
least,  the  great  fact  with  which  we  are  dealing.  It 
may  be  that  the  ultimate  law  of  human  progress  lies 
wholly  beyond  our  reach,  but  this  need  not  weaken 
our  conviction  that  there  is  a  law.  True,  as  has  been 
claimed,  history  is  a  process,  a  drama  but  partially 
unfolded,  whose  conclusion  we  cannot  even  guess, 
a  perpetually  flowing  stream  ;  yet  as  we  gaze  at  an 
unfinished  sketch,  we  may  be  convinced  that  every 
stroke  of  the  pencil  had  a  purpose,  though  we  can- 
not guess  what  was  the  perfect  picture  which  the 
artist  was  aiming  to  represent  ;  and  as  we  stand  by 
the  bank  of  a  broad  river  we  may  see  that  its  cur- 
rent is  steadily  moving  in  one  direction,  though  we 


286  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

know  not  where  are  the  mountain  rills  that  feed  it, 
or  where,  at  last,  it  loses  itself  in  the  far-sounding 
sea. 

But  the  question  still  remains  to  be  considered 
with  which  our  present  argument  is  directly  con- 
cerned, that  is,  whether  this  progress  of  society  in- 
volves a  moral  progress.  One  does  not  seem  of  ne- 
cessity involved  in  the  other,  and  the  admission  of 
one  does  not  carry  with  it,  of  course,  the  admission 
of  the  other.  The  fact  of  a  physical,  a  social,  and 
an  intellectual  progress  is  conceded  by  some  who 
deny  that  the  history  of  the  race  furnishes  evidence 
of  any  moral  progress.  This,  to  go  no  farther,  was 
the  view  so  strongly  maintained  by  the  late  Mr. 
Buckle.  No  one  in  our  time  has  laid  down  so 
broadly  the  doctrine  that  the  evolution  of  society 
is  subject  to  laws,  but  these  laws,  he  maintains,  are 
purely  intellectual,  and  these  intellectual  forces  are 
the  only  motive  power  in  the  onward  movement  of 
society.  Moral  truths  are  stationary,  only  intel- 
lectual truths  are  progressive.  And  hence,  as  an 
element  in  civilization,  he  argues  the  superiority  of 
intellectual  acquisitions  over  moral  feeling,  and 
claims  that  the  development  of  humane  sentiments 
in  modern  times  is  due,  not  to  any  elevation  of 
moral  tone,  but  to  increased  intelligence.  Accord- 
ing to  this  view,  human  progress  affords  no  evi- 
dence of  moral  growth. 

Though  Mr.  Buckle  has,  perhaps,  pushed  this  view 
further  than  any  other,  he  by  no  means  stands  alone 
in  it.  Sir  James  Mackintosh  went  almost  as  far. 
"Morality,"  he  says,  "admits  of  no  discoveries. 
More  than  three  thousand  years  have  elapsed  since 
the  composition  of  the  Pentateuch  ;  and  let  any  man, 


HISTORY  AND  A   MORAL  PURPOSE.  287 

if  he  is  able,  tell  me  in  what  important  respect  the 
rule  of  life  has  varied  since  that  distant  period.  The 
fact  is  evident  that  no  improvement  has  been  made 
in  practical  morality.  From  the  countless  variety 
of  the  facts  with  which  the  physical  and  speculative 
sciences  are  conversant,  it  is  impossible  to  prescribe 
any  bounds  to  their  future  improvement.  It  is  oth- 
erwise with  morals.  They  have  hitherto  been  sta- 
tionary, and,  in  my  opinion,  they  are  likely  forever 
to  continue  so."  1  And  Lord  Macaulay  only  echoed 
these  sentiments  of  Sir  James  Mackintosh  in  the 
well-known  essay  upon  the  Church  of  Rome,  in 
which  he  sought  to  account  for  the  fact  that  since 
the  Reformation  the  relative  strength  of  Romanism 
and  Protestantism  has  remained  essentially  the  same. 
In  a  brilliant  passage  he  essays  to  prove  the  propo- 
sition that,  with  regard  to  the  great  problems  of 
man's  spiritual  nature,  a  highly  educated  European, 
without  revelation,  is  no  more  likely  to  be  in  the 
right  than  a  Blackfoot  Indian.2 

I  have  no  hesitation  in  dismissing  this  as  a  most 
superficial  and  erroneous  view  of  human  progress, 
and  a  view  directly  contradicted  by  some  of  the  best 
authenticated  facts  of  history.  As  it  is  a  most  nar- 
row theory  that  would  interpret  all  the  most  impor- 
tant social  phenomena  as  due  solely  or  chiefly  to 
physical  causes,  such  as  climate,  race,  soil,  so  is  it  an 
equally  narrow  theory  that  would  recognize  in  these 
phenomena  only  an  intellectual  factor.  Civilization 
is  a  slow  and  complex  process,  a  process  involving 
not  only  physical,  but  mental  and  moral  elements, 

1  [Life  of  Mackintosh,  by  his  Son,  vol.  i.,  p.  120.] 

2  [Review  of  Ranke's  History  of  the  Popes ;  Works,  Am.  ed.,  vol. 
iv.,  p.  303.] 


288  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

and  in  the  progress  of  rational  beings,  these  latter 
are  by  far  the  most  considerable.  Mr.  Buckle  would 
account  for  the  change  from  the  wandering  Arab  of 
the  desert  —  homeless  and  uninstructed  —  to  the 
cultivated  race  which  has  left  the  memorials  of  its 
taste  and  intelligence  in  the  structures  of  Delhi  and 
Granada,  simply  from  the  fact  that  they  had  changed 
from  a  sandy  and  barren  soil  to  fertile  tracts,  wholly 
forgetting  that  what  prompted  to  this  change,  and 
launched  the  Arab  race  on  this  new  course,  was  the 
prodigious  spiritual  revolution  effected  in  their  ideas 
of  life  and  duty  by  the  teachings  of  their  great 
prophet. 

Would  even  Lord  Macaulay,  with  all  his  love  of 
paradox,  venture  to  assert  that,  in  the  general  range 
of  their  moral  ideas,  the  Eskimo  and  the  European 
are  on  a  level  ?  that  the  principles  which  regulate 
family  life  and  social  and  political  duty,  are  not  more 
advanced  in  England,  to-day,  than  on  the  day  when 
Hengist  and  Horsa  landed.  And  if  it  be  replied,  that 
what  Sir  James  Mackintosh  and  Lord  Macaulay  had 
in  mind  were  simply  those  speculative  problems  re- 
specting which  unaided  reason  has  been  so  little 
able  to  reach  a  satisfactory  answer,  and  not  the 
practical  conceptions  of  moral  duty,  the  further  ques- 
tion arises,  whether  the  two  can  be  divided,  and 
whether  the  practical  conclusions,  which  men  reach 
at  any  time,  are  not  shaped  by  their  speculative 
views.  The  physical,  the  intellectual,  and  the  moral 
elements  in  civilization  are  in  fact  always  connected, 
and  what  affects  the  one,  sooner  or  later,  affects  the 
other  also.  A  mechanical  invention,  as  the  steam- 
engine  or  the  telegraph,  may  indirectly,  but  power- 
fully, affect  the  moral  relations  of  a  community,  and 


HISTORY  AND  A   MORAL   PURPOSE.  289 

the  practical  convictions  of  duty  which  sway  a  peo- 
ple, or  an  age,  always  have  their  roots,  more  or  less 
distinctly  recognized,  in  speculative  opinion. 

Here,  again,  let  us  remember  that  the  question  is 
simply  one  of  fact,  to  be  determined  by  an  investi- 
gation of  phenomena.  Looking  at  the  history  of  the 
race  in  its  broadest  aspects,  contrasting  its  most 
widely  separated  periods,  placing  side  by  side  the 
controlling  opinions  and  convictions  of  the  most 
primitive  and  rudest  and  of  the  latest  and  most  civ- 
ilized races,  have  we  any  evidence  afforded  that  the 
general  moral  level  has  been  raised  ?  The  question 
at  first  sight  is  intricate,  but  yet  not  really  so  diffi- 
cult as  it  would  seem.  For  the  great  facts  in  the 
history  of  the  race  are  always  the  most  manifest 
facts.  We  may  dispute  without  arriving  at  any  sat- 
isfactory result,  about  the  character  of  an  individual, 
or  the  value  of  a  dynasty.  Opinions  are  still  divided 
respecting  Hildebrand,  and  Henry  VIII.,  and  Mary 
Stuart.  But  the  grand  lineaments  and  characteris- 
tics of  an  epoch,  or  of  a  man,  are  set  forth  in  such  a 
variety  of  ways,  and  perpetuated  in  so  many  unde- 
signed memorials  and  authentic  monuments,  that  we 
can  be  rarely  in  doubt  respecting  them.  And  the 
moral  characteristics,  especially  of  a  people  or  an 
age,  are  illustrated  in  such  a  variety  of  ways  that 
there  can  be  little  dispute  about  them. 

Let  us  take,  for  example,  two  such  significant 
epochs  as  those  illustrated  respectively  in  the  Tro- 
jan war  and  the  Crusades.  Both  were  European  en- 
terprises, undertaken  against  Asia,  and  both,  in  their 
general  tenor  and  characteristics,  have  been  faithfully 
mirrored  in  literature.  For  whatever  may  be  our 
theory  respecting  the  origin  of  the  Homeric  poems, 
19 


29O  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

whether  we  see  in  them  the  impress  of  one  mind,  or 
view  them  as  a  collection  of  ballads,  sung  originally 
by  different  bards,  we  cannot  doubt  that  they  faith- 
fully picture  the  heroic  age.  They  are  in  all  re- 
spects as  authentic  memorials  of  that  early  civiliza- 
tion, as  the  chronicles  of  the  Crusades,  of  Ville- 
hardouin  and  Joinville,  are  memorials  of  mediaeval 
life.  At  first  sight  those  widely  separated  periods 
seem  equally  periods  of  war  and  carnage,  periods  of 
the  exhibition  of  the  cruel  traits  of  human  nature ; 
but  only  a  superficial  examination  is  needed  to  re- 
veal the  essential  contrast  between  the  two,  to  show 
us  how  beneath  the  rudeness  and  ferocity  of  medi- 
aeval war'  lurked  the  germs  of  the  finer  sentiments 
that  distinguish  modern  society ;  how  chivalry  was 
there,  with  its  regard  for  the  weak  ;  how  the  spirit  of 
brotherhood  was  there,  destined  at  length  to  break 
down  the  odious  barriers  of  class. 

The  broad  question  as  to  the  reality  of  a  moral 
progress  of  humanity  may  be  best  answered  by  se- 
lecting some  single  conspicuous  illustrations.  ,  Here, 
as  before,  when  speaking  of  intellectual  progress,  let 
us  bear  in  mind  that  the  movement  for  which  we 
contend  has  been  by  no  means  universal,  and  has 
been  often  intermitted,  and  has  its  periods  of  deca- 
dence and  relapse  alternating  with  those  of  progress. 
It  is  only  a  progress  on  the  whole  that  can  be  shown. 
But  let  us  glance,  for  example,  at  a  relation  in  which 
the  play  of  moral  sentiment  is  especially  conspic- 
uous,—the  relation  of  the  family,  —  and  see,  if 
we  can,  whether  the  sentiments  of  civilized,  show 
any  advance  upon  the  sentiments  of  uncivilized 
races.  Take  the  notion  of  primitive  marriage,  which 
we  find  so  widely  diffused ;  which  made  the  wife  the 


HISTORY  AND  A   MORAL  PURPOSE.  29 1 

prize  of  conquest,  or  the  result  of  purchase ;  which 
placed  her  completely  in  the  power  of  her  new  mas- 
ter, a  household  drudge,  to  be  used  or  discarded  at 
his  will,  and  then  ask  ourselves  whether  the  relation 
of  the  sexes,  in  modern  times,  does  not  show  an  im- 
provement over  this,  —  an  improvement  not  merely 
in  physical  condition,  but  in  the  whole  legal  and 
moral  status. 

Take  another  great  characteristic  feature  of  human 
society,  in  its  successive  stages  of  development  from 
barbarism  to  civilization, —  the  conception  of  criminal 
legislation.  Note  how,  in  the  early  ages,  crime  is 
always  regarded  as  simply  an  injury  done  an  individ- 
ual, to  be  punished  by  personal  vengeance,  or,  at 
most,  atoned  for  by  compensation  to  the  injured 
party,  with  no  attempt  to  measure  the  degree  of 
moral  culpability,  and  no  recognition  of  any  relation 
to  the  public  weal ;  and  then  contrast  with  this  the 
criminal  legislation  of  the  most  civilized  societies  of 
modern  times  ;  note  how  crimes  are  discriminated, 
how  the  motives  and  temptations  of  the  offender  are 
carefully  weighed,  how  his  offense  is  looked  at,  not 
as  a  mere  private  injury,  but  as  a  violation  of  public 
order,  to  be  punished,  not  by  the  injured  party,  but 
by  the  authorized  representative  of  the  whole  social 
body  ;  how,  above  all,  into  criminal  legislation  a 
wholly  new  idea  has  insinuated  itself,  and  punish- 
ment h*as  been  made  a  means  for  the  reformation 
of  the  offender,  and  then  ask  whether,  in  its  long 
onward  march,  the  moral  sentiments  of  the  race 
have  not  been  modified  and  expanded. 

But  the  most  impressive  evidence  of  the  gradual 
modification  of  the  moral  standard  of  the  race  will 
be  found  in  the  contrast  presented  in  the  interna- 


292  THE  THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

tional  relations  of  races  and  states.  In  the  earliest 
periods  these  will  uniformly  be  found  to  be  hostile. 
Members  of  the  same  tribe  were  brethren,  but  mem- 
bers of  different  tribes  were  enemies.  They  had  no 
relations,  and  could  conceive  of  no  relations,  but  re- 
lations of  hostility.  A  state  of  war  was  the  state  of 
nature.  This  is  the  condition,  to-day,  of  all  savage 
tribes.  Those  who  are  familiar  with  the  recent  vol- 
umes of  travel  in  Central  Africa  will  need  no  descrip- 
tion of  what  this  condition  is.  The  first  step  out 
of  this  is  where  tribes,  kindred  in  blood,  or  profess- 
ing the  same  religion,  are  banded  together.  But  all 
outside  this  charmed  circle  are  still  regarded  in  the 
light  of  foes.  No  leagues  made  with  them  are  bind- 
ing ;  if  resident  without  the  confederacy  they  can 
acquire  no  civil  rights.  These  are  still  limited  by 
blood.  The  Hellenic  states,  in  the  epoch  of  their 
palmiest  civilization,  did  not  get  beyond  this  line. 
The  terms  Greek  and  barbarian,  expressed  and  per- 
petuated the  profound  antithesis  that  ran  through 
their  whole  civilization. 

First  in  the  beneficent  expansion  of  the  Roman 
code  do  we  come  in  contact  with  a  wider  conception 
of  the  relations  of  races  and  nations.  The  universal 
empire  of  Rome  inevitably  prepared  the  way  for  this 
by  blending  nations  and  races  together,  and  by  com- 
pelling the  recognition  of  mutual  rights.  Roman 
law,  as  developed  especially  by  the  praetorian  edict, 
is  the  proud  monument  of  this  march  of  moral  ideas. 
That  there  was  a  universal  right  binding  on  all  na- 
tions alike  now  came  to  be  recognized.  And,  on 
this  foundation  of  natural  right,  the  modern  science 
of  international  law  was  first  erected  ;  and  step  by 
step  a  code  of  international  ethics  has  been  devel- 


HISTORY  AND  A   MORAL   PURPOSE.  293 

oped,  and  a  moral  sentiment,  common  to  civilized 
nations,  has  come  into  being,  and  the  great  truth  is 
recognized,  that  the  nations  of  the  earth  are  made  of 
one  blood  and  form  one  common  family.  But  how 
vast  the  interval  between  the  relations  of  savage 
tribes,  which  rested  only  on  force  and  recognized  no 
law  but  the  law  of  the  strongest,  and  the  humane 
principles  which  regulate  the  relations  of  modern 
states,  which  emphasize  the  peaceful  rather  than  the 
hostile  relations  of  nations,  and  which,  while  permit- 
ting war,  have  still  done  so  much  to  remove  or  miti- 
gate its  horrors ! 

These  cursory  statements  are  not  adduced  as  proof 
of  the  proposition  that  the  history  of  the  race  is 
marked  by  moral  progress,  but  rather  for  the  pur- 
pose of  illustrating  the  kind  of  proof  that  might  be 
presented  did  the  limits  of  our  discussion  allow.  I 
have  selected  only  a  few  of  the  most  salient  speci- 
mens out  of  many.  But  enough  has  been  said  to 
show  that  the  doctrine  of  the  moral  progress  of  the 
race  rests  upon  the  same  evidence  as  that  of  its  intel- 
lectual progress.  The  two  are  but  different  aspects 
of  the  same  subject,  for  in  the  complex  movement  of 
civilization  the  moral  and  intellectual  factors  can  no 
more  be  separated  than  in  the  development  of  indi- 
vidual character.  The  most  recent  school  of  histor- 
ical science,  in  opposition  to  Comte  and  Buckle, 
strongly  emphasize  the  moral  element  in  social 
progress.  According  to  Mr.  Spencer,  the  essential 
conditions  of  development  in  social  progress  are  the 
community  and  its  environment.  The  environment 
of  a  community  comprises  all  the  circumstances  to 
which  the  community  is  in  any  way  oblige^  to  con- 
form   its    actions,    including    not    only  its    physical 


294  THE   THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

conditions,  such  as  climate,  natural  productions,  geo- 
graphical contour,  but  also  the  ideas,  feelings,  cus- 
toms, and  observances  of  past  times,  so  far  as  they 
are  preserved  by  literature,  by  traditions,  and  by  mon- 
uments, as  well  as  contemporary  manners  and  opin- 
ions, so  far  as  they  are  regarded  by  the  community. 
The  environment  of  a  community,  therefore,  in- 
cludes spiritual  as  well  as  physical  factors  ;  and,  as 
civilization  advances,  the  relative  importance  of  the 
former  constantly  increases.  From  age  to  age,  the 
environment  of  a  community  is  slowly  but  inces- 
santly changing,  and  to  these  gradual  changes  the 
community  is  continually  adapting  itself.  Thus  the 
entire  organized  experience  of  each  generation  adds 
an  element  to  the  environment  of  the  next  genera- 
tion, so  that  the  circumstances  to  which  each  new 
generation  is  required  to  conform  are  somewhat  dif- 
ferent from  the  circumstances  to  which  the  genera- 
tion preceding  was  required  to  conform  ;  and  thus, 
by  its  own  spiritual  activity,  the  community  is  con- 
tinually modifying  its  environment.  The  application 
of  the  principle  of  evolution  to  social  progress,  there- 
fore, recognizes  civilization  as  a  process  in  which 
the  whole  nature  of  man  is  concerned,  a  process  in 
which  the  supreme  and  determining  factors  are  not 
physical  but  spiritual,  and,  therefore,  must  be  re- 
garded as  showing  a  great  advance,  not  only  over 
the  view  of  Mr.  Buckle,  but  over  all  views  which 
regard  the  moral  conceptions  of  man  as  stationary. 

The  final  conclusion  to  which  we  are  brought  in 
this  discussion  is,  that  history,  like  nature  and  hu- 
man life,  constitutes  a  process,  the  successive  parts 
of  which  have  a  certain  organic  connection  with 
each  other;  that  its  successive  stages   show,  both 


HISTORY  AND  A   MORAL   PURPOSE.  295 

with  regard  to  its  intellectual  and  its  moral  features, 
a  tendency  which  can  only  be  explained  from  the 
presence  and  operation  of  some  controlling  princi- 
ple. There  is,  on  the  whole,  a  movement,  and  that 
movement  is  in  the  direction  of  improvement.  And, 
whatever  theory  we  may  adopt  to  account  for  these 
phenomena,  even  though  we  should  adopt  to  its  full 
extent  the  theory  of  social  evolution  so  elaborately 
marked  out  by  Mr.  Spencer,  we  have  still,  as  in  the 
case  of  physical  evolution,  the  process  itself  to  ac- 
count for.  For,  what  we  are  pleased  to  term  the 
laws  of  history,  like  the  laws  of  nature,  are  simply 
abstract  statements  of  a  regular  recurrence  of  facts. 
The  efficient  cause  must  lie  further  back,  the  mere 
conception  of  abstract  law  does  not  meet  the  diffi- 
culty. Hence,  alike  in  nature  and  in  history,  we 
are  led  back  to  the  conception  of  a  supreme  control- 
ling will. 

But,  further,  as  the  supreme  fact  revealed  in  his- 
tory is  moral  progress,  this  order  of  the  world,  which 
we  have  been  brought  to  recognize,  must  be  a  moral 
order,  and  thus  the  facts  of  human  history,  viewed 
in  their  broadest  aspect,  go  directly  to  confirm  the 
verdict  already  rendered  by  human  consciousness. 
In  other  words,  when  we  sound  the  depths  of  our 
own  moral  nature,  or  when  we  fly  abroad  on  the 
great  stream  and  tendency  of  human  affairs;  when 
we  look  at  ourselves  as  individuals,  or  when  we  look 
at  the  race  as  a  mighty  whole,  we  find  the  same 
great  truth  illustrated,  —  that  we  are  under  a  govern- 
ment of  moral  laws ;  and  we  are  forced,  as  an  inevi- 
table consequence,  to  clothe  the  supreme  cause  with 
moral  attributes.  Thus  the  twofold  argument  from 
external  nature  and  from  man  is  completed.     "  No 


296  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT 

one  can  intelligently  accept  this  truth  without  per- 
ceiving that  it  is  the  key-stone  of  the  great  arch  of 
nature  and  life,  of  society,  of  polity,  and  of  history. 
The  phenomena  and  laws  of  history  can  be  under- 
stood and  explained  only  by  the  admission  of  this 
great  central  conception  of  a  supreme  will  embra- 
cing, directing,  and  controlling  all  things,  all  beings, 
and  all  events,  in  all  space,  and  in  all  time."  l 

1  Adam,  T/ieories  of  History,  p.  314. 


LECTURE   X. 

PERSONALITY   AND   THE   INFINITE. 

In  my  argument  thus  far  I  have  followed  strictly 
an  inductive  method.  My  attempt  throughout  has 
been  to  reason  from  the  known  to  the  unknown, 
from  the  seen  to  the  unseen,  from  the  undisputed 
and  accepted  facts  of  external  nature  and  conscious- 
ness to  the  principles  by  which  alone  they  can  be 
explained.  We  have  considered  the  phenomena 
presented  in  the  universe  around  us,  and  the  phe- 
nomena attested  in  human  consciousness  and  in  the 
history  of  the  race,  and  have  confined  ourselves  to 
the  evident  logical  inferences  which  these  involved. 
We  found  ourselves  in  the  presence  of  facts,  and 
these  facts  demanded  explanation.  We  have  pushed 
our  conclusions  no  further  than  these  explanations 
required.  And,  if  I  have  not  been  wholly  astray  in 
my  reasoning,  I  have  succeeded  in  showing  that 
the  physical  universe,  as  a  great  fact  or  result,  de- 
mands for  its  explanation  a  cause  ;  that  the  vari- 
ous and  complicated  arrangements  of  the  universe 
prove  this  cause  to  have  been  intelligent,  and  that 
the  phenomena  of  human  consciousness  and  of  hu- 
man history,  equally  warrant  us  in  ascribing  to  this 
cause  the  attributes  of  a  moral  being. 

And  further,  what  has  been  the  principal  aim  of 
this  whole  discussion,  I  have  sought  to  show  that 
these  arguments  have  not  been  essentially  affected 


298  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

by  any  of  the  recent  speculations  respecting  the  na- 
ture of  matter  and  force,  or  the  process  by  which 
the  present  universe  has  been  evolved  out  of  pre- 
ceding conditions.  We  have  seen  that,  whatever 
theory  we  may  adopt  with  regard  to  the  method  of 
creation,  the  problem  remains  the  same,  and  far 
back  as  we  may  push  our  researches  into  the  his- 
tory of  the  physical  universe,  the  same  question 
confronts  us,  a  question  which  can  neither  be  an- 
swered nor  set  aside  by  any  conclusions  of  physical 
science.  Conceding  all  that  is  claimed  by  the  most 
extreme  advocates  of  evolution,  and  allowing  its  ap- 
plication, not  only  in  the  sphere  of  physical  nature, 
but  in  the  sphere  of  intellectual  and  moral  action, 
it  is  still,  when  rightly  understood,  simply  a  method, 
a  method  implying  the  existence  of  suitable  agents, 
requiring  constant  and  new  adjustments,  leading 
logically  back  to  an  intelligent  source,  and  hence 
only  adding  new  support  to  the  arguments  for  a 
supreme  cause,  which  it  was  erroneously  supposed 
to  contradict. 

But  if  we  now  pause  for  a  moment  and  carefully 
review  all  that  we  have  thus  far  sought  to  establish, 
it  will  be  seen  at  once  that  all  this  by  no  means  com- 
pletes the  theistic  argument.  If  we  stop  here  we 
stop  very  far  short  of  the  proposition  which  we  set 
out  to  establish.  We  have,  in  fact,  laboriously 
climbed  up  this  lofty  eminence,  only  to  see  more 
clearly  how  far  above  us  still  rises  the  summit  which 
we  are  seeking  to  scale.  For,  even  should  it  be 
conceded  that  everything  claimed  in  the  foregoing 
discussion  has  been  established,  it  may  still  be  ob- 
jected, and  objected  with  reason,  that  it  does  not 
amount  to  a  demonstration  of  the  existence  of  God, 


PERSONALITY  AND    THE  INFINITE.  299 

in  the  full  sense  in  which  that  august  term  is  com- 
monly understood.     Granted   that  the  existence  of 
a  material  universe  requires  us  to  suppose  a  cause, 
granted  that  to  that  supreme  cause  must  be  attrib- 
uted the  characteristics  of    intelligence  and    good- 
ness, granted  that  the  history  of  the   world   shows, 
on  the  whole,  such  a  tendency  as  implies  a  moral 
government,  still,  it  may  be  claimed,  there  is  noth- 
ing in  all  this  that  proves  this  first  cause  to  be  in- 
finite, eternal,  and  absolute  in  being  and  perfection  ; 
yet  without  this  we  do  not  reach  the  idea  of  God. 
All  our  reasoning  thus  far  has  been  from  finite 
phenomena,  and  when  from  the  finite  we  argue  to 
the  infinite,  we  take  a  great  leap,  for  which  we  can 
plead  no  logical  justification.     Our  whole  argument 
has  professed  to  rest  on   a   basis   of  facts,   and  we 
have  no  right  to  push  our  inferences  a  step  beyond 
the  line  which  our  facts   mark  out.     The  moment 
we  pass  this  line  we  leave  the  solid  ground  of  proof, 
and  embark  on  the  uncertain  flood  of  fancy.     What- 
ever of  force  there  may  be  in  the  argument  for  a 
cause,  still,  it  is  claimed,  this  argument  cannot  lift 
us  above  the  region  of  the  contingent  and  the  finite. 
All  that  we  know  of  the  connection  of  cause  and  ef- 
fect   comes    from    our   observation    of    phenomena 
within  this  sphere.     And  admitting  the  validity  of 
the  argument  of  design,  it  is  still  an  argument  from 
finite  designs,  and  from  an  indefinite  number  of  fi- 
nite designs  we  cannot  infer  an   infinite   designer. 
At  best,  we  can  only  reach  back  to   the  idea  of  a 
grand  artificer.    The  only  valid  inference,  it  is  urged, 
from  the  phenomena  of   design  would  be  that  of 
a  phenomenal  first  cause.     The  evidences  of  design 
do  not  warrant  the  inference  of  a  being  detached 
from,  and  independent  of,  these  designs. 


300  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

The  difficulty  that  here  presents  itself  seems,  in- 
deed, so  insurmountable,  the  flaw  in  the  argument 
at  this  point  appears  so  fatal,  and  all  that  has  been 
established  falls  so  far  short  of  the  conclusion  which 
alone  can  satisfy  the  reason,  that  not  a  few  of  the 
most  devout  and  earnest  advocates  of  theism  have 
been  moved  to  cast  aside  all  inductive  and  a  pos- 
teriori  arguments,  and  to  solve  the  problem  in  a 
more  direct  and  summary  method.  Belief  in  the 
existence  of  God,  it  is  claimed  by  those  who  adopt 
this  method  of  reasoning,  is  a  primary  instinct  of 
the  soul  which  we  can  neither  justify  nor  go  behind. 
The  idea  of  God  exists  in  the  mind  as  one  of  its  ul- 
timate and  ineradicable  notions.  Those  who  take 
this  view  do  not  deny  that  from  finite  sequences  we 
may  reason  back  to  a  first  cause,  but  they  deny  that 
this  first  cause  can  be  identified  with  a  personal 
God.  They  do  not,  in  the  least,  deny  the  proofs  of 
design  in  nature,  but  they  claim  that  these  proofs 
of  design  have  no  theistic  value  until  we  have  been 
first  led  to  recognize  the  existence  of  a  supreme 
mind  in  nature  upon  wholly  different  and  indepen- 
dent grounds.  The  book  of  nature  becomes  illu- 
mined and  radiant  only  to  one  who  already  be- 
lieves in  God. 

It  is  not  claimed  by  those  who  urge  this  argu- 
ment from  intuition  that  all  men  are  equally  en- 
dowed with  this  faculty  of  immediately  apprehend- 
ing divine  things.  On  the  contrary,  the  instinct  in 
the  soul  to  which  this  appeal  is  made,  when  it  first 
appears  is  crude,  dim,  and  inarticulate.  It  is  grad- 
ually shaped  into  greater  clearness  by  the  myriad 
influences  of  education  and  tradition.  It  is  there- 
fore no  evidence  against    the  reality  or  the  trust- 


PERSONALITY  AND    THE  INFINITE.  3OI 

worthiness  of  this  intuition  that  its  manifestations 
are  not  uniform  in  different  periods  ;  that  it  even 
seems  absent  in  some  states  of  human  consciousness, 
or  in  certain  grades  of  civilization.  At  times  it  may 
seem  wholly  to  slumber,  not  only  in  individuals,  but 
in  a  race  or  an  era.  But  still  it  exists,  and  however 
crude  in  its  elementary  forms,  always  manifests  it- 
self in  its  highest  state  as  an  act  of  intelligence  and 
faith,  as  a  direct  gaze  with  the  inner  eye  into  the 
regions  of  spirit.  While  the  God  of  the  logical  un- 
derstanding is  a  mere  projected  shadow  of  the  mind 
itself,  and  while  the  argument  of  design  is  simply 
finite  man  drawing  his  own  portrait  upon  the  can- 
vas of  infinity,  to  the  eye  of  intuition  is  directly  re- 
vealed the  presence,  behind  phenomena,  of  a  great 
and  transcendent  reality. 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  intuition  of  the  exist- 
ence of  God,  which  is  here  asserted,  is  direct*  and 
immediate.  It  is  not  the  product  of  knowledge  or 
reflection ;  it  does  not  come  as  the  close,  or  comple- 
tion, of  a  process  of  rational  investigation,  but  is  the 
spontaneous  impulse  of  the  soul  in  presence  of  the 
object  whose  existence  it  attests.  As  such  it  is,  of 
necessity,  prior  to  any  act  of  reflection.  It  cannot 
be  regarded  as,  in  any  sense,  the  product  of  experi- 
ence. The  main  characteristic  of  this  intuition  is 
that  it  proclaims  a  supreme  existence  without  and 
beyond  the  mind,  which  it  apprehends  in  the  act  of 
revealing  itself.  Yet  it  is  not  without  certain  crite- 
rions  of  its  trustworthiness.  These  are  the  persist- 
ence with  which  this  intuition  appears  and  reap- 
pears, the  obstinacy  with  which  it  reasserts  itself, 
and  the  tenacity  with  which  it  clings  to  us  ;  and 
further,  its  historical  permanence,  the  confirmation 


302  THE    THE/STIC  ARGUMENT. 

which  it  receives  from  ages  and  generations ;  and 
lastly,  the  inner  harmony  between  this  intuitive  be- 
lief and  the  whole  realm  of  man's  psychological  na- 
;  ture.  An  intuition  which  has  raised  and  elevated 
man,  and  led  him  to  walk  in  increasing  light,  has 
the  most  convincing  evidence  of  trustworthiness. 

This  short  and  easy  method  of  settling  the  vexed 
problem  of  the  divine  existence  would  be  satisfac- 
tory if  the  existence  of  such  universal  and  intuitive 
belief  in  God  could  be  established.  But  if  we  are 
so  made  that  we  have  a  direct  and  immediate  intui- 
tion of  the  existence  of  a  supreme  being,  an  intuition 
independent  of  all  external  evidence,  a  direct  revela- 
tion to  the  soul,  we  may  well  inquire  why  has  the 
question  of  the  divine  existence  given  rise  to  so 
much  discussion.  If  the  idea  of  God  is  a  first  prin- 
ciple, lying  behind  the  earliest  conscious  exercise  of 
reflection,  recognized  as  part  of  the  primary  concep- 
tions which  the  mind  forms,  a  spontaneous  convic- 
tion needing  no  proof,  waiting  for  no  evidence,  why 
should  it  have  been  so  often  called  in  question  ? 
The  assertion  that  man  knows  God  by  immediate 
intuition  is,  in  fact,  mere  dogmatism.  Those  who 
profess  to  hold  this  theory  so  explain  it,  in  many 
cases,  as  to  show  that  they  hold  nothing  of  the  kind. 
All  that  is  found  to  be  innate  is  a  sense  of  depend- 
ence upon  a  higher  power.  None,  in  fact,  but  the 
most  extreme  school  of  mystics  have  consistently 
claimed  an  intuition  of  God  independent  of  the  ordi- 
nary laws  of  cognition. 

Such  of  you  as  have  carefully  followed  the  course 
of  my  argument  up  to  this  point  will  not  need  to  be 
reminded  that  I  have  sedulously  avoided  drawing 
the  illogical  inference  to  which  those  who  advocate 


PERSONALITY  AND    THE  INFINITE.  303 

the  theory  of  direct  intuition  so  justly  object.  I  have 
nowhere  sought  to  make  this  leap  from  the  finite  to 
the  infinite  which  is  so  strongly  denounced.  I  have, 
throughout,  restrained  myself  from  urging  these 
proofs  from  external  nature,  from  human  conscious- 
ness, or  from  history,  as  affording  any  complete  and 
final  demonstration  of  the  divine  existence  and  at- 
tributes. I  have  only  presented  them  as  the  prelim- 
inary steps  towards  such  a  conclusion,  and  though  I 
earnestly  maintain  that  all  of  them,  when  taken  to- 
gether, constitute  a  perfectly  convincing  argument, 
up  to  a  certain  point,  yet, I  have  nowhere  asserted, 
or  implied,  that  they  yield  the  final  result  for  which 
we  have  all  along  been  seeking.  Our  work  up  to  this 
stage  has  been  preparatory;  we  have  been  laying 
the  foundations  of  a  structure  which  yet  remains  to 
be  finished;  we  have  laboriously  reared  an  arch, 
symmetrical  and  perfect  indeed,  but  which  will  only 
fall  to  the  ground  unless  the  key-stone  be  fitted  in. 

But,  because  all  the  arguments  based  on  induction 
are  confessedly  incomplete,  they  should  not  be  re- 
jected as  illusory  or  worthless.  Because  they  do 
not  yield  us  the  full  proof  that  we  want,  we  need 
not  dismiss  them  as  futile  attempts  to  scale  an  in- 
accessible height.  Though  insufficient,  they  yet 
serve  a  most  important  purpose.  They  are  the  pre- 
liminary conditions  of  the  final  step  by  which  the 
argument  for  the  existence  of  God  is  completed.  It 
cannot  be  questioned  that  the  human  mind  conceives 
of  the  Supreme  Being  as  absolute,  as  infinite,  as  eter- 
nal, as  perfect ;  and  that  it  can  never  rest  satisfied 
with  a  conception  of  deity  that  stops  short  of  this. 
Neither  the  intellect,  nor  the  heart,  will  accept  the 
thought  that  the  being  whom  they  adore  as  God  is 


304  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

dependent  on  any  antecedent  or  on  any  higher  be- 
ing, that  he  is  limited  in  his  existence  either  in  time 
or  space,  or  that  he  is  lacking  in  any  conceivable 
perfection.  The  problem,  then,  now  before  us  is  to 
connect  our  conclusions  thus  far  with  this  concep- 
tion of  infinite  and  absolute  being,  to  show  that  these 
attributes  must  be  the  attributes  of  the  intelligent 
and  righteous  author  of  all  things,  whose  existence 
the  frame  of  nature  and  the  constitution  of  man 
alike  attest. 

To  solve  the  problem  here  presented  we  shall  be 
obliged  to  turn  our  attention  to  a  region  which  we 
have  not  yet  explored,  and  glance  more  closely  than 
we  have  yet  done  at  our  own  mental  processes.  We 
have  thus  far  studied  only  the  broad  facts  presented 
in  human  consciousness,  we  have  not  investigated 
the  laws  to  which  those  phenomena  are  due.  We 
have  traced  the  operations  of  mind  up  to  a  certain 
point,  but  we  have  not  yet  asked  how  it  reaches  its 
supreme  conclusions.  In  proceeding  to  make  this 
further  inquiry  we  not  only  do  not  need  to  cast 
aside,  as  worthless,  the  results  which  we  have  al- 
ready reached,  but  we  do  not  even  need  to  abandon 
the  sober  and  safe  method  of  inquiry  which  we  have 
thus  far  followed.  We  are  still  dealing  with  facts, 
and,  in  any  conclusions  that  we  may  reach,  still  ad- 
here to  our  inductive  reasoning.  Only,  in  the  results 
which  we  now  reach,  we  shall  discover  that,  in  all 
our  reasoning,  there  are  certain  fundamental  truths 
involved  which  induction  does  not  give  us,  truths 
which  we  do  not  become  possessed  of  by  any  logical 
process,  but  truths  which  are  the  original  and  funda- 
mental conditions  of  thought  itself. 

According  to  one  school  of  thinkers,  a  school  very 


PERSONALITY  AND    THE  INFINITE.  305 

widely  represented  at  the  present  day,  the  mind  de- 
rives all  its  knowledge,  its  maxims,  and  its  prin- 
ciples, solely  from  observation  and  experience.  In ) 
its  modern  form  this  doctrine  dates  from  Locke,  who 
in  laboring  to  prove  that  the  mind  possessed  no  idea 
prior  to  experience,  confounded  the  cause  with  the 
occasion  of  ideas,  and  held  that  the  mind,  before  it 
received  impressions  through  the  senses,  was  a  blank 
sheet,  on  which  the  record  of  experience  was  yet  to 
be  written.  Thus  all  ideas  were  traced  to  a  purely 
empirical  source.  Another  school,  which  recognizes 
Leibnitz  as  its  great  leader,  held  that  the  mind  is  by 
nature  endowed  with  certain  aptitudes,  dispositions, 
or  faculties,  by  which  it  is  put  in  immediate  posses- 
sion of  necessary  and  absolute  truths.  Because  of 
a  natural  tendency  the  mind  tends  to  grasp  these 
truths.  As  present  in  the  mind,  before  all  experi- 
ence, these  ideas  may  be  termed  innate.  Carried  to 
an  extreme  by  Kant,  these  inner  aptitudes  became 
laws  of  thought,  essential  conditions  of  all  intellec- 
tual acts,  having  validity  for  the  mind  itself,  but  for 
which  no  reality  can  be  claimed  when  applied  to  the 
external  world. 

What  is  the  element  of  truth  in  this  famous  con- 
troversy ?  Abandoning  without  hesitation  the  claim 
set  up  by  the  transcendental  school,  that  the  reason 
gazes  directly  at  the  universal,  eternal,  and  absolute, 
that  it  lives  in  immediate  communion  with  the  true, 
the  beautiful,  and  the  good,  that  without  help,  with- 
out external  stimulus,  without  an  intellectual  process 
of  any  kind,  it  soars  directly  to  this  lofty  sphere,  let 
us  ask  whether  between  these  two  extremes  of  sen- 
sationalism and  transcendentalism  there  may  not  be 
a  middle  ground.     This  controversy,  like  most  con- 


306  THE   THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

troversies,  has  been  complicated  by  the  varying 
senses  in  which  the  terms  used  have  been  employed. 
Intuition  is  a  word  which  modern  science  has  been 
eager  to  banish  from  its  vocabulary,  and  the  mere 
mention  of  it  may  call  forth  a  sneer  from  those  who 
pride  themselves  upon  a  rigid  adherence  to  the  meth- 
ods of  modern  science.  Mr.  Spencer,  while  depart- 
ing in  many  respects  from  the  maxims  of  the  sen- 
sational school,  still  maintains  that  all  our  general- 
ized notions  have  become  forms  of  thought  simply 
from  the  fact  that  they  have  arisen  from  the  organ- 
ized and  consolidated  experiences  of  countless  for- 
mer generations. 

Is  the  mind,  then,  let  us  ask,  endowed  with  any 
truth  or  principles,  the  recognition  of  which  may 
be  fairly  termed  intuition  ?  The  question  is  one  to 
be  answered  by  an  examination  of  our  mental  proc- 
esses. What  is  the  answer  that  consciousness  gives 
us  to  this  inquiry  ?  At  the  outset  we  may  concede 
without  hesitation,  that  the  mind  is  not  possessed  of 
innate  ideas,  in  the  sense  in  which  that  term  is  com- 
monly understood.  In  his  argument  against  this 
view,  Locke,  it  must  be  granted,  gained  the  victory, 
though  whether  the  doctrine  of  innate  ideas  was 
ever  really  maintained  in  the  sense  in  which  he  de- 
nied it,  may  be  questioned.  We  may  also  concede 
that  the  soul,  at  the  outset  of  its  conscious  exist- 
ence, is  not  endowed  with  abstract  notions  of  any 
kind.  For  all  abstract  notions,  as,  for  example,  the 
notions  of  substance  or  space,  are  the  result  of  a 
mental  process  by  which  we  separate  the  part  from 
the  whole,  the  quality  from  the  substance  to  which 
it  belongs.  In  the  act  of  knowing  the  mind  always 
starts  with  the  singular  and  the  concrete,  and  all  our 


PERSONALITY  AND    THE  INFINITE.  307 

general  notions  are  the  result  of  an  operation  by 
which  we  contemplate  a  number  of  separate  objects 
as  possessed  of  common  attributes. 

Thus  it  must  be  granted,  that  however  inaccurate 
many  of  Locke's  statements,  he  was  undoubtedly 
right  in  holding  so  strongly  as  he  did  that  in  the 
formation  of  our  general  ideas  an  element  of  previ- 
ous experience  was  always  called  into  play.  But  this 
experience  was  not  a  cause,  it  was  simply  a  condi- 
tion. It  was  not  the  primal  source  and  fountain- 
head  of  thought,  but  simply  determined  the  channel 
down  which  the  stream  of  thought  should  flow.  In 
this  process  the  mind  was  not  passive,  like  a  sheet 
of  paper,  simply  receiving  and  preserving  the  record 
of  experience,  but  had  a  capacity  of  reacting  upon 
the  impressions  of  the  senses.  It  was  endowed 
with  an  originating  potency;  and  this  potency  of 
mind,  like  the  potencies  of  matter,  was  not  lawless 
and  capricious  in  its  action,  but  was  subject  to  cer- 
tain laws  and  was  controlled  in  its  operation  by  fixed 
methods.  And  further,  by  careful  observation  and 
analysis,  these  laws  can  be  arrived  at,  precisely  as 
we  arrive  at  the  laws  of  the  external  world.  By 
the  operation  of  these  laws  the  mind  rises  to  the 
perception  of  absolute  and  necessary  truth.  They 
are  a  part  of  the  mind  ;  their  presence  and  control 
are  attested  as  clearly  as  the  laws  of  the  physical 
universe. 

Even  that  very  experience  on  which  so  much 
stress  is  laid,  and  which  is,  as  we  have  seen,  the  es- 
sential condition  of  all  our  knowing,  would  avail  us 
nothing  but  for  this  reaction  of  the  mind  upon  the 
phenomena  which  experience  makes  known  to  us. 
Experience  would,  in  fact,  be  nothing  but  a  scries  of 


308  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT 

sensations  or  impressions,  but  for  this  generalizing 
faculty  which  coordinates  the  facts  of  experience, 
and  enables  us  to  contemplate  them  in  a  logical  re- 
lation. To  learn  aright  the  very  lessons  of  experi- 
ence, we  need  then,  in  the  mind,  something  which 
experience  cannot  furnish.  In  this  lies  the  essential 
distinction  between  the  experience  of  man  and  the 
experience  of  the  lower  animals.  They  are  endowed, 
in  many  cases,  with  keener  perceptions  than  ours. 
Their  experience,  in  many  directions,  must  be  far 
more  acute.  But  there  is,  in  them,  no  such  power 
of  reaction  upon  experience  as  we  see  in  man.  The 
vast  fabric  of  human  knowledge  has  been  built  up 
in  this  way.  All  the  inductive  sciences  are  rested 
upon  this  foundation.  They  imply  and  recognize 
principles  not  derived  from  experience.  Astronomy 
rests  on  first  truths  respecting  space  and  number 
and  time  ;  and  physical  science  on  first  truths  re- 
specting force  and  matter. 

Thus  all  our  reasoning  proceeds  on  principles 
which  cannot  be  found  by  reasoning,  but  must  be 
assumed  as  intuitive  truths.  We  cannot  construct 
the  simplest  argument,  we  cannot  convict  an  oppo- 
nent of  error,  we  cannot  justify  to  ourselves,  even, 
the  maxims  which  we  hold  to  be  true,  without  rec- 
ognizing mental  principles  which  are  either  accepted 
as  intuitive,  or  which  lead  us  directly  back  to  prin- 
ciples which  are.  (The  primary  convictions  of  the 
mind  are  all  of  the  nature  of  intuitions,  j  These  may 
arise  either  in  connection  with  some  external  object, 
or  in  connection  with  some  internal  sentiment. 
Thus,  when  I  see  this  desk  before  me,  I  intuitively 
recognize  it  as  occupying  space,  though  of  space 
itself  I  neither  have  had  nor  can  have  any  actual 


PERSONALITY  AND    THE  INFINITE.  309 

experience.      So    a   succession    of   events    awakens 
the  intuition  of  time,  though  time,  like  space,  can 
be  revealed  to  me  by  no  positive  apprehension.     Let 
us  notice,  however,  that  these  intuitions,  though  not 
derived  from  experience,  are  yet  never  called  into 
existence  without  the  help  of  experience.     In  other 
words,  an  intuition  is  not  gazing  at  the  absolute,  but 
is  always  the  perception  of  an  object,  or  of  some- 
thing  connected  with    an   object.      Hence  we    are 
never  directly  conscious  of  the  true,  the  beautiful, 
and  the  good,  simply  as  such,  but  just  as  after  con- 
templating a  body  that  occupies  space,  we  get  the 
abstract  idea  of  space,  so  after  contemplating  actions 
as  good  or  evil,  we  get  the  notion  of  abstract  moral 
qualities.     These  intuitive  convictions  can  be  gener- 
alized, and  when  generalized  we  are  compelled  to  re- 
gard them  as  necessary  truths.    For  the  laws  of  men- 
tal action  are  analogous  to  the  laws  which  regulate 
external  nature.     Like  the  physiological  processes  of 
the  body,  these  intuitions  depend  on  no  action  of  the 
will ;  on  the  contrary,  they  are  often  in  most  perfect 
action  when  we  are  most  unconscious  of  their  pres- 
ence.    Yet,  while  analogous  in  their  operation  to  the 
laws  which  we  trace  in  external  nature,  they  are  of 
a  higher  order  than  any  generalizations  from  mere 
external  or  physical  facts.     For  they  carry,  in  their 
very  nature,  a  character  of  necessity  or  universality, 
and  hence  in  an  especial  sense  may  claim  to  be  re- 
garded as  first  principles.     They  are  truths  pertain- 
ing to  our  original  constitution,  and  are  the  grounds 
of  all  knowledge.     And  while  the  study  of  them  is 
more  difficult  and  more  delicate  than  the  investiga- 
tion of  ordinary  truth,  this  need  not  weaken  our  con- 
viction of  their  reality,  or  cause  our  confidence  to 
waver  in  our  methods  of  establishing  them. 


3IO  THE    THE  IS  TIC   ARGUMENT. 

Let  it  be  borne  in  mind  that  in  all  this  we  are 
not  claiming  any  such  transcendent  and  complete 
knowledge  as  carries  with  it  an  irrefragible  assur- 
ance, nor  supposing  any  such  faculty  of  intuition  as 
gives  us  direct  cognizance  of  real  existence.  The 
only  knowledge  possible  to  beings  constituted  as  we 
are  is  knowledge  of  the  phenomena  of  conscious- 
ness, and  the  inferences  which  we  draw  from  them. 
These  necessary  inferences  from  the  phenomena  of 
consciousness  are  sometimes  called  intuitions  and 
sometimes  primitive  beliefs.  Sir  William  Hamilton 
employs  the  latter  term.  He  says,  "Our  knowl- 
edge rests  ultimately  on  certain  facts  of  conscious- 
ness, which  as  primitive,  and  consequently  incom- 
prehensible, are  given  less  in  the  form  of  cogni- 
tions than  of  beliefs.  But  if  consciousness  in  its 
last  analysis, — in  other  words,  if  our  primary  ex- 
perience be  a  faith,  the  reality  of  our  knowledge 
turns  on  the  veracity  of  our  constitutive  beliefs. 
As  ultimate  the  quality  of  these  beliefs  cannot  be 
inferred  ;  their  truth,  however,  is  in  the  first  in- 
stance to  be  presumed."  The  particular  name  by 
which  we  describe  them  is,  however,  not  a  matter 
of  importance.  The  essential  thing  is  to  recognize 
the  fact  that,  without  certain  inferences  transcend- 
ing phenomena,  which  the  mind  draws,  we  cannot 
conceive  the  external  world,  or  make  a  distinction 
between  the  present  and  the  past. 

And  further,  as  we  are  simply  dealing  here  with 
facts  of  consciousness,  it  does  not  matter  what  the- 
ory we  adopt  to  account  for  these  facts.  As  these 
intuitions  present  themselves  to  us,  they  appear  in 
a  completed  state,  and  they  have  doubtless  borne 
that  character  as  long  as  we  have  known  anything 


PERSONALITY  AND   THE  INFINITE.  3  1 1 

about  them.  But  it  seems  probable  that  we  inherit 
natures  which  cannot  but  develop  these  results  as 
soon  as  they  develop  at  all.  To  recognize  the  fact 
that  the  present  form  of  these  intuitive  convictions 
has  been  gradually  established,  is  simply  to  recog- 
nize the  fact  that  the  rational  history  of  their  pro- 
duction is  similar  to  that  which  marks  a  large  por- 
tion of  the  universe  as  known  to  us.  This  is  the 
explanation  of  the  origin  of  our  intuitive  beliefs 
given  by  Mr.  Spencer,  that  they  are  a  habit  of  mind 
engendered  by  the  antecedent  experience  of  an  in- 
definite series  of  ancestors.  And  for  this  explana- 
tion it  is  claimed  that  it  completely  reconciles  the  op- 
posing theories  of  the  school  of  Locke  and  of  Kant. 
But  this  explanation  of  their  origin  does  not,  in  the 
least,  affect  the  claim  that  to  the  human  mind  in  its 
present  matured  and  perfected  state,  they  bear  the 
character  of  immediate  and  necessary  truths.  The 
doctrine  of  evolution  does  not  detract  from,  but 
truly  considered,  adds  to  their  binding  authority. 

Among  the  most  evident  and  undeniable  of  these 
primary  cognitions,  or  beliefs,  which  thus  carry  with 
them  the  characteristic  of  intuition,  must  be  reck- 
oned our  conviction  of  the  infinite.  This  convic- 
tion, like  every  other  intuitive  conviction,  will  be 
found,  on  examination,  not  to  exist  in  the  mind  as 
an  innate  idea,  but  is  always  connected  with  some 
positive  cognition.  That  is,  it  does  not  appear 
full-blown  at  the  dawn  of  consciousness,  but  in  all 
cases  arises  after  the  mind  has  reached,  through  ex- 
perience, the  perception  of  certain  other  truths.  It 
is  claimed  by  some  that  the  finite  mind  can  never 
have  a  conception  of  infinity,  and  that  we  only 
mock  ourselves  with  words  and  phrases  when  we 


312  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

presume  to  talk  about  it.  But  while  no  one  will 
deny  that  the  human  mind  can  form  no  conception 
of  infinity,  as  we  picture  an  object  or  recall  a  scene, 
or  construct  a  mental  image,  it  by  no  means  follows 
that  we  can  absolutely  have  no  apprehension  of  the 
infinite.  We  constantly  appre"hend  things  of  which 
we  can  distinctly  frame  no  mental  image,  and  while 
it  is  perfectly  true  that  we  can  have  no  proper  or 
adequate  conception  of  infinity,  and  not  less  certain 
that  we  can  never  rise  to  it  by  any  process  of  gen- 
eralization, it  does  not  by  any  means  follow  from 
this  that  we  may  not  have  a  real  and  positive  appre- 
hension of  it.  We  can  have  no  conception,  either  of 
infinite  space  or  of  infinite  time,  but  if  we  take  the 
wings  of  morning  and  fly  to  the  extremest  verge  of 
the  material  universe,  we  cannot  then  cast  from 
us  the  conviction  that  immeasurable  space  still 
stretches  beyond  our  utmost  vision,  or  if  we  go 
back  in  time,  through  the  illimitable  periods  of  geo- 
logic or  cosmic  history,  the  background  of  a  fathom- 
less eternity  still  rises  up  before  us.  Infinite  space 
and  infinite  time  are  necessities  of  thought.  They 
are  conceptions  which,  indeed,  we  cannot  grasp, 
but  which  we  are  equally  unable  to  cast  aside.  We 
are  persuaded  of  them  not  less  irresistibly  than  we 
are  persuaded  of  our  own  existence.  We  can  con- 
ceive of  neither,  but  we  are  equally  unable  to  con- 
ceive that  both  do  not  exist.  While  they  are  in- 
exorable necessities  of  thought,  they  are  not  less 
supreme  characteristics  of  human  intelligence.  Sir 
William  Hamilton  has  represented  this  notion  of 
infinity  as  a  result  of  mental  impotency.  But  it  is 
not  simply  negative.  It  is  in  the  truest  sense  a  pos- 
itive conviction,  and  though  any  attempt  to  grasp  it 


PERSONALITY  AND    THE  INFINITE.  313 

only  heightens  our  own  sense  of  inadequacy,  yet 
the  mind  is  impelled  by  our  active  impulses  to 
stretch  after  what  it  can  never  reach. 

If  it  be  objected  that,  in  making  this  inference, 
we  are  passing  wholly  beyond  the  bounds  of  knowl- 
edge, and  the  legitimate  sphere  of  the  human  in- 
tellect, I  reply,  that  we  are  doing  so  no  more  than 
when  we  arrive  at  the  knowledge  of  anything  out- 
side of  our  personal  consciousness.  When  the 
man  of  science  ascribes  a  real  existence  to  any  of 
the  phenomena  of  external  nature  about  which  he 
reasons,  he  only  infers  that  such  is  the  fact.  Rea- 
son compels  the  belief  that  the  stream  of  phenom- 
ena, of  which  alone  we  are  directly  conscious,  is 
not  self-sufficient,  but  that  it  involves  the  existence 
of  something  not  itself  revealed  to  consciousness, 
by  which  these  phenomena  must  be  explained.  In 
consciousness  we  have  only  the  signs  of  external 
things.  But  when  science  goes  beyond  this  limit, 
when  she  concedes,  as  she  does,  the  real  existence 
of  an  external  world,  when  she  reasons  of  force 
and  matter  as  something  more  than  conceptions 
which  the  mind  has  formed,  then  she  recognizes 
the  truth  that  the  mind  is  compelled  to  make  infer- 
ences respecting  a  sphere  into  which  experience 
does  not  reach,  and  respecting  which  consciousness 
has  no  direct  information.  The  great  physical  doc- 
trine of  the  persistence  of  energy  all  rests  on  this 
admission. 

"  It  is  unquestionable,  then,"  says  Mr.  Herbert, 
"  that  the  testimony  of  consciousness  to  much  that 
lies  beyond  the  present  phenomenon  is  accepted 
without  hesitation,  that  human  life  would  be  at  a 
standstill  if  credit  was  not  continually  given  to  in- 


314  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

ferences  from  the  symbols  which  present  themselves 
in  consciousness.  To  read  off  the  meaning  of  these 
symbols  is  the  very  function  of  our  intelligence; 
reason  finds  its  occupation  in  the  interpretation  of 
signs ;  and  that  is  preeminently  its  office  in  the  ar- 
duous and  elaborate  investigations  of  science.  To 
recognize  the  world  as  external  is  to  assume  a 
power  outside  me  working  effects  on  me ;  to  affirm 
that  a  phenomenon  had  an  antecedent  is  to  accept 
the  testimony  of  memory  to  a  fact  which  is  incapa- 
ble of  proof.  Science,  then,  transcends  phenomena 
at  every  step ;  the  whole  fabric  of  human  knowl- 
edge would  collapse,  unless  the  testimony  of  con- 
sciousness were  accepted  to  facts  not  found  among 
phenomena,  but  inferred  from  them.  Yet  those 
who  are  indebted,  at  every  turn,  to  such  inferences, 
boast  of  giving  recognition  to  phenomena  alone. 
Nor  is  it  a  mere  practical,  .as  distinguished  from  a 
philosophical  recognition,  that  is  given  to  such  in- 
ferences, for  the  entire  edifice  of  their  science  re- 
poses on  them."  2 

'  Let  us  now  proceed  to  connect  this  reasoning 
with  the  results  of  our  previous  discussion.  I  have 
wandered  somewhat  away  from  the  direct  line  of  my 
argument  for  the  purpose  of  making  perfectly  plain 
an  important  principle.  The  proof  that  the  first 
cause  is  the  infinite,  eternal,  and  perfect  being,  has, 
for  the  most  part,  been  derived  directly  from  princi- 
ples and  ideas  held  to  be  innate.  Various  methods 
have  been  adopted  for  showing  this,  but  they  all 
"  agree  in  attempting  to  demonstrate  the  divine  exist- 
ence and  attributes  by  a  process  of  purely  deductive 
reasoning.     Thus  arguments  for  the  divine  exist- 

1   The  Realistic  Assumptions  of  Modern  Science  Examined,  p.  344. 


PERSONALITY  AND    THE  INFINITE.  3  1 5 

ence  have  been  deduced  from  the  nature  of  truth, 
which  implies  a  being  as  absolutely  true,  or  from 
the  nature  of  the  human  mind,  as  united,  through 
its  universal  notions,  with  the  divine  mind,  or  from 
the  nature  of  knowledge,  which  is  held  to  be  possible 
only  through  ideas  which  have  their  source  in  an 
eternal  reason,  not  derived  from  the  senses  but  in- 
herent in  the  divine  nature.  Anselm  held  that,  from 
the  very  idea  of  God,  as  the  highest  being,  his  neces- 
sary existence  might  be  strictly  deduced,  while  Des- 
cartes maintained  that,  in  the  very  consciousness  of 
imperfection  and  limitation,  was  involved  the  idea 
of  an  all-perfect  and  unlimited  being.  Others  have 
derived  so-called  demonstrations  of  the  divine  exist- 
ence from  the  notions  of  existence  and  causality. 
My  present  argument  must  not  be  confounded  with 
any  of  these.  As  I  do  not  adopt  them,  I  do  not 
need  to  explain  or  defend  them.  They  are  all  at- 
tempts to  evolve,  by  a  purely  logical  process,  what 
is  involved  in  certain  primary  intuitions,  or  funda- 
mental conditions  of  the  mind,  and  it  is  claimed  for 
them  that,  unless  we  fall  back  upon  the  skeptical 
alternative  that  the  consciousness  and  reason  of  man 
cannot  be  trusted,  we  must  believe  in  the  existence 
of  an  eternal,  infinite,  and  unconditional  being.  But 
the  fatal  defect  seems  to  me  to  lurk  in  all  this  rea- 
soning that  it  proceeds,  throughout,  on  a  purely 
ideal  basis  ;  it  is  reasoning,  not  respecting  the  facts 
of  nature,  but  respecting  the  conceptions  of  the  hu- 
man mind.  A  purely  subjective  necessity  of  rea- 
soning is  projected  outwards,  and  because  logically 
conclusive,  is  held  to  be  conclusive  in  the  realm  of 
objective  reality.  Under  every  one  of  its  modifica- 
tions this  argument  proceeds   from   the  necessary 


3  l6  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

idea  of  God  to  his  necessary  being ;  it  passes  from 
thought  to  reality  precisely  as  we  pass  from  prem- 
ise to  conclusion. 

But  I  propose  to  make  no  such  application  of  our 
intuitive  beliefs.  I  am  not  arguing  from  our  intu- 
ition of  the  infinite  to  the  existence  of  an  infinite 
being,  but  having  found  the  existence  and  attributes 
of  some  being  by  a  wholly  different  method,  am  now 
asking  whether  we  are  not  compelled  to  connect  our 
intuitions  of  the  infinite  with  this  existing  being. 
It  may  be  thought,  by  some,  that  as  soon  as  the  idea 
of  the  infinite  is  thus  apprehended,  the  full  theistic 
inference  goes  with  it,  and  that  the  inference  of  the 
mind  to  the  existence  of  the  Deity  is  self-evident. 
But  an  atheist  does  not  deny  infinity  as  an  abstract 
conception,  and  few  will  refuse  to  recognize  the  fact 
that  they  apprehend  immediately  certain  aspects  of 
infinity.  What  they  refuse  to  acknowledge  is  that 
the  apprehension  of  the  infinite  implies  anything 
more  than  the  boundlessness  of  space,  the  eternity 
of  time,  or  the  self-existence  of  matter.  Something, 
then,  is  needed  to  complete  the  argument,  and  to 
show  that  there  is  some  being  of  whom  such  infinite 
attributes  are  predicable.  The  proof  that  God  is 
^infinite  and  absolute  should,  therefore,  not  precede, 
but  should  follow,  the  proof  of  the  existence  of  an 
intelligent  and  righteous  cause.  We  do  not  pass  by 
any  illicit  process  from  the  ideal  to  the  actual,  but 
have  reasoned  from  facts  to  the  existence  and  attri- 
butes of  a  first  cause,  before  we  have  undertaken  to 
apply  to  him  our  intuitive  conceptions.  We  have 
shown  that  the  universe  must  have  had  an  incon- 
ceivably powerful  and  intelligent  author,  a  supreme 
framer  and  governor  who  has  adjusted,  throughout 


PERSONALITY  AND    THE  INFINITE.  317 

its  wondrous  frame,  means  to  ends  with  marvelous 
exactness  ;  who  has  formed  his  creatures  to  recognize 
a  moral  law,  who  has  made  the  course  of  their  his- 
tory, through  the  ages,  an  increasing  expression  and 
illustration  and  demonstration  of  a  moral  purpose. 
We  have,  further,  shown  that  we  are  so  made,  or 
if  another  statement  of  the  fact  be  preferred,  have 
grown  so  to  be,  that  we  have  intuitions,  which  are 
the  very  framework  of  all  our  thought,  of  infinity 
and  eternity.  When  we  have  reached  this  point  the 
idea  of  God  spontaneously  completes  itself.  We 
irresistibly  connect  these  intuitions  with  the  first 
cause.  The  author  of  the  universe  must  be  the  be- 
ing of  whom  these  are  predicable.  When  the  mind 
has  been  brought  to  admit  the  existence  of  a  su- 
preme intelligence  and  will  it  will  not  hesitate  to 
believe  that  this  intelligence  and  will  are  also  infinite  \ 
and  eternal. 

From  what  has  been  said  the  part  which  intuition 
holds,  in  our  present  argument,  has  been  made  suffi- 
ciently plain.  (While  we  had  no  hesitation  in  reject- 
ing intuition  as  an  exclusive  and  immediate  source 
of  our  belief  in  the  divine  existence,  we  recognize 
intuition  as  essential  to  the  completeness  of  the  the- 
istic  argument.^  We  recognize  it,  not  as  doing  away 
with  the  various  inductive  arguments,  based  on  the 
constitution  of  the  universe  and  the  nature  of  man, 
but  as  completing  those  arguments,  and  carrying 
them  to  the  final  stage,  short  of  which  they  fail  to 
satisfy  the  mind.  II n  other  words,  we  regard  intu- 
ition, not  as  a  distinct  and  independent  faculty  of 
the  mind,  a  faculty  transcending  all  the  ordinary  and 
recognized  processes  of  intelligence,  but  as  a  part  of 
cognition,  as  the  final  and  legitimate  step  to  which 


318  THE   THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT 

the  intellectual  process  leads.  J  And  not  the  comple- 
tion of  one  process,  but  the  completion  of  all,  so  that 
the  final  conviction  to  which  the  reason  is  brought 
is  the  central  truth  towards  which  all  the  converg- 
ing lines  of  inquiry  lead.  Hence,  by  whatever  avenue 
we  approach  the  Deity,  whether  we  view  him  as  first 
cause  or  as  moral  governor,  we  are  brought  at  last 
to  this  conclusion. 

The  theistic  argument  is  completed  at  this  point.) 
All  its  threads  are  gathered  up  and  woven  together 
by  this  supreme  act  of  the  mind.  At  the  outset,  we 
saw  that  the  argument  was  complex.  The  proof  of 
the  divine  existence  was  drawn  from  many  sources. 
It  was  not  claimed  that  any  one,  taken  by  itself, 
yielded  a  perfectly  satisfactory  result.  The  neces- 
sity of  supposing  a  first  cause  was  not  itself  a  proof 
of  the  divine  existence.  The  evidence  of  intelli- 
gence in  nature  was  not  a  proof  of  the  divine  exist- 
ence ;  the  traces  in  history  of  a  moral  governor  were 
not  proofs  of  the  divine  existence.  But  all  these 
were  undeniable  facts ;  they  all  pointed  in  the  same 
direction,  they  all  converged  to  a  common  centre, 
they  all  brought  us,  at  last,  face  to  face  with  the 
conviction  of  a  being  behind  phenomena,  transcend- 
ing existence,  endowed  with  wisdom  and  goodness 
beyond  anything  that  the  imagination  of  man  could 
conceive.  At  this  point,  and  by  a  strictly  legitimate 
process  of  intellection,  a  process  implied  in  all  knowl- 
edge, and  lying  at  the  basis  of  every  science,  we 
clothed  this  conception  with  the  attributes  of  infin- 
ity, and  when  this  was  done,  the  idea  of  God  was 
completed.  , 

But  at  this  stage  in  our  argument  we  encounter  a 
new  objection.     Granting  all  that  has  been  claimed, 


PERSONALITY  AND    THE  INFINITE.  319 

it  may  now  be  urged  that  it  proves  too  much  ;  that 
when,  by  this  appeal  to  intuition,  we  have  succeeded 
in  establishing  the  existence  of  an  infinite  and  abso- 
lute being,  we  have  at  the  same  time  destroyed  all 
the  distinctive  grounds  of  religious  belief ;  for  this 
infinite  and  absolute  being  must,  in  the  nature  of 
the  case,  be  incomprehensible,  and  we  are  only  in- 
volved in  endless  and  inextricable  contradictions  if 
we  attribute  to  it  any  definite  qualities.  Above  all, 
it  is  said,  are  we  debarred  by  this  conclusion  from 
connecting  with  the  infinite  and  absolute  being  the 
idea  of  personality  ;  for  we  cannot  at  the  same  time 
think  of  the  Supreme  Being  as  infinite  and  think  of 
him  as  personal.  The  two  representations  cannot 
be  reconciled,  for  personality,  in  its  nature,  is  limit- 
ation, and  we  cannot  conceive  of  personality  into 
which  some  form  of  limitation  does  not  enter.  We 
cannot  transcend  in  thought  our  own  personality, 
and  hence  to  speak  of  an  infinite  and  absolute  per- 
son is  simply  to  play  with  phrases  that  have  no  in- 
telligible meaning. 

This  objection  is  a  metaphysical  one,  and  has  been 
made  sufficiently  familiar  in  the  writings  of  Mr. 
Mansel.  It  is  a  repetition  of  Spinoza's  famous 
maxim,  —  "  Determinatio  est  negatio,"  —  to  define 
God  is  to  deny  him.  But  it  is  also  the  view  of  Mr. 
Spencer,  in  whose  system  science  and  metaphysics 
are  continually  confounded.  While  Mr.  Spencer  as- 
serts the  existence  of  an  all-pervading  and  all-sus- 
taining power,  eternally  and  everywhere  manifested 
in  the  phenomenal  activity  of  the  universe,  alike  the 
cause  of  all  and  the  essence  of  all,  he  holds,  not  less 
strongly,  that  this  cause  and  essence  are,  to  us,  in- 
scrutable, and  that  the  terms  personality  and  infinity, 


320  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

especially,  express  ideas  which  are  mutually  incom- 
patible. The  most  that  we  can  do  is  to  assert  the 
persistence  of  an  unconditioned  reality,  transcending 
our  knowledge  or  conception,  without  beginning  or 
end.  The  axiomatic  truths  of  physical  science  una- 
voidably postulate  this  absolute  Being  as  their  ba- 
sis ;  but  beyond  this  we  cannot  go.  As  soon  as  we 
reason  about  it  we  are  involved  in  contradictions. 
So  that  the  highest  attainment  of  the  human  mind 
is  to  ascertain  the  laws  of  phenomena,  and  then 
bow  down  in  humble  recognition  of  the  infinite  un- 
known. 

Mr.  Matthew  Arnold,  with  more  grace  of  style  if 
less  scientific  vigor,  has  unfolded  the  same  doctrine. 
Mr.  Arnold  tells  us,  with  almost  wearisome  iteration, 
that  we  must  renounce  forever  the  delusion  "  that  God 
is  a  person  who  thinks  and  loves."  For  this  convic- 
tion, endeared  to  so  many  generations  of  believing 
souls,  we  are  to  substitute  the  idea  of  a  "  stream  of 
tendency  by  which  all  things  fulfill  the  law  of  their 
being ; "  not  a  person  who  thinks  and  loves,  but  a 
"  power  that  lives  and  breathes  and  feels."  We  are 
bidden  to  lift  our  eyes,  not  to  a  righteous  ruler  of 
the  world,  but  to  "the  eternal  not-ourselves  that 
makes  for  righteousness  ;"  or,  in  other  words,  to  sub- 
stitute for  a  personal  God  a  negative  entity,  of  which 
all  that  can  be  with  certainty  affirmed  is,  that  it  is 
"  not  we-ourselves,"  and  that  it  is  beyond  us  and 
eternal.  By  what  precise  process  we  reach  this  con- 
clusion is  not  clearly  pointed  out.  No  one,  we  are 
told,  "  has  discovered  the  nature  of  God  to  be  per- 
sonal, or  is  entitled  to  assert  that  he  has  conscious 
intelligence;"  but  we  are  told  to  look  to  the  "consti- 
tution and  history  of  things,"  where  we  shall  find  an 


PERSONALITY  AND   THE  INFINITE.  32 1 

eternal  tendency  at  work,  and  that  this  eternal  ten- 
dency "makes  for  righteousness."  1 

So  far  as  this  definition  of  Matthew  Arnold  is 
an  attempt  to  bring  the  conclusive  evidence  of  the 
divine  existence  within  the  range  of  human  experi- 
ence, so  that  it  can  be  tested  and  verified,  I  cordially 
accept  it.  It  is  wholly  in  the  spirit  of  this  discus- 
sion, and  is  an  affirmation  of  one  essential  part  of 
my  argument,  —  the  argument  from  history.  I  en- 
deavored to  show  that  the  course  of  history,  with 
whatever  exceptions,  yet  on  the  whole,  undeniably 
"makes  for  righteousness."  So  far,  too,  as  this  view 
is  a  protest  against  the  common  tendency  to  identify 
personality  in  God  with  personality  in  man,  thus 
assuming  that  human  nature  is  an  adequate  measure 
or  representative  of  the  divine,  it  may  be  accepted 
as  working  a  wholesome  reaction.  The  old  Hebrew 
prophets  said  as  much.  But  Mr.  Arnold  evidently 
means  more.  His  language,  though  not  always 
clear,  must  still  be  taken  to  imply  that  human  per- 
sonality not  only  inadequately  represents  the  divine, 
but  that  there  is  a  radical  inconsistency,  or  contra- 
diction, between  the  two  ideas  ;  so  that  if  God  be 
infinite  he  cannot  be  a  person,  and  if  personal  hej 
cannot  be  infinite.  An  infinite  being  must  exclude! 
limitation  and  relation. 

The  question  whether  the  Supreme  Being  is  per- 
sonal, or  can  be  interpreted  by  us  in  terms  in  which 
we  interpret  our  own  personality,  is  a  very  old  one, 
and  it  would  be  idle  to  disguise  the  difficulties  which 
surround  it.  From  the  universal  instinct  of  the  hu- 
man race  to  recognize  the  Supreme  Being  as  per- 
sonal, the  great  majority  of  all  forms  of  false  religion 

1  [See  Arnold,  Literature  and  Dogma.] 
21 


322  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

have  arisen.  For  the  moment  the  mind  proceeds 
to  clothe  the  Supreme  Being  with  the  attribute  of 
personality,  the  subtle  process  of  anthropomorphiz- 
ing begins,  and,  as  experience  shows,  this  process 
carries  in  its  train  every  form  of  idol  worship,  from 
the  loftiest  to  the  most  degraded.  "The  fair  hu- 
manities of  old  religion,"  whose  passing  away  from 
earth  a  great  modern  poet  has  deplored,  and  the  low- 
est fetish  worship  of  an  African  savage,  all  had  their 
beginning  here.  It  is  not  surprising  that  this  result 
should  produce  with  some  a  deep  revulsion  of  feel- 
ing, and  that,  not  in  the  name  of  science  only,  but 
even  in  the  name  of  religion,  they  should  feel  called 
upon  to  utter  a  protest  against  what  they  stigmatize 
as  "  anthropomorphic  theism,"  as  a  mere  survival  of 
the  primitive  fetishistic  habit  of  thought. 

Yet  anthropomorphism,  though  evidently  capable 
of  being  carried  to  a  ruinous  extreme,  represents  a 
universal  tendency,  and  so*  according  to  the  maxim 
of  the  evolution  school,  would  seem  to  have  its  roots 
in  some  great  truth.  That  the  human  mind  has 
shown  this  instinctive  tendency  would  seem  a  fact, 
of  itself,  sufficient  to  suggest  the  question  whether 
there  were  not  some  reality  corresponding  to  this 
irrepressible  instinct.  "We  must  not  fall  down 
and  worship,"  we  are  told,  "  as  the  source  of  our  life 
and  virtue,  the  image  which  our  own  minds  have 
set  up.  Why  is  such  idolatry  any  better  than  that 
of  the  old  wood  and  stone  ?  If  we  worship  the 
creations  of  our  minds,  why  not  also  those  of  our 
hands  ?  The  one  is,  indeed,  a  more  refined  self-ado- 
ration than  the  other ;  but  the  radical  error  remains 
the  same  in  both."  Yet,  clearly,  because  we  can 
recognize  the  Supreme  Being  as  good  and  wise,  it 


PERSONALITY  AND    THE  INFINITE.  323 

does  not  follow  that  his  goodness  and  his  wisdom 
are  simply  the  creations  of  our  thought ;  and  if  we 
can  recognize  him  as  personal,  and  if  we  instinct- 
ively tend  so  to  do,  this  of  itself  would  furnish  no  1 
ground  whatever  for  discrediting  the  reality  of  his/ 
personality  as  distinct  from  our  conceptions. 

Mr.  Spencer  concedes,  not  only  that  we  are  com- 
pelled to  recognize  the  existence  of  something  be- 
hind phenomena,  but  we  are  compelled  to  recognize 
that  something  as  efficient  cause.  It  is  only  when 
we  attempt  to  reason  about  it  that  we  are  involved 
in  contradictions.  But,  similar  contradictions  beset 
us  just  as  much  when  we  attempt  to  reason  about 
other  things.  When  we  analyze  the  grounds  for 
believing  in  our  own  continuous  existence,  our  own 
personality  or  freedom,  or  when  we  attempt  to  frame 
definite  conceptions  of  notions  so  fundamental  as 
space,  time,  or  motion,  we  are  encompassed  with 
contradictions.  There  is  nothing,  whatever,  excep- 
tional in  our  experience  when  we  lift  our  thoughts 
to  the  Supreme  Being.  And  the  natural  inference 
is  that  our  conceptions,  derived  directly  or  indirectly 
from  phenomena,  are  not  inadequate  to  represent 
realities  transcending  phenomena,  which  however 
dimly  shadowed  forth  are  yet  irresistibly  suggested. 
Absolute  knowledge  of  these  realities  is  confessedly 
unattainable,  yet  the  conviction  of  their  existence  is 
irresistible ;  and  shall  we  rest  with  the  blank  admis- 
sion of  their  existence,  or  may  we  proceed  to  explore, 
even  though  imperfectly,  their  nature  ? 

Surely,  if  our  ignorance  of  the  Supreme  Being 
disqualifies  us  from  affirming  or  denying  anything 
about  him,  it  disqualifies  us  from  ascribing  to  him 
power.     How,  according  to  Mr.  Spencer's  view,  we 


324  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

are  "obliged  to  regard  every  phenomenon  as  a  mani- 
festation of  some  power,"  and  yet  are  debarred  from 
regarding  phenomena  as  manifestations  of  intelli- 
gence, it  is  not  easy  to  see.  Are  not  power  and 
intelligence  equally  attributes  ?  Are  we  not  forced 
to  the  conviction  of  the  reality  of  a  power  by  the 
existence  of  the  universe,  and  are  not  the  character- 
istics of  the  universe  as  much  phenomena  demand- 
ing explanation  as  its  bare  existence  ?  Clearly,  to 
be  consistent  with  himself,  Mr.  Spencer  should  dis- 
miss from  his  system,  not  only  the  idea  of  intelli- 
gence, but  the  idea  of  power,  and  even  of  any  reality 
in  the  external  universe.  These  attributes  are  as 
perplexing  and  inscrutable  as  any  that  the  mind  can 
connect  with  the  Supreme  Being.  Thus,  according 
to  this  view,  the  only  consistent  and  logical  result 
that  can  be  reached  with  regard  to  this  whole  sub- 
ject is,  an  utter  paralysis  of  thought.  We  virtually 
fall  back  upon  the  Hegelian  conclusion,  where  pure 
existence  is  identified  with  pure  nothing. 

All  that  I  claim  is  that  there  are  many  concep- 
tions which  the  mind  is  irresistibly  prompted  to 
form,  which,  when  logically  followed  out,  are  found 
to  involve  contradictions.  Such  are  our  conceptions 
of  mind  and  thought,  of  matter  and  motion,  of  time 
and  space.  In  whatever  direction  our  inquiries 
move  these  conceptions  quickly  land  us  in  contra- 
dictions. All  these  conceptions  involve  inferences 
that  transcend  phenomena,  yet  they  are  inferences 
to  which  reason,  when  it  investigates  phenomena,  is 
inevitably  led.  What  course,  now,  do  we  pursue  ? 
Do  we,  on  account  of  these  recognized  and  acknowl- 
edged difficulties,  dismiss  such  conceptions  from  our 
minds,  or  doubt  their  reality  ?     Do  we  question  the 


PERSONALITY  AND    THE  INFINITE.  325 

existence  of  mind  or  matter,  because  an  ideal  or  a 
material  conception  of  the  universe  cannot  be  recon- 
ciled ;  do  we  doubt  the  reality  of  time  and  of  space, 
because  the  attempt  to  conceive  either  involves  us 
in  contradiction  ?  Do  we  not  accept  these  concep- 
tions as  necessary,  while  we  recognize  them  as  im- 
perfect ?  And  while  we  cannot  attain  absolute  knowl- 
edge respecting  these  inferences,  do  we  not  yet  rest 
in  the  firm  conviction  that,  however  imperfect,  they 
represent  realities  ? 

To  describe  his  distinctive  position,  Mr.  Spencer 
applies  to  his  system  the  epithet  "  Transfigured  Real- 
ism." By  this  he  affirms  the  reality  of  some  objec- 
tive existence,  as  a  necessity  of  thought,  but  denies 
that  it  is  more  than  an  unknown  correlative  of  con- 
sciousness. We  can  say  that  it  is,  but  cannot  say 
what  it  is.  But  either  this  high-sounding  phrase 
means  nothing,  or  it  means  much  more  than  Mr. 
Spencer  is  willing  to  admit.  If  he  admits  that  the 
mind  is  competent  to  recognize  anything  but  mere 
phenomena,  he  opens  a  door  which  he  has  no  right 
to  close.  The  question  is  not,  whether  we  can  reason 
back  to  the  essence  of  the  Supreme  Being,  —  no  one 
claims  that ;  the  question  is  not  whether  we  can  fully 
search  out  the  attributes  of  the  Supreme  Being,  —  no 
one  claims  that  we  have  more  than  a  partial  knowl- 
edge even  of  the  attributes  which  are  revealed  ;  the 
simple  question  is,  whether,  if  we  are  competent  to 
recognize  power,  which  Mr.  Spencer  admits,  we  are 
not  competent  to  recognize  other  attributes.  By 
Mr.  Spencer's  own  admission,  the  middle  wall  of 
partition  between  the  seen  and  the  unseen  is  broken 
down,  and  the  question  what  we  know  of  the  su- 
preme cause  becomes  a  question  of  degree. 


326  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

To  ascribe  personality  to  the  Supreme  Being  is 
often  spoken  of,  as  it  were,  in  a  peculiar  way  to 
ascertain  his  essence,  as  though,  in  thus  represent- 
ing him,  we  claimed,  more  than  in  any  other  way,  to 
know  him  as  he  is.  But  has  the  attribute  of  personal- 
ity any  such  precedence  over  other  attributes  ?  When 
we  ascribe  conscious  life  to  our  fellow-men,  we  do  it 
wholly  on  the  ground  that  their  bodies  exhibit  cer- 
tain movements  resembling  the  movements  of  our 
own  bodies  when  actuated  by  conscious  impulses. 
We  know  nothing  whatever  of  the  real  nature,  or 
essence,  of  the  power  that  produces  these  results 
either  in  ourselves,  or  in  them.  In  their  case,  we 
have  nothing  but  physical  appearances,  yet  we  do 
not  for  a  moment  doubt  that  these  movements  are 
guided  by  intelligence  to  a  designed  result.  We  are 
justified  in  drawing  the  same  inference  respecting 
nature  distinct  from  human  bodies,  when  we  observe 
certain  phenomena.  We  do  not  hesitate  to  ascribe 
these  changing  phenomena  to  some  reality  behind 
them.  We  go  even  further.  We  find,  in  ourselves, 
conscious  intelligence ;  we  form  plans  and  we  have 
power  to  realize  them,  and  we  ascribe  the  same  char- 
acteristics to  other  beings  like  ourselves. 

We  are  following  strictly  the  same  process  of  rea- 
soning when  turning  our  gaze  to  external  nature 
and  finding  there  far  more  elaborate  and  skillfully 
contrived  plans  than  we  have  ever  been  able  to  exe- 
cute ;  and  remembering  that  man  himself  is  but  a 
part  of  nature,  and  is  included,  as  a  conscious,  ra- 
tional, and  voluntary  being  in  the  same  great  scheme, 
we  feel  compelled  to  recognize  the  attributes  of  per- 
sonal intelligence.  In  doing  this,  we  no  more  pre- 
tend to  fathom  the  nature  of  the  inscrutable  reality 


PERSONALITY  AND    THE  INFINITE.  327 

thus  revealed  to  us,  than  we  pretend  to  understand  / 
the  personality  revealed  to  us  in  our  fellow-men.  In  ■ 
either  case,  we  are  directly  dealing  with  mere  phe- 
nomena, but  as  we  cannot  refuse  to  recognize  per- 
sonal intelligence  in  the  minor  facts  which  we  term 
human  beings,  we  cannot  consistently  refuse  to 
recognize  it  in  the  stupendous  phenomena  of  the 
external  world.  We  go  no  further  in  the  one  case 
than  in  the  other,  and  as  we  claim  only  to  know 
very  imperfectly  our  fellow-beings,  when  we  ascribe 
to-  them  the  attributes  of  persons,  so  no  more  can  it 
be  said,  when  we  ascribe  the  same  attribute  to  the 
supreme  cause,  that  we  have  found  out  the  Almighty 
to  perfection. 

It  may  still  be  urged  that,  even  granting  that  this 
process  is  legitimate,  and  that  in  reaching  this  con- 
clusion we  do  no  more  than  when  we  reason  respect- 
ing any  phenomena,  yet  a  reverent  mind  shrinks 
back  from  it,  since  in  thus  ascribing  personality  to 
the  unsearchable  power  revealed  in  phenomena,  we 
only  invest  him  with  attributes  which  are  but  exag- 
gerations of  our  own  qualities,  and  thus  degrade  him 
to  our  own  level.  This  objection  is  urged  as  con- 
clusive by  those  who  love  to  express  contempt  for 
what  they  are  pleased  to  term  "  Anthropomorphic 
Theism,"  yet,  on  examination,  it  will  be  found  desti- 
tute of  real  weight.  For  what  are  the  alternatives 
which  are  open  to  us  ?  Do  we  get  a  more  adequate 
and  more  exalted  conception  of  the  Supreme  Being 
by  refusing  to  invest  him  with  personality.  There 
may  be,  Mr.  Spencer  suggests,  "  a  mode  of  being  as 
much  transcending  intelligence  and  will  as  these 
transcend  mechanical  motion."  This  no  one  will 
deny,  for  no  one  claims  that  the  designation  of  the 


328  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

Supreme  Being,  as  personal,  is  anything  more  than 
a  partial  and  inadequate  description.  But  how  shall 
we  make  the  nearest  approach  to  a  conception  of 
this  transcendent  being  ?  Is  it  by  appealing  to  the 
lowest  conceptions  that  nature  supplies  us,  or  is  it 
by  appealing  to  the  highest  ?  Is  it  by  expressing  the 
Supreme  Being  in  terms  of  physical  force,  of  matter 
and  motion,  or  is  it  by  expressing  him  in  terms  of 
spiritual  action,  of  will,  intelligence,  and  personal- 
ity ?  Granted  that  both  are  imperfect,  which  is 
likely  to  be  more  adequate.7"  Is  it  not  obvious  that 
the  former  way  of  conceiving,  or  of  describing,  the 
Supreme  Being,  instead  of  giving  us  a  more  ele- 
vated, is  to  give  us  a  more  degrading  conception  ? 
Our  highest  conception  of  existence  is  bound  up 
with  personality.  From  this  highest  level  of  expe- 
rience we  must  start  to  reach  the  most  adequate 
conception  of  the  Supreme  Being.  Our  argument, 
in  short,  amounts  to  this  ;  that  to  refuse  to  form 
any  conception  of  Deity  is  to  rest  in  utter  vacancy, 
and  is  the  least  satisfactory  and  least  rational  result 
of  all ;  that  to  accept  the  existence  of  a  reality  be- 
hind phenomena,  and  describe  it  under  phrases  de- 
/  rived  from  physical  causation,  is  to  represent  the 
supreme  cause  as  in  reality  inferior  to  ourselves ; 
and  that  hence  the  only  rational  course,  always  bear- 
ing in  mind  the  inadequacy  of  our  conclusions,  is  to 
invest  him  with  the  highest  attributes  of  which  we 
have  any  knowledge,  —  the  attributes  of  a  personal 
beinG:. 


LECTURE   XL 

THE    ALTERNATIVE    THEORIES. 

I  have  thus  far  aimed  simply  to  present  the  posi- 
tive grounds  on  which  the  theistic  argument  rests. 
I  have  confined  myself  throughout  the  entire  discus- 
sion to  rigid  inductive  reasoning.  From  the  mani- 
fest and  undisputed  facts  presented  in  the  external 
world  and  in  human  consciousness,  I  have  sought 
to  establish  certain  conclusions  respecting  the  exist- 
ence and  attributes  of  a  supreme  cause.  By  a  sim- 
ilar method  I  ascertained  the  existence  of  certain 
necessary  intuitions  of  the  mind,  and  proceeded  to 
connect  these  intuitions  with  the  conclusions  already 
reached.  At  this  point  the  argument  was  completed. 
Whatever  validity  it  has  a  right  to  claim,  and  what- 
ever acceptance  it  ought  to  win,  depend  upon  the 
force  of  what  has  been  presented.  My  aim  has  been 
to  set  forth  the  rational  grounds  by  which  we  are 
led  to  a  belief  in  the  divine  existence,  and  the  con- 
clusion to  which  the  discussion  has  brought  us  is 
that  no  other  intelligible  explanation  of  the  universe 
is  possible,  save  that  it  owes  its  existence  and  its 
continuance  in  existence  to  a  self-existent  being  who 
is  infinitely  powerful,  wise,  and  good. 

A  conclusion  so  solemn  and  momentous  ought  to 
make  its  appeal  to  positive  grounds,  and  on  no  other 
could  its  acceptance  be  for  a  moment  urged.  If 
these  are  not  sufficient,  nothing  is  left  but  to  aban- 


330  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

don  the  argument  altogether.  But  the  question  may 
be  looked  at  in  another  light,  and,  before  we  leave 
it,  it  may  be  useful  and  instructive  so  to  do.  If  I 
have  not  wholly  failed  in  the  task  I  have  undertaken, 
I  have  shown  that  these  positive  grounds  are  suffi- 
cient, and  that  they  have  not  been  shaken  by  any  of 
the  recent  objections  brought  against  them.  Still, 
without  implying  any  doubt  as  to  their  sufficiency, 
we  may  ask,  before  closing  our  discussion,  what  is 
deft  us  should  the  theistic  conclusion  be  rejected. 
Even  if  our  argument  for  the  divine  existence  has 
not  been  carried  to  the  point  of  absolute  demonstra- 
tion, it  will  hardly  be  denied  that  it  reaches  a  high 
degree  of  probability,  and  that  it  supplies  a  rational 
explanation  of  the  phenomena  of  the  physical  uni- 
verse and  of  consciousness.  The  question  which  I 
now  propose  to  ask  is  :  in  case  this  conclusion  be 
rejected,  what  other  explanation  of  the  facts  of  na- 
ture or  of  life  shall  be  substituted  for  it  ? 

In  presenting  what  seems  to  me  the  convincing 
and  overwhelming  proofs  of  theism,  I  have  already 
been  compelled  to  examine  at  considerable  length 
the  leading  antagonistic  theories.  For  much  of  the 
argument  could  not  be  fairly  unfolded  without  keep- 
ing constantly  in  view  the  objections  that  had  been 
brought  against  it.  But  this  was  mainly  for  the  pur- 
pose of  warding  off  the  attacks  of  those  who  deny 
that  theism  rests  on  any  sufficient  foundation.  The 
treatment  of  these  objections  was  defensive.  So  far 
as  the  argument  was  concerned  this  would  have  been 
sufficient,  and  the  objections  brought  against  theism 
might  well  have  been  left  alone  after  their  inade- 
quacy or  irrelevancy  had  been  made  apparent.  Our 
discussion   of   the  subject  will,   however,  be  more 


THE  ALTERNATIVE    THEORIES.  331 

complete  and  more  satisfactory,  if  we  go  beyond 
this,  and  inquire  whether  those  who  reject  theism 
have,  themselves,  any  sufficient  ground  to  stand 
upon,  and  whether  the  various  substitutes  which 
they  offer  meet  those  wants  which  have  led  the 
great  majority  of  mankind  to  crave  with  so  much 
earnestness  some  proof  of  the  existence  of  a  being 
superior  to  themselves. 

The  time  remaining  at  my  disposal  would  not 
allow  anything  like  a  complete  review  of  anti-the- 
istic  theories,  even  were  such  a  review  in  itself  de- 
sirable. For  my  present  purpose  it  will  be  enough 
to  confine  myself  to  the  more  prominent  hypotheses 
which  are  just  now  awakening  discussion.  The  de- 
nial of  the  divine  existence  has  assumed  a  great 
variety  of  forms,  and  has  appealed,  at  different 
times,  to  a  great  variety  of  arguments.  Still  each 
successive  age  has  had  its  distinctive  type  of  unbe- 
lief, and  the  phases  of  anti-theistic  speculation  may 
be  very  readily  discriminated.  While  these  are  often 
closely  connected,  and  pass  one  to  the  other  by  a 
very  gradual  process  of  development,  they  may  yet 
be  regarded  as  distinct,  and  as  having  a  real  relation 
to  the  currents  of  contemporary  thought.  I  propose 
to  pass  in  review,  at  present,  only  those  aspects  of 
anti-theistic  speculation  which  reflect  our  present 
ways  of  looking  at  nature  or  at  man,  and  which  have 
sprung  directly  from  the  intellectual  conditions  of 
our  own  time.  This  will  furnish  us  with  more  than 
enough  for  satisfactory  examination  during  the  hour 
before  us. 

The  negative  of  theism  is  atheism,  but  with  athe- 
ism, in  the  strict  meaning  of  the  term,  we  do  not 
need  to  concern  ourselves.     For  if  by  atheism  we 


332  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

mean  the  absolute  denial  of  the  divine  existence, 
the  theory  is  one  that  hardly  calls  for  serious  refu- 
tation. It  is  true  that  some  are  found,  even  in  our 
own  day,  who  make  a  bold  profession  of  this  dog- 
matic atheism,  who,  if  we  may  accept  their  own 
statements,  have  reasoned  themselves  into  the  con- 
viction that  there  is  nothing  in  the  universe  higher 
than  man  ;  that  there  is  no  good  which  is  not  ma- 
terial and  perishable  ;  that  there  is  nothing  infinite 
and  nothing  eternal  in  whom  the  soul  may  confide. 
Thus  Feuerbach  says,  "  It  is  clear  as  the  sun  and 
evident  as  the  day  that  there  is  no  God,  and  still 
more  that  there  can  be  none  ; "  and  Flourens,  in 
language  more  offensive,  asserts,  "  Hatred  of  God  is 
the  beginning  of  wisdom.  If  mankind  would  make 
true  progress  it  must  be  on  the  basis  of  atheism." 
When  men  meet  us  with  declarations  like  these  we 
are  bound  to  take  them  at  their  word,  however  in- 
conceivable it  may  seem  to  us  that  a  rational  being 
could  be  brought  to  utter  such  absurdity. 

For  the  naked  assertion  that  God  does  not  exist 
is  evidently  one  that  no  finite  being  is  capable  of 
making.  Whatever  may  be  the  difficulty  of  proving 
that  there  is  a  God,  to  prove  that  there  is  not  a 
God  is  manifestly  beyond  the  power  of  human  in- 
tellect. That  God  exists  is  a  proposition,  the  truth 
of  which  may  be  deduced  from  a  circle  of  facts 
lying  within  our  immediate  range  ;  but  to  prove  that 
God  does  not  exist  we  must  have  sounded  the  uni- 
verse in  all  its  length  and  breadth.  If  he  has  left 
no  traces  of  his  existence  in  the  narrow  field  open  to 
our  inspection,  we  yet  cannot  affirm  that  no  such 
trace  exists  in  the  measureless  spaces  which  we 
have   never  explored ;    if  he   has   never   uttered   a 


THE  ALTERNATIVE   THEORIES.  333 

voice  during  the  brief  space  that  we  have  existed, 
we  still  cannot  declare  with  certainty  that  he  has 
never  revealed  himself  to  other  beings  during  the 
eternal  round  of  time.  When,  therefore,  Von  Hol- 
bach  declares  that  the  existence  of  God  "  is  not  a 
problem,  but  simply  an  impossibility,"  the  statement 
may  be  dismissed  as  destitute  of  meaning.  It  is  a 
waste  of  time  to  refute  a  proposition  which  the  hu- 
man mind,  in  the  nature  of  things,  has  no  capacity 
for  asserting. 

Few  allow  themselves  to  be  hurried,  either  by 
passion  or  prejudice,  to  this  irrational  extreme. 
Without  going  to  the  extent  of  denying  absolutely 
the  divine  existence,  most  of  those  who  decline  to 
accept  theism  content  themselves  with  denying  that 
there  is  any  sufficient  proof  of  the  existence  of  a 
supreme  being,  or  that  if  he  exists  we  are  capable 
of  knowing  it.  To  such  as  content  themselves  with 
this  more  moderate  conclusion  the  term  atheist  is 
not  commonly  applied,  and  in  some  cases  they  have 
taken  express  pains  to  disavow  it.  This  is  the  form 
of  unbelief  in  the  divine  existence  which  prevails 
most  widely  at  the  present  day.  Unlike  the  ex- 
treme form  of  atheism,  it  cannot  be  dismissed  as 
perfectly  irrational,  but  claims  to  ally  itself  with  the 
most  certain  conclusions  of  science.  In  distinction 
from  the  dogmatic  atheism,  which  absolutely  denies 
the  divine  existence,  this  is  skeptical  or  critical.  It 
does  not  declare  that  there  is  no  God,  but  contents 
itself  with  affirming  that  the  human  mind  can  never 
know  whether  there  is  a  God  or  not.  The  question 
of  the  divine  existence  it  regards  as  an  insoluble 
problem  which  the  wise  man  will  leave  alone.  For 
a  human  mind  it  has  no  meaning. 


334  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

So  far  as  the  practical  conclusion  is  concerned, 
the  difference  between  denying  that  there  is  a  God 
and  denying  that  we  can  ever  know  whether  there  is 
a  God  or  not  is  so  very  slight  that  the  two  theories 
might  well  be  classed  together.  There  is,  however, 
between  them  a  broad  distinction,  and  those  who 
hold  to  the  latter  are  not  bound,  by  any  means,  to 
accept  the  former.  One  is  atheism,  the  other  is 
agnosticism  ;  one  denies,  the  other  simply  holds  it- 
self in  suspense.  While  the  former  has  never 
gained  any  wide  acceptance,  and  when  averred 
seems  the  hasty  utterance  of  passionate  enthusi- 
asts, the  latter  has  much  in  common  with  the  calm, 
even,  cautious  temper  of  modern  times.  It  has,  on 
its  face,  the  recommendation  of  a  modest  theory  ; 
it  harmonizes  with  the  temper  which  science  en- 
joins. Nor  has  it  always  been  found  associated 
with  unbelief.  Some  have  supposed  that  the  claims 
of  revealed  religion  could  be  more  powerfully  vindi- 
cated, that  the  authority  of  divine  truth  could  be 
set  in  a  clearer  light,  by  first  demonstrating  the 
utter  incapacity  of  the  finite  intellect  to  deal  with 
any  problems  relating  to  the  infinite  and  supersen- 
suous  sphere. 

And  here  we  are  brought  in  contact  with  the 
first  of  the  alternative  hypotheses  which  I  propose 
to  consider,  the  system  of  thought  which  goes 
under  the  general  designation  of  positivism.  In 
using  this  phrase,  let  me  premise  that  I  do  not  use 
it  in  its  strict  sense  as  designating  a  single  school, 
but  rather  as  indicating  a  much  more  wide-spread 
habit  of  mind.  Nor  do  I  propose  to  discuss  the 
question,  how  far  this  mental  habit  represents  any- 
thing original  in  the  history  of  speculation.     I  shall 


THE  ALTERNATIVE    THEORIES.  335 

simply  exhibit  its  recognized  and  acknowledged  at- 
titude towards  religion.  Respecting  this  there  is 
no  room  for  dispute.  According  to  the  fundamen- 
tal maxims  of  positivism,  we  know,  and  can  know, 
nothing  except  physical  phenomena  and  their  laws. 
The  senses  are  the  sole  sources  of  thought,  and  be- 
yond the  facts  which  they  report,  and  the  evident 
relations  of  sequence  and  resemblance  in  which 
these  facts  stand  to  each  other,  our  intellectual 
vision  cannot  extend.  Only  the  laws  under  which 
physical  phenomena  may  be  grouped  present  any 
legitimate  subject  of  inquiry.  Any  attempt  to  go 
beyond  this  clearly  defined  line,  any  searching  into 
the  causes  of  phenomena,  whether  final  or  efficient, 
must  be  scouted  as  sheer  folly. 

Hence  positivism  lays  of  necessity  an  absolute 
interdict  on  all  religious  speculation.  It  equally  re- 
jects theism  and  atheism,  and  denies  the  capacity  of 
human  reason  either  to  affirm  or  to  deny  the  divine 
existence.  Belief  or  unbelief,  with  regard  to  a  prob- 
lem so  far  transcending  the  legitimate  range  of  hu- 
man faculties  is  denounced  as  equally  absurd,  and 
a  sane  mind  will  hold  itself  jealously  aloof  from 
an  inclination  either  to  the  one  or  to  the  other  di- 
rection. The  question  of  the  existence  of  a  su- 
preme being,  a  being  in  whom  we  may  trust,  to 
whom  we  may  look  for  guidance,  whom  we  may 
love  and  reverence  and  adore,  is  a  question  that  has 
for  us  no  more  significance  than  the  question  what 
language  is  spoken  in  the  stars.  It  is  a  waste  of 
time,  a  misuse  of  faculties,  to  busy  ourselves  with 
such  inquiries.  The  fact  that  we  are  interested  in 
such  a  question  is  simply  proof  that  our  intellects 
are   immature.      Wherever   such   speculations    are 


336  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

found  thought  is  still  in  its  infancy.  We  think  as 
children,  and  we  talk  as  children,  when  we  prattle 
about  a  first  cause  or  a  Supreme  Being.  The  best 
proof  that  we  have  become  men  is  forever  putting 
aside  these  childish  things. 

So  far  as  the  positive  philosophy  involved  any- 
thing distinctive  or  original,  it  has  had  its  day,  and 
is  now  seldom  mentioned  but  with  contempt.  It  is 
needless  to  dwell  upon  its  misconceptions  and  incon- 
sistencies, and  show  how,  in  professing  to  rest  itself 
upon  an  impregnable  basis  of  fact,  it  either  ignored 
or  denied  the  most  universal  and  best  attested  facts 
of  human  experience.  As  a  mere  theory,  it  is  not 
in  harmony  with  itself.  It  is,  to  a  considerable  ex- 
tent, a  materialistic  theory ;  but  so  far  as  it  involves 
materialism  it  denies  positivism.  For  positivism 
asserts  that  we  can  know  only  phenomena ;  but  ma- 
terialism implies  that  matter  is  more  than  a  phenom- 
enon. Again,  if,  as  Comte  asserted,  we  know  merely 
phenomena,  we  can  have  no  warrant  for  saying  that 
phenomena  which  we  call  mental  can  be  resolved 
into  phenomena  which  we  call  physical.  We  can 
only  say  that  they  are  coexistent  or  successive.  We 
have  a  direct  and  immediate  knowledge  of  mental 
phenomena.  We  are  as  sure  of  their  existence  as 
we  can  be  of  any  material  phenomenon.  A  system 
which  asserts  that  objects  of  sense  are  the  only  phe- 
nomena known  contradicts  the  positive  testimony 
of  human  consciousness. 

Not  only  is  the  positive  philosophy  inconsistent, 
it  is  incomplete ;  it  does  not  follow  into  the  logical 
conclusions  from  its  own  premises.  For  if  the 
senses  are  our  sole  means  of  knowing,  then  our  only 
real  knowledge  must  be  sensations  ;  but  sensations 


THE  ALTERNATIVE    THEORIES.  337 

are  simply  states  of  consciousness  ;  that  is,  they  are 
phenomena,  not  of  matter,  but  of  mind.  Therefore, 
if  we  know  only  phenomena,  it  is  not  material  but 
mental  phenomena  that  we  know;  and  hence  if  we 
accept  this  system  we  are  logically  bound,  to  dis- 
card not  only  belief  in  God,  but  belief  in  the  reality 
of  any  external  world.  A  permanent  possibility  of 
sensations  is,  in  fact,  all  that  we  have  left.  Nor  can 
we  stop  even  here ;  for  mind  cannot  be  identified 
with  its  phenomena.  If  we  know  only  phenomena 
we  know  only  a  series  of  states  of  consciousness. 
We  have  no  right  to  go  beyond  these.  We  have  no 
right  to  reason  respecting  the  mysterious  thread 
which  holds  these  states  of  consciousness  together. 
Hence  positivism  must  give  up  both  matter  and 
mind.  So  that  the  reasoning  which  undertakes  to 
prove  that  we  can  know  nothing  about  God,  if 
pushed  to  its  logical  consequences,  proves  that  we 
cannot  know  anything  at  all. 

The  assertion  of  the  positive  philosophy,  that  be- 
lief or  disbelief  in  the  divine  existence  is  equally 
absurd,  can  only  be  maintained  upon  one  of  two 
grounds  :  either  that  there  is  no  reason  whatever  in 
favor  of  either,  or  that  the  arguments  which  can  be 
adduced  for  one  are  exactly  counterbalanced  by  the 
arguments  which  can  be  adduced  for  the  other.  But 
to  assert  that  there  are  absolutely  no  reasons  which 
can  be  adduced  for  belief  in  the  divine  existence,  as 
we  have  already  seen,  is  to  do  what  no  finite  mind 
has  a  right  to  do.  To  prove  that  God  cannot  be 
known,  we  must  prove  that  there  is  something  con- 
tradictory in  the  very  notion  of  the  divine  existence  ; 
but  a  system  which  rests  rigidly  upon  the  facts  of 
experience  manifestly  cannot  do  this.     This  can  only 


338  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT 

be  done  by  an  appeal  to  those  very  metaphysical 
ideas  which  the  positive  philosophy  denounces  as 
worthless.  It  only  remains,  then,  to  show  that  the 
arguments  adduced  in  favor  of  the  divine  existence 
are  exactly  counterbalanced  by  the  arguments  ad- 
duced against  it.  But  this  can  only  be  done  by  com- 
parison and  examination.  And  this  examination 
evidently  ought  to  be  most  comprehensive  and  thor- 
ough. 

The  only  thing  approaching  such  an  examination 
which  the  positive  philosophy  gives  us  is  in  the  so- 
called  law  of  the  three  states.  According  to  this, 
human  speculation  has  passed  through  three  stages. 
It  was  first  theological,  then  metaphysical,  and  lastly, 
in  the  ripened  manhood  of  human  intelligence,  it  has 
become  positive.  Respecting  this  assumed  law  of 
human  progress,  it  is  enough  to  say,  not  only  that  no 
solid  historical  evidence  was  produced  in  its  favor, 
but  the  known  facts  of  history  all  disprove  it.  These 
coexistent  states  are  here  confounded  with  three  suc- 
cessive stages  of  thought,  —  three  aspects  of  things 
with  three  epochs  of  time.  Theology,  metaphysics, 
and  science,  instead  of  thus  following  one  another 
in  successive  epochs,  have  always  existed  side  by 
side,  and  exist  side  by  side  to-day.  Neither  one  of 
them  has  passed,  or  can  pass,  away.  All  positive 
science  rests  on  the  recognition  of  metaphysical  prin- 
ciples, and  theology  lies  behind  both.  History,  in- 
stead of  showing  that  theology  and  metaphysics  are 
.  mere  passing  phases  of  thought,  makes  clearly  evi- 
dent that  they  are  modes  of  conceiving  truth  which 
are  as  permanent  as  human  reason  itself. 

The  fundamental  objection  of   the  positivist  to 
theism  is,  that  it  is  based  on  the  assumption  that 


THE  ALTERNATIVE    THEORIES.  339 

man  can  attain  to  a  knowledge  of  causes,  while,  ac- 
cording to  the  positivist  theory,  causes  are  wholly 
inaccessible  to  human  intellect.  They  lie  in  a  region 
beyond  that  which  his  limited  faculties  can  reach. 
It  deserves  to  be  noted  that  Comte  admits  that  if 
reason  can  rise  to  the  recognition  of  causes,  belief  in 
a  divine  author  of  the  world  becomes  inevitable.  All 
arguments  of  positivists  against  causes  resolve  them- 
selves, at  last,  into  this  single  one,  that  they  cannot 
be  recognized  by  the  senses.  Our  senses  show  us 
simply  succession,  not  causation,  antecedents  and 
consequents,  but  not  causes  and  effects  ;  and  that 
we  know  nothing,  and  have  a  right  to  believe  noth- 
ing, beyond  what  the  senses  teach.  These  arguments 
ignore  the  fact  that  the  mind  itself  is  a  factor  in 
knowledge,  and  that  there  are  laws  of  thought  as 
well  as  a  constitution  of  things.  Could  their  doc- 
trine be  established  there  would  evidently  be  no  room 
for  religion.  But  the  grounds  on  which  Comte 
sought  to  establish  it  would  have  given  him  equally 
good  reason  for  denying  his  own  existence  as  for  de- 
nying the  existence  of  God.  The  mind  cannot  know 
itself  as  a  cause  if  it  cannot  recognize  cause  in  nature. 
A  most  striking  proof  of  the  insufficiency  of  this 
theory  was  furnished  in  the  fact  that  the  founder  of 
the  positive  philosophy,  after  proving  that  no  relig- 
ion was  possible,  became  so  conscious  of  his  own 
religious  needs  that  he  proceeded  to  invent  one. 
Having  denounced  "religiosity  "  as  a  mere  weakness 
and  avowal  of  want  of  power,  he  afterwards  devised 
a  creed  presenting  such  a  grotesque  mixture  of  athe- 
ism, fetishism,  and  ritualism,  that  it  has  done  more 
than  all  the  arguments  of  his  opponents  to  bring 
him  and  his  doctrines  into  contempt.     The  essence 


340  THE   THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

of  this  new  gospel  lay  in  a  radical  transformation  of 
the  meaning  of  the  word  religion.1  With  all  man- 
kind, and  from  the  first  day  when  the  word  had  been 
introduced  into  human  language,  religion  had  been 
used  to  imply  some  sense  of  the  supernatural.  Be- 
lief in  God  was  the  essence  of  all  that  men  had  been 
accustomed  to  call  religion.  But  according  t6  Comte, 
religion  is  "the  synthetic  idealization  of  our  exist- 
ence ; "  or,  in  other  words,  the  worship,  not  of  God, 
but  of  humanity.  As  expressed  by  Mill,  it  is  "  a  be- 
lief, or  a  set  of  beliefs,  deliberately  adopted,  respect- 
ing human  destiny  and  duty,  to  which  the  believer 
acknowledges  that  all  his  actions  ought  to  be  subor- 
dinate." 

But  while,  as  a  reasoned  system,  positivism  hardly 
calls  for  refutation  at  the  present  day,  the  mental 
attitude  which  it  represents,  and  which  is  really  very 
much  older  than  any  of  the  speculations  of  Comte, 
still  asserts  itself,  and  forms  the  real  groundwork  of 
much  thinking  which  passes  under  another  name. 
Some  of  those,  in  fact,  who  have  been  most  ready 
to  ridicule  the  French  philosopher  and  his  system 
virtually  accept  what  was  really  essential  in  it.  One 
of  the  most  biting  sarcasms  uttered  against  positiv- 
ism, as  a  specific  system,  has  been  uttered  by  Mr. 
Huxley.  Yet  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  quote  from 
Mr.  Huxley's  writings  passages  which  prove  beyond 
doubt  that  his  general  attitude  of  mind,  with  regard 
to  all  truth  beyond  that  which  the  senses  cognize, 
is  identical  with  that  of  Comte.  Though  he  may 
scorn  the  name  of  a  disciple,  he  is  treading  the  same 
path,  and  logically  should  arrive  at  the  same  goal. 
And  when  Tyndall  declares  of  the  power  manifested 

1  [See  Comte,  Catechisme  Positiviste  (Paris,  1852).] 


THE  ALTERNATIVE   THEORIES.  341 

in  the  universe,  "  I  dare  not  call  it  mind;  I  refuse 
even  to  call  it  cause,"  whatever  name  he  may  give  to 
his  speculations,  he  stands  virtually  upon  the  ground 
of  Comte.  He  refuses  to  accept  as  truth  what  the 
senses  do  not  certify. 

The  ablest  avowed  duciple  of  this  school  was  the 
late  Professor  Clifford.  With  him  human  society  is 
the  highest  of  all  possible  organisms.  Sociology 
becomes,  therefore,  the  only  foundation  of  morality, 
and  for  the  ethical  basis  of  human  action  we  do  not 
need  to  look  beyond  the  confines  of  the  present  life. 
In  the  same  spirit  Mr.  Huxley  tells  us  that  "the  true 
city  of  God  is  where  each  man's  moral  faculty  shall 
be  such  as  leads  him  to  control  all  those  desires  which 
run  counter  to  the  good  of  mankind."  In  other 
words,  man's  moral  nature  can  be  completely  devel- 
oped without  any  reference  to  an  invisible  world,  or 
to  an  eternal  destiny.  Or,  to  quote  Professor  Hux- 
ley again  :  "  The  assertion  that  morality  is  in  any 
way  dependent  on  certain  philosophical  problems 
produces  the  same  effect  on  my  mind  as  if  one  should 
say  that  a  man's  vision  depends  on  his  theory  of 
sight,  or  that  he  has  no  business  to  say  that  ginger 
is  hot  in  his  mouth  unless  he  has  formed  definite 
views  as  to  the  nature  of  ginger."  If  this  means 
anything,  it  means  that  the  speculative  opinions  a 
man  may  cherish  with  regard  to  God  and  immortal- 
ity are  of  no  account  as  influencing  his  conduct,  and 
hence  that  they  are  better  let  alone. 

When  positivism  passes  from  the  hands  of  men  of 
science  and  letters,  and  assumes  a  coarser  garb,  it  be- 
comes secularism.  The  two  systems  are  so  nearly 
allied  that  one  may  be  regarded  as  the  practical  the- 
ory of  life  to  which  the  other  supplies  the  specula- 


342  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT 

tive  basis.  Like  the  positivists,  the  better  class  of 
secularists  refuse  to  be  called  atheists.  They  even 
claim  that  literal  theists,  or  literal  believers  in 
another  life,  may  consistently  force  themselves,  for 
practical  ends,  upon  the  secularist  platform.  As 
stated  by  their  most  intelligent  representative,  Mr. 
Holyoake,  secularism  starts  with  the  study  of  nature, 
and  simply  ignores  religion.  It  is  a  study  of  life 
and  its  duties,  founded  exclusively  on  a  study  of  nat- 
ural laws.  With  regard  to  the  origin  of  these  laws, 
it  commits  itself  to  no  hypothesis.  They  are  ac- 
cepted simply  as  facts.  The  present  life,  with  its 
duties,  may  be  dealt  with  as  a  fact,  without  raising 
the  question  whether  there  is  a  future  life.  But  to 
ignore  is  not  to  deny.  As  the  chemist  ignores  archi- 
tecture, but  does  not  deny  it,  so  the  secularist  con- 
cerns himself  simply  with  this  world,  without  deny- 
ing or  discussing  any  other.  As  a  secularist  he  is 
not  called  upon  to  be  either  a  theist  or  an  atheist. 

This  purely  secular  or  non-religious  system  is  as- 
serted as  sufficient  for  all  the  practical  and  worthy 
ends  of  living.  The  man  who  guides  himself  by 
this  rule  has  enough  for  all  the  duties  that  concern 
him  as  man.  Secularism  lays  down  as  its  leading 
principle,  that  precedence  should  be  given  to  the 
duties  of  this  life  over  those  that  pertain  to  another, 
on  the  simple  ground  that  the  duties  which  pertain 
to  this  life  are  known  to  us,  while  those  which  per- 
tain to  another  are,  at  best,  only  matter  of  conjec- 
ture. The  gospel  it  preaches  is  summed  up  in  the 
maxim,  "  Be  worldly-minded ;  think  much  of  this 
life,  and  as  little  as  possible  of  the  next."  Secular- 
ism scouts  the  idea  that  the  future  should  influence 
the  present.     It  recognizes  no  Providence  but  sci- 


THE  ALTERNATIVE    THEORIES.  343 

ence,  and  affirms  that  it  will  go  well  with  us  simply 
as  we  understand  and  learn  to  apply  physical  laws. 
Morality,  and  not  religion,  it  maintains,  is  the  proper 
business  of  life.  In  the  general  good  we  have  a  rule 
of  action  independent  of  God,  of  immortality,  of 
revelation.  In  the  practice  of  human  duties,  in  the 
seeking  of  ends  compressed  within  the  scope  of  hu- 
man life,  we  have  sufficient  incitement  and  sufficient 
reward.  The  foundation,  the  sanction,  the  inspira- 
tion of  conduct,  are  all  centred  here. 

I  pass  to  consider  the  second  of  the  alternative 
hypotheses  which  have  been  presented  as  substitutes 
for  theism.  Of  all  these  substitutes  it  is  the  most 
wide-spread  and  most  formidable,  and  must  be  re- 
garded at  the  present  moment  as  forming,  without 
doubt,  the  central  point  from  which  anti-theistic 
speculation  springs.  This  is  materialism.  But  it 
would  be  a  grave  mistake  to  suppose  that  by  this 
designation  is  meant  any  single  or  definite  theory. 
On  the  contrary,  it  covers  a  variety  of  hypotheses, 
by  no  means  consistent  with  one  another.  Used  in 
its  strict  and  proper  sense,  the  term  should  denote 
a  theory  that  seeks  to  explain  the  universe  by  what 
is  known  as  matter ;  but  no  system  of  materialism 
has  ever  undertaken  to  do  this.  And  it  is  the  dis- 
tinctive characteristic  of  modern  materialism  that  it 
exalts  matter  far  above  anything  that  the  senses  can 
certify  ;  it  does  not  hesitate  to  ascribe  to  matter  the 
attribute  of  self-existence  ;  it  endows  it  with  a  vague 
potency  of  life ;  it  even  goes  so  far,  at  times,  as  to 
attribute  to  it  sensation,  volition,  and  intelligence. 
The  matter  with  which  modern  science  deals  is 
something  wholly  different  from  the  matter  of  the 
old  materialists. 


344  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

We  see  from  this  how  materialism  passes  beyond 
the  line  which  positivism  essays  to  draw.  Positiv- 
ism asserts  that  we  can  go  no  further  than  to  recog- 
nize those  orderly  sequences  in  nature  to  which  we 
give  the  name  of  laws.  It  refuses  to  search  for 
causes,  and  hence  denies  philosophy.  But  materi- 
alism is  a  boldly  reasoned  theory  of  the  universe. 
It  sets  itself  up  as  an  ultimate  and  complete  ex- 
planation of  things.  The  claim  for  acceptance  which 
it  most  strongly  urges  is,  that  it  meets,  better  than 
any  other  system,  the  legitimate  demand  of  the  mind 
for  unity.  It  explores  the  ground  of  things,  and 
seeks  to  satisfy  the  intellectual  need  of  a  first  cause. 
Assuming  that  there  can  be  but  one  ultimate  solu- 
tion of  the  problem  of  existence,  rejecting  every 
form  of  dualism,  it  looks  beyond  all  secondary  and 
coordinate  causes  for  the  supreme  principle  on 
which  they  are  all  dependent.  It  is  really  a  philos- 
ophy of  nature,  of  the  boldest  and  most  comprehen- 
sive kind  ;  and  whatever  judgment  we  may  pass  upon 
it  and  upon  its  claims,  it  is  impossible  not  to  recog- 
nize the  fact  that,  as  a  logical  method,  it  is  far  more 
adequate  and  satisfactory  than  positivism. 

And,  considered  as  a  method,  it  is  not  one  that 
the  human  mind  is  likely  very  soon  to  outgrow. 
There  is  much  in  nature  to  make  it  attractive,  and 
much  in  human  life  to  lend  it  very  strong  apparent 
support.  It  seems  to  be  peculiarly  allied  with  cer- 
tain conditions  of  social  life.  It  has  special  affin- 
ities with  any  corrupt  and  disorganized  society.  It 
found  advocates  in  England  in  the  reign  of  Charles 
II.  It  was  wide-spread  in  France  in  the  period 
preceding  the  Revolution.  It  is  not  less  closely  con- 
nected   with    certain    intellectual    tendencies.      It 


THE  ALTERNATIVE    THEORIES.  345 

would  be  a  gross  injustice  to  attribute  the  refined 
materialism  of  the  present  day  to  any  low  standard 
of  morals,  or  pursuit  of  selfish  and  personal  aims. 
Modern  materialism  is  partly  a  natural  reaction 
from  the  excessive  idealism  to  which  the  transcend- 
ental philosophy  opened  the  door,  but  still  more  a 
concomitant  of  the  rapid  and  brilliant  progress  of 
physical  and  especially  of  biological  science.  This 
enormous  advance  in  our  knowledge  of  the  organic 
world  has  had  a  marked  effect  on  the  scientific 
spirit.  It  has  transferred  science  from  the  realm  of 
fact  to  the  realm  of  speculation. 

There  was  a  time  when  the  methods  of  science 
were  clearly  defined,  and  when  in  practice  they 
were  rigidly  adhered  to.  Science  professed  to  reach 
her  results  by  processes  of  induction  or  deduction, 
and  the  line  between  an  ascertained  law  and  an  un- 
verified hypothesis  was  carefully  observed.  Noth- 
ing was  more  common  than  to  hear  from  the  physi- 
cist expressions  of  contempt  for  the  metaphysician. 
But  with  the  recent  rapid  advance  of  the  physical 
sciences  this  has  been  very  much  changed.  The 
confident  assertions  that  come  to  us  from  so  many 
quarters  show  conclusively  that  the  notion  of  what 
constitutes  a  proof  has  become  extremely  confused. 
The  Darwinian  doctrine  of  natural  selection,  for  ex- 
ample, is,  at  best,  but  an  hypothesis.  It  was  so  set 
forth  by  the  cautious  student  of  nature  from  whom 
it  borrows  its  name.  Yet  by  some  it  is  asserted 
as  though  established  by  evidence  as  conclusive 
as  that  on  which  we  accept  the  law  of  gravitation. 
We  have  a  school  of  metaphysical  physics  which 
carries  its  conclusions  far  beyond  anything  that 
a  mere  investigation  of  phenomena  warrants.     With 


346  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

this  school  modern  scientific  materialism  is  most 
closely  allied. 

If  we  ask  for  a  definition  of  materialism,  it  may 
be  stated  as  that  system  which  essays  to  explain  the 
universe  in  terms  of  matter.  Bearing  always  in 
mind  that  it  conceives  of  matter  in  that  highly  re- 
fined and  etherealized  sense  in  which  it  can  hardly 
be  distinguished  from  spirit,  it  resolves  everything 
in  nature,  order,  organization,  sensation,  thought, 
volition,  into  combinations  and  motions  of  matter. 
Thus  the  universe  is  exhibited  as  a  homogeneous 
and  coherent  system.  Without  doubt  this  consti- 
tutes, for  many  minds,  the  strongest  attraction  of 
the  system.  It  is  a  thorough  system  of  monism, 
and  conforms  to  that  rational  principle  which  com- 
pels us  to  admit  as  few  causes  as  possible  for  a 
given  phenomenon.  If  we  claim  for  ideas  an  ex- 
istence distinct  from  matter,  we  are  met  with  the  re- 
ply that  we  know  nothing  of  ideas  or  thoughts  ex- 
cept as  states  of  consciousness,  that  is,  as  special 
phenomena  in  the  life  of  men,  which  are  simply  the 
last  product  of  a  long  natural  evolution.  Man  is 
part  of  nature,  and  thought  is  simply  part  of  man. 
Hence  we  are  compelled  to  seek  the  explanation 
of  man  in  the  common  source  of  all  natural  phe- 
nomena, that  is,  in  matter  and  motion. 

"  I  take  it  to  be  demonstrable,"  says  Professor 
Huxley,  who,  if  at  times  he  is  a  positivist,  at  times 
is  no  less  a  materialist,  "  that  it  is  utterly  impossi- 
ble to  prove  that  anything  whatever  may  not  be  the 
effect  of  a  material  and  necessary  cause,  and  that 
human  logic  is  equally  incompetent  to  prove  that 
any  act  is  really  spontaneous.  A  really  spontaneous 
act  is  one  which,  by  the  assumption,  has  no  cause ; 


THE  ALTERNATIVE    THEORIES.  347 

and  the  attempt  to  prove  such  a  negation  as  this  is, 
on  the  very  face  of  the  matter,  absurd.  And  while 
it  is  thus  a  philosophical  impossibility  to  demonstrate 
that  any  given  phenomenon  is  not  the  effect  of  a  ma- 
terial cause,  any  one  who  is  acquainted  with  the  his- 
tory of  science  will  admit  that  its  progress  has,  in  all 
ages,  meant,  and  now  more  than  ever  means,  the  ex- 
tension of  the  province  of  what  we  call  matter  and 
causation,  and  the  concomitant  gradual  banishment 
from  all  regions  of  human  thought  of  what  we  call 
spirit  and  spontaneity.  And  as  surely  as  every  future 
grows  out  of  the  past  and  present,  so  will  the  phys- 
iology of  the  future  gradually  extend  the  realm  of 
matter  and  law  until  it  is  coextensive  with  knowl- 
edge, with  feeling,  and  with  action."  1  This  lucid 
language  can  only  mean  that  mind  is  but  the  high- 
est development  of  force ;  that  motion,  heat,  and 
light  are  but  other  names  for  sensation,  emotion, 
and  thoughts  ! 

To  this  imposing  hypothesis,  however,  an  obvious 
objection  at  once  presents  itself.  The  strongest  in- 
tellectual attraction  of  materialism  consists  in  the 
fact  that  it  is  a  system  of  monism  ;  it  apparently  sat- 
isfies the  craving  for  unity  which  is  so  deeply  planted 
in  the  human  mind,  and  which  receives  new  support 
with  the  progress  of  knowledge.  We  may  assume, 
without  hesitation,  that  a  monistic  theory  is  the  ex- 
pression of  rational  thought.  Human  intelligence 
instinctively  conceives  of  all  coordinate  causes  as 
secondary.  But  the  evident  argument  against  ma- 
terialism is  that  it  does  not  meet  this  very  want. 
We  need  not  discuss  the  question,  how  far  we  reach 
any  real  unity  by  analysis  of  matter.     How  far  sci- 

1  Quoted  by  Prof.  R.  Flint,  Anti-Theistic  Theories,  p.  131. 


348  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

ence  may  ultimately  go  in  resolving  the  elements  of 
matter  into  a  single  one,  we  need  not  undertake  to 
decide.  Certainly  at  present  this  goal  is  far  enough 
from  being  reached.  But,  supposing  matter  to  have 
been  reduced  to  a  single,  pure,  homogeneous  phys- 
ical element,  we  have  still  to  explain  the  fact  that,  in 
all  the  phenomena  of  the  universe,  matter  is  always 
combined  with  force.  It  is  not  dead  matter  with 
which  we  deal,  but  matter  organized,  and  undergo- 
ing incessant  and  universal  transmutations. 

The  question  at  once  arises,  Is  matter  the  cause 
of  force,  or  is  force  the  cause  of  matter  ?  Unless 
one  of  these  questions  be  answered  in  the  affirma- 
tive, we  have  two  original  principles  in  the  universe 
instead  of  one,  and  thus,  at  the  first  step,  sacrifice 
that  principle  of  unity  on  which  scientific  material- 
ism so  much  prides  itself.  For  evidently  if  force 
and  matter  be  conceived  of  as  not  related  as  cause 
and  effect,  but  as  inseparable  and  coordinate,  we 
have  two  eternal  principles  instead  of  one,  and 
the  boasted  monism  of  materialism  is  merged  in 
dualism.  The  perplexity  of  the  problem  is  not  les- 
sened, but  increased.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  force 
be  conceived  as  the  cause  of  matter,  we  preserve 
unity,  but  we  destroy  materialism.  For  we  trace 
the  existence  of  matter  to  an  immaterial  source  ; 
it  becomes  at  once  secondary  and  dependent.  If 
reason  pursues  its  search  for  unity  it  cannot  stop 
with  physical  force,  for  a  universe  of  physical  force 
would  be  simply  an  aggregate  of  forces.  Behind 
the  multiplicity  of  natural  forces  there  must  reside 
some  single,  original,  and  indivisible  power.  But 
when  we  have  reached  this  conclusion,  we  are  on 
the  threshold  of  the  great  truth  that  the  universe 
had  its  origin  in  mind. 


THE  ALTERNATIVE    THEORIES.  349 

Thus,  in  this  whole  discussion  of  matter  and  force, 
materialism  is  involved  in  fatal  contradictions.  As 
a  reasoned  system  of  the  universe  it  goes  beyond  its 
own  limits,  and  falsifies  its  own  premises.  For  ma- 
terialism, so  far  as  it  claims  any  logical  basis,  rests 
on  the  postulate  that  all  knowledge  is  attained 
through  the  organs  of  sense,  and  that  beyond  what 
the  senses  report,  and  the  generalizations  from  this, 
we  know  and  can  know  nothing.  The  properties  of 
matter,  it  is  claimed,  are  the  sole,  the  direct,  the  im- 
mediate objects  of  the  senses  ;  and  the  facts  of  nat- 
ure do  not  demand  for  their  explanation  anything 
distinct  from  matter.  Materialism,  of  necessity,  in- 
volves sensationalism,  and  sensationalism  necessarily 
signifies  that  all  knowledge  of  matter  is  dependent 
on  the  particular  constitution  of  the  senses  of  the 
individual.  The  materialist  cannot  pretend  to  any 
knowledge  of  matter  as  it  is  in  itself ;  it  can  exist 
for  him  only  so  far  as  his  senses  perceive  it  to  exist. 
"All  our  knowledge,"  says  Professor  Huxley,  "is  a 
knowledge  of  states  of  consciousness.  Matter  and 
force  are,  so  far  as  we  can  know,  mere  names  for 
certain  forms  of  consciousness.  What  we  call  the 
material  world  is  only  known  to  us  under  the  forms 
of  the  ideal  world."  1 

But  if  matter  and  force  are  mere  names  for  cer- 
tain states  of  consciousness,  what  right  has  the 
materialist  to  ascribe  to  them  any  real  existence 
independent  of  thought.  Yet  the  whole  system  of 
scientific  materialism  is  built  up  on  the  assumption 
of  the  real  and  independent  existence  of  force  and 
matter.      We   are   told    that   force   and  matter  are 

1  Macmillan's  Magazine,  May,   1870.     See  Herbert,  Modem  Real- 
ism, etc.,  p.  92. 


350  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

eternal,  that  they  are  absolutely  incapable  of  in- 
crease or  diminution,  of  creation  or  annihilation. 
On  what  evidence  are  these  assertions  made  ?  Is 
the  eternity  of  matter  or  of  force  anything  which 
the  senses  report  to  us  ?  or  is  it  a  legitimate  gen- 
eralization from  anything  that  the  senses  report  ? 
When  he  ventures  to  make  these  assertions,  the  ma- 
terialist asserts  something  that  he  could,  by  no  pos- 
sibility, have  learned  through  his  senses,  and  some- 
thing that  no  experiment  of  science  could  have 
demonstrated.  Modern  materialism  rests  through- 
out upon  a  series  of  realistic  hypotheses,  and  yet 
these  hypotheses,  from  its  own  stand-point,  are 
wholly  untenable.  Materialism  claims  to  be  a  sys- 
tem which  appeals  only  to  principles  that  are  rigidly 
scientific,  yet  it  cannot  reach  one  of  the  conclusions 
on  which  it  most  strongly  insists  without  setting 
these  principles  aside. 

It  would  be,  doubtless,  an  injustice  to  Mr.  Her- 
bert Spencer  to  term  him  a  materialist,  as  that  term 
is  commonly  accepted.  It  is  claimed,  indeed,  for 
his  system,  that  it  has  finally  and  completely  demon- 
strated the  untenableness  of  the  materialistic  hy- 
pothesis, and  it  is  frankly  conceded  by  his  followers 
that  through  no  imaginable  future  advance  in  phys- 
ical discovery  can  the  materialists  ever  be  enabled 
to  realize  their  desideratum  of  translating  mental 
phenomena  in  terms  of  matter  and  motion.  The 
latest  results  of  scientific  inquiry  leave  the  gulf  be- 
tween mind  and  matter  as  wide  as  in  the  time  of 
Descartes.  The  attribute  of  one  is  thought,  and 
of  the  other  extension,  and  there  is  nothing  like 
identity,  or  similarity,  that  can  be  traced  between 
them.     In  Mr.  Spencer's  view,  physical  and  mental 


THE  ALTERNATIVE    THEORIES.  35  I 

processes  form  parallel  series  of  changes,  insepa- 
rable in  fact,  though  refusing  to  be  identified  in 
thought  In  company  with  our  mental  processes 
there  is  an  unbroken  sequence  of  physical  changes, 
so  that  physical  and  mental  phenomena,  though  dis- 
tinct, are  subjective  and  objective  faces  of  the  same 
fact,  or,  in  other  words,  manifestations  of  an  ulti- 
mate reality  in  which  both  are  united. 

By  this  highly  metaphysical  hypothesis,  Mr. 
Spencer  seeks  to  extricate  sensationalism  from  the 
dilemma  in  which  it  is  involved,  and  preserve  those 
realistic  conceptions  which  seemed  at  first  sight  dis- 
sipated. Without  pausing  to  dwell  upon  the  inherent 
difficulties  involved  in  this  theory,  it  is  enough  for 
our  present  purpose  to  ask  what  it  accomplishes. 
From  the  alleged  fact  that  the  order  of  its  manifesta- 
tions throughout  all  mental  phenomena  proves  to  be 
the  same  as  the  order  of  its  manifestations  through- 
out all  material  phenomena,  we  are  authorized  to 
infer  that  it  is  one  and  the  same  ultimate  reality  that 
is  thus  manifested  to  us  in  these  two  ways ;  but  be- 
yond this  we  have  no  right  to  go.  The  nature  of 
that  which  is  revealed  under  these  two  forms  re- 
mains forever  inscrutable.  Every  hypothesis  con- 
cerning the  essence  or  attributes  of  this  unknown 
reality  can  only  illustrate  our  own  mental  impo- 
tence. Asserting  persistence  of  power  is  but  another 
mode  of  asserting  an  unconditioned  reality  without 
beginning  or  end.  But  the  materialist  may  well  ask, 
What  advance  in  knowledge  do  we  make  by  calling 
an  eternal  force  an  inscrutable  power  ? 

I  pass  to  consider  the  third  alternative  hypothesis 
which  has  been  presented  in  our  own  time  as  a  sub- 
stitute for  theism,  —  the  strange  conception  of  the 


352  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

universe  and  man  which  passes  under  the  name  of 
pessimism.  Between  materialism  and  pessimism 
there  is  this  broad  distinction,  that  materialism,  if 
an  insufficient  explanation,  at  least  claims  to  be  a 
rational  explanation  of  the  universe.  It  aims  to 
meet  certain  intellectual  wants,  and  to  answer  the 
questions  that  the  mind  instinctively  puts  itself 
when  it  considers  the  wondrous  framework  of  the 
world.  And  it  claims  to  exalt  the  motives  of  living, 
so  far  at  least  as  the  present  life  is  concerned.  Pes- 
simism, on  the  other  hand,  looks  at  the  universe  as 
a  stupendous  illusion,  and  expresses  unqualified  con- 
tempt for  nature  and  life.  It  dismisses,  as  unworthy 
of  the  slightest  regard,  the  demands  of  the  intellect 
or  the  heart.  Conscience  it  scorns  as  a  chimera. 
Regarding  the  universe  as  throughout  irrational,  it 
makes  no  attempt  to  explain  it.  Good  and  evil  are 
laid  under  the  same  condemnation.  Considering 
existence  itself  an  evil,  it  is  brought  logically  to  the 
dreary  issue,  that  the  only  satisfactory  solution  of 
the  problem  of  life  is  utter  annihilation. 

While,  in  its  scientific  form,  this  theory  is  one  of 
the  most  recent  products  of  thought,  in  its  funda- 
mental conceptions  it  is  one  of  the  most  ancient. 
Without  entering  into  the  disputed  question  of  the 
Buddhist  Nirvana,  it  may  be  safely  asserted  that 
the  Buddhist  conception  of  life  is  essentially  pessi- 
mistic. Evil,  according  to  Buddhism,  is  of  the  very 
essence  of  existence.  All  sentient  beings  are  made 
to  mourn  ;  the  world  is  a  vale  of  tears.  The  stream 
of  life  bears  on  its  tide  nothing  but  uncertainty  and 
sorrow.  All  pleasure  is  rooted  in  delusion,  and 
dogged  by  pain.  What  are  reckoned  good  things 
are  only  seemingly  good  ;  the  best  of  all  is  not  to  be. 


THE  ALTERNATIVE    THEORIES.  353 

It  is  as  an  escape  from  these  evils  that  Nirvana  is 
promised.  Whether  by  this  is  meant  a  state  of  ab- 
solute extinction,  or,  as  Max  Muller  would  have  us 
think,  a  state  of  blissful  quiescence  and  repose,  what 
alone  renders  it  alluring  is  the  contrast  it  presents 
to  the  evils  of  life.  There  is  nothing  in  this  present 
life  that  should  detain  us,  nothing  that  in  the  end 
will  not  fail  to  satisfy,  nothing  that  is  not  at  war 
with  the  highest  good  of  the  soul.  In  its  estimate 
of  the  nature  and  wants  of  mortal  existence,  Bud- 
dhism is  thoroughly  pessimistic. 

That  such  a  gospel  should  have  been  eagerly  em- 
braced by  so  many  millions  of  our  race,  would  seem 
to  show  that  it  conforms  to  some  powerful  instincts 
of  the  human  heart.  We  need  not  seek  for  such 
instincts  in  the  dreamy  East  alone.  The  tendency 
has  been  wide-spread,  and  even  Christianity  has  not 
held  wholly  aloof  from  it.  Many  forms  of  Christian 
mysticism  have  run  very  close  to  the  Buddhist  con- 
ception of  life ;  and  from  hymns  that  are  sung  every 
Sunday  in  our  churches  illustrations  of  a  pessimistic 
habit  of  looking  at  things  might  be  easily  culled. 
Human  life  presents,  in  fact,  a  great  variety  of  as- 
pects, each  of  which  may  be  viewed  in  a  cheerful  or 
a  despondent  light ;  and  which  of  these  two  aspects 
will  present  itself  depends,  for  the  most  part,  on 
causes  over  which  the  individual  has  little  or  no  con- 
trol. There  are  few  of  us  who  have  not  known  sea- 
sons when  life  seemed  a  burden  hard  to  be  borne, 
and  when  we  have  almost  longed  for  the  narrow 
house  where  the  weary  are  at  rest.  Pain,  disap- 
pointment, sorrow, — these  are  the  spectre  shapes 
that  lurk  by  every  pathway  ;  and  few  are  so  uni- 
formly strong  and  healthy  and  prosperous  that,  at 

23 


354  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

unbidden  moments,  we  are  not  conscious  of  their 
presence.  Sunshine  and  shadow  alternate  on  every 
landscape. 

Much  of  the  most  popular  literature  of  every  coun- 
try derives  its  principal  charm  from  voicing  this  dis- 
content :  "  Vanity  of  vanities,"  says  the  Preacher, 
"all  is  vanity."  "  I  have  seen  all  the  works  that  are 
done  under  the  sun,  and  behold  all  is  vanity  and  vex- 
ation of  spirit."  Classical  literature  abounds  with 
similar  complaints.  The  sunny  Homer  falls  into  a 
pessimistic  vein  when  he  says,  "  There  is  nothing 
whatever  more  wretched  than  man,"  *  and  the  maxim 
of  Menander  is  familiar  to  us  all :  "  They  whom  the 
gods  love  die  young."  Seneca  praises  death  as  the 
best  invention  of  nature,  and  the  virtuous  Marcus 
Aurelius  holds  it  up  as  a  positive  good.  Modern 
poetry  is  tinged  with  an  absorbing  sense  of  the  sor- 
rows of  life.  It  colors  the  beautiful  conceptions  of 
Shelley;  it  utters  itself,  without  restraint,  in  the 
lines  of  Byron,  — 

"  Count  o'er  the  joys  thine  hours  have  seen, 
Count  o'er  thy  days  from  anguish  free, 
And  know,  whatever  thou  hast  been, 
'T  is  something  better  not  to  be."  2 

The  intense,  and  often  bitter,  melancholy  that  per- 
vades the  lines  of  Heine,  the  representation  of  all 
earthly  good  as  fleeting  and  unsatisfying,  show  how 
strong  is  the  hold  of  this  view  of  life  upon  sensitive 
spirits. 

But  it  has  been  reserved  for  our  time  to  elevate 
an  occasional  mood  to  the  rank  of  a  logical  sys- 
tem, and  to  convert  the  laments  of  wearied  and  over- 
wrought   natures    into    established    conclusions    of 

1  II.  17,  446.  2  [Euthcviasia.] 


THE  ALTERNATIVE    THEORIES.  355 

science.  Pessimism  as  a  mere  view  of  life  is  de- 
pendent on  temperament,  on  circumstances,  on  bod- 
ily states ;  but  pessimism  as  presented  in  its  most 
recent  and  famous  form  claims  to  rest  on  a  solid 
basis  of  reasoned  truth.  The  founder  of  pessimism, 
in  this  sense,  is  Arthur  Schopenhauer,  whose  early 
career  in  letters  was  a  disappointment,  and  whose 
views  of  life  were  doubtless  tinged  with  gloom 
in  consequence.  According  to  Schopenhauer,  the 
world  of  phenomena  exists  only  for  our  percipient 
minds,  and  its  essential  character  is  therefore  men- 
tal representation.  Yet  this  phenomenal  world  is 
not  the  whole  of  existence.  Behind  it  lies  an  un- 
explored remainder,  an  absolute  something,  tran- 
scending and  enfolding  all  existence,  which  Schopen- 
hauer conceived  as  will.  With  him,  will  is  the  one 
universal  substance  :  it  appears  in  every  blind  force 
of  nature  ;  it  manifests  itself  in  every  conscious  act 
of  man.  Thus  will  is  the  ultimate  principle  of  all 
things.  Unlike  the  materialists,  who  reduce  will  to 
force,  Schopenhauer  reverses  the  process,  and  re- 
duces all  the  forces  of  the  organic  and  inorganic 
world  to  will. 

It  is  in  the  nature  of  will  that  Schopenhauer  finds 
the  basis  of  his  pessimistic  theory.  Will  is,  in  its 
nature,  striving.  In  its  absolute  existence,  blind,  un- 
conscious, purposeless,  it  comes  to  self-conscious- 
ness in  life.  It  manifests  itself  in  man  and  the  lower 
animals  as  will  to  live.  Life  is  that  for  which  every- 
thing pants  and  labors.  From  this  effort  and  strug- 
gle, it  results  that  life  is  a  constant  discontent,  —  an 
insatiable  thirst.  Permanent  satisfaction  is  out  of 
the  question.  No  sooner  is  any  new  stage  reached 
than    new  wants  are    created,  and    the   longer   the 


356  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT 

process  is  continued  the  more  these  wants  are  mul- 
tiplied. For  the  misery  of  living,  being  thus  es- 
sentially connected  with  the  nature  of  will,  increases 
in  the  direct  ratio  of  consciousness,  or  intelligence. 
In  the  lower  order  of  creatures  it  is  trifling ;  it  be- 
comes intense  in  the  vertebrates  ;  it  reaches  its 
maximum  in  man.  Man  is  simply  the  concrete  em- 
bodiment of  a  thousand  needs.  The  more  intelli- 
gent he  is  the  more  acute  his  suffering,  and  the  man 
of  genius  suffers  most  acutely  of  all.  Even  habit, 
which  dulls  pleasure,  increases  sensibility  to  pain. 
Life  is  but  a  process  of  dying  ;  the  history  of  the 
race  a  "dream,  long,  heavy,  and  confused." 

By  Hartmann  this  theory  is  modified  in  form,  but 
with  the  same  substantial  result.  Whatever  his  own 
claims  to  be  regarded  as  an  independent  thinker,  his 
system  must  be  regarded  as  a  development  of  Scho- 
penhauer's main  ideas.  At  all  events,  he  reaches 
precisely  the  same  conclusion.  He  accepts  the  same 
pessimistic  view  of  life,  and,  like  Schopenhauer,  sees 
in  the  cessation  of  life  the  only  ultimate  relief  for 
rational  beings.  That  absolute  ground  behind  phe- 
nomena which  Schopenhauer  defines  as  will,  Hart- 
mann defines  as  the  unconscious.  Everywhere,  he 
claims,  in  the  processes  of  organic  life,  the  action 
of  unconscious  will  and  unconscious  intelligence  is 
clearly  recognizable.  But  in  the  phenomena  of  in- 
stinct, this  action  of  unconscious  mind  is  much  more 
distinctly  presented.  These  phenomena  clearly  in- 
volve mental  processes,  and  since  they  are  not  con- 
scious they  must  result  from  a  will  and  an  intelli- 
gence which  are,  in  every  sense,  unconscious.  But 
the  great  region  in  which  the  unconscious  reveals 
itself  is  the  human    mind.     In  love,  in   feeling,  in 


THE  ALTERNATIVE    THEORIES.  357 

pleasure  and  pain,  in  character,  in  artistic  creation, 
it  may  be  distinctly  noted  ;  so  that  all  the  conscious 
acts  of  man  may  be  traced  back  to  an  unconscious 
presiding  and  directing  volition. 

From  this  fundamental  conception  his  view  of  life 
springs.  Since  existence  is  thus  due  to  the  working 
of  unconscious  and  unintelligent  will,  it  is  essentially 
irrational  and  incomplete.  It  is,  in  fact,  a  huge  blun- 
der. Like  Schopenhauer,  he  regards  the  impulse 
to  will  as  the  primary  source  of  all  the  misery  of  life. 
He  holds  that  it  is  of  the  nature  of  will  to  be  eter- 
nally dissatisfied ;  and  since,  in  consequence,  the  sum 
of  pain  must  always  exceed  the  sum  of  pleasure,  not 
to  be  is  better  than  to  be.  As  a  conclusion  based  on 
a  systematic  examination  of  the  facts  of  life,  he  does 
not  hesitate  to  assert,  not  only  that  pain  preponder- 
ates over  pleasure  as  a  general  rule,  but  that,  even 
with  the  most  highly-favored  individuals,  this  is  the 
fact.  If  we  look  at  the  lauded  results  of  progress 
they  dwindle  to  nothing.  Neither  theoretical  nor 
practical  science  kMfe  effected  much  for  human  hap- 
piness. Social  and  political  progress  may  remove 
negative  evils,  but  do  nothing  to  promote  the  posi- 
tive pleasures  of  life.  If  we  ask,  What  is  the  final 
end  of  the  world-process,  of  the  long  evolution  of 
life  ?  the  only  answer  that  Hartmann  gives  us  is,  that 
the  misery  of  life  can  be  annihilated  only  by  the 
total  denial  of  will. 

So  far  as  pessimism  lays  claim  to  any  philosoph- 
ical basis  it  need  not  detain  us  long.  In  the  mere 
conception  of  Schopenhauer,  of  the  universe  as  hav- 
ing its  sole  ground  of  existence  in  will,  there  is  much 
that  is  noble  and  elevated.  It  marks  a  great  ad- 
vance upon  materialism,  for  it  gives  a  direct  and  ab- 


358  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

solute  denial  to  the  theory  that  all  phenomena  can 
be  explained  in  terms  of  matter  and  motion.  It  car- 
ries the  mind  far  back  of  mere  physical  causation. 
It  insists  that  every  object  which  is  recognized  by 
our  senses,  that  every  change  which  takes  place  in 
the  universe,  is  but  the  manifestation  of  one  infinite 
will.  Any  materialistic  hypothesis  of  nature  is  ren- 
dered forever  impossible  by  this  theory.  The  result 
here  reached,  as  I  have  endeavored  to  show  in  a 
former  lecture,  is  one  of  vital  import.  But  having 
reached  this  result,  why  stop  here  ?  If  the  universe 
is  only  a  manifestation  to  sense  of  the  universal  will, 
which  is  the  essence  and  internal  nature  of  all  things, 
which  creates  and  sustains  all  things,  why  may  we 
not  argue  from  the  constitution  of  the  universe  back 
to  the  characteristics  of  this  will,  which  is  precisely 
what  we  have  been  doing  throughout  this  whole  dis- 
cussion ? 

Hartmann  modifies  the  theory  of  Schopenhauer  in 
tracing  the  universe  to  two  principles,  will  and  intel- 
lect, acting  in  inseparable  but  unconscious  union. 
Consciousness  does  not  exist  until  these  two  prin- 
ciples are  partially  divorced  in  man.  He  admits 
design  in  nature,  recognizes  in  its  adjustments  the 
evidences  of  purpose  ;  but  will  not  admit  that  the  in- 
telligence and  will,  thus  clearly  manifested,  are  attri- 
butes of  any  conscious  subject.  The  "  Unconscious  " 
is  the  phrase  with  which  he  describes  this  principle 
of  all  things.  But  Hartmann,  to  establish  his  the- 
ory, follows  the  method  of  the  physical  sciences. 
He  rests  his  conclusion  almost  wholly  upon  induc- 
tion from  observed  facts.  The  simple  question,  then, 
that  presents  itself  is,  What  do  facts  show  ?  This 
question,  too,  we  have  endeavored  to  answer  in  the 


THE  ALTERNATIVE    THEORIES.  359 

preceding  discussion.  No  one  denies  that  nature 
presents  everywhere  the  evidence  of  unconscious  ac- 
tion. In  some  instances,  as  with  instinct  in  the  lower 
animals,  it  is  action  with  reference  to  an  end.  But 
nature  presents  just  as  clearly  facts  of  another  class, 
—  facts  that  prove  conscious  and  intelligent  action, 
as  illustrated  in  man.  Shall  we  now  explain  the 
lower  by  the  higher,  or  the  higher  by  the  lower  ? 

Pessimism  makes  its  main  appeal  to  the  facts  of 
life.  From  these  facts  it  draws  its  conclusion  re- 
specting the  value  of  life.  And,  in  making  such 
appeal,  it  has  not  been  without  its  use.  In  some 
respects  it  supplies  a  wholesome  protest  against  a 
superficial  optimism  that  has  not  been  without  its 
advocates.  It  serves  as  a  corrective  of  the  too  com- 
placent view,  which  some  have  been  inclined  to  take, 
of  human  life  and  of  human  destiny.  This  distinct 
vein  of  optimism  runs  through  most  of  the  moralists 
of  the  last  century.  By  those  writers  the  pains  and 
evils  of  life  are  almost  proved  not  to  exist.  Pessi- 
mism has  a  use  in  calling  attention  to  the  darker 
aspects  of  life.  It  will  not  let  us  lose  sight  of  its 
mystery.  It  brings  home  to  us,  with  unrivaled 
force,  its  solemn  lessons.  If  it  gives  us  no  worthy 
solution  of  the  problem  of  life,  it  at  least  does  not 
evade,  or  set  aside,  or  seek  to  misrepresent,  those 
distinctive  aspects  of  life  which  invest  it  with  so 
much  meaning.  It  forces  upon  the  most  thought- 
less the  great  fact  that  life,  limited  to  earthly  condi- 
tions, and  looked  at  simply  from  a  human  point  of 
view,  is  full  of  perplexing  and  inexplicable  contra- 
dictions. 

In  undertaking  to  make  an  estimate  of  the  value 
of  life,  and  give  an  answer  to  the  question  whether 


360  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

life  is  worth  living,  it  is  evident  that  all  will  depend 
upon  whether  we  regard  life  as  a  fleeting  state  of 
consciousness,  extinguished  forever  in  the  grave,  or 
whether  we  look  upon  this  life  as  a  preparation  for 
another.  I  am  far  from  asserting  that  all  the  evils 
and  sorrows  of  life  find  their  explanation  in  the  doc- 
trine of  immortality,  but  it  is  plain  that,  in  striking 
a  balance  between  the  good  and  the  evil  of  life,  the 
doctrine  of  a  life  to  come,  in  which  so  much  that 
seems  evil  in  this  present  life  might  be  turned  into 
a  means  of  good,  would  form  a  very  important  ele- 
ment in  the  calculation.  But  this  element  pessi- 
mism ignores,  for  it  allows  no  future  for  man  but  the 
annihilation  of  his  conscious  personality.  It  begs, 
at  the  outset,  one  of  the  essential  questions  which 
reasoning  from  the  facts  of  life  is  meant  to  solve. 
The  true  answer  to  the  pessimistic  theory  will  be 
found,  not  in  refusing  to  recognize  the  dark  shadows 
of  life,  but  in  looking  through  these  dark  shadows 
to  the  light  beyond.  Faith  in  God  furnishes  the 
only  satisfactory  solution. 


LECTURE   XII. 

THE    INFERENCES    FROM    THEISM. 

I  have  now  brought  to  a  close  the  task  which  I 
undertook.  I  trust  that  the  manner  in  which  the 
subject  has  been  handled,  however  imperfect,  has 
yet  justified  the  claim  which  I  made,  at  the  outset, 
that  though  the  theme  was  old  as  human  thought, 
yet  the  altered  phases  of  opinion  respecting  many 
of  its  fundamental  aspects  furnished  ample  excuse 
for  giving  it  a  fresh  examination.  With  this  con- 
ception of  my  task,  it  has  not  been  my  aim  to  re- 
view all  the  grounds  of  natural  religion,  but  simply 
to  ascertain  how  far  those  grounds  have  been  affected 
by  recent  scientific  theories.  This  has  sometimes 
required  me  to  restate  familiar  truths,  and  enter  upon 
paths  which  have  been  frequently  trodden  ;  but  I 
have  only  done  so  when  a  different  course  would 
have  left  my  argument  obscure  or  incomplete.  It 
would  be  evidently  impossible  to  decide,  with  any 
satisfaction,  how  far  the  argument  for  theism  has 
been  modified  by  modern  speculation  without  deter- 
mining the  precise  nature  of  the  argument  itself. 
For  there  are  some  forms  of  the  argument  which  I 
would  not  undertake  to  defend. 

By  a  certain  class  of  writers  it  has  been  asserted 
that  the  physical  theories  of  the  present  day  have 
placed  the  problems  of  natural  theology  upon  a 
wholly  new  basis ;  and  that  the  more  recent  con- 


362  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

elusions  of  science,  if  they  have  not  absolutely  dis- 
proved, have  at  least  rendered  wholly  unnecessary 
and  gratuitous  any  hypothesis  of  a  supernatural 
origin  of  the  universe.  The  universe,  with  all  its 
manifold  phenomena  of  matter  and  of  mind,  can  be 
sufficiently  accounted  for,  we  are  assured,  in  terms 
of  matter  and  motion  ;  and  the  conception,  so  long 
cherished,  of  an  intelligent  author  of  nature  must 
give  place  to  the  doctrine  of  the  persistence  of  en- 
ergy, of  natural  selection,  and  of  evolution.  Evolu- 
tion, especially,  is  the  conjuring  wand  made  use  of 
to  explain  the  riddle  of  existence.  It  has  been  my 
aim,  throughout  this  whole  discussion,  to  make  evi- 
dent that,  even  if  we  accept  these  hypotheses  as 
well  established,  they  still  do  not  touch  the  ultimate 
problems  with  which  natural  theology  deals.  They 
simply  illustrate  the  method  by  which  nature  works  ; 
they  belong  to  the  sphere  of  second  causes ;  they 
do  not  answer  one  of  the  questions  which  the  mind 
is  forced  to  put  itself  in  presence  of  the  transcend- 
ent mysteries  of  existence. 

Before  leaving  the  subject  I  am  anxious  to  make 
my  views  on  this  point  perfectly  clear.  In  the 
course  of  my  argument  I  have  frequently  contro- 
verted theories  which  are  classed  as  scientific,  and 
may  have  seemed  to  place  myself  in  opposition  to 
the  conclusions  of  science.  I  most  earnestly  dis- 
claim any  such  interpretation  of  my  position,  for  I 
do  not  believe  that  there  is,  or  that  there  can  be, 
any  antagonism  between  science  and  religion.  I 
hold  that  so  long  as  science  confines  herself  to  phe- 
nomena and  their  laws,  any  conclusions  that  she 
establishes  are  valid,  and  must  be  accepted  without 
dispute,  and  I  hold  that  science  is  never  required 


THE  INFERENCES  FROM  THEISM.  363 

to  go  beyond  this.  But  I  also  hold  that  any  satis- 
factory conception  which  we  can  form  of  nature,  or 
life,  involves  inferences  that  go  beyond  phenomena, 
and  that  the  whole  structure  of  human  knowledge 
rests  on  assumptions  that  science  is  not  competent 
to  establish.  Science  calls  on  us  to  exercise  faith 
in  many  things  not  demonstrable  by  reason.  In 
fact,  we  transcend  phenomena,  and  put  faith  in  the 
unseen  when  we  infer  the  existence  of  a  material 
world,  just  as  much  as  when  we  infer  the  presence 
of  a  supernatural  agency. 

Deducing  my  inferences  both  from  the  facts  of 
the  external  world,  as  they  are  made  clearly  mani- 
fest to  unbiased  observation,  and  from  the  less  evi- 
dent, but  not  less  real,  and  more  impressive  facts  of 
the  inner  world  of  consciousness  and  moral  action 
in  which  we  come  nearest  the  mysterious  source  of 
energy,  of  volition,  of  life,  I  reached  the  conclu- 
sion that  the  most  rational  explanation  that  can  be 
given  of  the  universe,  with  all  its  varied  manifesta- 
tions, both  of  matter  and  of  mind,  is  the  explana- 
tion which  recognizes  a  being  of  infinite  wisdom 
and  power,  in  whose  will  all  existence  had  its  origin. 
I  have  not  claimed  that  this  infinite  being  can  be 
more  than  imperfectly  recognized  by  the  limited  in- 
tellect of  man  ;  nor  have  I  claimed  that  the  exist- 
ence, even,  of  this  being  can  be  demonstrated  as 
we  demonstrate  the  abstract  truths  of  science.  I 
have  only  claimed  that  the  universe,  as  a  great  fact, 
demands  a  rational  explanation,  and  that  the  most 
rational  explanation  that  can  possibly  be  given  is 
that  furnished  in  the  conception  of  such  a  being. 
In  this  conclusion  reason  rests,  and  refuses  to  rest 
short  of  >any-otker.*i-f-. 


364  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

In  asserting  this  much  let  me  not,  however,  be  un- 
derstood to  imply  that  the  conclusion  here  reached, 
simply  as  a  rational  inference  from  the  facts  of  ex- 
ternal nature  and  of  consciousness,  is  by  any  means 
coextensive  or  identical  with  that  belief  in  God 
which  is  the  essence  of  religion,  and  which  has 
been  such  a  controlling  factor  in  the  shaping  of 
human  character  and  of  human  society.  The  task 
which  I  have  attempted  has  a  much  humbler  and 
more  limited  scope  than  to  account  for  such  a  phe- 
nomenon. All  that  I  have  aimed  at  has  been  to  es- 
tablish the  intellectual  grounds  for  this  belief,  so  far 
as  they  exist  in  nature  alone.  All  that  we  have 
been  able  to  reach  by  this  process  is  a  logical  con- 
clusion, a  result  far  short  of  the  practical  convic- 
tion by  which  men  have  been  swayed.  Such  mere 
logical  conclusions  may  remain  abstract  and  power- 
less, with  no  vital  relation  to  the  deepest  sources 
of  belief  and  action.  Yet,  while  it  is  only  a  step 
in  establishing  a  positive  theistic  belief,  it  is  an  es- 
sential step,  and  whatever  further  and  fuller  conclu- 
sions we  arrive  at  will  be  found  to  imply  these  pre- 
liminary postulates. 

And  still  less  would  I  be  thought  to  imply  that 
belief  in  God,  as  it  actually  exists,  and  as  it  actually 
sways  such  countless  multitudes  of  men,  has  had 
its  origin  in  any  such  process  of  reasoning  as  I 
have  here  traced  out.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  belief 
in  a  Supreme  Being  is  never  arrived  at  in  this  way. 
The  great  mass  of  mankind  who  sincerely  accept 
this  great  truth,  and  who  show  in  their  daily  lives 
that  they  are  governed  by  it,  have  never  reasoned 
about  final  causes,  or  analyzed  the  intuitions  of  the 
mind.     If  religion  could  only  exist  under  this  con 


THE  INFERENCES  FROM  THEISM.  365 

dition,  atheism  must  be  the  dismal  refuge  of  the 
great  majority  of  the  race.  It  has  been  because 
they  have  been  possessed  with  this  belief,  because 
they  have  been  conscious  of  the  mighty  hold  it  had 
upon  them,  because  they  have  sought  in  vain  to 
break  its  bands  asunder  and  cast  it  away  from  them, 
that  they  have  been  prompted  to  analyze  its  rational 
grounds.  Belief  in  God  is  a  great  primary  fact  in 
human  nature,  —  a  fact  which  individual  conscious- 
ness establishes,  and  to  which  the  experience  of  the 
whole  race  bears  witness.  It  is  older  and  deeper 
than  any  arguments  about  it. 

The  positive  religious  value  of  the  conclusions 
which  we  have  thus  far  reached  lies  not  in  these 
conclusions,  taken  by  themselves,  but  in  the  further 
inferences  which  we  draw  from  them.  The  theistic 
argument,  the  steps  of  which  have  been  traced  in 
the  foregoing  lectures,  if  accepted  as  valid,  estab- 
lishes a  fundamental  truth,  —  a  truth,  indeed,  the 
most  fundamental  in  human  thought ;  a  truth  which 
is  the  condition  and  ground  of  all  religious  belief; 
but  yet  a  truth  which,  by  itself,  may  remain  a  barren 
and  abstract  speculation.  It  is  a  truth  which,  dis- 
connected from  other  truths,  is  too  illimitable  to  be 
grasped  in  human  consciousness.  That  God  exists, 
that  he  is  infinitely  wise  and  good,  that  he  is  a  per- 
son, even,  with  affections  analogous  to  those  which 
are  felt  by  us,  —  all  these  are  statements  which  may 
be  accepted  without  hesitation  by  the  speculative 
intellect,  but  which  yet  can  have  little  practical 
meaning,  unless  it  can  be  further  shown  that  there 
is  some  vital  relation  between  this  infinite  being 
and  ourselves.  It  is  in  bringing  us  to  this  conclu- 
sion that  natural  religion  discharges  its  most  impor- 
tant function. 


366  THE   THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

The  connection  between  natural  and  revealed  re- 
ligion, as  I  remarked  in  my  opening  lecture,  is  a 
question  on  which  opinions  are  by  no  means  harmo- 
nious ;  and  the  line  of  distinction  between  them  is 
one  that  cannot  be  traced  with  entire  precision  ;  but 
it  is  clear  that  they  must  stand  or  fall  together. 
And  this  for  the  simple  reason  that  the  conclusions 
of  natural  religion  are  the  postulates  on  which  re- 
vealed religion  rests.  Hence,  unless  the  results  of 
the  preceding  discussion  are  accepted ;  unless  we 
concede  that  the  material  universe  furnishes  evi- 
dence of  the  existence  of  an  immaterial  cause  ;  un- 
less we  concede  that  human  faculties,  though  lim- 
ited, can  overleap  the  limits  of  the  finite  and  the 
sensible,  that  in  nature  they  can  recognize  the  pres- 
ence of  the  supernatural,  it  is  idle  to  make  any  ap- 
peal to  the  teachings  of  revelation.  And  it  is  equally 
true,  that  all  the  conclusions  we  have  reached  re- 
specting the  existence  and  attributes  of  a  Supreme 
Being  remain  an  idle  speculation,  unless  we  proceed 
to  draw  from  these  conclusions  the  further  infer- 
ences they  involve  respecting  the  relations  of  that 
being  to  ourselves. 

I  am  well  aware  that  in  any  inferences  from  nat- 
ural religion  as  to  the  possible  nature,  or  contents, 
of  a  revealed  religion  we  should  proceed  with  the 
utmost  caution.  On  subjects  so  much  above  the 
ordinary  range  of  our  reasoning,  any  conclusions 
must  be  accepted  with  hesitation.  Unless  we  tread 
warily  on  such  a  road  we  may  prove  more  than  we 
intend.  The  most  discreet  and  sober  of  theologians, 
Bishop  Butler,  warns  us  that  we  are  in  no  sort  judges, 
beforehand,  by  what  laws  or  rules,  or  in  what  de- 
gree,  or  by  what  means,    God   would  instruct  us, 


THE  INFERENCES  FROM    THEISM.  367 

either  by  the  use  of  our  natural  powers,  or  through  a 
supernatural  revelation.  Yet  he  gives  us  the  exam- 
ple, in  his  famous  work,  of  the  method  of  reasoning 
by  analogy  from  the  truths  of  natural  to  the  truths 
of  revealed  religion.  We  cannot  doubt  that  such 
reasoning  is  legitimate,  and  that  the  inferences  which 
it  involves  must  be  accepted.  And  all  that  we  have 
ascertained  with  regard  to  uniformity  of  method  in 
the  physical  universe  must  dispose  us  to  believe 
that  between  the  truths  of  natural  and  the  truths  of 
revealed  religion  some  close  correspondence  must 
exist. 

Throughout  these  lectures,  as  you  cannot  fail  to 
have  observed,  I  have  earnestly  combated  the  opinion 
that  either  the  methods  or  the  conclusions  of  mod- 
ern science,  when  rightly  comprehended,  are  antag- 
onistic to  religious  truth.  Still,  it  has  fallen  within 
the  scope  of  this  discussion  to  show  this  simply  with 
reference  to  natural  religion.  My  proper  subject 
did  not  go  beyond  this.  But  now  I  will  go  further, 
and  express  my  profound  conviction  that  the  meth- 
ods of  modern  science  and  the  new  conceptions  of 
the  physical  universe  which  it  has  been  the  work  of 
modern  science  to  render  familiar  not  only  are  not 
antagonistic  to  revealed  truth,  but  will  be  ultimately 
found  to  harmonize  more  completely  with  that  truth 
than  the  conceptions  which  they  have  displaced.  In 
other  words,  the  dynamical  conception  of  nature  as 
a  plastic  organism,  pervaded  by  a  system  of  corre- 
lated forces,  uniting  at  last  in  one  supreme  force,  is 
altogether  more  in  harmony  with  the  spirit  and  the 
teachings  of  the  gospel  than  the  mechanical  concep- 
tion which  prevailed  a  century  ago,  which  insisted 
on  viewing  nature  as  an  intricate  machine,  fashioned 
by  a  great  artificer  who  stood  wholly  apart  from  it. 


368  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT 

I  proceed  to  trace  some  of  the  more  obvious  in- 
ferences that  follow  from  the  theistic  conclusion 
which  has  been  established.  The  inquiry  must  have 
pressed  itself  upon  many  among  us  during  the  course 
of  the  preceding  discussion  :  If  all  this  be  true,  — 
if  there  exists,  as  is  claimed,  a  being  of  infinite  wis- 
dom and  goodness ;  a  being  whose  will  created  and 
whose  power  sustains  all  that  we  see  around  us ;  a 
being,  above  all,  who  has  caused  to  come  into  ex- 
istence a  creature  capable  of  recognizing  these  attri- 
butes, and  yearning  for  communion  with  the  unseen 
source  of  his  existence, — why  should  a  truth  so  fun- 
damental, so  impressive,  so  consoling,  be  left  veiled 
in  so  much  obscurity  ?  With  the  earliest  impulses 
of  conscious  life  the  child  learns  to  recognize  its 
earthly  parent ;  the  mother's  fond  caress  is  the  first 
convincing  evidence  of  something  outside  itself ; 
why  should  the  existence  of  a  heavenly  parent  re- 
main to  be  demonstrated  by  such  laborious  argu- 
mentation ?  Why  should  the  human  soul  be  left  in 
any  doubt  and  uncertainty  respecting  the  existence 
and  character  of  the  being  in  whom  all  things  con- 
sist ? 

If  it  be  true  that  such  a  being  exists,  if  it  be  true 
that  there  is  a  God,  that  he  is  endowed  with  moral 
attributes,  that  all  human  creatures  are  subject  to  a 
moral  law,  that  to  this  law  their  actions  must  be  con- 
formed, that  the  end  of  their  creation  can  be  realized 
only  so  far  as  this  conformity  is  attained,  no  one  can 
doubt  that  the  knowledge  of  this  being  and  of  this 
moral  government  is  more  essential  to  the  welfare 
of  man  than  any  other  knowledge.  No  knowledge 
of  mere  natural  things  can  for  a  moment  be  weighed 
with  it.     We  can  understand  that  a  sincere  and  in- 


THE  INFERENCES  FROM   THEISM.  369 

genuous  mind  may  be  haunted  with  doubts  of  the 
divine  existence.  If  we  accept  the  assurances  of 
some  sober  thinkers,  it  is  possible  to  look  abroad 
over  the  creation  ;  possible  to  recognize,  to  the  full- 
est extent,  the  wonderful  harmony  and  intricate 
adaptations  of  the  physical  world  ;  possible  to  study 
the  impressive  workings  of  man's  moral  nature,  and 
not  be  convinced  of  the  divine  existence.  But  it  is 
impossible  to  conceive  that  any  one  can  concede  the 
fact  of  that  existence,  and  not  regard  the  knowledge 
of  God  as  the  most  excellent  of  all  knowledge. 

It  does  not  matter  in  the  least  how  human  nature, 
as  such,  came  to  exist.  We  take  it  simply  as  a  fact, 
—  as  a  fact  just  as  real,  just  as  indubitable,  with  the 
same  claim  to  our  attention,  and  as  capable  of  being 
examined  and  understood  as  any  fact  of  the  physical 
universe.  No  matter  how  man  began  his  career. 
We  may  accept,  if  you  please,  the  most  extreme  hy- 
pothesis, which  explains  not  only  his  physical  but  his 
intellectual  and  even  his  moral  being  from  a  long 
process  of  evolution,  reaching  back  to  the  fiery  cloud 
which,  we  are  told,  was  once  the  sole  thing  floating 
in  space ;  still,  with  his  present  endowments  and  at- 
tributes and  yearnings,  he  remains  just  as  much  a 
fact,  and  just  as  much  the  supreme  result  which  the 
travailing  creation  has  thus  far  brought  forth.  He 
is  the  marvelous  world-child  ;  in  him  the  whole  effort 
of  nature  is  summed  up.  And  it  cannot  be  denied 
that  the  characteristic  thing  about  him  is  his  appe- 
tency for  the  invisible.  Creature  of  time  and  sense, 
he  instinctively  strives  to  pass  these  barriers.  With 
large  discourse  of  reason,  he  longs  to  lift  the  veil 
and  solve  the  great  mystery  of  life  and  death. 

According  to  the  view  which  has  been  strenuously 
24 


370  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

insisted  on  throughout  these  lectures,  the  existence 
of  such  a  rational  being  can  only  be  explained  as  the 
result  of  a  divine  purpose.  Evolution  itself  becomes 
a  rational  explanation  of  the  universe  and  a  working 
hypothesis  only  on  this  admission.  Evolution,  by 
itself,  is  a  mere  process,  which,  in  turn,  needs  to  be 
accounted  for.  We  cannot  conceive  of  evolution 
out  of  nothing,  nor  can  we  conceive  of  orderly  and 
progressive  evolution  save  with  the  admission  of  di- 
recting intelligence  behind  it.  So  that  man,  how- 
ever we  may  explain  the  method  by  which  he  came 
to- exist,  must  be  regarded  as  a  divine  product  ;  and 
not  only  this,  but,  so  far  as  we  know,  as  the  highest 
product  of  creative  power.  He  is  the  image  of  his 
Maker.  In  his  moral  freedom  and  power  of  choice 
and  capacity  of  originating  acts,  he  supplies  us  with 
the  most  adequate  commentary  on  the  power  by 
which  the  worlds  were  made.  Nor  can  we  admit  all 
this,  and  not  proceed  to  draw  the  conclusion  that 
such  a  being  must  have  been  meant  for  a  more  inti- 
mate communion  with  his  Maker  than  mere  nature 
affords. 

It  seems  to  me  beyond  a  doubt  that  the  truths  of 
natural  religion  not  only  furnish  the  basis  for  re- 
vealed religion,  but  that  they  render  the  fact  of  a 
revelation  in  the  highest  degree  probable  ;  or,  in 
other  words,  that  revelation  is  not  only  a  historical 
fact,  capable  of  being  brought  into  harmony  with 
the  doctrines  of  natural  religion,  but  that  natural 
religion  furnishes  the  antecedent  grounds  from 
which  the  fact  of  a  revelation  might  be  inferred. 
In  truth,  revelation  is  a  postulate  of  human  nature, 
when  we  use  the  term  in  the  large  and  adequate 
sense  which  alone  covers  the  facts  in  the  case.     All 


THE  INFERENCES  FROM  THEISM.  37 1 

human  history  shows  that  man  is  not  satisfied  with 
his  present  surroundings.  He  looks  before  and 
after  ;  he  asks  himself  the  question,  Whence  am  I, 
and  whither  shall  I  go  ?  He  instinctively  reaches 
after  the  source  of  things.  The  centuries  ring  with 
his  cry,  "  If  a  man  die  shall  he  live  again  ?  "  Man 
is  as  distinctively  a  religious  animal  as  he  is  a  social 
animal,  and  by  the  whole  make  and  strain  of  his 
being  he  is  forced  to  murmur,  "  Oh,  that  I  knew 
where  I  might  find  Him  !  " 

When  I  thus  claim  that  revelation  is  a  postulate 
of  human  nature,  I  mean  the  fact  of  a  revelation,  not 
its  specific  contents.  I  am  aware  that  it  may  be 
objected  that  this  claims  too  much ;  that  if  revela- 
tion be  thus  accepted  as  a  postulate  of  human  nat- 
ure, we  are  logically  led  to  the  conclusion  that  rev- 
elation must  have  been  primeval  and  universal.  But 
this  is  a  conclusion  from  which  I  not  only  do  not 
shrink,  but  one  which,  on  every  account,  I  am  in- 
clined to  accept.  Such  a  conclusion  seems  to  me 
not  only  in  the  highest  degree  probable  when  we 
reason  from  the  truths  of  natural  religion,  but  to  be 
in  accordance  with  the  traditions  of  the  past.  All 
these  preserve  the  memory  of  an  early  guidance 
of  the  race,  and  tell  us  of  the  day  when  man  was 
cheered  with  divine  communications.  And,  however 
we  may  suppose  that  these  primeval  traditions  have 
been  overlaid  with  myth  and  legend,  and  however 
difficult  it  may  be,  at  the  present  day,  to  separate 
the  original  germ  from  the  subsequent  accretion, 
the  fact  seems  attested  beyond  doubt.  And  to  this 
great  truth  of  a  primeval  revelation,  I  need  hardly 
add,  the  Hebrew  Scriptures  bear  impressive  testi- 
mony. 


372  THE    THE/STIC  ARGUMENT 

I  by  no  means  assert  that,  on  the  grounds  sup- 
plied by  natural  religion,  we  can  demonstrate  a  pri- 
ori the  contents  of  a  revelation,  for  were  that  possi- 
ble the  need  of  a  revelation  would  no  longer  exist. 
Could  we  foretell  with  certainty  the  precise  import 
of  the  message,  we  should  need  no  further  informa- 
tion respecting  its  source.  In  the  very  idea  of  rev- 
elation is  involved  the  existence  of  truth  which  we 
could  arrive  at  in  no  other  way.  It  would  cease 
to  be  revelation  if  it  contained  nothing  more  than 
the  unaided  reason  could  search  out.  As  a  mani- 
festation of  the  absolute  truth,  it  must  contain  ele- 
ments outside  the  bounds  of  finite  inquiry.  All 
that  I  insist  on  is  that  human  nature,  in  the  course 
of  its  development,  and  as  a  necessary  result  of  that 
development,  reaches  a  point  where  it  is  no  longer 
satisfied  with  the  conditions  of  its  existence  ;  where, 
like  a  child  that  has  come  to  man's  estate,  and  is 
no  longer  capable  of  being  pleased  with  childish 
things,  it  demands  a  new  environment,  and  yearns 
for  a  fuller  knowledge,  and  is  haunted  with  the 
larger  problems  that  spread  out  before  it. 

Now  if  we  concede  that  the  human  soul  has  been 
brought  to  this  stage  by  a  normal  development ;  that 
these  yearnings,  instincts,  appetences,  —  whatever 
they  may  be  called  —  are  inseparable  from  the  ad- 
vanced state  of  progress  to  which  it  has  been 
brought  ;  that  they  are  the  logical  consequence  of 
a  process  of  moral  and  spiritual  evolution,  no  matter 
at  what  point  that  process  began,  or  by  what  agen- 
cies or  methods  it  has  been  carried  on,  then  I  claim 
that  the  accepted  teachings  of  modern  science  war- 
rant the  inference  that  these  new  wants  and  new 
capacities  would  be  provided  for  by  some  modifica- 


THE  INFERENCES  FROM  THEISM.  373 

tion  of  the  conditions  of  its  existence.  We  may 
safely  assert  this  much,  and  assert  no  more  than  is 
asserted  by  those  who  claim  that  the  physical,  the 
moral,  the  social  condition  of  man,  as  he  exists  to- 
day, in  the  highest  stage  of  his  development,  is 
the  consequence  of  a  correlation  between  the  inner 
growth  and  the  external  environment.  A  revela- 
tion to  waiting,  expecting,  yearning  man  of  spirit- 
ual truth  would  be  the  most  complete,  the  most  im- 
pressive, the  most  beautiful  illustration  of  this  law. 

If,  in  answer  to  this,  it  be  said  that  revelation,  if 
we  regard  it  thus  as  a  continuation  of  a  great  sys- 
tem of  development,  reaching  back  to  the  very  be- 
ginning of  things,  should  itself  bear  the  marks  of 
progress,  and  show  a  continuous  unfolding,  I  reply 
that  such  is  undoubtedly  the  fact.  All  that  natural 
religion  can  do  is  to  render  a  revelation  probable, 
and  show  that  such  illumination  of  man's  spiritual 
life,  from  a  source  outside  himself,  is  strictly  in 
analogy  with  the  whole  method  of  nature  ;  the  pre- 
cise scope  of  a  revelation  can  only  be  learned  from 
a  study  of  the  revelation  itself.  Here  we  revert  to 
the  facts  of  history.  That  a  revelation  is  reason- 
able, that  a  revelation  is  probable,  the  instincts  of 
the  soul  and  the  methods  by  which  the  universe 
has  been  produced  unite  to  show;  but  to  learn  how 
it  was  really  made,  to  ascertain  how  far  the  actual 
fact  conforms  to  this  anticipation,  we  must  study  the 
records  of  human  experience.  From  an  investiga- 
tion of  the  actual  course  of  these  divine  illumina- 
tions, as  they  cast  their  radiant  light  across  the 
page  of  history,  must  we  trace  their  correspondence 
with  natural  laws. 

Now,  if  we  look  at  that  revelation  which  asserts 


374  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

itself  as  the  supreme  communication  to  man  from 
the  spiritual  world,  we  find  it  marked  by  nothing 
more  indubitably  than  by  this  very  characteristic  of 
progressive  adaptation,  both  to  human  capacities 
and  to  human  wants.  First  the  blade,  then  the  ear, 
then  the  full  corn  in  the  ear  ;  this  is  the  note  of 
revelation,  from  the  simple  faith  of  the  patriarchs 
on  to  the  fuller  day  when  man  was  taught  the  great 
lesson  that  he  is  a  son  of  God.  But  the  Old  and 
New  Testaments  are  vocal  with  this  truth.  And 
nothing  in  the  New  Testament  is  more  marked  and 
more  significant  than  the  constant  assertion  of  the 
organic  connection  between  the  earliest  simple  com- 
munication and  the  final  complete  manifestation. 
It  has  passed  to  a  maxim  that  what  was  hid  in  the 
Old  Testament  is  brought  to  light  in  the  New,  and 
that  lawgivers,  prophets,  and  apostles,  how  dimly 
soever  they  may  have  realized  the  fact,  were  en- 
gaged in  one  great  work,  and  were  the  ministers 
of  one  organic,  ever  advancing  revelation.  In  the 
apostle's  phrase,  "  they  drank  of  that  [same]  spirit- 
ual rock." 

In  a  natural  desire  to  emphasize  the  claims  of  rev- 
elation, it  has  been  too  much  the  custom  to  draw  a 
sharp  line  of  distinction  between  natural  and  re- 
vealed religion  ;  and  hence,  as  a  consequence,  to 
represent  the  latter  as  something  in  its  nature  ex- 
ceptional and  wholly  out  of  the  common  course. 
Thus  the  argument  from  miracles  has  been  assigned 
a  wholly  disproportioned  prominence  among  Chris- 
tian evidences.  Such  reasoning  is  of  the  same  kind 
with  that  which  leads  a  savage  to  see  a  more  evident 
token  of  the  divine  presence  in  an  eclipse  than  in 
the  orderly  movements  of  Orion  and  Arcturus.     If, 


THE  INFERENCES  FROM  THEISM.  375 

as  we  have  seen,  the  creation  is  controlled  by  uni- 
form laws,  the  instructed  mind  sees  in  the  regular 
sequence  of  phenomena,  in  the  harmonious  move- 
ments of  the  heavenly  bodies,  in  the  unfailing  suc- 
cession of  seed-time  and  harvest,  the  most  striking 
testimony  to  the  existence  of  an  intelligent  cause. 
Such  a  mind  is  most  conscious  of  the  presence  of 
God,  not  in  the  earthquake,  nor  in  the  whirlwind, 
but  in  the  still  voice  in  which  day  utters  to  day  and 
night  shows  to  night  the  power  and  wisdom  of  the 
Creator. 

So  it  seems  to  me  that  the  most  convincing  proof 
of  the  truth  of  any  revelation  is  to  be  found,  not  in 
the  fact  that  it  stands  apart  from  nature,  still  less  in 
the  fact  that  it  seemingly  contradicts  or  suspends 
any  of  the  laws  of  nature  ;  but  rather  in  the  fact 
that  it  corresponds  with  nature,  and  that  while  going 
beyond  it,  while  disclosing  truths  which  mere  exter- 
nal nature  could  not  suggest,  and  which  it  never 
even  entered  into  the  heart  of  man  to  conceive,  it 
still,  in  its  supreme  disclosures,  conforms  to  the  anal- 
ogy of  nature,  and  follows  the  method  which  nature 
in  a  lower  sphere  has  indicated.  Thus  it  is  that  rev- 
elation carries  with  it  the  irresistible  conviction  that 
the  truths  of  nature  and  the  truths  of  revelation 
have  proceeded  from  the  same  source,  and  that  all 
the  testimony  which  has  been  furnished  by  one  to 
the  divine  existence  and  the  divine  attributes  is  not 
contradicted,  but  confirmed,  by  the  other.  Such  a 
revelation  does  not  perplex  reason  and  confuse  the 
inferences  drawn  by  the  mind  from  nature,  but 
stands  in  harmony  with  the  whole  system  of  things. 

In  the  very  idea  of  revelation  as  the  communica- 
tion of   truth  above  the  ordinary  level  of    human 


376  THE   THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

knowledge,  and  not  attainable  in  the  normal  exercise 
of  the  human  faculties,  there  is  involved  not  only 
the  possibility,  but  the  anterior  probability,  that  it 
would  be  accompanied  with  unusual  phenomena. 
These  phenomena  are  not,  however,  so  much  an  es- 
sential part  of  the  revelation  as  its  incidental  con- 
comitant. They  would  not  so  much  demonstrate  its 
truth  to  those  disposed  to  doubt  or  reject  it,  as  con- 
firm its  truth  to  those  already  inclined  to  accept  it. 
And  however  exceptional  or  abnormal  such  phe- 
nomena might  seem,  it  is  clear  that  they  derive  this 
character  solely  from  the  point  of  view  from  which 
they  might  be  considered  ;  since  our  knowledge  of 
the  powers  of  nature  and  of  the  relations  of  matter 
and  spirit  is  far  too  limited  to  warrant  any  one  of  us 
in  affirming  that  what  seem  to  us  the  most  excep- 
tional facts  and  most  contrary  to  our  own  experi- 
ences may  not  be  the  natural  and  necessary  result  of 
some  higher  potencies  of  which  we  know  nothing. 

It  would,  however,  be  a  most  natural  and  possible 
anticipation  that  these  exceptional  phenomena  at- 
tending a  revelation  would  be  most  marked  at  its 
earlier  stages,  and  that,  with  its  progressive  recep- 
tion, they  would  either  wholly  disappear  or  become 
its  normal  operation.  To  borrow  an  imperfect  illus- 
tration from  physical  science,  revelation  in  this 
respect  may  be  likened  to  the  transformation  of  en- 
ergy. In  the  familiar  case  of  heat,  this  transforma- 
tion takes  place  between  two  bodies  that  differ  in 
temperature.  We  get  no  work  from  heat  unless  part 
of  it  can  fall  from  a  higher  to  a  lower  grade.  When 
two  bodies  differ  greatly  in  temperature  the  trans- 
formation is  violent ;  but  as  the  level  of  the  one  ap- 
proaches  that   of    the   other,  the  transformation    is 


THE  INFERENCES  FROM   THEISM.  377 

more  srentle  and  unobserved.  So  a  revelation  of 
spiritual  truth  to  a  race  whose  light  was  darkened 
would  be  attended  with  marvels,  while  to  a  race 
whose  moral  level  had  been  raised  precisely  the  same 
truth  might  be  communicated  without  giving  any 
violent  wrench  to  their  previous  conceptions. 

This  course  of  reasoning  derives  a  striking  con- 
firmation from  the  recorded  history  of  revelation. 
Such  a  record,  I  need  hardly  say,  is  peculiarly  liable 
to  become  tinctured,  in  the  course  of  time,  with  hu- 
man elements,  and  hence  can  only  claim  acceptance 
as  subject  to  sound  canons  of  historical  criticism. 
With  this  qualification,  the  record  of  revelation 
shows  one  manifest  and  undeniable  characteristic  : 
that  the  most  surprising  phenomena  belong  always 
to  its  beginning,  while,  in  its  highest  stage,  the 
merely  marvelous  is  always  subordinated  to  the 
spiritual  element.  This  feature,  which  is  characteris- 
tic of  the  history  of  revelation  as  a  whole,  is  further 
exemplified  in  the  career  of  Jesus.  His  most  sur- 
prising works  were  always  witnessed  in  his  contact 
with  those  who  were  just  drawn  to  him,  and  with 
whom  faith  was  undeveloped.  With  the  inner  circle 
of  his  disciples  he  ceases  to  be  a  wonder-worker,  and 
in  the  last  and  loftiest  revelation  of  himself  to  them, 
on  the  night  before  he  was  betrayed,  he  is  simply 
the  divine  teacher,  the  true  bread  of  life. 

In  the  recorded  miracles  of  Jesus  I  note  two  un- 
varying characteristics,  —  characteristics  which  have 
been  far  too  much  lost  sight  of  by  many  of  the  most 
zealous  defenders  of  his  claims.  In  the  first  place, 
he  always  refused  to  work  miracles  simply  as  mar- 
velous displays  of  power.  He  never  made  use  of 
miracles  as  a  means  of  convincing  unbelief ;  on  the 


378  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT 

contrary,  when  unbelief  was  present,  he  steadfastly 
refused  to  do  any  of  his  mighty  works.  The  doubts 
respecting  his  mission  seem  to  have  arisen  mainly 
from  his  persistent  refusal  to  work  miracles  simply 
to  attest  his  mighty  power.  In  him  the  miraculous 
was  always  secondary  and  incidental.  In  the  sec- 
ond place,  when  his  miraculous  power  was  exercised 
it  was  always  exercised  not  as  something  excep- 
tional and  strained,  but  as  the  purely  normal  and 
easy  exercise  of  a  power  belonging  to  him.  In  the 
midst  of  his  most  wonderful  works  he  seems  to  be 
pursuing  the  perfectly  even  tenor  of  his  way,  and 
when  putting  in  play  his  most  astounding  powers 
betrays  no  consciousness  that  he  was  lifted  in  the 
least  above  his  ordinary  level.  His  resurrection  is 
represented  as  a  natural  result. 

In  the  record  of  miracles  the  greatest  of  all  mir- 
acles is  Jesus  himself.  The  more  closely  and  dis- 
passionately we  study  his  career,  the  more  pro- 
foundly shall  we  be  convinced  of  this.  I  do  not 
now  refer  to  him  in  any  of  the  dogmatic  or  ecclesi- 
astical aspects  in  which  he  is  usually  presented,  and 
in  which  the  most  significant  features  of  his  char- 
acter are  too  often  obscured,  but  I  refer  to  him  sim- 
ply as  an  authentic  fact  of  human  history.  What- 
ever interpretation  we  may  choose  to  put  upon  him, 
whatever  degree  of  obedience  we  may  choose  to 
accord  to  him,  respecting  his  purely  historical  posi- 
tion, his  actual  relation  to  the  cause  of  man's  spir- 
itual development,  there  is  no  room  for  dispute. 
The  most  obdurate  skeptic  must  recognize  him  as 
the  most  significant  fact  with  which  the  student 
of  history  has  to  deal.  In  him  centres,  beyond 
doubt,   the  most  complete  revelation  in  the  inner 


THE  INFERENCES  FROM  THEISM.  379 

life  of  man  of  which  the  human  race  has  had  any 
experience,  and  to  him,  as  their  source  and  fountain- 
head,  reach  back  the  most  commanding  influences 
that  fashion  modern  civilization. 

Yet  what  must  strike  every  one  of  us  most  for- 
cibly, as  we  study  this  marvelous  career,  is  its  per- 
fect simplicity  and  naturalness.  Asserting  himself 
as  a  revelation  in  human  life  of  the  divine  nature, 
he  was  the  most  intensely  human  of  all  religious 
teachers.  Separate  from  men  in  the  sinless  purity 
of  his  life,  he  drew  the  outcast,  and  forsaken,  and 
contemned  to  him  with  a  might  as  irresistible  as  it 
was  gentle  and  mild.  He  entered  into  the  springs 
of  human  life,  and  touched  its  sympathies,  and  kin- 
dled its  hopes,  and  drew  forth  its  confidence  and 
love,  as  could  only  be  done  by  one  who  was  himself 
in  full  sympathy  with  human  wants.  He  taught 
transcendent  truths,  —  truths  that  man  had  never 
conceived  ;  but  he  taught  these  truths  in  words  that 
were  heard  gladly  by  common  people,  and  set  them 
forth  in  illustrations  and  parables  drawn  from  the 
most  familiar  incidents  of  every-day  life.  He  did 
mighty  works  ;  he  restored  sight  to  the  blind,  he 
raised  the  dead,  but  he  constantly  reminded  his 
hearers  that  better  and  greater  than  these  wonders 
was  the  practice  of  the  common  duties  of  life,  —  to 
love  our  neighbor,  to  do  good  to  such  as  despitefully 
use  us. 

In  further  illustration  of  this,  let  us  not  omit  to 
note  the  significant  declarations  which  Jesus  makes 
respecting  himself.  At  the  beginning  of  his  min- 
istry he  speaks  with  the  authority  of  a  master.  He 
calls  on  his  hearers  to  give  up  all  that  they  have 
and  follow  him,  and  he  calls  in  a  tone  of  authority 


380  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT 

which  they  are  constrained  to  recognize  and  obey. 
His  relation  to  them  is  external.  He  stands  above 
them  as  their  lord  and  king.  So  filled  are  they 
with  the  sense  of  his  superiority  that,  in  their  rever- 
ence, they  cast  their  very  garments  in  the  way  before 
him.  But  when,  at  the  close  of  his  career,  he  comes 
to  the  deepest  and  truest  and  most  inmost  revela- 
tion of  himself,  his  relation  is  represented,  not  as 
official  and  external,  but  as  essential  and  internal. 
In  that  wonderful  discourse  in  which  he  set  forth 
most  adequately  the  true  nature  of  his  spiritual 
kingdom,  he  describes  himself  under  the  most  sim- 
ple analogies  of  the  natural  world.  He  is  the  true 
vine  of  which  they  are  the  branches  ;  he  is  the  liv- 
ing bread  which  is  given  to  them.  He  is  no  longer 
a  mere  teacher,  but  he  abides  in  them,  and  they  are 
made  perfect  as  they  abide  in  him. 

Who  can  fail  to  notice  the  striking  analogy  be- 
tween these  highest  teachings  of  Jesus  and  the 
latest  results  of  our  study  of  the  natural  world  ? 
As  physical  science  has  brought  us  to  the  conclu- 
sion that,  back  of  all  the  phenomena  of  the  material 
universe,  there  lies  an  invisible  universe  of  forces, 
and  that  these  forces  may  ultimately  be  reduced  to 
one  all-pervading  force,  in  which  the  unity  of  the 
physical  universe  consists,  and  as  philosophy  has 
advanced  the  rational  conjecture  that  this  ultimate, 
all-pervading  force  is  simply  will-force,  so  the  great 
Teacher  holds  up  to  us  the  spiritual  world  as  per- 
vaded by  one  omnipresent  life,  —  a  life  which  was 
revealed  in  him  as  its  highest  manifestation,  but 
which  is  shared  by  all  who  by  faith  become  par- 
takers of  his  nature.  When  we  are  told  that  the 
Word,  by  whom  all  things  were  made,   was  made 


THE  INFERENCES  FROM  THEISM.  38 1 

flesh  and  dwelt  among  us,  that  the  eternal  reason 
abode  in  human  form,  we  are  not  only  told  nothing 
that  science  contradicts,  but  have  revealed  to  us  a 
law  of  the  spiritual  world  with  which  all  the  latest 
conclusions  of  science  stand  up  in  mighty  and  im- 
pressive parallel. 

When  we  separate  Christianity  from  its  mere  ex- 
ternal circumstances,  when  we  strip  it  of  the  dress 
which  it  wears  of  necessity  as  a  historical  event, 
related  to  a  particular  age  and  social  state,  and  look 
at  it  in  its  deeper  meaning,  nothing  about  it  seems 
to  me  so  striking  as  this  feature  of  which  I  now 
speak.  It  is  a  larger  and  fuller  illustration  of  what 
nature  everywhere  shows.  For  not  only  does  nat- 
ural religion,  considered  fairly,  make  antecedently 
probable  the  fact  of  a  revelation  ;  not  only  does  all 
that  it  reveals  of  the  existence  and  nature  of  a  Su- 
preme Being,  and  of  man's  spiritual  aptitudes  and 
wants,  prepare  us  to  anticipate  a  time  when  man 
and  his  Maker  would  be  brought  into  some  closer 
contact  and  communion,  but  all  that  we  learn  of  the 
processes  of  nature,  of  its  progressive  evolution,  and 
of  the  presence  of  an  all-pervading  force  shaping  its 
phenomena  still  further  prepares  us  for  a  revelation 
which  is  not  a  mere  system  of  external  laws  and  or- 
dinances, but  a  spiritual  force  dwelling  in  man,  and 
operating  directly  upon  the  human  will. 

The  last  and  highest  conclusion  to  which  the  re- 
searches of  physical  science  have  brought  us  is  that 
there-is  a  power  behind  nature  making  itself  mani- 
fest through  all  natural  phenomena.  The  highest, 
apd  at  the  same  time  the  simplest,  aspect  in  which 
Christianity  is  revealed  to  us  is  that  of  a  new  spirit- 
ual  power  imparted  to   human  society.     That   stu- 


382  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

pendous  fact  which  we  term  the  incarnation  was 
simply  this.  It  was  the  dwelling  in  human  nature 
of  a  divine  life  and  energy,  the  lifting  of  man  to 
a  higher  level  of  spiritual  activity.  When  Jesus 
chose  for  his  favorite  designation  of  himself  the 
title  "  Son  of  Man,"  he  hinted  this  great  analogy 
between  the  natural  and  the  spiritual  spheres.  As 
Son  of  Man  he  expressed  and  illustrated  the  crown- 
ing result  of  a  human  development,  for  in  him  hu- 
manity reached  its  highest  level.  Even  when  as- 
serting his  most  intimate  relations  with  the  Father, 
he  still  spoke  of  himself  as  Son  of  Man.  And,  as 
Son  of  Man,  he  expressed  the  further  truth  that 
what  he  claimed  for  himself  he  claimed  for  his  fol- 
lowers. They  were  his  brethren.  They,  too,  had 
power  given  them  to  become  sons  of  God  !  The 
incarnation  meant  all  this. 

We  are  too  much  accustomed  to  look  at  the 
manifestation  of  God  in  Christ  as  something  excep- 
tional and  apart ;  as  something  having  no  precedent, 
or  analogy,  or  hint  in  any  other  modes  of  the  divine 
working.  Hence,  as  too  often  presented,  the  doc- 
trine of  the  incarnation  perplexes  human  reason. 
But  there  is  no  justification  whatever  for  such  a  view. 
Not  only  is  the  incarnation  in  harmony  with  the 
method  of  nature,  but  it  is  uniformly  described  in 
Scripture  as  something  wholly  within  the  natural 
course  and  tendency  of  things.  It  was  heralded  by 
a  long  historical  preparation ;  it  is  represented  as  the 
crowning  result  of  a  connected  series  of  social  and 
political  changes ;  it  came  in  the  fullness  of  times. 
Everything  about  it  shows  that  it  was  part  of  a  pur- 
pose which  had  long  been  ripening,  —  realization,  in 
fact,  of  a  plan  formed  from  the  foundation  of  the 


THE  INFERENCES  FROM   THEISM.  383 

world.  All  this,  while  it  does  not  in  the  least  de- 
tract from  the  divine  origin  or  authority  of  the  Son 
of  Man,  yet  sets  him  in  the  line  of  other  historical 
phenomena,  and  reveals  him,  in  his  highest  and 
truest  aspect,  as  part  and  parcel  of  the  whole  sys- 
tem of  things. 

Hence  it  seems  to  me  that  the  mode  of  conceiv- 
ing the  operations  of  nature  which  is  most  widely 
accepted  to-day,  which  goes  under  the  general  des- 
ignation of  evolution,  instead  of  rendering  the  great 
cardinal  truths  of  the  gospel  less  credible,  only  ren- 
ders them  more  credible.  Such  a  revelation  of  God 
as  is  given  us  in  Jesus  Christ  is  precisely  the  kind 
of  revelation  which  the  methods  of  divine  operation, 
revealed  in  nature,  would  lead  us  to  expect.  It  is  a 
revelation  throughout  natural,  simple,  prepared  for, 
coming  as  the  result  of  a  process,  and  illustrating  in 
its  coming  all  the  antecedent  steps  and  features  of 
that  process.  The  Son  of  Man  did  not  separate 
himself  from  what  had  gone  before,  but  ever  claimed 
that  he  was  only  the  complete  fulfillment  of  what  the 
law  and  the  prophets  had  imperfectly  taught.  Most 
of  all,  the  excellence  of  the  gospel  consisted  in  the 
fact  that  it  was  an  inner  dispensation  ;  not  an  out- 
ward kingdom,  not  a  system  of  external  laws  and 
ordinances,  but  a  spiritual  principle  working  in  the 
soul,  like  the  leaven  which  a  woman  took  and  hid 
in  three  measures  of  meal  till  the  whole  was  leav- 
ened. 

But  we  may  trace  this  close  analogy  between  nat- 
ural and  spiritual  methods,  not  only  in  the  great  cen- 
tral fact  of  revelation,  the  manifestation  of  the  eter- 
nal Word.  What  is  so  clearly  illustrated  at  the 
beginning  of  the  new  dispensation  is  not  less  clearly 


384  THE    THE  IS  TIC  ARGUMENT. 

shown  in  its  whole  subsequent  history.  Not  simply 
in  the  career  of  Christ  himself,  but  in  all  that  he 
teaches  respecting  the  spiritual  kingdom  which  he 
came  to  establish,  we  have  the  great  truth  set  forth 
that  the  natural  and  the  spiritual  are  not  antagonis- 
tic, but  that  they  proceed  according  to  the  same 
method  and  illustrate  similar  laws.  As  we  rise  from 
the  realm  of  nature  to  the  realm  of  spirit,  we  do  not 
enter  a  strange  and  unfamiliar  region.  The  same 
divine  power  is  manifest  in  both,  and  is  manifest  in 
analogous  ways  of  working.  In  his  last  sayings  to 
his  disciples,  the  Son  of  Man  most  urgently  insisted 
on  this  truth.  When  he  likened  himself  to  a  vine 
of  which,  He  declared,  they  were  the  branches,  he 
hinted  to  them  the  nature  of  that  profound  law  by 
which  the  kingdom  of  nature  and  the  kingdom  of 
spirit  are  bound  together. 

When  we  look  at  external  nature  we  are  every- 
where struck  with  the  presence  of  two  great  princi- 
ples, to  which  all  the  phenomena  of  the  external 
world  conform.  These  two,  as  I  have  already  had 
occasion  repeatedly  to  remark,  are  the  law  of  unity 
and  the  law  of  progress.  There  is,  through  all  the 
material  universe,  an  organic  connection,  by  virtue 
of  which  nothing  stands  apart  and  alone,  but  all 
things  are  members  one  of  another ;  and  precisely 
as  we  rise  in  the  scale  of  being  this  organic  unity 
and  completeness  are  more  apparent.  It  is  by  virtue 
of  this  organic  relation  that  all  the  forces  of  nature 
are  resolved,  at  last,  into  one  force.  And  not  less 
striking  is  the  other  law,  everywhere  manifest,  by 
which  the  phenomena  of  nature  follow  an  orderly 
succession,  and  constantly  rise  from  a  less  perfect 
to  a  more  perfect   state.     The  physical  history  of 


THE  INFERENCES  FROM  THEISM.  385 

creation,  so  far  as  the  curious  eye  of  science  has 
traced  it  back,  is  an  illustration  of  this  principle. 
Each  stage  of  inorganic  or  organic  being  has  led  to 
another  and  better,  and  evolution  from  a  lower  to  a 
higher  has  been  the  universal  law. 

Who  can  fail  to  note  the  fact  that,  in  all  that  the 
Son  of  Man  taught  respecting  the  future  growth  and 
influence  of  that  gospel  which  he  so  aptly  likened  to 
a  grain  of  mustard-seed,  we  have  these  two  princi- 
ples continually  set  forth.  He  made  organic  unity 
the  fundamental  and  essential  condition  of  the  new 
dispensation.  This  unity  was  set  forth  under  the 
most  expressive  figures.  Not  only  was  he  the  true 
vine,  but  except  his  followers  should  abide  in  him 
they  could  bear  no  fruit.  Christian  life  was  not 
something  sporadic  and  individual,  having  its  source 
in  the  personal  conviction  of  each  disciple ;  it  im- 
plied a  real  connection  with  Christ  as  the  head.  A 
spiritual  power  was  promised  to  dwell  in  them 
which  proceeded  from  one  source,  and  should  make 
itself  felt  in  all  as  one  and  the  same  power.  In 
other  words,  we  have  here  repeated  the  great  princi- 
ple which  physical  nature  everywhere  presents  ;  and 
just  as  back  of  all  the  phenomena  of  nature  we  have 
one  pervading  force,  so  behind  all  the  varieties  of 
Christian  life  and  of  Christian  character  we  have 
one  spiritual  power.  The  truth  is  no  more  myste- 
rious in  the  one  case  than  in  the  other. 

Furthermore,  as  nature  shows  everywhere  a  con- 
stant progress  from  the  lower  to  the  higher,  so  the 
Son  of  Man  taught  that  his  kingdom  would  be  gov- 
erned by  the  same  law.  In  the  very  nature  of  the 
new  dispensation  this  was  involved ;  for  this  new  dis- 
pensation was  always  described  as  a  new  life,  and 
25 


386  THE    THEISTIC   ARGUMENT. 

the  unfailing  characteristic  of  life  is  progress  and 
growth.  When  growth  stops,  decay  and  death  be- 
gin. The  gospel  of  Jesus  was  a  proclamation  of 
life  ;  in  him  was  life,  and  the  aim  of  his  coming  was 
that  men  might  have  it  more  abundantly.  And  he 
taught,  unmistakably,  that  this  life  would  be  pro- 
gressive, not  only  in  the  individual,  but  in  the  larger 
scope  and  result  of  history.  All  the  analogies  and 
figures  under  which  the  Son  of  Man  describes  the 
future  history  of  his  church  conform  to  the  great 
law  written  on  every  page  of  the  volume  of  nature. 
This  new  life  should  pervade  human  society  as 
leaven  leavens  the  loaf ;  it  should  spread  among  the 
nations  as  a  seed  grows  to  be  a  tree.  That  pressing 
toward  the  mark  of  an  unrealized  perfection,  which 
was  the  characteristic  of  a  genuine  disciple,  would 
be,  not  less  the  characteristic  of  the  whole  body  of 
Christ. 

These  truths  received  their  complete  expression 
in  the  Christian  doctrine  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  In 
this  doctrine  which  in  its  scope  and  bearings  is  far 
too  much  neglected,  we  have  set  forth  the  permanent 
relation  of  divine  truth,  both  to  the  individual  soul 
and  to  human  society.  It  reveals  the  method  by 
which  the  divine  Spirit  makes  itself  effectual  in  the 
life  of  man.  According  to  the  latest  teachings  of  the 
Son  of  Man,  his  own  personal  mission  was  simply 
meant  as  preparatory  to  another,  —  a  higher  and  a 
permanent  dispensation.  His  own  departure  would 
be  the  signal  for  the  outpouring  of  a  new  spiritual  life 
which  would  abide  with  his  followers  as  their  organ- 
izing, directing,  and  controlling  principle.  It  would 
be  a  force  behind  them,  a  force  working "  through 
them,  a  force  making  itself  manifest  in  their  lives. 


THE  INFERENCES  FROM  THEISM.  387 

This  indwelling  life  and  power  would  at  once  sup- 
ply the  pervading  principle  of  unity,  by  which, 
though  many,  they  should  always  remain  one,  and 
the  principle  of  progress,  by  which  they  should  be 
brought  to  the  mark  of  their  high  calling. 

In  the  doctrine  of  the  Holy  Spirit  we  have,  there- 
fore, the  most  complete  revelation  of  the  harmony 
of  the  natural  and  the  spiritual  world.  Here  the 
methods  of  physical  nature  and  the  methods  by 
which  the  divine  Spirit  directly  teaches  and  illumi- 
nates human  souls  are  made  to  illustrate  and  con- 
firm each  other.  They  are  seen  to  be,  not  antago- 
nistic, but  harmonious  ;  and  we  recognize  the  same 
power  working  in  all  things  and  through  all  things, 
and  bringing  all  things  to  pass,  whether  we  look  at 
the  works  of  nature  or  look  at  the  spiritual  life  of 
man.  These  two  revelations  lend  to  each  other 
a  convincing  and  overwhelming  support.  As  we 
accept  in  its  fullness  the  Christian  doctrine  of  the 
Spirit,  we  shall  learn  to  look  on  all  nature,  not  as  a 
mass  of  inert  matter,  but  as  everywhere  pervaded  by 
a  living  presence ;  and  so  too,  just  as  much,  if  we 
accept  the  modern  conclusions  of  science  respecting 
the  force  behind  all  phenomena,  to  which  organiza- 
tion and  life  are  due,  we  shall  be  disposed  to  accept 
the  teaching  of  revelation  respecting  the  work  of  the 
Spirit. 

My  limits  allow  me  to  glance  only  in  the  most 
superficial  way  at  a  few  aspects  of  a  great  and  sol- 
emn theme.  Of  course  in  the  general  idea  at  the 
bottom  of  my  discussion  there  is  nothing  new.  The 
analogy  between  the  truths  of  natural  and  of  revealed 
religion  is  an  old  and  familiar  theme.  We  have  all 
learned  it  from  one  of  the  wisest  masters  of  English 


388  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT. 

theology.  "  Men,"  says  Bishop  Butler,  "  are  impa- 
tient and  for  precipitating  things  ;  but  the  author  of 
nature  appears  deliberate  throughout  his  operations, 
accomplishing  his  natural  ends  by  slow  successive 
steps.  And  there  is  a  plan  of  things  beforehand 
laid  out,  which,  from  the  nature  of  it,  requires  vari- 
ous systems  of  means,  as  well  as  length  of  time,  in 
order  to  the  carrying  on  its  several  parts  into  execu- 
tion. Thus,  in  the  daily  course  of  natural  provi- 
dence, God  operates  in  the  same  manner  as  in  the 
dispensation  of  Christianity  :  making  one  thing  sub- 
servient to  another  ;  this  to  something  further  ;  and 
so  on  through  a  progressive  series  of  means,  which 
extend,  both  backward  and  forward,  beyond  our  ut- 
most view.  Of  this  everything  in  nature  is  as  much 
an  instance  as  any  part  of  the  Christian  dispensa- 
tion." i 

But  the  special  point  on  which  I  insist  is  this : 
I  that  this  reasoning  of  Butler,  instead  of  being  weak- 
ened, has  been  greatly  extended  and  enlarged  by 
the  results  of  modern  science.  From  the  obvious 
course  of  natural  phenomena  he  reasoned  to  the 
more  obvious  teachings  of  revelation.  What  I  claim 
is,  that  the  modified  views  of  nature  to  which  modern 
science  has  accustomed  us,  views  which  were  not 
accepted  in  Butler's  time,  have  brought  out,  in  a  still 
more  striking  manner,  the  analogy  between  the 
methods  of  nature  and  the  most  distinctive  and  spir- 
itual teachings  of  revelation.  Modern  science  rests 
throughout  on  realistic  assumptions.  It  tends  to 
recognize  in  all  nature  a  pervading  unity.  Behind 
phenomena  it  discovers  what  no  phenomena  directly 
reveal.      It  regards  the  universe  as  a  process  for 

1  [Analogy,  P.  II.,  ch.  iv.] 


THE  INFERENCES  FROM  THEISM.  389 

which  matter  cannot  account ;  and  in  all  this  I  am 
glad  to  welcome  a  habit  of  mind,  a  mode  of  con- 
ceiving truth,  which,  whatever  its  present  attitude, 
must  ultimately  tend  to  harmonize  with  the  highest 
teachings  of  revelation. 

And  now,  at  the  risk  of  what  may  seem  to  you  a 
wearisome  repetition,  let  me  sum  up  in  few  words 
the  results  of  this  whole  discussion.  I  have  sought 
to  show  not  only  that  the  rational  grounds  on 
which  we  believe  in  the  existence  of  God  have  not 
been  affected  by  any  of  the  recent  conclusions  of 
science,  but  that  these  conclusions  lead  us  to  a 
point  where  this  belief  is  forced  upon  us  with  irre- 
sistible power ;  that  the  new  conceptions  of  nature, 
with  which  science  makes  us  familiar,  render  the 
presence  and  constant  operation  of  God  a  most  rea- 
sonable postulate  ;  and  that  the  modes  of  operation 
on  which  science  insists,  instead  of  making  the 
mind  averse  to  revelation,  in  reality  harmonize 
with  the  most  distinctive  teachings  of  our  holy  re- 
ligion. Whatever  the  personal  attitude  of  some 
men  of  science,  the  bent  and  tendency  of  scientific 
thought  is  in  a  wholesome  direction,  and  can  only 
result  in  the  fuller  confirmation  of  that  truth  of 
which  the  church  is  the  pillar  and  ground. 

The  term  "  evolution  "  need  not  disturb  us  in  the 
least.  In  laying  so  much  stress  on  this  truth  mod- 
ern science  simply  repeats  what  was  taught  by 
Thomas  Aquinas  centuries  ago,  that  one  increasing 
purpose  runs  through  the  successive  stages  of  cre- 
ation up  to  man.  The  more  carefully  we  study  the 
process  of  creation,  the  more  profoundly  must  we 
be  convinced   that  this  mighty  process  had  its  ori- 


390  THE    THEISTIC  ARGUMENT 

gin  in  mind  ;  and  the  more  devoutly  shall  we  ac- 
cept the  teaching  of  Holy  Writ,  "  In  the  beginning 
was  the  Word  : "  "  all  things  were  made  by  Him, 
and  without  Him  was  not  anything  made  that  was 
made." 


INDEX  OF  NAMES 


Anselm,  80,  87,  97. 

Aquinas,  389. 

Argyle,  Duke  of,   111,    149,   150, 

160,  179. 
Arnold,  Matthew,  320. 
Austin,  J.,  106. 


Bacon,  Lord,  138. 
Berkeley,  42,  45. 
Bowen,  Prof.  F.,  14. 
Buckle,  61,  106,  282 
Butler,  Joseph,  388. 
Byron,  71. 


285. 


Carpenter,  Dr.,  221. 
Channing,  W.  E.,  44. 
Clark,  Dr.  S.,  83. 
Comte,  50,  60,  61,  219,  257,  285, 
286,  336  seq. 

Darwin,  158,  162,    163,   166,  180, 

181,  188,  189,  195,  199. 
Democritus,  121,  204. 
Descartes,  6,  97,  80,  81,  87,  139, 

I75»  350- 

Epicurus,  121. 

Feuerbach,  332. 

Fiske,  J.,  17,  195,  240. 

Flint,  Prof.  R.,  74,  77,  106,  148, 

183,  203,  347. 
Fraser,  Prof.  A.,  44. 
Froude,  J.  A.,  280. 

Goethe,  10. 
Gray,  A.,  167. 
Guizot,  285. 

Hamilton,   Sir  W.,  97,  244,  310, 
312. 


Harrison,  F.,  63. 
Hartmann,  214  seq.,  356  seq. 
Hegel,  206,  214. 
Heine,  354. 
Helmholtz,  146. 
Heraclitus,  204. 
Herbert,  T.  M.,  313,  349. 
Hooker,  106. 
Homer,  354. 

Hume,  7,  8,  10,  12,  57,  84. 
Huxley,  6,  9,  61,   181,   182,  220 
232,  340  seq.,  346,  349. 

Janet,  106,  137,  142, 143,  156,  159, 
160,  185. 

Kant,  45,  46,  48,  57,  76,  85,  220, 

237,  3°5- 
Kepler,  103,  108,  109. 

Lamarck,  187. 

La  Place,  66,  191. 

Leibnitz,  220,  236. 

Lewes,  G.  H„  38,  55,  58,  131,  139. 

Locke,  6,  7,  45,  93,  305,  307. 

Lucretius,  130,  156,  166. 

Macaulay,  I,  27,  287  seq. 

Mackintosh,  Sir  J.,  8,  286. 

Maine,  Sir  H.,  283. 

Mallock,  21. 

Mansel,  H.  L.,  319. 

Marcus  Aurelius,  354. 

Menander,  354. 

Mill,  J.  S.,  14,  17,  50,  57,  60,  77, 

84,88,  90,  92,  93,  118,  137,  142, 

163,  220. 
Moliere,  81. 
Morell,  J.  D.,  9. 
Mozley,  85,  140. 
Miiller,  John,  143. 


392 


INDEX  OF  NAMES. 


Newman,  J.  H.,  64,  65,  245. 
108,   109, 


Newton,  37 
177. 


103, 


[69, 


Paley,  I,  209. 

"  Physicus,"  19,  116,  125,  127. 

Porter,  N.,  136. 

Powell,  Baden,  115,  122. 

Schelling,  206,  231. 

Schleiermacher,  206. 

Schopenhauer,  214,  355. 

Shakespeare,  25,  117,  191. 

Shelley,  71. 

Smith,  Goldwin,  276,  280. 

Socrates,  1. 

Spencer,  H.,  51  seq.,  60,  117,  124, 


128,  169,  172,  176,  191,  192  seq., 
220,  239,  252,  293  seq.,  311,  319, 

323  ^->  350- 
Spinoza,  204,  319. 
Symonds,  71. 

Trelawny,  70. 
Tyndall,  94,  220. 

Ulpian,  106. 

Vico,  285. 
Voltaire,  155. 
Von  Holbach,  333. 

Wordsworth,  207. 
Wright,  Chauncey,  33. 


Theological  Seminary-Sp 


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